Actually I would say that by the time a third wave hits, the American fighters are going to be swarming like angry bees. And they would far outnumber the A6M escort.
What if japan hit the fuel stores at pearl harbour?
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Theres easily another 25 tanks there.
Given that I counted 17 in the upper tank farm we are definitely over 40 tanks. Probably 45 or more.
Given that I identified above a need for 4 bombs per tank you are in a situation where you need 50 hits to take out a quarter of the tank farm. 50 hits would be an achievement given that the Japanese are down to 250ish aircraft after the first two waves which includes a fighter escort.
"7 December 1941, The Air Force Story" by Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn,1991, Appendix B, lists (Army) aircraft status before and after the attack ,there would have been 43 serviceable P-40 and P-36 (plus another four P-26) fighters available to meet a third wave attack. Navy and Marine aircraft available could have been the fourteen F4F fighters of the Enterprise's air wing and possibly a few (if any) surviving miscellaneous F2A or F4F fighters that may have been at Ford Island or Kanoehe.
For the Japanese, according to Wiki:
The 1st Wave consisted of 49 B5N Kates carrying the modified 16" AP bombs, 40 B5Ns with torpedoes, 51 D3A Val dive bombers with 550 pound GP bombs, and 43 A6M Zeroes. Of these, 3 A6Ms were lost along with 1 D3a and 5 B5Ns.
The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns carrying a mix of 550 and 132 pound GP bombs, 78 D3As with 550# GP bombs and 35 A6Ms. Of these, 6 A6Ms and 14 D3As were lost.
As for a potential third wave, there are several considerations restricting the number of fighters that could accompany the bombers making it difficult to even send as many as were in the first two waves. Given losses, damage and mechanical issues, fewer fighters would remain serviceable, and with at least two USN carriers lurking about, a robust CAP would be necessary to protect the IJN fleet. Third wave size is also restricted to no larger than the two previous waves due to the numbers of planes that could be spotted and launched at one time. Therefore, the number of defending US fighters would exceed what the IJN could send, maybe by a significant margin.
For the Japanese, according to Wiki:
The 1st Wave consisted of 49 B5N Kates carrying the modified 16" AP bombs, 40 B5Ns with torpedoes, 51 D3A Val dive bombers with 550 pound GP bombs, and 43 A6M Zeroes. Of these, 3 A6Ms were lost along with 1 D3a and 5 B5Ns.
The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns carrying a mix of 550 and 132 pound GP bombs, 78 D3As with 550# GP bombs and 35 A6Ms. Of these, 6 A6Ms and 14 D3As were lost.
As for a potential third wave, there are several considerations restricting the number of fighters that could accompany the bombers making it difficult to even send as many as were in the first two waves. Given losses, damage and mechanical issues, fewer fighters would remain serviceable, and with at least two USN carriers lurking about, a robust CAP would be necessary to protect the IJN fleet. Third wave size is also restricted to no larger than the two previous waves due to the numbers of planes that could be spotted and launched at one time. Therefore, the number of defending US fighters would exceed what the IJN could send, maybe by a significant margin.
Attachments
I doubt it.
Dont get me wrong, destroying critical infrastructure with precision strikes is a receipe for success unless the opponent is:
A. the Viet Cong with very little critical infrastructure- or
B. the United States that mixes tons of critical infrastructure with an excess capacity that staggers the imagination.
The tank farms have been hit hard. The IJ's ubber trained, but numerically fragile carrier task force is short a few dozen more essentially irreplaceable air crew. Operationally, the US flies into a sense of urgency:
- The tank farms are replaced by tanker ships positioned around the harbor. Getting some forms of fuel ashore to the users is cumbersome- but US ingenuity mixed with, well, excess capacity paves paths that are not available to other nations.
- Dozens of bull dozers, rollers, cranes, tracked shovels, graders and dump trucks, are transported in from the west coast to prep the sites for new construction. The fact that a Honda bull dozer won a pre war "doze off" contest and that the IJA and IJN have several score of the winning dozers scattered across occupied Asia does not really matter. US dumps more mechanized construction resources at the tank farms than the Japanese have in all of occupied Asia.
- Replacement tanks are prepped. Can tanks be pre fabricated in Long Beach for easier assembly in Hawaii? What about pre fabricating pipe systems, pumps etc. For rapid assembly? How many skilled civilian engineers, welders, piper fitters, electricians, machinists will need to be pulled from state side oil fields to supplement arriving military construction battalions? Can the most urgent workers be flown to Hawaii via Pan Am flying boats sans sexy stewardesses? Or, maybe take them to?
- Wow, Toyoda has an acclaimed light truck design- and builds several hundred a year? Our Hawaii tank farm and port effort alone is going to be supported by several hundred "deuce and a halfs". And yes, we have mechanics and drivers for all of them.
In short, the destroyed tank farms are a total "yawn" in the strategic sense. US victory is delayed by several days.
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The Japanese were prepared to tow, and if necessary scuttle DDs if fuel got too low. The oilers had been sent back to the Home Islands. Japanese fuel stores were located at the Home Islands, Korea, Formosa, an Truk.
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marathag
Banned
Haven't brought it up yet, but the US was busily digging the underground Red Hill storage tank facilities at Pearl
Good point for medium and longer term, but in the short term tankers are the practical answer.
Tanks are more or less prefabricated already as they are too big to assemble and then transport, so panels, fastenings, paint etc are brought in and built on the (prepared) spot.
But your points about being able to bring in the parts and the people and put them up relatively quickly is a good one. There would be some earthworks and most likely some concreting needed to start, so probably six to eight weeks minimum to prepare and to alliw four weeks for any concrete to develop strength. Maybe add another month because there's a lot of clearing up to do first.
If you need cranes and scaffolding then these can be brought in on the first load.
The US economy is big enough to do anything (though not necessarily everything) it thinks is really important, so if replacement tabks at Hawaii count then money and meabs will be found. There will still be some delays through design, getting orders in place, production lines up and running, shipping and cobstruction, but it's looking like a few months rather than years. Then trying to get enough fuel there to fill these and the tunnels and do the day to day operations. But all still very possible.
rascal1225
Banned
Actually you're still short by quite a few large storage tanks ... NOT including the numerous 25,000 gallon military tanks scattered around Oahu ... many buried for safety
Visible on https://www.navsource.org/Naval/helpers/ph104.jpg though its not always easy ...
Ford Island - 9 avgas tanks
Upper Tank Farm - 17 tanks east of the PH submarine base
Middle Tank Farm - 12 storage tanks south of Merry Loch
Lower Tank Farm - 27 storage tanks south of Hospital Point
HEPCO Power Plant #2 single (1) new tank on the NE shore of East Loch, PH - just below Pearl City
NOT visible on that photo ...
Honolulu Harbor Civilian Tank Farm - 16 storage tanks of various sizes including fuel oils, diesel, mogas, industrial solvents etc all flammable to various degrees BUT all confined in a single containment berm, NOT in separate berms so much easier to ignite
HEPCO Power Plant #1 twin (2) tanks @SE edge of Honolulu Harbor
EDIT: Its not a great view but this photo shows this powerhouse in the distance ... the building with the tall twin smokestacks
grand total = 84 big storage tanks as best I can tell
Also NOT including the two (2) USN underway replenishment capable fleet oilers , USS Ramapo and USS Neosho present within Pearl Harbor, out of a total of ONLY 4 such vital vessels which the USN had in the Pacific on Dec. 7'41. IIRC, a 3rd was hauling fuels in Philippine waters and the 4th was delivering in Alaskan waters ...
Perhaps re-targeting Nagumo's 2nd wave might have removed any need for a 3rd wave attack on Pearl Harbor ?
I would draw your attention to the fact that the Japanese Aichi D3A1 "Val" divebomber came factory equipped to carry 1 x 250kg centerline bomb and 2x 30kg bombs, one under each wing. The later D3A2 could carry 2x60kg bombs under it's wings but not the D3A1 model. The Japanese had effective 30kg incendiary bombs before Dec.7'41 ... so EACH D3A1 Val could have easily hauled a big 250kg "fuel tank cracker" bomb to Pearl Harbor's various tank farms, along with 2 smaller zip lighters ...
Yes, I know that historically Nagumo's Kido Butai pilots did NOT carry incendiary bombs to Pearl Harbor but my point is, they easily COULD have, had Nagumo intended to bomb fuel storage tanks ...
As for the discrepancy between the 78 Val divebombers which were historically within Nagumo's second wave air attack (it was supposed to be 81 but 3 had mechanical "issues" and had to abort) and 84 big American storage tank targets, please recall that the Honolulu Harbor Civilian Tank farm had 16 storage tanks surrounded by a single berm, so ... instead of 16 Vals being assigned to bomb it, just 4 could probably have ignited all of it ... leaving 2x3 =6 Vals to bomb each (for a total of 12) of the stationary USS Neosho and USS Ramapo.
A modern day air photo of that same but now enlarged Honolulu Harbor tankfarm can be viewed with Google Earth Pro (a free download)
As Alan Zimm points out, the historical 2nd wave Vals didn't actually accomplish much of note since their 250kg bombs were much too weak to do much serious damage to USN capital ships ... and attacking fuel storage tankfarms would have kept those Vals much further away from heavy USN AAA fire, thus reducing IJN warplane losses, sure to keep Nagumo happier ...
The Second-Wave Attack on Battleship Row
While the first strike on Pearl Harbor wreaked havoc and destruction, the follow-up strike was a thorough bust. What happened?
20/20 hindsight is indeed a wonderful thing ...
Your thoughts, gentlemen ?
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A good way to imagine the Bunker C fuel tanks is to imagine a large steel tank outer shell that has a build up of the Bunker C clinging to the inside of the tank where it would not have been exposed to the steam or hot water coils that are used to raise the temp in it to make it flow into the pipe lines. Depending on how long it is since it was filled to when it was heated up you could get up to 2 or three feet of an asphalt like liner to the steel of the tank. One of the problems is that you cannot heat up the whole of the tank and have that build up on the inside of the tank. This in its own way makes up a separate layer to the shell of the tanker that does have some give to it and will absorb some of the energy of the bomb strike on the tank. Even if you make a hole in the tank and set fire to it it would be easily put out by putting water on the inside of the tank. You would have to crack the side of it to even have a chance to cause a flow out of it.
A dive bomber is not what you want to hit it with. You want a skip bomb or something to hit it from the side to open it up.
A dive bomber is not what you want to hit it with. You want a skip bomb or something to hit it from the side to open it up.
SMS Emden bombarded the oil tanks at Madras in 1914 and set 5 of 6 tanks on fire.
This was with 105mm shells, I imagine HE, since AP would not be needed to penetrate the tanks.
Firing from a range of 3000 yards at a stationary target, lit by search lights, accuracy would not have been a problem. I don't know how many rounds Emden expended.
The 10.5 cm/L40 guns have a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute, and Emden's broadside was 5 guns. Emden theoretically could have shot 750 rounds in 10 minutes, to achieve this effect, but I'm sure she didn't.
NavWeapons does not give a bursting charge for the 10.5cm/L40 HE, but the 10.5 cm L/45 SK C/32 had a 3.1 pound bursting charge for a similar shell weight.
I don't know if this is at all useful as a comparison, or if it is a total red herring.
en.wikipedia.org
https://themadeinmadras.wordpress.com/2017/11/11/emden-attack-1914/
This blog say Emden fired 125 rounds, and includes a picture of the holes in the oil tanks.
This was with 105mm shells, I imagine HE, since AP would not be needed to penetrate the tanks.
Firing from a range of 3000 yards at a stationary target, lit by search lights, accuracy would not have been a problem. I don't know how many rounds Emden expended.
The 10.5 cm/L40 guns have a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute, and Emden's broadside was 5 guns. Emden theoretically could have shot 750 rounds in 10 minutes, to achieve this effect, but I'm sure she didn't.
NavWeapons does not give a bursting charge for the 10.5cm/L40 HE, but the 10.5 cm L/45 SK C/32 had a 3.1 pound bursting charge for a similar shell weight.
I don't know if this is at all useful as a comparison, or if it is a total red herring.
Bombardment of Madras - Wikipedia
This blog say Emden fired 125 rounds, and includes a picture of the holes in the oil tanks.
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rascal1225
Banned
I question some of your assumptions ....
Since Pearl was THE major USN Pacific base, I cannot imagine Kimmel allowing his fuel supply to "harden up" inside of Oahu's numerous above ground storage tanks ... THAT would be a career ending move for him if a conflict suddenly broke out ... I suspect at least a minimal amount of tank heating to keep his ONLY naval fuel supply easily pumpable ... how else to refuel his USN warships ?
Every photo that I have seen of the tropical Oahu fuel storage tanks that I have seen (save for 3 experimental cammoflage paint jobs on tanks near to the PH submarine base) clearly shows those tanks painted WHITE (or a very light grey) which to me seems to be a measure designed to reduce overheating by that TROPICAL sun ...
Oahu's military fuel tanks were constructed from overlapping 1/2" steel plates, riveted together ... easily busted open by a 250kg bomb ... even heat from adjacent already burning fuel tanks would eventually cause a tank to "boil over" and release explosive vapour up thru it's roof vent ... exactly the method of flame spread at the British Penbroke Docks oil complex fire where one bombed and ignited fuel oil tank eventually caused the total loss, over some 18 days, of 10 other similarly sized fuel oil storage tanks.
Sure, fuel oil stored below the cold Pacific winter waterline in USN double hulls would be more than likely to thicken up unless steam heated but I'm not nearly so sure that Oahu's tropical sunshine couldn't keep Kimmel's above ground fuel storage tank oils nice and warm and "runny" ...
Hell, even Alan Zimm admits, deep in a footnote, that a Japanese bomb could ignite an Oahu fuel storage tank and as we ALL KNOW, he is an EXPERT on the topic ... LoL !
Something everyone here appears to be missing, by mid afternoon on the 7th, and definitely by the morning of the 8th, American commanders would have realized the Opana radar station will have both incoming and outbound plots of the Japanese strikes, to give to the American carriers, and air defenses Out to about 100 miles North of Oahu.
If the Japanese return there will be no question as to the location of Kido Buti. What planning will be given to the exhausted pilots, as well as weapons load out? Can Kido Buti survive with another 8 to 12 hours of operational steaming, to carry out a 3rd strike, added on to it's high speed withdrawl?
If the Japanese return there will be no question as to the location of Kido Buti. What planning will be given to the exhausted pilots, as well as weapons load out? Can Kido Buti survive with another 8 to 12 hours of operational steaming, to carry out a 3rd strike, added on to it's high speed withdrawl?
rascal1225
Banned
A closer historical example can be seen in the 1942 Japanese bombing of fuel oil storage tanks at Dutch Harbor, Alaska as detailed by:
http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Pacific/NA50/Gallery_GeneralAttack.html and
Researcher @ Large - Gallery - The Attack on Dutch Harbor, Alaska
www.researcheratlarge.com
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Yes, those 5 tanks did burn up after getting hit by a IJN carrier strike, similar in composition to the PH raid. However, I note that the Dutch Harbour fuel tanks were closely spaced and had no berms separating them, like the PH tank farms did.
In addition, every tank at Pearl Harbor had a floating lid inside the tank that rode on top of the bunker oil contained therein. This prevented the accumulation of volatile gasses above the oil on tanks that were not 100% full. So setting the tanks of fire is a difficult job. The most likely outcome would be punching holes in them, which is where the earthen berms contain any spillage.
Going after the tanks would be a job for the dive bombers in my opinion, but the Japanese practice of using shotai of three aircraft (two wingmen following a lead) is going to waste ordinance and planes trying to do so.
My thoughts,
You cannot heat the entirety of the tank, nor would you have all the tanks completely heated all the time. They were not designed to be all ready all the time. There were some tanks that were designed to take the input from the other tank and to be the ready use tanks to be pumped to the fleet and others that were only used for storage and to be pumped as needed. There was an excess of Bunker C and other POL at Pearl because of the transit time from the West Coast and the need to keep a proper amount in stock for more than just the current fleet to be fueled with an excess stock for 30 or more days of continuous operations. Part of the storage of Bunker C safety wise is to not keep all the tanks heated and even in a tank just to keep the minimum heated.
rascal1225
Banned
Actually, the majority of the PH fuel storage tanks were built as cheaply as possible for the 1923/4 era by oil companies involved in the "Great Teapot Dome Scandal" so they had NO such expensive and hard to maintain floating inner roofs ... while most modern fuel storage tanks certainly do ... thought they still burn out on occasion too ... Zimm claims that they had floating roofs but his widely read PH Myths book also claims (assumes) that those PH fuel storage tanks had steel wall thicknesses of between 1.5" and 3" when a bit of www research would have provided him with the only 1/2" mild rolled steel plate truth ... as a result of his faulty assumptions wrt the PH fuel storage tanks, his computer modelling included storage tanks many times more difficult to puncture / ignite than would have been the actual case at Pearl Harbor.
Possibly but my understanding of Japanese divebombing tactics of the time was that the 2 "wingmen" were supposed to watch the fall of their shotaI leaders's bomb before adjusting their own aim ... with the PH fuel storage tanks clustered so closely together, I think it reasonable that those "wingmen" could aim at 2 adjacent tanks after their leader's bomb actually hit a storage tank ...
I suspect that the more difficult problem would have been the smoke screens produced by burning fuel storage tanks obscuring the aim of follow on IJN Val divebombers ... a problem solved easily enough by starting with bombing downwind fuel storage tanks ... with the huge smoke pyres generated by the IJN's first wave air attacks on the USN warships within PH providing hard to miss seeing wind direction indicators ...
in any case, the 18 day Pembroke Docks fuel oil fire certainly points out the ability of adjacent oil storage tank fires to radiantly heat up other fuel storage tanks close to them, to the point of those venting highly combustible fumes into an area full of active fires ...
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rascal1225
Banned
Why not ? The US tax payer was footing the fuel bill afterall ...and they were mostly 2,500 miles to the east of Oahu at the time ...
Why not ? What if an enemy suddenly attacked PH BY SURPRISE and bombed the heating tanks, leaving NOTHING but chilled tanks filled with fuel oil too "thick" to pump into USN warships ? "Sorry Mr. President but your ENTIRE Pacific Fleet was sunk inside of Pearl Harbor, imobilized and unable to fight back because I turned off the fuel heaters." Doesn't sound too good for one's naval career does it ?
There were some tanks that were designed to take the input from the other tank and to be the ready use tanks to be pumped to the fleet and others that were only used for storage and to be pumped as needed. There was an excess of Bunker C and other POL at Pearl because of the transit time from the West Coast and the need to keep a proper amount in stock for more than just the current fleet to be fueled with an excess stock for 30 or more days of continuous operations. Part of the storage of Bunker C safety wise is to not keep all the tanks heated and even in a tank just to keep the minimum heated.
And your sources for all of those "facts" would be ... ?