To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
- Start date
You’re 100% correct. The direct soviet threat is pretty much limited to Ukraine Belarus and possibly possibly the baltics (if the Germans are just completely unrelenting) and even then they aren’t likely to get unconditional support from the entirety of those territories. But the Soviet threat will become ideologically tied to the internal threat of socialism in Western Europe, at least in the minds of the capitalist elites. This will undoubtedly factor into the post-war alignment. The soviets could never in a million years “liberate” anywhere in the US, for example, that didn’t stop the red scare from dominating US consciousness, arguably even up to today with fears of china. It won’t be enough to erase grievances between Germany and the west, but it could definitely be enough to make them less relevant than they would be with a white Russia or surviving Tsardom. The fact that France is no longer in a position to meaningfully “check” Germany will also play into this. The elites of Britain and the US may see it as a choice between Germany or socialism, without a strong France to provide a “third way” in opposition to both. Italy is already in a de-facto civil war between socialists and capitalist monarchists, and while I don’t subscribe to the view that France is 100% fated for an extremist revolution, if there is one, I find a communist one to be more likely than a fascist one, personally. So the socialist threat will be at the forefront of every western governments mind in the post-war period.Not a bad way of putting it.
In this timeline, of course, the Soviets will not ... you know, have the ability to march on Warsaw. So the direct conventional threat to the West that they posed in OTL in 1920 won't be here in quite the same way, even if they somehow manage to pry most of Ukraine or any of the Caucusas into their control (which, I think is unlikely). A German-garrisoned Mitteleuropa stands in the way, even if some of its precincts are a little rowdier than Berlin would like.
But, elites in all of these countries will be living in dread fear of a threat from within. And if they can't find ways to make their economies deliver for most of their populaces, they are gonna find all sorts of occasions for seeing substance in those fears...
This is a great point, because there is very good reason to think that India will be even more of a problem for Britain in this postwar, because for the first time since 1783, it has fought a major power war that it didn't win. Yes, they can make an argument that they didn't exactly lose it, either... But it's still a weakening of British moral authority, at least as an empire maintainer, and that will absolutely be felt in India.
Thanks for the kind comment.
I view that as a possibility, but at what point in that process do the British decide they’d rather drop Japan than the US? Even if it means tolerating Germany. Japan is in no position to affect European affairs at all, while, even in alliance with Germany, the US is at this point, outside of the USSR, the only way Britain can give themselves a significant position within the German order. In this case, Britain would be a clear third wheel behind the US and Germany, but that seems preferable to their only real ally being half a world away.
If anything, them not being able to use military might make them scarier to the Elites.
Because now they can double down on seditious elements and such. Especially if they're smart about it.
Yeah. A soviet invasion of Europe is scary to the west. What’s even scarier is a homegrown pro-Soviet uprising. That’s the kind of thing that would make Churchill and the like piss the bed at night.
What's happening in Northern Italy will absolutely put the fear of God (er, Marx?) in every political leadership right now.
In OTL, the British only ditched the alliance under duress of sorts. It was the price the Americans demanded for the WNT. So, even though few in Whitehall wanted to lose the Japanese alliance, they ditched it anyway, because they prized a serious limitation of naval arms more than they did alliance with Japan, because Britain was nearly broke. (In the long run this backfired pretty badly on U.S. interests, but that was not so apparent, maybe, in 1921-22.)
Well, in this timeline, that calculation won't be there. Britain, whether it be with Bonar Law, Croft, Churchill, or even Adamson or MacDonald in Number 10, is not going to be prepared to drastically hack down the RN with a first rate navy operated by a European hegemon right across the North Sea. Due to their parlous finances, they really can't afford to build like the maniacs they were in 1895-1914, but no naval agreement with Berlin is going to make the paranoia in London go away. Most of the G3's and N3's are likely getting built here, along with a serious commitment to development of formal ASW capabilities. Unfortunately for Britain, this means the Americans are going to be building a lot of super dreadnoughts, too...
Anyway, what other levers could the U.S. use? Debt repayment is the one obvious one I can see. I'm not sure that's enough, but maybe it could be used to push modest modifications of the Alliance treaty at its next renewal?
It could also be that Bonar Law (or his successors) try hard to pursue some more formal strategic relationship with the U.S., to counterbalance Germany, especially if attempts at rapprochement are not bearing fruit. If so, that could be a *positive* incentive for abrogating the alliance. The thing is, the way our author paints the U.S.'s stance, it seems unlikely that the U.S. is going to greet any such overture with any enthusiasm. Odds are, you could get an even more isolationist America than what we got in our TL.
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... and here you seem to somewhat miss your claim of plausibility by IMHO too clicheesque aperception of german politicians as bullying idiots. Such a 'demand' by the german side is rather unfounded in OTL esp. late in the war (I talk about politicians not about Ludendorff lackeys).
It was already clear to the germans in 1916 that a ruler in Poland won't be a german noble. Berlin and Vianna rather quickly settled on Archduke Charles Stephen of Austria or his son Archduke Karl Albrecht of Austria. The german politicians knew very well that an insult as you propose would be out of question. A rebellious revolutionary and upheveal Austria-Hungary wasn't anything anybody wanted.
The term "germano-polish" - you might want to refer to in your proposal -refers more to the extent the new polish state should have. They - the protagonists for this germopolish solution - envisaged a polish state at least reunified with Galicia/Lodomeria if not even embracing the eastern parts of the polish kingdom of 1793 (Curland, Lithunia, western Ruthenia, Wolhynia) reaching from the Irben street of the Baltics to the borders of the Bukowina.
Vienna - well aware of the precariously balanced relation between all other parts of the austro-hungarian empire which would have been busted with such a big solution - aimed at a "Small Poland" solution aka aka Congreß-Poland of 1815. ... though they actually were aslo well aware of the frictions this would cause within both such polish parts of the empire (Congress-Poland and Galicia/Lodomeria).
This seems quite likely to me. A (rough and tenuous) Anglo-German detente to counter the soviets, with America pledging neutrality in Europe while making absolutely clear what they will and will not tolerate from Japan. How exactly this would work I’m not sure, as in the case of war, if east Asia is roughly the same as otl, it would make the US and USSR de facto allies in the region, which idk how the Americans would feel about that if Britain and Germany are fighting the USSR simultaneously in Europe and Central Asia. Japan really is what throws a wrench in any US-UK-Germany anti-Soviet pact. Without Britain dropping Japan outright due to the WNT, what do you think could be a possible compromise to keep the US on board? And would Japan accept the British telling them to limit themselves for the sake of the US? The whole situation post-WWI is very tricky in general. Of the five main players (US, UK, Germany, USSR, Japan) they all have very different interests, often overlapping. The UK and Germany may be able to swallow their differences in the face of the shared soviet threat, but the US and Japan seem harder to reconcile with each other without one of them outright refusing the compromise brokered by the British. And the USSR, without pulling in the US or Japan is largely completely isolated, though geography makes that isolation less of an existential threat than it would be for most. If the communists in China get going as OTL, they, the USSR, and the US would have a mutual interest in containing Japan, but ideology and the European situation severely complicate that potential relationship.
One interesting consequence I think you might see will be a ''red doublethink'' myth because of the current balance of power.
By that their will be no Russian intervention their will be much less data about the USSR strength, surely this lack of war should improve relations right? Unfortunately it makes it much easier for propaganda by Whites defeated to portray them as supermen however it also means the people who think they can just crush communism and such will be able to do more easily given the USSR did not beat a divided coalition of over 10 nations including Germany, Japan, USA and Britain that convinced the powers that be they are not just going away soon from power.
So I think for how the USSR get's treated will be along this spectrum, Britain might actually be willing to become a investor of the USSR if they are convinced they are weak to try and avoid complete German hegemony but Japan thinking they are facing a super power that is could soon subsume their government and way of life be far more aggressive land grabbing for the war they are soon convinced will happen with the USSR and step on a lot of toes, France is looking mighty weak now for example.
Though for Italy it will be curious to see how it impacts Africa given the colonies there should be experiencing the same divided for the civil war, you could see Egypt become the homeland of royalists Italians if they lose.
By that their will be no Russian intervention their will be much less data about the USSR strength, surely this lack of war should improve relations right? Unfortunately it makes it much easier for propaganda by Whites defeated to portray them as supermen however it also means the people who think they can just crush communism and such will be able to do more easily given the USSR did not beat a divided coalition of over 10 nations including Germany, Japan, USA and Britain that convinced the powers that be they are not just going away soon from power.
So I think for how the USSR get's treated will be along this spectrum, Britain might actually be willing to become a investor of the USSR if they are convinced they are weak to try and avoid complete German hegemony but Japan thinking they are facing a super power that is could soon subsume their government and way of life be far more aggressive land grabbing for the war they are soon convinced will happen with the USSR and step on a lot of toes, France is looking mighty weak now for example.
Though for Italy it will be curious to see how it impacts Africa given the colonies there should be experiencing the same divided for the civil war, you could see Egypt become the homeland of royalists Italians if they lose.
This is plainly incorrect. The Austro-Polish solution was over by mid, if not early 1918 and Austria was forced to make massive concessions to Germany throughout the last year of the war both economically, politically and even diplomatically - including a commitment to joining Germany's planned Mitteleuropa. This is backed up both by research conducted on the 1914-1918 encyclopedia online, and also Germany's War Aims in the First World War - Fritz Fischer, which explicitly states this to be the case.
I disagree with this assertion, and don't particularly see how I am doing so. Dont cast asperions on the plausibility of my timeline on the basis of your own lack of information. It's demoralizing, and not the first time you've specifically referenced 'plausibility' despite the OP explicitly stating not to do this.
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The Austrians had little to no capability to resist German demands on the East by late 1918, which were becoming increasingly expansive and developed towards the end of the First World War as militarists in the German high command turned to their eastern gains to justify the huge losses in the war. They had already been seen as ramshackle and precariously reliant on German patronage, even before the war. During the war, which was launched in part of hopes of proving the empire's metal against nationalistic challanges, only eroded the autonomy further as Austria had to rely repeatedly on Germany- including against Russia in 1914 and 16, against Italy in 1916 and against even Serbia- to avoid complete collapse. The empire was exhausted, in a state of famine and on the brink of internal implosion by 1918. The Germans weren't passive observers here. The Duel Alliance was meant to bind Austria heavily to Germany and provide a buffer in the Balkans, but all these failures directly damaged Germany's war effort and there was a growing mood of anger at the empire that makes, so I doubt the German military authorities would take protestations about the ruler very seriously. Ref's TL here isn't a miracle on the Danube- the precarities and inadqueacies accentuated by the war are still raw. I think it's pretty reasonable to assume the least of Austria's worries would be resisting German designs on Poland or demanding an Austrian Poland given their fall to near vassalage under the spectre of wartime failure.
On the other hand, the French wouldn't have as heavy of a reparations burden and be disarmed to the same extent that Germany was OTL.
I could see British investment in the USSR early on as a counter to Germany, but as the USSR begins to solidify and exert its strength I doubt it will lead to an alliance. France is subservient to Germany for all intents and purposes at this point, and while German hegemony is a massive threat to Britain, helping the USSR rebuild the Russian empire, while only getting in exchange the French and Belgian territories returned, and empowering a nation perfectly situated to strip the jewel of the empire from her, is not in Britain’s best interest. German dominated Europe sucks for Britain, but the Germans are in no place to threaten the empire, so unless the Germans start sending warships across the North Sea, I can’t see the British outright fighting with the soviets. OTL WWII was a very different situation. The British and Americans could not tolerate Nazi plans for Europe under any circumstances, TTL European order, while certainly unpalatable, is something that can be reasonably dealt with as long as Britain keeps decent men on the diplomatic front. The British have to ask themselves, “if we give the soviets everything up to Warsaw, where will they go next?” And the answer to that question is India. We must also consider the USSR’s position, unlike OTL, they are reduced quite a bit more in territory, and enveloped in the west by countries that exist solely for German (and western, if the Germans are smart) exploitation. When soviet leaders look west, regardless of the reality on the ground, they will see a continent waiting to be liberated by their brothers in arms, much more so than OTL. I wouldn’t be surprised if the doctrine of “permanent revolution” becomes much more influencial in the USSR purely because of the shared border with mittleuropa. This would become even more prevelant if, as is likely, the Germans crack down on socialist revolutionaries in the puppets, as those people, if they could escape death or imprisonment, would likely flee to the USSR, and spend much of their time convincing soviet authorities that revolution in Eastern Europe is imminent and all they need is a bit of help from “big brother Russia.”
But they lack the ability of Germany to so quickly build a fighting force to tear through Europe. Losing the briey-longwy mines will put a sizable dent in the French economy and war-making capabilities, even without reparations and debt to the allies. There is also the psychological effects of this being the second war in little over half a century that France has lost to Germany, and that Germany, with the eastern puppets and western annexations, is stronger than ever. If the soviets are somehow occupying Berlin, I’m sure the French would jump to grab the lost lands, outside of that though I just can’t see it.
someone on here said it before, but I can’t remember who. But that France would be more similar to Germany post-WWII, than Germany post-WWI, still a strong nation, still capable of a vibrant economy, still able to throw around its weight with money, but unable to militarily exert its will on its immiediate neighbors.
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Sorry for posting so much in a row, but another thing I was thinking about was the colonies. France, being reduced to a second rate power in Europe, will likely try and hold onto the empire with everything they have, much more so than OTL. The British will be much less willing to part with their empire as well considering it is at this point all that keeps them in the same league as Germany and the US. And the US, seeming to trend more towards neutrality in Europe, will probably have much less ability to force the European powers to replace empire with “independent” republics to be exploited as OTL. We could see longer lasting European empires, particularly in Africa, and this could have a myriad of effects on the European powers, economically, diplomatically, and socially.
Honestly I'm rather enjoying watching your brain work. Tis funny seeing how hot or cold you are when it comes to my actual plans lol
I can’t wait to see your plans come to fruition!! I’m also interested in seeing how close I am to what you’re gonna do ITTL lolol
One of the reasons France surrendered in 1940 was they were still reeling from the population losses of WWI. And this france doesn't have piles of money they got out of germany like candy from a Pinata
There's that famous table Churchill stuck in The Gathering Storm, titled, "Table of the Comparative French and German Figures for the Clases born from 1914 to 1920, and called up from 1934 to 1940." The grand total of men in these seven induction classes came to 3,172,000 men for Germany, and only 1,574,000 for France - basically, the Germans had twice as many men being inducted into the Wehrmacht every year. Which is remarkable given that Germany suffered almost 700,000 more casualties in the Great War than France did. The reason was twofold: Germany already had a much larger population base to work from by 1914, and the greater efficiency of its army (and lessened exposure to Spanish Influenza) meant that it had a significantly lower casualty rate than France (3.4% to 4.3%).
{And this doesn't even include the additional military age manpower Germany had access to once it annexed Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 - an additional population of over 10 million Germans!]
The French Army general staff was painfully aware that this was going to be case almost as soon as the killing stopped in 1918. And this was a big driving impulse behind the pursuit of the Maginot Line: a big force multiplier for a smaller force to offset an enemy with more men. It was far from a stupid idea.
But there's another point that needs to be made about those horrendous casualties. In France as well as Germany, it had a pacific effect on the population. The irony is, it was clearly more intense in victorious France, in part because unlike defeated Germany, there was no compensating sense of injustice over its postwar treatment, nor relentless Nazi propaganda whipping up revanche 24/7.
All that is in a world where France *won* the First World War. I wonder if we can properly imagine how deep the demoralization of those losses would be in a timeline where it *lost* in 1918. I confess, I struggle to do so.
Albert Bettannier's "La Tache Noire" (1887)
Culture, the old axiom goes, is the stories a people tells itself about who they are. France had had competing cultural narratives it told itself after 1789, but one thing they had in common was a sense of the greatness of France: a France with special mission in the world (even if they could not always agree on what that mission was). France had enjoyed more than its share of military glory before the Revolution, and after it, too. In these narratives, the defeats of 1814-15 and 1870 could be, and were, explained away in various ways, but usually centered on Bonapartist overreach (Napoleon I) or Bonapartist ineptitude (Napoleon III). In our history, the Great War could still fit in this narrative, albeit in a terribly costly way. But in this timeline, as someone else has already pointed out, France has suffered crushing military defeats by Germany twice in less than 50 years. Worse, it happened in spite of having five great power allies this time around! At this point, the moral despair felt by the Macedonians and Carthaginians after Zama and Cynoscephalae is going to start feeling a little too familiar.
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