The resent posts are indicative of just how far from OTL this TL has moved, and how different from OTL the future is going to be. Starting with events in North Africa, and not just the South African forces, the situation is now very different from what it was IOTL. The Italians have effectively been thrown out of both North and East Africa, while their German allies have washed their hands of the conflict. The big question right now is how long it’s going to be before the Vichy French regimes in North Africa and the Levent, will remain loyal to Vichy before they decide to jump ship and join up with the Free French Movement, if they do. They might decide to reject the Free French under de Gaulle, and instead form their own “Free French Movement”, with ether Admiral Darlan, or General Juin, as its leader. While the British were prepared to tolerate de Gaulle, and support his Free French Movement, the Americans were not, and up until the Touch landings had maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime. And were pushing for anyone other than de Gaulle to be the leader of the Free French Movement, nor did they ever hide their contempt of him. While his relationship with the British was to say the least prickly, his relationship with the Americans was down right hostile. If the Vichy French regime in North Africa and the Levent do decide to jump ship, but don’t accept de Gaulle as the leader of the Free French Movement, this will cause the British a major headache.
The situation in regards to the various South African forces in Africa, is very complicated, and is going to require some very sure footed decisions to be made by both the British and the South African governments. Unlike Australia, and New Zealand which had a very united population, and even more so than Canada which did have some internal problems, the White population of South Africa was very divided in its attitudes towards the war, with the Anglo population being very much more supportive, as apposed to a large section of the Afrikaans population being at best tepid, while the more extreme were openly hostile. Smuts had major problems trying to walk a very slack tightrope, between the various factions within his own party, and the factions nationwide. He had a clear vision of what he wanted for the South African Army, he wanted to get away from the old Boer War vision of a peoples part time force, ready to take up their gun and jump on their pony, at a moments notice. And try to develop a more professional military, fit for the time, one equipped with the latest technology, and able to take its place alongside the best in the world. Hence the idea of converting one of the devisions in North Africa to an armoured formation while they had the chance. Remember that the South Africans were not best pleased with the Americans, of all the nations who came out of WWI with war debts to America, they had paid off their debts in full, it helps to have the largest gold mines in the world. But America treated them the same as other nations, and refused to allow them to raise money in America, during the war to buy military equipment, and insisted that they were required to abide by the restrictions on trade of the Lend Lease acts.
In addition Smuts had a problem with the formation of the South African Army, like all of the Imperial nations, there were restrictions on where conscripts could be deployed. Australia got round this to an extent by declaring that the various Australian overseas territories counted as home territory. And the South Africans stated that conscripts could serve in Africa, hence the South African units in East and North Africa. But service outside of Africa was limited to volunteers only, and that would have political consequences, as the majority of volunteers would be Anglos, while the majority of Afrikaans stayed safe at home or in Africa. Which would be the worst way to reenforce the divisions within the country, which were strong to start with. As I said earlier Smuts was walking a tightrope, and of all the Imperial Prime Ministers, he was always very concerned about what the views on his home front were, his was a very divided nation, which had seen during WWI, significant internal opposition to the war, which had involved military action. The fact that in the long run, he failed to pay sufficient attention to the home front, and in the inevitable post war elections, he and the more moderate sections of the South African political spectrum, lost to the nationalist parties, was a tragedy. If his side of the political spectrum, had managed to win that election, and put in place, some very basic reforms, especially in regards to the voting system, there is a good chance that the horrors of the Apartheid system could have been avoided. Remember Apartheid was modelled on the German Antisemitic laws, which were themselves modelled on the American Jim Crow legislation.
Events in Malaya are becoming more and more of a disaster for the Japanese, and the chances of the British falling to retain Singapore and a significant portion of Malaya, are slim to none. This will have a major effect on the Japanese campaign in the Far East region, and significant implications for the post war world in both the region and internationally. Without the fall of Singapore, the Anglo Dutch, campaign in and around the DEI, stands far more chance of being successful. If the Anglo Dutch can retain Sumatra and Java, then they have secured the eastern communications link with Australia and New Zealand, especially for the blood of modern warfare, oil. No need to run tanker convoys from the Californian oil fields and refineries across the Pacific, all of the oil needs, other than for high octane aviation fuel, can be met from the oil fields and refineries in Burma and the DEI. Note once these refineries have been modified, as was done with Abadan, they too will be able to provide all of the petroleum needs of the various forces in the theatre including the Americans. If as seems probable, instead of the ABDA naval forces suffering the extensive defeats they did IOTL, they given the much stronger British contingent now available, they inflict a series of defeats on the Japanese navy. Which will have a serious knock on effect on the remainder of the campaign in the DEI, and around Papua, Australia and the Solomons. If the Japanese send a major carrier group towards Australia it might find itself encountering a mixed British American carrier group. And while the British carriers and carrier aircraft are no match for the Japanese force in daylight, they might give the Japanese a major shock at night. And while the Japanese are concentrating on the Anglo American naval threat, they will not be covering an invasion of Papua, or bombing Darwin.
In Malaya once the two Indian devisions have retired through the three fresh experienced divisions, the Japanese are in a world of hurt. Far from collapsing in front of them as happened IOTL, the British forces are becoming stronger, and more able to resist the Japanese advance. The initial shock of the Japanese air attacks on Singapore and Malaya, which will have caused confusion and disruption to the British efforts and local communities, will by now given firm local leadership and governance, have worn off. The only times that a bombing campaign worked, was when, such as in Rotterdam, it was a one against an unprepared target, and there was at the same time, a collapse of the administration. The far heavier attacks against London, which lasted for months, saw the population adjust and the government become increasingly efficient at dealing with the problem. By now even the sleepy colonial administration of Singapore, will have begun to get its act together, and the locals begun as did the locals of London, Madrid and other cities, to adjust to being bombed. Note given the weakness of the Japanese airforce in comparison to the German Luftwaffe, and the failure of the Japanese to maintain a continuous day and night attack, by now most people will regard the bombing as a nuisance, not a calamity. The Japanese are about to but heads with a number of battle hardened, experienced troops, who have had the chance to acclimatise and learn something of local conditions. The Japanese airforce is facing increasing opposition in the air, while suffering from disruption by stay behind forces, on the ground. Japanese logistics, never their strong point, have major problems, as they try to supply an ever increasing campaign, from a very shallow well.
RR.
