What kinds of sensitive issues would emerge in a Central Powers victory?

kham_coc

Kicked
Except that Germany unilaterally invaded Belgium. IOTL, they got the consequence. ITTL, they would have been rewarded, and similar behaviours would have been encouraged down the road.

Add to that, Germany also did scorched earth when withdrawing.
Prioritizing your national interests over others ?
(that's not new).
 
regarding Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans many people are under the assumption that they won't reform and change even though that is what will naturally happen considering all the reform movements that are on going inside of them. also no one here is willing blow up the British Empire for some reason even though that's what you should do for more interesting stuff
 
International Law, in this case means a game of Calvinball whos meta-rules are something like: London and Washington are always justified in doing what they want (as are a constellation of other groups), and Germany is always in the wrong.
Germany's fundamental problem is that in any plausible victory, the British and Americans remain as going concerns to continue their hostility.
 
regarding Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans many people are under the assumption that they won't reform and change even though that is what will naturally happen considering all the reform movements that are on going inside of them
They may reform. But equally they are not guaranteed to do so.

In the Ottoman Empire the CUP had decided to base Ottoman identity on Turkish lines. This inevitably left other people groups out in the cold and increased ethnic tensions in a very multiethnic nation. Even if the Ottomans don’t need to deal with the Arabs after the war, those will be serious issues. They will be much more so if the Arab majority areas are still within their borders. Which probably means at some point there will be a confrontation, and either some version of Ottomanism will find a central focus for the state other than Turkish identity or the non-Turkish minorities will find themselves pushed to the fringes.

In Austria-Hungary, the divide between Austrian and Hungarian visions for the future of the nation still need to be addressed, not to mention the desire of the other minorities for more representation. It may not be fated to fall apart but it is a lot of horses to try and ride at once. And as far as I know no one had a reasonable idea of how to adequately balance those competing interests in the 1910’s.

It’s certainly not a guarantee that those empires would reform and find a lasting stability even if they are on the side of the victors.


also no one here is willing blow up the British Empire for some reason even though that's what you should do for more interesting stuff
Seems a common element of a number of CP victory scenarios, some plausible, some less so. I would hardly say no one is willing to do it.

As to it being necessary to make a TL interesting, I find that debatable. It seems possible to make an interesting story (or fail to do so) in either case. However, if you feel that way, you are certainly free to write that into your own story.
 
It’s certainly not a guarantee that those empires would reform and find a lasting stability even if they are on the side of the victors.
you act as if the failures in the war wouldn't expose necessity for reform even more so And you need to stop freezing these empires at 1914 and consider how they would evolve with time and like how they would be in the 20s in and all the reforms that are necessary especially if there's a centralization versus federalization in say the Ottoman Empire .
 
you act as if the failures in the war wouldn't expose necessity for reform even more so
You act as if exposing weakness in the system makes everyone eager to change it, or unanimous in their solution. It doesn’t. And nations do not necessarily ride a gradual gradient from divergent interests to happy cooperation (what I assume you mean by “reform”). Change is a messy process.


And you need to stop freezing these empires at 1914 and consider how they would evolve with time
I’m not. As with any nation their status at a point (1914 in this case) is largely due to the forces and situations that have arisen in the past and how they have dealt with them. Those forces (ethnic tension, divergent addendas, economic troubles from a major war, etc) do not necessarily go away if you are on the winning side. In many cases they get worse. This does not mean that these empires are doomed. But the need for “reform” being made clear and being acted upon is not the only way this can go. Even if it were “reform” is not always positive or stabilizing. It can go either way.


if there's a centralization versus federalization in say the Ottoman Empire
As long as the CUP is in power, federalization will not be an option. As long as Turkish identity is made central to the states future it is also highly unlikely. Removing the CUP stands at least a fair chance of being a violent affair, if it happens at all. And would not guarantee to improve things.
 
I love how people drum their anglo culture is superior wardrum.

I think colonialism will be still a big point of debate
This is a salient point. Decolonization will be different if/when it does happen. I'm imagining a situation in which the mainlands of the Americas, Africa, and Asia are all decolonized, but more peripheral areas and islands are retained or directly annexed. Specifically, perhaps Germany today still retains its piece of New Guinea, with the Dutch controlling the west, and the Territory of Papua as an integral part of Australia.
 
the CUP stands at least a fair chance of being a violent affair
and how do you know that factionalism would wouldn't just break it apart especially if three pashas are moved from power for their incompetence during the war in its aftermath
Change is a messy process.
why are you accusing me that I would assume that would be that it will be smoothly it inherent nature of reform processes
This does not mean that these empires are doomed.
your certainly act like they are, you're being very deterministic about their trajectory
Those forces (ethnic tension, divergent addendas, economic troubles from a major war, etc) do not necessarily go away i
again why are you assuming that I'm assuming that I'm just saying that reform is inherently a part of the process of change and it's very natural for it to happen .you act like it's natural for them to fall apart, these are complicated issues that need to be approach with the nuance rather than a blunt hand and broad brushes. you must research it in the language of the empires to understand what the latest scholarship is about them and go from there instead of relying on assumptions and probably older ideas
 
The Soviet Union would still be a genocidal basket case, but it wouldn't hold the Ukraine (or at least as much of it as OTL) and possibly other territory it held so will have less people to kill by collectivisation and purge.
Sure, and German efforts to try and turn Ukraine into a colony wouldn't result in any unpleasantness.

Much depends on how Germany wins the war - if the war is won relatively quickly, with France knocked out in 1914 and Russia throwing the towel in during 1915, then I can well see Germany being a better overlord than the Soviets (though I doubt the Soviets would control Russia in this scenario - more likely after a short war it would be the liberals, the SRs or a combination of the two). But if victory somehow comes after Ludendorf and Hindenburg established their de facto dictatorship, the odds for an enlightened post-war Germany drop, as do the odds for a grown-up policy in the lands Germany took from defeated enemies, and there's even a chance that Imperial Germany turns into something every bit as awful as Nazi Germany (Ludendorf's ideas on how to run a country were a major influence on Shōwa era Japan and quite impressively depraved).

But then again, nothing is inevitable. The German conquest of Ukraine and the suppression of those nationalist groups the Germans took a dislike to would be a brutal affair simply because great power war is brutal by nature, but after the end of the war, there are multiple roads to both better and worse futures.

France wanting revenge. You might see a French version of Hitler in this timeline.
Heck no! France was too weak to go another round. You might get a French version of Franco, but a French version of Hitler wasn't on the cards.

Having lost two major wars against Prussia/Germany, and lacking the Junker class who were willing to destroy the country in their quest to deny "pacificism" an opportunity to take root, the main foreign policy plank of most French governments will be making nice with the Germans.

Plus, remember that even in Germany, Hitler faced significant obstacles to gaining power, and got ridiculously lucky both in terms of foreign and domestic events aligning to his benefit. Even if an alt-France had a nutter who was even more lucky than Hitler was in OTL, it's hard for me to imagine a Germany that managed to win WW1 at any point allowing France to fall into the hands of someone for whom "revenge on Germany" was a major policy platform. Especially when the other major neighbours of France have vivid memories of the last time a conquest-addict got to run France.

fasquardon
 
and how do you know that factionalism would wouldn't just break it apart especially if three pashas are moved from power for their incompetence during the war in its aftermath
I don’t. How do you know:
1. That they will be removed from power. They have just won after all.
2. That this would cause the CUP to break up
3. That this would be a positive for the Ottomans

why are you accusing me that I would assume that would be that it will be smoothly it inherent nature of reform processes
I’m not accusing you of anything. Just pointing out that reform is not inevitable. Positive reform even less so.

your certainly act like they are, you're being very deterministic about their trajectory
My entire point has so far been that how these empires turn out is not determined. Reform is possible, but not guaranteed. Austria and the Ottomans could reform into stable and prosperous states. Or they could fall apart into chaos. But either way they will have to deal with the effects of the past up to that point.

again why are you assuming that I'm assuming that I'm just saying that reform is inherently a part of the process of change and it's very natural for it to happen .you act like it's natural for them to fall apart, these are complicated issues that need to be approach with the nuance rather than a blunt hand and broad brushes. you must research it in the language of the empires to understand what the latest scholarship is about them and go from there instead of relying on assumptions and probably older ideas
More or less my point. So unless you have something new to add or some incite from said research I think I will leave it here. Before we continue arguing over an agreement.
 
However, if there is a fascist regime in France it has the potential to enact the same pro-natal policies under the Vichy regime that led to France's demographic 'miracle' in 1945-1975. And, if this France aligns itself with Italy and Spain the three would prove a powerful force to be reckoned with come the 1950s (I assume the German population would stagnate in the mid-1930s).
The pro-natalist policies actual predated the Vichy regime, though.
 

Deleted member 180541

I disagree with your assessment that fascism couldn't have arisen in France. I think even in OTL, without Papal condemnation Action Française had the potential to take over the French government. I agree though that France would not be able to try again against Germany. In fact, France following a WW1 defeat would probably become a second-rate power. However, if there is a fascist regime in France it has the potential to enact the same pro-natal policies under the Vichy regime that led to France's demographic 'miracle' in 1945-1975. And, if this France aligns itself with Italy and Spain the three would prove a powerful force to be reckoned with come the 1950s (I assume the German population would stagnate in the mid-1930s).
Adding to this, if the war is won in 1914 then France could have upwards of 60 million people by 1960 (if in 1918 max is probably 55 million), assuming contraception is banned like OTL, pro-natal policies brought under Vichy are implemented, and that secularisation laws are repealed in favour of pro-Catholic ones. Say Italy has 55 million and Spain 35 million, which aren’t unreasonable estimates without the world wars, this ‘Latin Bloc’ could have upwards of 150 million people by 1960. This would be a very powerful economic and political alliance, even in a German dominated continent.

Moreover, you also have North Africa. While this ‘Latin Bloc’ can’t realistically take on Germany, they can vent their frustrations out there. You could see Spanish-French-Italian elite emerge and dominate the coast. Basically the Pied-Noir on steroids. A Neo-Crusader and Neo-Roman ideology. Libya is probably fully Italianised. Europeans could probably make up a plurality in Tunisia too.

Regardless, there are lots of options for France to remain relevant even if Germany wins WW1. This isn’t even mentioning the potential for a resurgent Russia or increasing ethnic tension in A-H causing it to collapse. A revanchist Latin west and Slavic east puts Germany in a pickle.
 

Deleted member 180541

The pro-natalist policies actual predated the Vichy regime, though.
And they sort of worked. The number of births in the interwar period were actually decent, but because of the sheer number of casualties France suffered during the war the death rate was extremely high, which offset the increase in births. The government had to resort to banning contraception, and almost reformed the voting system to give men an extra vote for each child they had. It was specifically the Vichy pro-Natalist policies, such as paying money to family with lots of children, which caused the baby boom though. The Vichy government even changed the national motto to travail, famille, patrie which sort of fostered a pro-natalist sentiment post-war.
 
It was specifically the Vichy pro-Natalist policies, such as paying money to family with lots of children, which caused the baby boom though
I understand that this was introduced as part of the Code de la famille passed in 1939.

I disagree with your assessment that fascism couldn't have arisen in France. I think even in OTL, without Papal condemnation Action Française had the potential to take over the French government. I agree though that France would not be able to try again against Germany
They were simply not as powerful as their German/Italian/Japanese counterparts, and they also had comparatively weak starting point. And as I mentioned, the Third Republic as a regime had much more staying power with more well-established democratic institutions than every single nation state on both sides that fell into authoritarianism IOTL during the 1930s. It would have more 50% probability of surviving, unlike the common trope here.
 
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If Fascism in France is unlikely to rise, maybe we would see a Franco-esque military dictatorship lead by Petain arise in the 30's to counter the "red menace"?
 
If Fascism in France is unlikely to rise, maybe we would see a Franco-esque military dictatorship lead by Petain arise in the 30's to counter the "red menace"?
You say that as if Franco and Petain weren't fascisists...

Franco's Spain and Vichy France were absolutely fascist regimes. They were just fascist regimes that unlike Italy and Germany were just focused on being vile to their domestic populations and the colonies their predecessors had conquered, and not also focused on getting new colonies to be vile to.

But yes, it is entirely possible in the generation after a German WW1 victory that France might fall to such a "defense minded" fascist regime if the right confluence of factors comes together to allow it. Not I think the most likely way things could go. The 3rd Republic was actually a pretty robust system, but as they say "it can happen here".

fasquardon
 
You say that as if Franco and Petain weren't fascisists...

Franco's Spain and Vichy France were absolutely fascist regimes. They were just fascist regimes that unlike Italy and Germany were just focused on being vile to their domestic populations and the colonies their predecessors had conquered, and not also focused on getting new colonies to be vile to.

But yes, it is entirely possible in the generation after a German WW1 victory that France might fall to such a "defense minded" fascist regime if the right confluence of factors comes together to allow it. Not I think the most likely way things could go. The 3rd Republic was actually a pretty robust system, but as they say "it can happen here".

fasquardon
I'm not saying that they weren't terrible dictatorships or that they weren't "as bad". But Franco Spain lacked a few classic fascist characteristics, such as a mass-movement. It was more a classic reactionary dictatorship than the more "modern" fascist mass-movements in Germany or Italy.
 
AIDS would become a global problem 30 years early. Why? German colonists introducing africans in the former belgian congo to making sandwiches with raw meat and spices like how Germans do at home. Same for monkeypox.
 
"Hyphenated Americans" would have gained huge traction had the US and Germany actually become rivals. And once the US entered WW1, suppression of German culture would have happened regardless of the Red Scare.
Some tension may arise but a full on suppression of American-German culture is unlikely to occur outside of another war. Again, a German-US rivalry will most likely lack the toxic ideological component that made the Red Scare and assosiated cultural supression so pervasive. And unlike Chinese or Japanese immigrants, German-Americans are much closer to cultural norms of the US and far less likely to end up as targets of such suppression unless there is a large-scale war. As for a US that enters WW1 it depends on if it actually fights and how long the war goes.
They were the largest faction by far in the Reichstag. In order to block them the DNVP had to join in. Unfortunately, they had more common with the Nazis than with the democrats.
Largest but already declining. They had lost 5% of the popular vote and over 30 seats in the November election. As the economic situation continued to improve, they would have lost even more support. Its Papen's and Schleicher's power plays that give Hitler the opportunity to get into a position of power.
Other than humiliation and loss, many of the non-economic factors were already present even before ww1: 1) extreme nationalistic volkism and even anti-Semitism were on the rise in the few years leading up to ww1; 2) the pre-industrial elites, the reactionaries and right-wing nationalists held dominant power in the Civil Service, the diplomacy, the school system, the Courts, and Europe's largest standing military; 3) inadequate democratic system - it was very similar to Imperial Japan in the fact that political reforms lagged behind economic modernization/industrialization & state building - and the state building process was imposed from the top to bottom; 4) the German political right absolutely hated democracy.
1) The presence of these movements and their wider acceptance in society has been over stated time and time again. And they certainly weren't on the rise in the years leading up to the war. Anti-semitism in particular was a widespread feature in European society at the time and grew more after WW1.

2) The position and power of the reactionaries, nationalists and elites within Imperial German institutions was less solid than you might imagine. Particularly outside the state of Prussia. Especially in the industrial regions of the Rhineland and southern Germany they were not nearly as present as you make them out to be.

3) While certainly flawed in several places, the Imperial German system was rather stable and modern in several places and lacked the critical weakness against military factions that the Japanese system had. For the "Silent Dictatorship" to even take form, it took the decision by the Bundestag to set their political decision making behind the war needs with the express intention to regain it once the war was over. And the Weimar System, while taking several aspects from the Imperial one, was critically weakened by its inception during the defeat and revolutionary character.

4) The German political right was a minority since the time of Bismarck and never even approached anything close to a majority until the 1932 elections. And even then, the rise of the NSDAP among workers and other lower class groups was moreso a result of the economic promises made. The Social Democrats, Moderates and Liberals made up the vast majority of the German electorate until the flaws of the Weimar System and economic crisis combined.
 
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