Millennium Shuffle 1943-1945
1st January 1943 – The Turning of the Tide – Part I – Japan & Italy
By the start of 1943 whatever the propaganda emanating from Tokyo and Berlin might claim about how victory would still be theirs so long as the people were willing to give their all to the war effort it was obvious to many that recent events were no mere temporary setbacks, the war had firmly turned against the Axis partners. Japanese forces were being slowly pushed back in the Pacific and South East Asia and the powerful carrier force which had struck the shocking blow at Pearl Harbor that opened the Pacific war was gone and could not be replaced by Japanese shipyards, indeed Japanese industry as a whole was struggling in the face of shortages of fuel and raw materials. Their Germans allies could offer little in the way of aid. A trickle of critical raw materials was transported between the two nations courtesy of submarines making the long hazardous journey from Europe to Japan and back and the missions also carried technical blueprints and samples of the latest equipment being put into service. The Germans were largely dismissive of Japanese technology, but the Japanese did take inspiration from some of the information provided, especially jet and rocket technology. Despite what some have claimed the number of instances where the Japanese simply copied a German design outright were rare [1].
Few details of the battles being fought by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy reached the Japanese public, or at least few accurate ones. With Japan’s defeats happening in far flung corners of Asia and the Pacific and no access to alternative accounts of the progress of the war the Imperial authorities retained a much tighter grip on the flow of information than even their counterparts in Berlin. And yet the many citizens involved in war industries, especially the naval shipyards of the Home Islands, and those who received the notices that their sons or husbands had fallen in battle could hardly help but see the increasingly grim situation Japan faced {2].
The official propaganda focused on sending the message that the sacrifices of the Japanese soldiers across the Pacific were guaranteeing Japanese victory, so long as their sacrifices were matched by those made on the home front. This meant yet more deprivations for the Japanese citizenry, already struggling with inadequate supplies of basic necessities as the military got first priority for what was available and expedients such as using rice to make alcohol that could be used to supplement their dwindling fuel stocks were also put into practice, meaning even less food for the civilian population. The great lie at the heart of this propaganda was that even if such sacrifices could have replenished the ranks of the Japanese Army and Navy and gotten Japanese war factories running at full capacity it would have made little difference to Japan’s situation. Raw recruits were no substitute for the experienced sailors, pilots, and soldiers lost during the first year of the war in the Pacific, with the effects on the quality of Japanese naval aviation being especially acute. Likewise putting out a few more tanks, aircraft, and warships would do little in the face of the tidal wave of US production that threatened to drown Japan, even worse new equipment coming out of US factories was addressing the deficiencies that had been identified during the battles of 1942 [3].
The much vaunted Zero fighter was no longer a mystery to the Allies after crashed examples had been repaired and tested. They knew its weaknesses, particularly the fact that so much of its vaunted agility came from being extraordinarily light, lacking the armour and self-sealing tanks that the Allied air forces regarded as a basic requirement for their fighter. An entire new class of Fleet Carrier, the Essex was due to come into service in 1943 as well as new classes of Escort Carrier. In the same time frame the Japanese could expect to commission a single carrier to replenish their losses, and replacing their lost air groups was an even bigger challenge. Ways of compensating for this degradation in the quality of their air and naval power were being discussed, and it wouldn’t take long before individual acts of sacrifice committed in the name of honour would be converted into a doctrine that wholeheartedly embraced suicide tactics [4].
The closest thing to a realistic strategy being discussed in Tokyo was to fight a series of battles that cost the lives of so many enemy soldiers that the Allies would grow weary of the war and seek to end it on terms that, even if the fell short of Japan’s ambitions at the start of the war, would at least preserve the integrity of the Japanese Home Islands and retaining the position of the emperor. How many Japanese lives would be lost to achieve even this limited goal was barely even considered, likewise the probability that the USA in particular would accept anything less than the complete crushing of Japan, given their powerful desire to avenge the ‘sneak attack’ at Pearl Harbor, was not a topic for discussion among the Japanese leadership [5]. Such was the atmosphere in Tokyo that even these conservative war aims were fiercely opposed, as there were still prominent figures clinging to the idea that one decisive battle could still turn the tide and see Japan being the one to set the terms of peace. For the likes of Tojo and Yamamoto it was not a matter of realism versus delusions, simply a matter of differing degrees of self-deception.
The only way that Italy could claim to be in a better position than Japan was that no one still entertained any illusions that Italy could win the war, and many doubted the nation could even survive. Italy was still a member of the Axis and it was still a combatant, though at this point it would be hard to find anyone bar a few diehard Fascists who were happy about that. Italian troops remained in the Balkans, fighting against the various partisan groups that had sprung up and guarding the coasts against Allied commando raids, with Crete acting as staging ground for all sorts of Allied ‘mischief’. The army was also deeply involved in preparing for the defence of Italy, continuing the plans originally laid out by the Ciano government to create a series of fortified positions covering the ports and beaches that might be used by the Allies as landing zones, which was now being supplemented by further defensive lines further inland, though work on any such defences facing north had naturally ceased. The Regia Aeronautica was still occasionally bombing Crete and attacking shipping in the waters around the island, with intermittent support from the Luftwaffe and They were likewise tasked with intercepting Allied bombing raids on targets in Italy itself as well as Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans, with the Germans being particularly eager to stop any raids that might be directed against the Ploesti oilfields. A casual inspection of the situation might then lead one to imagine than nothing much had changed after the German intervention. While this was certainly the public position of the Ciano government it was far from the truth, and no amount of propaganda could keep the Italian people from realizing that they were now to all intents and purposes an occupied nation, with the added burden of being expected to keep their armed forces in the field [6].
One of the most tangible signs that Italy was no longer being treated as an ally was the logistical support that Italy was required to provide to the German forces in the country. The Wehrmacht forces stood at around ten divisions by 1943, backed up by Luftwaffe bomber and fighter squadrons, all of whom the Italians were expected to provide them with food, fuel, and other supplies, and to do so even at the expense of their own armed forces. The issue was made far worse by the fact that the demands made by the Germans could have generously supplied thirty or forty divisions, and it was no secret that most of the supplies made their way to Wehrmacht forces in France or on the Eastern Front. Providing these supplies was a significant burden to the Italians, especially as industry and agriculture were being significantly impacted by the demands for labour and construction materials imposed by the construction of the defensive positions. The Germans magnanimously agreed slave labour from Eastern Europe, though the Italian government was expected to pay for such labour in the same way that German companies were, and at a considerably higher price than that charged by the SS to German industry for access to concentration camp labour. The Germans made it clear they would be happy to offset Italy’s new debts by taking a controlling interest in some of the most notable Italian companies, with FIAT being top of their shopping list. Ciano deployed his best diplomatic efforts to fend off these suggestions, but it could only a matter of time before Italian industry was reduced to mere subsidiaries of the most prominent German conglomerates [7].
If the Army and the Air Force had survived the German intervention had been a deathblow for the remaining surface fleet of the Regia Marina. They had been largely confined to port even before Operation Alaric and now even the idea of maintaining a fleet in being had been abandoned. The resources needed to keep the fleet running, especially fuel, could be put to better use elsewhere, and this was not simply the opinion of the Germans, the Italian Army and the Ciano government largely agreed with this decision and the guns of the remaining warships of the Regia Marina would be demounted and used in shore emplacements. The remaining Italian submarine forces would remain in action, for as long as they survived in hostile waters, but even this would be hampered by fuel supply issues [8].
As stated, the Italian Army remained in the field, this did not mean though that it had not suffered after the intervention. Logistical support for the Italian forces had always been poor and in the winter of 1942-43 it nearly broke down altogether. Troops were in some cases reduced to begging for food, if they happened to be stationed in Italy. In Greece and Yugoslavia, they simply seized whatever they could at gun point, not that there was all that much to take after eighteen months of Italian occupation. Desertion was an increasing problem in Italy and while most soldiers who fled ditched their uniforms many kept their weapons and joined one of the nascent partisan groups, with many making a sudden conversion from Fascism to Communism [9].
Whatever deprivations might have been faced by Italian soldiers and even the luckless slave labourers it was nothing compared to the fate of those Italian Jews who couldn’t flee or hide. They were now subjected to being rounded up and deported to the Nazis death camps and much of this round up was carried out by the Italian authorities, not the SS or the Wehrmacht as some Italians claimed later and attempts to pretend that anyone believed that the Jews were being detained or resettled are flatly contradicted by those records and reports that survived the attempts to burn them when the war ended. Ciano and many of the senior military leaders were perfectly aware of the Holocaust, whether they colluded because they agreed with the goal of destroying the Jews or simply from fear of the consequences of opposition varied from person to person [10].
The situation in Italy was clearly miserable and yet the Ciano government knew it could be worse, certainly for them personally. There was ongoing anxiety about an Allied invasion and a strong belief that as burdensome as the Wehrmacht presence might be it was at least acting as a deterrent to the Allies who would hopefully turn their attention elsewhere. By 1943 then the ambitions of the Italian government had been reduced to simply avoiding Italy becoming a battleground, and even this was dependent on forces beyond their control [11].
[1] The Kikka jet fighter of OTL was certainly inspired by the ME 262 but the visual similarities were just a product of the limitations of designing a twin engine jet fighter with the technology available. And their version of a flying bomb was a very different beast, mainly of course because it was manned.
[2] However hard the Japanese government clamps down on information it’s kind of difficult to hide the fact that some very large warships never come into port anymore, or how your loved one serving on the frontline never sends letters home anymore.
[3] So for those in Washington calling for a higher priority for the Pacific it’s a good news bad news situation. The stronger Allied performance in the Pacific and SEA makes it easier for them to lobby for a bigger share of US military output, but the plans for full invasion of Europe in 1943 creates pressure in the other direction. Overall, there will be more men and equipment for the Pacific than IOTL, but still less than they want.
[4] The Japanese are going down that road much faster than OTL because of course things are getting worse for them faster.
[5] The sort of people who tried to stage a coup to stop the surrender in our 1945 are still prevalent in Tokyo.
[6] With friends like these…
[7] The Nazis behaved very oddly when it came to taking over control of companies in the west, taking what be generously seen as a legal approach, and being rebuffed on multiple occasions.
[8] The surface fleet didn’t dare take to sea and of course the Germans aren’t convinced that some warship at sea might not just sail to an Allied port and raise the white flag.
[9] These are the sort of men who are drawn to the extremes, so not surprising that when one fails them they turn to another.
[10] The Allies staying out of Italy might end the war sooner by focusing on North-western Europe but there is a price for that plan.
[11] It could be worse, and it will be in due course…
