You could probably help relations by not having de Gaulle be leader of the Free French.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
So, green American troops, with completely untested officers and kit which has only ever been tested under ideal conditions, ramming their faces into a well-dug-in and expertly made layered defensive line held by veteran German formations?
I am sure that will work just fine.
Eh, I'm sure the equipment will be well-tested. The American army is usually pretty strict in its testing regime.
Well the navy weren't when it came to their torpedoes, but did the army have different 'check the kit does what it says on the label' testing methods and procurement personnel?
Historically the US was very keen on a 1943 invasion of France as has been discussed several times on this site. The British were very opposed and made two arguments against:
- We're not ready, the German Army is too tough and we should only engage them in geographically confined theatres where they can't bring their strength to bear because of logistics constraints (i.e. Southern Italy)
- All of our troops, shipping etc. is in the Med and we can't get everything north quickly enough post finishing operations in Tunisia to launch an invasion before the Channel gets too rough. So instead of losing the whole year we should go for Sicily and southern Italy and then moving the shipping north over winter
Here both of those arguments are going to be weaker. The whole North Africa campaign is between 12-15 months ahead of schedule, depending on what happens with Vichy and it looks like by January 1943 there won't be any obvious amphibious targets left in the Med meaning that shipping will be free to go North in plenty of time for a May/June '43 invasion. Secondly the German Army looks a lot less intimidating both to the British because they've beaten them but also to the Americans because of prevailing racism. From an American perspective yes the Germans have beaten the French, Greeks and Russians but every time they've gone up against the British it's been an even fight and the Americans are certainly the equal of the British, therefore there's nothing to be scared of.
All of which means a 1943 invasion is very likely and for the command authority reasons I mentioned upthread I think it will be weighted very heavily towards US troops. With British troops being concentrated in different theatres (Italy, South France, possibly Norway) under British command.
The US Army did have a much better equipment acceptance process than the US Navy and it's stuff was generally very good but without the experience of North Africa and Sicily it's leadership, doctrine and training won't be and the blood price will be significant. But unless the US are willing to accept British leadership they won't be able to season their troops in the Med and considering 1917-18 and the lionisation of Pershing I think the likelihood is the US military, civilian leadership and public all accepting extra dead GI's as the price of keeping US troops under US command.
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That's why I said the American Army. The USA contains something approximating almost every land terrain, except (ironically perhaps), jungles.
Logistically, an invasion in 1943 can't be easily supported.
In terms of simple invasion shipping it's not so bad, Sicily involved moving more troops a longer distance than Normandy but more broadly definitely. The most important factor is there have been no visible butterflies to the Battle of the Atlantic so it is probably proceeding as in OTL and won't be won until May 1943 and the Victory ships didn't start arriving until January 1944. So the limits on troop numbers and all types of supplies are going to be much tighter with a 43 invasion.
However on the plus side the German position in France is much weaker, the Atlantic Wall is still mostly on paper and the number of Divisions and quality of Division is much lower so paradoxically the initial 2-3 weeks will probably go better. The problems will start when veteran units start arriving from Germany and then the East however I really doubt that the Germans will be able to throw the Americans back into the sea so it will turn into a long, grinding attritional slog.
But the logic of a '43 invasion is inescapable in this scenario because what else is the US Army in Europe meant to do. In OTL there were enough problems with having troops twiddling their thumbs in Kent in 1943 but at least the Army Ground Forces could point to US troops fighting under US command in Army strength in Sicily and Italy. Here you'll have the US Navy and Marines filling the newspapers back home with stories of fighting in the Pacific, the USAAF launching the Combined Bomber Offensive and what is the US Army doing? It's got one or two Divisions fighting under British command in the Med. That's a major political problem. The US Army will be in a use it or lose it position in terms of resources and manpower allocations in the eternal struggle against their real enemy, the other services.
Quite so. The British used the extra year to build a whole suite of logistic infrastructure to supply a continental size army in the field over months. Getting an army ashore is almost a given. Even the USM would have got some troops etc. ashore, somewhere. Maintaining them month after month of continuous fighting is another thing. Dieppe had already shown the unlikeliness of seizing an operating port so supply over open beaches is all that is left, including fuel tankered in by sea.
Now if this AH leaves a Vichy in place in 1943, a Vichy switch to the Allies could possibly seize a west coast French port or two until Commonwealth and US forces land to support them and take on the Germans. But a French North Africa switch to the Axis in this AH is the only way they can avoid Case Anton etc. if Vichy declares war on the Allies and actively fights against them, leaving Vichy still in control at home, (under the German and Italian Commission’s overview) and building a scratch peer army at home to support the defence of North Africa from the Allies. However, a free running Axis Vichy-Italian fleet with German released fuel could make the Mediterranean a naval fleet battle zone and delay possible landings until too late for a 1943 invasion of the European mainland in France.
But again I am pursuing my AH thoughts and leave the thread in the capable hands of the OP.
Both the USA and Britain have the troops, but no way to actually get them ashore in Europe in numbers, or keep them supplied in the face of stiff opposition.
Exactly. Landing the troops is one thing (and the Allied ability to do even this - in sufficient numbers - in 1943 is in question), keeping them supplied and supported is entirely another.
I was thinking of 1943-45, rather than 1942. Before major American deployments to Europe, sure, the British are supplying the minority of the Allied forces there, but by the same token these forces are too weak to consider offensive operations against German-held territory. Even Sicily is likely beyond their reach, given the shortage of transport and amphibious capacity.
The British army may have performed well, but it is also tiny, compared both to the Wehrmacht and the planned American forces. In France it deployed ~10 divisions and did little more than speedbump the Panzers. In North Africa it has only just reached the point of being able to put 2 Corps in the front line. A massive expansion is not in prospect, given manufacturing and manpower limitations. The commitments to the Battle of the Atlantic and the Bomber Offensive have not gone away and TTL the British are likely to be sending more forces to SE Asia.
Bottom line is that the British don't have the resources to do anything significant in Europe without large-scale American support. And if the Americans pull a Pershing and say "Nope. No US divisions under foreign command." then the British are pretty much stuck.
... And snarky historians will argue that Italy was only ever a secondary theatre, that the division of command hurt the Allies, that the resources expended in slogging through the Appenines would have been better used in the Low Countries and that the British should have swallowed their Imperial pride and let their veteran units be integrated into the main Allied army. 😉
Presumably UK / Empire will have lost a fair few less soldiers without NA going on for so long
There’s also the fact that air superiority is an absolute must have prior to the invasion; difficult to see how that will be achieved in 43, with the lack of long ranged escorts to properly attrite the German fighter strength.
We must, however, remember how far ahead they are here. OTL they lost over 30,000 dead or captured (mostly the latter) in Greece, but likely not here. North Africa cost them ~220,000 casualties, mostly in the Western Desert Campaign, while here they've taken only a tiny fraction of that. In the Med, they're a year-and-a-half ahead of schedule (and hold Crete), and have almost a quarter of a million more men than OTL.
Maybe, but the British have a much better bargaining position than OTL. Also, remember that for Overlord, Eisenhower was the only American in a major leadership position, his deputy (Tedder), and the commander-in-chiefs of all three arms (Army - Montgomery, Air Force - Leigh-Mallory, Navy - Ramsay) were British.
And they'd likely be correct.
Assume you mean majority but that's actually not the case. OTL Husky involved the 6 US Divisions (1st, 3rd, 9th, 45th Infantry Divisions, 82nd Airborne and 2nd Armoured against a British Empire contribution of 6 Divisions (5th, 46th, 50th, 51st, 78th Infantry and 1st Canadian) but Britain also provided the bulk of the Corps and Army troops including 4 whole Brigades. The comfortable majority of the Air component was British and the same applied to the Naval element. In this scenario the British can absolutely put together a 14 Division equivalent force an invasion, especially without the OTL PoW losses of Greece, Crete and North Africa.
Britain certainly can't invade France on their own. They need American help and will have to accept American leadership in that Theatre as the price of that help. But in OTL the British Army peaked at 39 operational Divisions, or slightly less than half the size of the US Army before you count the Indian Army*, Canadians and Australians. Here fewer PoW's mean they will probably peak at 2 or 3 more Divisions.
But the crucial point is that the balance of power between the two Allies is going to shift later than OTL and will be less lopsided than OTL and even more importantly the US isn't the only country with domestic political constraints. In OTL the British Army weakened it's position by it's poor performance so that the British government from Churchill on down were not willing or able to fight for it's operational independence in the way that they did fight to ensure that the Royal Navy was always in charge of operations in the Med and Atlantic with only very, very nominal adherence to Eisenhower and Harris was able to operate Bomber Command with even less lip service to Allied unity. A British Army that has won a string of victories is a British Army that will have MP's fighting it's corner in Parliament and around the Cabinet table rather than criticising it. Now that isn't going to make the US any more willing to put their troops under British command but it is probably going to result in a much weaker Supreme Command, less unity of purpose and overall a less efficient campaign.
*which included a lot of British troops and manpower, equivalent to another 4 or 5 Divisions at least.
The battle of the Atlantic maybe going slightly better given the big escort loss of Crete hasn't happened. Also hold Bengazi helps as well since it lessens the need slightly of having to run fast convoys through the Med to Malta aince you can fly aircraft from there to Malta to help keep numbers up as well as provide a supplement to its fighter cover as well.
Adding to this give how dramatically different NA and Africa as a whole has gone it also eases the strain tone degree on British logistics as well.
So it lessen the strain though to what degree I'm unsure.
Better moral too as well since less dead sons, fathers, brothers and friends. As well as time to both learn get better trained formations and more and better kit into their hands.
Like I imagine we may see the Stirling earlier for example.
Florida Everglades might count as 'jungle' in places.
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They are (if I read the maps right) in one of the most southerly parts of the mainland USA.
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The counterpoint is similar to an earlier discussion in this thread that no Panzerarmee Afrika means hundreds of tanks, thousands of trucks and several hundred thousand men are available for the fighting in Russia, Case Blue isn't going to succeed but an extra 3 armoured divisions is going to help.
Similarly an earlier end to German interest in the Med means 1/3rd of the U-Boots aren't going to be in the Med in 1942, that means the second happy time might be even bloodier for the US. Of course the Germans could react to defeat in Libya by doubling down on the naval campaign in the Med in an effort to forestall an invasion of Sicily/Italy so more subs are pulled from the Atlantic than OTL meaning the Battle of the Atlantic goes better. It depends on Hitler's whims.
The counterpoint to that counterpoint is that Britain is sending much better equipment too, Valiant tanks and opposed to Valentines OTL.
True that's why I I preferenced it with slightly better Thoresby. A lot can go wrong and a lot can go right at the end of the day for both Allies and the Axis when it comes down to it a lot will depend on decision made at various levels.