Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
So really what the Italians have done is delay the British by providing them with valuable military hardware?
While enemy mines can be repurposed it's always preferable to use your own production which a.) your troops know how to use, b.) haven't been disturbed and possibly damaged in the act of being removed c.) have gone through your QC process. Anyway the real constraint on availability of anything in the Far East is shipping capacity not production capacity for which the British have enough munition production capacity at home, in the colonies and in the US to provide all they can ship.
The most likely use for these mines is either disposal or possibly be storage and then passed on to various partisan groups, probably in the Balkans, via the SOE.
The most likely use for these mines is either disposal or possibly be storage and then passed on to various partisan groups, probably in the Balkans, via the SOE.
Might be a bit of a distance to transport them, to use them in the Pacific. The Italians were not great munitions designers. Their mines were not known to be particularly powerful, unlike the Germans with their Teller mines...
Fair.
Yeah, that's a good idea.
Hey, free stuff is free stuff.
The main problem with repurposing Italian landmines is the little fact that the Italians know exactly where their mines are and the British don't. Don't forget that both Allied and Axis minefields are still killing & maiming people in North Africa, and elsewhere, to this day. To get the victor to collect all those landmines could require ASB level intervention.
The concern with arming local militia is what they could do with their weapons once the Japanese have been sent packing.
To be entirely fair, a fair chunk of the problems armed locals created OTL was partially down to being totally disillusioned with the power of their colonial overlords. If the empire could not hold off an invader, why not try to rebel? More successful British units fighting alongside some form of Malay volunteer force would be more likely to strengthen the bond between colonial overlord and colony, such that a more or less amicable and legal withdrawal is the expected endpoint.
Nit pick but offered as an assist. Troops are usually numbered and Squadrons lettered, so in current terms 1 to 4 troop make up A Sqn and so on. At present 1 RTR uses Ajax and Badger for A and B Sqns rather than Alpha and Bravo just to be different. I can't guarantee WW2 usage but what I have described is current in RAC, RAAC and RNZAC usage. Great story regardless. Vehicle names are usually organized on a Sqn basis all of A Sqn starting with an A as you have it.
6-11 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 5-10.
allanpcameron
Donor
6-11 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 5-10.
As expected, the main Italian position was anchored by the Wadis Sofeggin and Zerzer. Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, had insisted that the battle should be fought primarily with steel and fire rather than flesh and blood. A day been taken up bringing forward XIII Corps’ artillery (with the exception of that supporting the attack at Sedada). Once the artillery and ammunition were in place, a full and lengthy barrage was brought down on the Italian positions. The Fleet Air Arm’s Walrus aircraft carrying artillery spotters were used to make the best use of the barrage. The RAF Wellington bombers had been hitting Misurata, while the light bombers had focused on the road between Misurata and the front line. Under the cover of this bombardment, the Royal Engineers attempted to clear some of the mines that the Italians had sown in front of their positions.
Once Sedada had been cleared, 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th Bn RTR were to advance on the western side of Wadi Sofeggin, rolling up the Italian defenders from the south. On the right flank, beside the sea, the 7th Support Group continued to make progress along the coastal path, threatening the Italian flank from that direction.
On 9 November, before dawn, 16th Brigade, with support from 7th Hussars, began their assault. The main attack was to the right of the main road, following a track through the marshy sand sea. The attack on quite a narrow front bogged down, sometimes literally for the Valiant I tanks of 7th Hussars. Progress quickly began to peter out, with losses mounting among the 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment steadily increasing. Again and again, the CS tanks, with their 3-inch dual purpose guns, were called forward. The high velocity 2-pdr on most tanks were almost useless against the Italian bunker and trench systems. The machine gun ammunition for the co-axial BESA machine gun was used up, but the gunners occasionally attempted to use the main gun almost like a sniper rifle, not something that it excelled at.
A number of well concealed and protected Italian guns, either meant for anti-aircraft or general artillery roles, were used in the anti-tank role. The frontal armour on the Valiant tank withstood most hits, but as the range decreased, the toll on 7th Hussars mounted alongside that of the infantry. Brigadier Cyril Lomax was prepared to send in the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, but Major-General Evetts felt that wouldn’t change the situation entirely. Instead, he ordered Lomax to keep the Italians occupied by expanding the width of the attack, hopefully drawing their reserves to this axis of attack. The 22nd (Guards) Brigade were beginning to make progress on the left flank, which, if continued would unseat the Italians much more quickly, with hopefully, fewer casualties.
For the rest of that day, and for the next, continued British pressure made some progress, while the Italian defenders put up continued effective resistance. The break, when it came, came suddenly and completely.
Brigadier Hugh Russell’s 7th Armoured Brigade (1st Bn RTR, 8th Hussars, 45th Bn RTR) were due to support 50th (Northumbrian) Division in the second phase of the operation. They would exploit any breakthrough once it was achieved by 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division. Lt-General Godwin-Austen was used to this type of fighting in East Africa, his Army Commander, Lt-General O’Connor wasn’t. After a heated discussion, Godwin-Austin accepted O’Connor’s order to let 7th Armoured Brigade loose, with 50th Division hot on their heels.
When Russell got the order to move, he had a brief meeting with his counterpart in 4th Armoured Brigade, and decided that rather than use his tank force in ‘penny packets’, he would force the issue with the Italians in an all-out attack. Originally the idea was Russell would follow the path taken by 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th RTR, which was now little more than at half strength. Russell however, with O’Connor, had other ideas.
As dawn was breaking on the morning of 11 November, Armistice Day, 180 Valiant I tanks rolled forward under the cover of a sustained barrage by all the artillery of XIII Corps, 6th and 50th Divisions within range. Immediately behind the tanks was the lorried infantry of 151st Brigade. Moving from Sedada they followed the track towards the airfield at Bir El Gebira. There were two lines of Italian defences based on ridges at the edge of Wadi Soffegan and then Wadi Merdum. Up until now these had mostly been by-passed as the Guards had worked northwards to the east of these lines. With the constant danger in the centre of the Italian lines, more and more of the units designated to defend these lines had been pulled away to fill gaps.
Therefore as 7th Armoured Brigade emerged out of the edge of the barrage, before the Italians had time to fully man their positions, the tanks rolled over the first line, with 45th Bn RTR turning west and running along the Italian position from behind, aiming for another landing field at El Merdum. 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars continued forward, the barrage having once more been timed to allow the tanks to close with the Italian forces at Wadi Merdum as quickly as possible. The barrage wasn’t quite as effective, much of the artillery was now out of range, and the two tank battalions split to move to the left and right of the ridge. This allowed the Italian gunners to get an opportunity to hit the tanks on the sides, causing losses among the tanks and their crews.
The effect of the British tanks appearing on both flanks of the Italian positions very quickly put the defenders in an untenable position. While the men of 151st Brigade came forward to police up the Italian prisoners, the support vehicles arrived to replenish the tanks. While 7th Armoured Brigade paused, news of the breach reached the Italian Command HQ. The preceding days had pulled almost all reserves into the line to defend against the British attack. The only mobile reserve was what was left of the Ariete Division, based around Bir Durfan.
Their role was to attempt to counter such a left hook, or cover the retreat of the main forces towards Misurata if the main line was breached. They couldn’t do both. The news of the British breakthrough on their right flank caused dismay among many of the units which had been in the thick of the fighting over the previous few days. The idea that they would soon be cut off from Misurata had some commanders, especially at Brigade and Regimental level, ordering their own units to pull out before it was too late. The confusion in the Italian lines couldn’t have come at a better time for 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division.
After the initial barrage to support 7th Armoured Brigade, much of the artillery returned to their own targets. 2nd Bn Scots Guards were probing forward when the Italian unit in front of them suddenly broke. The chain reaction of a breakthrough on the main position, coupled with the upset of the arrival of British tanks on the flank, completely destroyed Italian resolve. For some men and units, they simply surrendered in place. Others, especially towards the rear and the coast turned tail and tried to make their way up the main road before it was cut off. Some units continued to fight until it was clear that doing so was a pointless waste of their lives.
Lt-General Godwin-Austin ordered 6th Infantry Division/4th Armoured Brigade to advance at best speed up the road, with the exception of 23rd Brigade which would deal with Italian prisoners and hold-outs.
Brigadier John Caunter (OC 4th Armoured Brigade) knew that the efforts of his three Battalions had taken a heavy toll. He ordered the two RTR battalions to amalgamate their surviving tanks and add the remaining squadron to strengthen 7th Hussars. Since the Hussars were in the best position to move forward, they took the lead, along with 16th Brigade through the Italian positions and up the road. Progress was slowed by the sheer number of Italian units that they had to pass through on the main road. Very little efforts were made by the Italians to resist the British advance, most of those captured early were on foot, often without their weapons.
The Ariete Division, on receipt of their orders to counter attack the British at Bir El Gibera, had begun to move. No sooner had they done so when counter orders were received to move to cover the withdrawal of the main Italian force along the main road. There followed a three way ‘discussion’ between the senior Italian commander in Tripoli, the Commander of the Italian defence line and the commander of the Ariete Division. For three hours the Division was forced to wait while the decision about which was the greater threat was hammered out.
By the time they did start to move, the 7th Armoured Brigade had been pushing north from Bir El Gibera. Making good time over the desert the South African Armoured Cars Company, acting as the scouting force for 7th Armoured Brigade began to run into elements of the Ariete Division that were moving east towards the road. Brigadier Russell ordered 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars to change their direction to punch into the side of the Italian force. At 16:00hrs 1st Bn RTR made contact with the 132nd Tank Regiment, swiftly followed by 8th Hussars. The Valiant I Infantry tanks outmatched the M13/40s of the Italians in almost everything but speed.
The battle between the two tank units was brief and one sided. Without time to coordinate with the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, which should have provided infantry, artillery and anti-tank support, two Battalions of 132nd Tank Regiment were destroyed, some 75 tanks had been knocked out. Sixteen Valiant tanks were disabled in the engagement, though only a few were actually destroyed, and fifteen had various mechanical malfunctions. What remained of the Ariete Division joined the stream of Italian units towards Misurata.
The two Battalions of 7th Armoured Brigade pulled back towards Bir El Gibera to replenish and leaguer for the night. 45th Bn RTR had captured El Merdum airfield and with the rest of 50th Division arriving during the night, Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) met with an exhausted Brigadier Russell to go over the plan for the next day. They agreed that 45th Bn RTR, with 151st Brigade would attempt to capture Beni Ulid. The rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 50th Division would continue firstly to Bir Durfan, then, all being well, the following day attempt to reach the coast at Zliten, cutting off the town of Misurata from Tripoli, and hopefully bagging the majority of the Italian army in the process.
As expected, the main Italian position was anchored by the Wadis Sofeggin and Zerzer. Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, had insisted that the battle should be fought primarily with steel and fire rather than flesh and blood. A day been taken up bringing forward XIII Corps’ artillery (with the exception of that supporting the attack at Sedada). Once the artillery and ammunition were in place, a full and lengthy barrage was brought down on the Italian positions. The Fleet Air Arm’s Walrus aircraft carrying artillery spotters were used to make the best use of the barrage. The RAF Wellington bombers had been hitting Misurata, while the light bombers had focused on the road between Misurata and the front line. Under the cover of this bombardment, the Royal Engineers attempted to clear some of the mines that the Italians had sown in front of their positions.
Once Sedada had been cleared, 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th Bn RTR were to advance on the western side of Wadi Sofeggin, rolling up the Italian defenders from the south. On the right flank, beside the sea, the 7th Support Group continued to make progress along the coastal path, threatening the Italian flank from that direction.
On 9 November, before dawn, 16th Brigade, with support from 7th Hussars, began their assault. The main attack was to the right of the main road, following a track through the marshy sand sea. The attack on quite a narrow front bogged down, sometimes literally for the Valiant I tanks of 7th Hussars. Progress quickly began to peter out, with losses mounting among the 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment steadily increasing. Again and again, the CS tanks, with their 3-inch dual purpose guns, were called forward. The high velocity 2-pdr on most tanks were almost useless against the Italian bunker and trench systems. The machine gun ammunition for the co-axial BESA machine gun was used up, but the gunners occasionally attempted to use the main gun almost like a sniper rifle, not something that it excelled at.
A number of well concealed and protected Italian guns, either meant for anti-aircraft or general artillery roles, were used in the anti-tank role. The frontal armour on the Valiant tank withstood most hits, but as the range decreased, the toll on 7th Hussars mounted alongside that of the infantry. Brigadier Cyril Lomax was prepared to send in the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, but Major-General Evetts felt that wouldn’t change the situation entirely. Instead, he ordered Lomax to keep the Italians occupied by expanding the width of the attack, hopefully drawing their reserves to this axis of attack. The 22nd (Guards) Brigade were beginning to make progress on the left flank, which, if continued would unseat the Italians much more quickly, with hopefully, fewer casualties.
For the rest of that day, and for the next, continued British pressure made some progress, while the Italian defenders put up continued effective resistance. The break, when it came, came suddenly and completely.
Brigadier Hugh Russell’s 7th Armoured Brigade (1st Bn RTR, 8th Hussars, 45th Bn RTR) were due to support 50th (Northumbrian) Division in the second phase of the operation. They would exploit any breakthrough once it was achieved by 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division. Lt-General Godwin-Austen was used to this type of fighting in East Africa, his Army Commander, Lt-General O’Connor wasn’t. After a heated discussion, Godwin-Austin accepted O’Connor’s order to let 7th Armoured Brigade loose, with 50th Division hot on their heels.
When Russell got the order to move, he had a brief meeting with his counterpart in 4th Armoured Brigade, and decided that rather than use his tank force in ‘penny packets’, he would force the issue with the Italians in an all-out attack. Originally the idea was Russell would follow the path taken by 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th RTR, which was now little more than at half strength. Russell however, with O’Connor, had other ideas.
As dawn was breaking on the morning of 11 November, Armistice Day, 180 Valiant I tanks rolled forward under the cover of a sustained barrage by all the artillery of XIII Corps, 6th and 50th Divisions within range. Immediately behind the tanks was the lorried infantry of 151st Brigade. Moving from Sedada they followed the track towards the airfield at Bir El Gebira. There were two lines of Italian defences based on ridges at the edge of Wadi Soffegan and then Wadi Merdum. Up until now these had mostly been by-passed as the Guards had worked northwards to the east of these lines. With the constant danger in the centre of the Italian lines, more and more of the units designated to defend these lines had been pulled away to fill gaps.
Therefore as 7th Armoured Brigade emerged out of the edge of the barrage, before the Italians had time to fully man their positions, the tanks rolled over the first line, with 45th Bn RTR turning west and running along the Italian position from behind, aiming for another landing field at El Merdum. 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars continued forward, the barrage having once more been timed to allow the tanks to close with the Italian forces at Wadi Merdum as quickly as possible. The barrage wasn’t quite as effective, much of the artillery was now out of range, and the two tank battalions split to move to the left and right of the ridge. This allowed the Italian gunners to get an opportunity to hit the tanks on the sides, causing losses among the tanks and their crews.
The effect of the British tanks appearing on both flanks of the Italian positions very quickly put the defenders in an untenable position. While the men of 151st Brigade came forward to police up the Italian prisoners, the support vehicles arrived to replenish the tanks. While 7th Armoured Brigade paused, news of the breach reached the Italian Command HQ. The preceding days had pulled almost all reserves into the line to defend against the British attack. The only mobile reserve was what was left of the Ariete Division, based around Bir Durfan.
Their role was to attempt to counter such a left hook, or cover the retreat of the main forces towards Misurata if the main line was breached. They couldn’t do both. The news of the British breakthrough on their right flank caused dismay among many of the units which had been in the thick of the fighting over the previous few days. The idea that they would soon be cut off from Misurata had some commanders, especially at Brigade and Regimental level, ordering their own units to pull out before it was too late. The confusion in the Italian lines couldn’t have come at a better time for 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division.
After the initial barrage to support 7th Armoured Brigade, much of the artillery returned to their own targets. 2nd Bn Scots Guards were probing forward when the Italian unit in front of them suddenly broke. The chain reaction of a breakthrough on the main position, coupled with the upset of the arrival of British tanks on the flank, completely destroyed Italian resolve. For some men and units, they simply surrendered in place. Others, especially towards the rear and the coast turned tail and tried to make their way up the main road before it was cut off. Some units continued to fight until it was clear that doing so was a pointless waste of their lives.
Lt-General Godwin-Austin ordered 6th Infantry Division/4th Armoured Brigade to advance at best speed up the road, with the exception of 23rd Brigade which would deal with Italian prisoners and hold-outs.
Brigadier John Caunter (OC 4th Armoured Brigade) knew that the efforts of his three Battalions had taken a heavy toll. He ordered the two RTR battalions to amalgamate their surviving tanks and add the remaining squadron to strengthen 7th Hussars. Since the Hussars were in the best position to move forward, they took the lead, along with 16th Brigade through the Italian positions and up the road. Progress was slowed by the sheer number of Italian units that they had to pass through on the main road. Very little efforts were made by the Italians to resist the British advance, most of those captured early were on foot, often without their weapons.
The Ariete Division, on receipt of their orders to counter attack the British at Bir El Gibera, had begun to move. No sooner had they done so when counter orders were received to move to cover the withdrawal of the main Italian force along the main road. There followed a three way ‘discussion’ between the senior Italian commander in Tripoli, the Commander of the Italian defence line and the commander of the Ariete Division. For three hours the Division was forced to wait while the decision about which was the greater threat was hammered out.
By the time they did start to move, the 7th Armoured Brigade had been pushing north from Bir El Gibera. Making good time over the desert the South African Armoured Cars Company, acting as the scouting force for 7th Armoured Brigade began to run into elements of the Ariete Division that were moving east towards the road. Brigadier Russell ordered 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars to change their direction to punch into the side of the Italian force. At 16:00hrs 1st Bn RTR made contact with the 132nd Tank Regiment, swiftly followed by 8th Hussars. The Valiant I Infantry tanks outmatched the M13/40s of the Italians in almost everything but speed.
The battle between the two tank units was brief and one sided. Without time to coordinate with the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, which should have provided infantry, artillery and anti-tank support, two Battalions of 132nd Tank Regiment were destroyed, some 75 tanks had been knocked out. Sixteen Valiant tanks were disabled in the engagement, though only a few were actually destroyed, and fifteen had various mechanical malfunctions. What remained of the Ariete Division joined the stream of Italian units towards Misurata.
The two Battalions of 7th Armoured Brigade pulled back towards Bir El Gibera to replenish and leaguer for the night. 45th Bn RTR had captured El Merdum airfield and with the rest of 50th Division arriving during the night, Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) met with an exhausted Brigadier Russell to go over the plan for the next day. They agreed that 45th Bn RTR, with 151st Brigade would attempt to capture Beni Ulid. The rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 50th Division would continue firstly to Bir Durfan, then, all being well, the following day attempt to reach the coast at Zliten, cutting off the town of Misurata from Tripoli, and hopefully bagging the majority of the Italian army in the process.
Donald Reaver
Donor
No problems, glad to see this continuing. Sounds like the Italian army is on its last gasps.