The issue was politics, USW was regarded by treaty as illegal, like gas..... planing for it would have started serious political problems domestically at a higher pay grade than 1st sea lord?
Royal Navy Fleet Problems
- Thread starter Hood
- Start date
The Royal Navy carried out a massive exercise every year throughout the interwar period, roughly comparable to the USN's fleet problems. These brought together the RN's two main fleets, the Atlantic (later Home) and Mediterranean Fleet together, to fight a major fleet action. They might include a strategic layer, carried out at the Staff College in Greenwich prior to the more tactical fleet exercises. The exercises typically tried to replicate real situations the RN might face - escorting convoys to relieve beleagured ports, establishing forward bases from which to strike at enemy trade, or forcing an evasive enemy to action. These large exercises were backed up by smaller ones held more frequently. The Mediterranean Fleet was a key tactical laboratory in this sense, with its exercises helping to develop much of the RN's carrier doctrine in particular.
ASW exercises weren't just done at the ASW school in Portland, but were fairly widespread. Pre-war doctrine for countering night attacks by surfaced submarines, for example, was partially informed by exercises carried out against the destroyer Mohawk, which found that ASDIC could detect a sub making such an attack well before the sub was visible to the naked eye.
The big problems that seems to have come out of Portland were less about difficulties detecting targets and more about difficulties attacking them. The exercises assumed that any charge dropped was set to the correct depth; this was probably true of any depth charge dropped in the shallow Channel, but not so much in the North Atlantic or Bay of Biscay, especially when the depth-finding abilities of the ASDICs fitted pre-war were minimal. Another problem was that Portland failed to realise that a submarine could take evasive action between a charge being dropped and it detonating, again likely due to the shallow conditions in the Channel.
A number of British exercises in the interwar period focused on this exact topic. These were carried out in the Mediterranean, for the most part, with various features standing in roughly for the Pacific. 1925's Exercise MU was a simulation of a relief of Singapore, with the Doro Channel standing in for the Malacca Strait. Exercise MU2, carried out in 1928, saw the Mediterranean Fleet trying to relieve Alboran Island and then Gibraltar, which stood in for Singapore and Hong Kong respectively, while Atlantic Fleet tried to prevent this.
ASW exercises weren't just done at the ASW school in Portland, but were fairly widespread. Pre-war doctrine for countering night attacks by surfaced submarines, for example, was partially informed by exercises carried out against the destroyer Mohawk, which found that ASDIC could detect a sub making such an attack well before the sub was visible to the naked eye.
The big problems that seems to have come out of Portland were less about difficulties detecting targets and more about difficulties attacking them. The exercises assumed that any charge dropped was set to the correct depth; this was probably true of any depth charge dropped in the shallow Channel, but not so much in the North Atlantic or Bay of Biscay, especially when the depth-finding abilities of the ASDICs fitted pre-war were minimal. Another problem was that Portland failed to realise that a submarine could take evasive action between a charge being dropped and it detonating, again likely due to the shallow conditions in the Channel.
It was done, on occasion. In 1930, for example, the Atlantic Fleet carried out an exercise testing the use of aircraft for convoy defense. Atlantic Fleet's capital ships, steaming at ten knots, stood in for the merchants, while two destroyer flotillas, Argus' air group and RAF flying boats formed the escort. They faced attacks by 16 submarines, using tactics that, to some extent, prefigured the wolf-pack in use in WWII. At other times, destroyer flotillas practiced escorting convoys, with single merchant/RFA ships simulating the convoy.
A number of British exercises in the interwar period focused on this exact topic. These were carried out in the Mediterranean, for the most part, with various features standing in roughly for the Pacific. 1925's Exercise MU was a simulation of a relief of Singapore, with the Doro Channel standing in for the Malacca Strait. Exercise MU2, carried out in 1928, saw the Mediterranean Fleet trying to relieve Alboran Island and then Gibraltar, which stood in for Singapore and Hong Kong respectively, while Atlantic Fleet tried to prevent this.
Japan is a threat for part of the time. But in no position to threaten British trade from the bases it has in the 20s and 30s. Italy possibly but thats a Med threat not a mid Atlantic one, France is no realistic threat, most of the French Navy is based in the Med, and designed for the Med and the defence would be air attacks on French ports. The USSR does not have a navy capable of attacking British trade. The USA theoretically could, but is not actually a threat and its ability to threaten British trade is limited to the western Atlantic and can be a achieved by closing its own ports.
Time spent exercising against purely theoretical and remote threats takes time away both from realistic threats and actual issues.
One of the major differences between the USN and the RN in terms of exercises is the USN have very very little experience of operating in wartime or as a fleet in the modern age . The RN has fought WW1, fought fleet actions, played hunt the raider for real, done the ASW thing in several theatres, amphib assault, and done long range transport of troops and shipping, and done carrier operations both in WW1 and immediately post war.
The main mission of the USN is to travel across the Pacific and engage the IJN, thats what its for. Its a pretty unique mission involving crossing the Pacific, with Japanese bases in the way and then operating off a hostile coast until they have captured a base. And defending the Canal and Pearl Harbour from enemy attack. Training for this is what the Fleet Exercises are about and developing technique for doing this.
The US zombie defence plan is actually an exercise in how to plan and because there is actually very little to do in Omaha most of the time. The RN has its own staff college and a tri service college for planning and training people on how to plan
My understanding is that RN had no academic/ theoretical institution quite like NWC that was preparing younger officers for command who drafted ideas and strategies that translated to fleet problems and then feed back real world lessons to the gaming to refine again the knowledge as well as planning. There was no linkage of theoretical to exercises back to the theorists. Moreover I am unaware of a linkage to those specifying and designing the ships as the Naval Board had at least something of a connection to both fleet and strategy as it devised the ships wanted/needed.
The R & S classes were too fragile for the Atlantic, any sort of weather caused them damage.
The RN had several such institutions. The Royal Naval College in Greenwich included under its umbrella the Staff College and War College. All three institutions trained young officers to command; most of the RN's large-scale exercises began with a strategic game worked out in Greenwich, with the starting conditions then fed to the fleets to determine the tactical situation. There was also the Tactical School at Portsmouth, which was responsible for lower-level wargaming. Both the RNC and the Tactical School were used to refine and hone the RN's war plans. As an example, at the start of the interwar period night fighting was not a part of the RN's tactical planning; by 1934 exercises had proven that the RN could do it confidently and capably, and by 1939 it was a major part of the RN's doctrine. Those specifying the ships were also part of the Navy staff - requirements were drawn up by the Naval staff based on a compromise between the demands of the various divisions of the Navy (gunnery, torpedo, engineering etc). This was an iterative process, with the naval constructors coming back to the staff and vice versa to work through what could effectively be built.
No, they didn't. The average convoy in 1918 was smaller than the average convoy sailing in 1939, and convoys only grew from there - they were reaching 60-80 by the end of 1942. The calculations performed in 1943 were also very different from those performed in 1918. In WWI, it was a simple calculation that the perimeter of the convoy (i.e. the number of escorts required) was proportional to the square root of the area of the convoy (i.e. the number of ships in it). The calculations in 1943 were a broader statistical analysis showing that larger convoys were ultimately a more efficient use of escorts and air support, as well as the need for faster merchants and more air power.
Seeing your latter two words reminds me: Didn't the US Army at one point have a plan drawn up to combat a hypothetical uprising by the Scout Movement?
I believe it was the girl scouts.
The question arose what does the US Army do if it is called in to assist in a large scale national civil disturbance and it is politically unacceptable to use a lot of force.
People started brainstorming what would cause such a civil disturbance and someone responded what if the girl scouts rebelled.
What? Enough people aren't buying their cookies and they break out the hockey sticks?
Girl Scouts Are Evil - TV Tropes
Is there anything more adorable and innocent than a Girl Scout? Definitely yes, if you ask some people (especially in the Webcomic community). For some reason, they often end up depicted as vile monsters who use deceptive cuteness and innocence …
tvtropes.org
Commander Rollo Appleyard's work was declared obsolete in 1939 and destroyed.
Valuable experience of 1914–18 was disregarded in other respects as concerns convoy. Until 1943, when Professor P. M. S. Blackett produced some interesting statistics about ocean convoys and changed the staff view on convoy escort, it was Admiralty gospel that ‘the larger the convoy the greater the risk’. Had the convoy statistics of 1917–18 been analysed after the war, and the printed results of the mathematical research on comparative escort strength by an acting commander, RNVR (Rollo Appleyard) early in 1918 been studied, the Admiralty would have been aware of ‘the law of convoy size’: ‘The escort strength requires to be measured, not in terms of the number of vessels in convoy, but in terms of the total area comprised within the boundary formed by lines connecting all outer vessels.’ Appleyard went on to prove mathematically that the ratio of the torpedo attack area around the convoy perimeter to the number of escorts directly watching it is ‘a more correct numerical measure of the escort strength of a convoy than is the ratio of the number of ships in convoy to the number of close escorts’. It is sad that operational research was not understood in the interwar years; it needed someone of the standing of Blackett to show what could be done in this field.
The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914–1918 Part II
There is substance in Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Waters’s assertion that ‘virtually every surface and air anti-submarine lesson of the first submarine war had to be, and ultimately was, re-learnt i…
weaponsandwarfare.com
Commander Rollo Appleyard's work was declared obsolete in 1939 and destroyed.
Valuable experience of 1914–18 was disregarded in other respects as concerns convoy. Until 1943, when Professor P. M. S. Blackett produced some interesting statistics about ocean convoys and changed the staff view on convoy escort, it was Admiralty gospel that ‘the larger the convoy the greater the risk’. Had the convoy statistics of 1917–18 been analysed after the war, and the printed results of the mathematical research on comparative escort strength by an acting commander, RNVR (Rollo Appleyard) early in 1918 been studied, the Admiralty would have been aware of ‘the law of convoy size’: ‘The escort strength requires to be measured, not in terms of the number of vessels in convoy, but in terms of the total area comprised within the boundary formed by lines connecting all outer vessels.’ Appleyard went on to prove mathematically that the ratio of the torpedo attack area around the convoy perimeter to the number of escorts directly watching it is ‘a more correct numerical measure of the escort strength of a convoy than is the ratio of the number of ships in convoy to the number of close escorts’. It is sad that operational research was not understood in the interwar years; it needed someone of the standing of Blackett to show what could be done in this field.The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914–1918 Part II
There is substance in Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Waters’s assertion that ‘virtually every surface and air anti-submarine lesson of the first submarine war had to be, and ultimately was, re-learnt i…
Ahh,, I was looking for what I had saved on Rollo Appleyard but couldn't find it.
It was declared obsolete, because its conclusions had become a large part of British convoy doctrine; the typical convoy in the first few years of WWII was over twice the size of the typical WWI convoy, and the maximum size felt practical due to handling concerns (60 ships) was four times the size. It was also obsolete because it was written for a very different threat environment and role for the convoy. In WWI, the convoy had been purely about limiting the exposure of the merchants to submarines, with the escorts there to hold down attacking subs until the convoy had passed. By WWII, it had shifted towards being a killing ground for submarines. A cornerstone of Blackett's work was that larger escort groups killed more submarines - but the only way to get those larger groups was to combine smaller convoys to form larger ones.
It doesn’t really undercut your point but from what I have seen the average size of a WW1 convoy hit 36 by October 1917 and convoys of over 50 ships were very common. Not sure where the 15 ship typical size is coming from.
I was going by numbers from Friedman's Fighting the Great War at Sea, which quotes 1502 arrivals in Britain from 99 Atlantic convoys up to the end of October 1917. Between May 1917 and November 1918, there were ~1500 transatlantic convoys, consisting of a total of ~18,000 ships, giving an average size of ~12 ships per convoy, per Chapter 10 of the USNWC's Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009. The coastal and North Sea convoys were typically much larger, which brings the numbers up.
Saying that increasing the size of the convoy reduces the number of escorts needed per ship is sort of true, but very simplistic.
Even in WW2 (and certainly not after!), escorts didnt just surround the convoy and stay there. They are deployed to cover the expected threat (this was turned into a complex proceedure during the cold war, in WW2 iit was a bit more empirical). More escorts ALWAYS helps, of course, and yes, a bigger convoy allows for this, but you still have two problems.
You still dont have enough escorts to cover all the options.
A very big convoy, especially if the screen is penetrated, will suffer more from a pack attack. Now by 1943, centimetric radar and other improvements had degraded the pack attack very considerably (note that a lot of U-boats around a convoy is not the same thing as a pack attack, which was intended to be a surface attack!).
Its a changing situation; by 1943 the larger convoy concept was correct (aided by the improvements at unloading/cargo handling that had taken place, and that the LW couldnt mob all those ships arriving at once). In 1940/41, I'm not so convinced...
Even in WW2 (and certainly not after!), escorts didnt just surround the convoy and stay there. They are deployed to cover the expected threat (this was turned into a complex proceedure during the cold war, in WW2 iit was a bit more empirical). More escorts ALWAYS helps, of course, and yes, a bigger convoy allows for this, but you still have two problems.
You still dont have enough escorts to cover all the options.
A very big convoy, especially if the screen is penetrated, will suffer more from a pack attack. Now by 1943, centimetric radar and other improvements had degraded the pack attack very considerably (note that a lot of U-boats around a convoy is not the same thing as a pack attack, which was intended to be a surface attack!).
Its a changing situation; by 1943 the larger convoy concept was correct (aided by the improvements at unloading/cargo handling that had taken place, and that the LW couldnt mob all those ships arriving at once). In 1940/41, I'm not so convinced...
I've been delayed getting back to this one, but some interesting passages from consulting Moretz. Quotes are in blue
p. 164 War with the United States
"The Service examined at the War College he general lines of how such a war might waged, held exercise on war game table and conducted, at sea, exercise in which Red Fleet, the British force, opposed Blue fleet, the United States Navy. An example of this was the exercises conducted by the Atlantic Fleet during its passage from England to Spanish waters during the Spring cruise of 1921. Hood and Repulse, acting as US battle cruisers, in company with Tiger, representing the US battlefleet, were to intercept the Atlantic Fleet and force and action prior to the latter's arrival at Arosa Bay. As the United States Navy did not possess a single battle cruiser in 1921, ad had only recently begun construction of the type with the laying down of the Lexington-class, it may be concluded that purpose of the exercise was to gauge the material readiness of the Royal Navy in a not-too-distant future war."
p. 166 War with Japan
"Exercise E.A. conducted 17-20 January 1922 as the Atlantic Fleet sailed from Portland to Arosa Bay, tested the concept of escorting a convoy including a Mobile Naval Base supply ship. The convoy formed, in part, by the carrier Courageous, HMS Pandora, HMS Assistance and HMS Sandhurst, was escorted by Red Fleet, a force composed of seven battleships the First Light Cruiser Squadron, and two flotillas of destroyers in the face of the Blue Fleet, a squadron of two battle cruisers, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, two flotillas of destroyers and submarines. The Red Fleet was to replenish the mobile base at Arosa Bay, represented by HMS Snapdragon and HMS Maidstone and defended by mines, submarines and a local defence flotilla.
A later exercise in Greek waters, 'N.A.S.F.' in August 1926 tested the practicality of the Mobile Base on a full-scale deployment.
Other exercises tested deploying the fleet to Singapore 35 days after a Japanese declaration of war. One concluded the Japanese could not secure Singapore before the arrival of the fleet, which Admiral Richmond, CinC East Indies questioned. He didn't think the Japanese would spend 12 days building an aerodrome.
Another simulated passage of the fleet through the Straits of Malacca. It was determined Queen Elizabeth, Barham and Marlborough had all received single torpedo hits, and CinC Mediterranean recommended 'adequate repair, docks, ammunition and store facilities should be available for the fleet on arrival on the far end'
p. 167
"In 1928, exercise 'M.U.2', beginning 15 March, saw over 80 ships from the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets test the concept of securing a decisive fleet action before Hong Kong, represented by Gibraltar, and Singapore, represented by the Spanish island of Alboran off the western coast of Algeria, succumbed to Japanese forces"
Some interesting passages on night fighting:
p.225
"The decision to not only accept battle at night, but, in fact, to seek it was established at long last because British naval supremacy could no longer be maintained by numbers alone and night-fighting appeared tailor-made for a Naval Service made up of effectively trained long-serving professionals....At best, Britain would be equal to an adversary in a future war, and could, indeed, be the weaker force."
p.226
"This last point was confirmed in a series of fleet exercises that sought to develop the necessary tactics to allow the British fleet to successfully engage an enemy force that enjoyed the advantage in long-range gunnery. With only Rodney and Nelson able to engage ships beyond 30,000 yards, and with US, Japanese, and German ships known to enjoy such an advantage in gunnery, the results were disquieting, to say the least. In April 1933, the Mediterranean Fleet tested the hypothesis in exercise 'R.R.' Red Fleet, consisting of five battleships, and enjoying a slight advantage in speed, but limited in firing its main armament to 23,800 yards, engaged Blue Fleet, a force of four battleships able to fire up to 32,000 yards. Both fleets were in equal in cruiser and destroyer forces, and while Red was able to dispose of Blue's cruiser force in short order, the engagement of the opposing battlefleets brought grief to Red. It is worth reporting a summary of the action at length:
11.The two battlefleets came in sight at 36,000 yards, and at 32,000 yards, Blue fired a few rounds. Red cruisers and destroyers then attempted to cover their battlefleet with smoke, but this did not prevent Blue deploying at a range of 29,000 yards, and beginning a four-ship concentration on Red Revenge...
12. Discounting the effect of Blue gunfire under these conditions, Red held his course for another twelve minutes, and then swung round to close at a maximum rate. After 40 minutes under fire, he was able to open his foremost turrets, at 23,700 yards, but in this interval Revenge had been destroyed.
13. With range down to 22,000 yards, Red turned to a parallel course to open his 'A' arcs. Blue promptly turned away together to open the range, leaving only his after turrets bearing, but Red followed at once. By this manoeuvre Blue had opened the range 800 yards, but Red was in pursuit, no advantage was to be gained by further retirement, and Blue turned back determined to close quickly to decisive range.
The assessment concluded by advising that:
15. Unless the fleet with the shorter range guns ha a large advantage in speed, or visibility is limited, the use of smoke appears to be essential in order to avoid damage, which may be serious, when closing a well-handled fleet armed with longer range guns.
In the following year, 1934, an expanded exercise, 'Z.J.', was conducted by the combined Mediterranean and Home Fleets on the question. This time of its five battleships, Red was allowed two whose maximum range exceeded 32,000 yards. They faced and equal number of Blue force battleships, all enjoying the advantage of long-range gunnery. If anything, the results were even more discouraging. Red Fleet lost two battleships"
p. 227
"outright, two others were disabled to 60 per cent and 25 per cent respectively, and Resolution was damaged but slightly. Blue Fleets losses included the sinking of Nelson and damage of 50 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, to Malaya and Barham. "
An aside, but an interesting passage on the new battleship after the holiday expired:
p. 228
"The Service's willingness to accept a night action was an attempt to mitigate through tactics its increasing strategic naval inferiority. This inferiority only worsened as the period progressed, as the Service's ships could not be built to the dimensions of their rivals because of limitation in port facilities and the constraints represented by the Suez Canal. Such limitations had long been recognised, and the Admiralty noted even in 1913 the ability of a Queen Elizabeth-class battleship to navigate the Suez Canal was possible only if their oil tanks were nearly empty. Given the restricted displacements of the second King George V and Lion-classes of battleships, and their limited ammunition load of 80 and 60 rounds per gun respectively, an engagement fought at long range was no longer a tactical option for the Royal Navy. The only chance that British forces appeared to have was to seek a night or restricted visibility engagement and pass as quickly as possible through the danger zone."
Regards,
p. 164 War with the United States
"The Service examined at the War College he general lines of how such a war might waged, held exercise on war game table and conducted, at sea, exercise in which Red Fleet, the British force, opposed Blue fleet, the United States Navy. An example of this was the exercises conducted by the Atlantic Fleet during its passage from England to Spanish waters during the Spring cruise of 1921. Hood and Repulse, acting as US battle cruisers, in company with Tiger, representing the US battlefleet, were to intercept the Atlantic Fleet and force and action prior to the latter's arrival at Arosa Bay. As the United States Navy did not possess a single battle cruiser in 1921, ad had only recently begun construction of the type with the laying down of the Lexington-class, it may be concluded that purpose of the exercise was to gauge the material readiness of the Royal Navy in a not-too-distant future war."
p. 166 War with Japan
"Exercise E.A. conducted 17-20 January 1922 as the Atlantic Fleet sailed from Portland to Arosa Bay, tested the concept of escorting a convoy including a Mobile Naval Base supply ship. The convoy formed, in part, by the carrier Courageous, HMS Pandora, HMS Assistance and HMS Sandhurst, was escorted by Red Fleet, a force composed of seven battleships the First Light Cruiser Squadron, and two flotillas of destroyers in the face of the Blue Fleet, a squadron of two battle cruisers, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, two flotillas of destroyers and submarines. The Red Fleet was to replenish the mobile base at Arosa Bay, represented by HMS Snapdragon and HMS Maidstone and defended by mines, submarines and a local defence flotilla.
A later exercise in Greek waters, 'N.A.S.F.' in August 1926 tested the practicality of the Mobile Base on a full-scale deployment.
Other exercises tested deploying the fleet to Singapore 35 days after a Japanese declaration of war. One concluded the Japanese could not secure Singapore before the arrival of the fleet, which Admiral Richmond, CinC East Indies questioned. He didn't think the Japanese would spend 12 days building an aerodrome.
Another simulated passage of the fleet through the Straits of Malacca. It was determined Queen Elizabeth, Barham and Marlborough had all received single torpedo hits, and CinC Mediterranean recommended 'adequate repair, docks, ammunition and store facilities should be available for the fleet on arrival on the far end'
p. 167
"In 1928, exercise 'M.U.2', beginning 15 March, saw over 80 ships from the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets test the concept of securing a decisive fleet action before Hong Kong, represented by Gibraltar, and Singapore, represented by the Spanish island of Alboran off the western coast of Algeria, succumbed to Japanese forces"
Some interesting passages on night fighting:
p.225
"The decision to not only accept battle at night, but, in fact, to seek it was established at long last because British naval supremacy could no longer be maintained by numbers alone and night-fighting appeared tailor-made for a Naval Service made up of effectively trained long-serving professionals....At best, Britain would be equal to an adversary in a future war, and could, indeed, be the weaker force."
p.226
"This last point was confirmed in a series of fleet exercises that sought to develop the necessary tactics to allow the British fleet to successfully engage an enemy force that enjoyed the advantage in long-range gunnery. With only Rodney and Nelson able to engage ships beyond 30,000 yards, and with US, Japanese, and German ships known to enjoy such an advantage in gunnery, the results were disquieting, to say the least. In April 1933, the Mediterranean Fleet tested the hypothesis in exercise 'R.R.' Red Fleet, consisting of five battleships, and enjoying a slight advantage in speed, but limited in firing its main armament to 23,800 yards, engaged Blue Fleet, a force of four battleships able to fire up to 32,000 yards. Both fleets were in equal in cruiser and destroyer forces, and while Red was able to dispose of Blue's cruiser force in short order, the engagement of the opposing battlefleets brought grief to Red. It is worth reporting a summary of the action at length:
11.The two battlefleets came in sight at 36,000 yards, and at 32,000 yards, Blue fired a few rounds. Red cruisers and destroyers then attempted to cover their battlefleet with smoke, but this did not prevent Blue deploying at a range of 29,000 yards, and beginning a four-ship concentration on Red Revenge...
12. Discounting the effect of Blue gunfire under these conditions, Red held his course for another twelve minutes, and then swung round to close at a maximum rate. After 40 minutes under fire, he was able to open his foremost turrets, at 23,700 yards, but in this interval Revenge had been destroyed.
13. With range down to 22,000 yards, Red turned to a parallel course to open his 'A' arcs. Blue promptly turned away together to open the range, leaving only his after turrets bearing, but Red followed at once. By this manoeuvre Blue had opened the range 800 yards, but Red was in pursuit, no advantage was to be gained by further retirement, and Blue turned back determined to close quickly to decisive range.
The assessment concluded by advising that:
15. Unless the fleet with the shorter range guns ha a large advantage in speed, or visibility is limited, the use of smoke appears to be essential in order to avoid damage, which may be serious, when closing a well-handled fleet armed with longer range guns.
In the following year, 1934, an expanded exercise, 'Z.J.', was conducted by the combined Mediterranean and Home Fleets on the question. This time of its five battleships, Red was allowed two whose maximum range exceeded 32,000 yards. They faced and equal number of Blue force battleships, all enjoying the advantage of long-range gunnery. If anything, the results were even more discouraging. Red Fleet lost two battleships"
p. 227
"outright, two others were disabled to 60 per cent and 25 per cent respectively, and Resolution was damaged but slightly. Blue Fleets losses included the sinking of Nelson and damage of 50 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, to Malaya and Barham. "
An aside, but an interesting passage on the new battleship after the holiday expired:
p. 228
"The Service's willingness to accept a night action was an attempt to mitigate through tactics its increasing strategic naval inferiority. This inferiority only worsened as the period progressed, as the Service's ships could not be built to the dimensions of their rivals because of limitation in port facilities and the constraints represented by the Suez Canal. Such limitations had long been recognised, and the Admiralty noted even in 1913 the ability of a Queen Elizabeth-class battleship to navigate the Suez Canal was possible only if their oil tanks were nearly empty. Given the restricted displacements of the second King George V and Lion-classes of battleships, and their limited ammunition load of 80 and 60 rounds per gun respectively, an engagement fought at long range was no longer a tactical option for the Royal Navy. The only chance that British forces appeared to have was to seek a night or restricted visibility engagement and pass as quickly as possible through the danger zone."
Regards,
Last edited:
Fuzzy Dunlop
Banned
No one has mentioned the elephant in the room regarding this though . . . Frederick 'Johnny' Walker of the Rn and his use of anti-sub tactics.
Interesting take. I had always assumed that the emphasis on night fighting was largely driven by assessments of the relative weakness of the RN in that area in WW1, and a desire not to be caught by such a deficiency again.