Royal Navy Fleet Problems

[Hood]

Yes one can only wonder where I got this idea...

My question is simple, what would Royal Navy fleet problems be if they decided to begin fleet problems of their own?

One can imagine north sea fleet problems, attacks on Gibraltar, Malta and Suez simulated, along with exercises in the Far East. How would these have fared, what could the RN have learned. Would ASW strategy have been improved. I'm thinking Singapore's weakness might have been more obvious, Pedestal esque supply convoys to Malta, and a better job corking the germans in the North Sea..

 

[ArtosStark]

Yes one can only wonder where I got this idea...

My question is simple, what would Royal Navy fleet problems be if they decided to begin fleet problems of their own?

One can imagine north sea fleet problems, attacks on Gibraltar, Malta and Suez simulated, along with exercises in the Far East. How would these have fared, what could the RN have learned. Would ASW strategy have been improved. I'm thinking Singapore's weakness might have been more obvious, Pedestal esque supply convoys to Malta, and a better job corking the germans in the North Sea..

In the years prior to WW1 they were doing them. They called them Fleet Exercises, and they generally were used to text the viability of new technology and tactics and simulate expected war scenarios.

Post WW1 they were cut largely for budgetary reasons. Had they continued I would guess they would have covered the reinforcement of a distant position through the use of temporary bases (simulating the move of the fleet to Singapore), the attack of an enemy held base across a considerable distance (retaking Hong Kong from the Japanese from a base in Singapore), the attack of an enemy fleet in harbour with aircraft (testing the idea first brought forward to deal with the Italians during Abyssinia), and after 1936 the control of a contained Sea against an opponent using unconventional tactics (fighting Germany in the North Sea). Besides this it would depend on what scenarios the RN strategic thinkers were putting forward as possibilities at the time.

 

[michael1]

During the interwar period I believe fleet and paper exercises were mostly aimed at the dispatch of the fleet to the far east and then its employment, including a possible fleet action around Singapore. There was no German battle fleet until late in the day so fleet problems against Germany weren't needed (as distinct from war plans). Gibraltar was indefensible against forces based in Spain and largely impregnable from elsewhere, so again fleet problems not needed. The (correct) expectation was that war against Italy would likely involve France, so convoys to Malta would have been fairly straightforward.

Plans and exercises against Japan involved both attacks on the fleet (and its accompanying logistics) before it reached Singapore (e.g. defence of a convoy against a surface fleet), and (less concretely) the advance North from Singapore and/or Hong Kong (involving establishing forward bases).

Compared to most countries the British focused more on specific campaigns than specific battles and favoured options rather than a single specific plan. This reflected their experience that fleet battles were likely to be rare, that they would probably be at moments of their opponents choosing and might occur in a wider range of theatres and circumstances than was likely for other countries. All of which made extensive preparation for specific battles less useful. Don't get me wrong, the British engaged in extensive preparations for fleet actions but the exercises were more general than say the US or Japan. The US and Japanese navies were largely preparing for specific campaigns with specific forces, whereas the RN was preparing for a wider range of possibilities with more uncertainty in the forces available for a given theatre.

 

[ArtosStark]

As to what they would have learned. I hope they would have led to development of at sea refuelling to improve operation in Eastern waters (and get the fleet to Singapore), possibly that their Sonar assets are not sufficient in and of themselves and maybe that naval aircraft could be used to neutralize hostile fleets early in certain circumstances.

 

[michael1]

Oh and it was the fall of Norway that enabled the Germans to "uncork" the North sea. Given the lack of radar and limited prewar cooperation from the RAF, the RN plans were reasonable, at least given the resources (and that Germany was reading the naval codes, enabling them to evade the patrols). Indeed, it was the awareness of the need to block access to the Atlantic that contributed to the fall of Norway

 

[Driftless]

Oh and it was the fall of Norway that enabled the Germans to "uncork" the North sea. Given the lack of radar and limited prewar cooperation from the RAF, the RN plans were reasonable, at least given the resources (and that Germany was reading the naval codes, enabling them to evade the patrols). Indeed, it was the awareness of the need to block access to the Atlantic that contributed to the fall of Norway

How seriously did the RN consider a German occupation of at least part of Norway? I believe there were some rumblings during WW1 by the Germans towards Norway, but obviously, it never got beyond diplomatic backroom saber-rattling. Of course, the Germans had a real fleet during WW1.

 

[1Big Rich]

Yes one can only wonder where I got this idea...


My question is simple, what would Royal Navy fleet problems be if they decided to begin fleet problems of their own?

One can imagine north sea fleet problems, attacks on Gibraltar, Malta and Suez simulated, along with exercises in the Far East. How would these have fared, what could the RN have learned. Would ASW strategy have been improved. I'm thinking Singapore's weakness might have been more obvious, Pedestal esque supply convoys to Malta, and a better job corking the germans in the North Sea..

Hood,

I think Moretz

The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective

Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of...

www.routledge.com

touches on this somewhat.

I'll have a look later today when I'm closer to his book.

Regards,

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The most important lesson for the RN to learn in any Fleet Exercises is that ASDIC alone isn't the answer to the submarine threat.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The most important lesson for the RN to learn in any Fleet Exercises is that ASDIC alone isn't the answer to the submarine threat.

The problem is that there were not that many submarines in the late 20s through to the late 30s

Germany from 35 were allow 40% of the number of British subs which was about 50 - so 20 odd!

Italy had more but - they were not viewed as an enemy until the late 30s

Unfortunately the 10 year holiday (that lasted for 20) pretty much retarded much in the way of development and few could have predicted how ww2 would turn out

The USN pretty much was able to dust off its campaign plans for the Mandates but this also had to include some heavy land fighting on PNG and Guadalcanal (and the loss on Philippines) and not even the fleet problems predicted that the entire fight would be by aircraft for the major fleet actions or that the lesser multiple SAG actions would force them to exchange cruisers for IJN destroyers.

I think concentrating on the basics and adapting was (without the benefit of hindsight) the sensible move.

 

[michael1]

Also, a major reason that asdic wasn't the cure was that uboats often operated on the surface by night (once they had sufficient numbers and until radar made this too dangerous). This probably wouldn't have been revealed by more extensive exercises before the war, it requires both a conceptual leap (they are submarines, why would they operate on the surface near surface warships) and large numbers of submarines and merchant ships for the advantages to be clear. Then, even if it was realized it's not clear what the appropriate response is until better radar is available

This is not to say that British ASW equipment and training was anywhere near as good as it could have been at the outbreak of war

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Also, a major reason that asdic wasn't the cure was that uboats often operated on the surface by night (once they had sufficient numbers and until radar made this too dangerous). This probably wouldn't have been revealed by more extensive exercises before the war, it requires both a conceptual leap (they are submarines, why would they operate on the surface near surface warships) and large numbers of submarines and merchant ships for the advantages to be clear. Then, even if it was realized it's not clear what the appropriate response is until better radar is available

This is not to say that British ASW equipment and training was anywhere near as good as it could have been at the outbreak of war

One of the reasons that British submarines had 'All of the torpedo tubes' was because it was believed that verses asdic a shallow periscope attack would be suicide and that any attack would have to be made at deeper depths using hydrophones and a large spread was necessary to achieve a hit

Indeed USN submarine doctrine was very constrictive for the first year or so of the pacific war with submarines staying submerged all day and only surfacing at night meaning that they often did not see the enemy resulting in a very poor result from the early war patrols - so the pre war exercises did not help there!

Obviously this idea of staying submerged or not attacking from periscope depth turned out to be rubbish but the idea of a submarine attacking on the surface at night would have been unthinkable to pre war thinkers.

The 'fix' was the bathe the entire area in flare light exposing any such surfaced sub to surface gunfire as soon as it was seen (or force it to dive and then keep it suprressed) - didn't always work

 

[Dorknought]

Its popular to bash RN interwar leadership.

It was difficult for the RN to concentrate like the USN could for 'Fleet Problems'. Most tactical thought went into using carrier aviation to wing an opponent [Bismarck - Ya!], and then finish it off at night [Pola & friends - Si, Si, Si!]. Against the IJN it was County class CA and O,P and R class submarines (they wanted 30 Thames class Fleet Subs) to hold the line and harry the IJN till the battle fleet arrived.

This is a very good book on the subject:
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

Server Busy

The problem is that there were not that many submarines in the late 20s through to the late 30s

Germany from 35 were allow 40% of the number of British subs which was about 50 - so 20 odd!

Italy had more but - they were not viewed as an enemy until the late 30s

The RN specifically went in to London with the aim of capping Japanese submarines which was successful, ie Japan wanted 90,000tons and accepted parity with the US and GB. The RN was confident it had mastered the submarine but the Submarine School at Portland had other ideas.

Unfortunately the 10 year holiday (that lasted for 20) pretty much retarded much in the way of development and few could have predicted how ww2 would turn out

The RN had already been in 5 years of holiday before Washington.

The USN pretty much was able to dust off its campaign plans for the Mandates but this also had to include some heavy land fighting on PNG and Guadalcanal (and the loss on Philippines) and not even the fleet problems predicted that the entire fight would be by aircraft for the major fleet actions or that the lesser multiple SAG actions would force them to exchange cruisers for IJN destroyers

The USN Fleet problems were more about tactical solutions, it was the table top gaming that worked on the strategic questions and this delivered on the far more important results like:

• We don't have enough cruisers - how about we initiate coalition war with navy's that have cruisers ie. British Empire. (to suggest this was truly career ending)
• It's too easy to cripple a carrier and its a long way to base - design carriers to be repaired in theatre.
• It will take 3 years to build a fleet and the US population will lose interest over that time - no answer.

Planning against Red was beneficial because it generated the list of Islands in the Caribbean that the US would want for bases and it only cost 50 overage destroyers in 1940. Bargain.

For the RN strategic planning, they planned against the US and they were smacked down by politicians. Then later the 'Locarno Wars' where they may need to fight France to support Germany and they were smacked down by politicians. Finally Japan occupied full focus and they were smacked down by politicians.

The RN did have tactical gaming rules that were too optimistic, River Plate should have been over in 30 minutes. US rules seemed to be more realistic in this respect.

Also, a major reason that asdic wasn't the cure was that uboats often operated on the surface by night (once they had sufficient numbers and until radar made this too dangerous). This probably wouldn't have been revealed by more extensive exercises before the war, it requires both a conceptual leap (they are submarines, why would they operate on the surface near surface warships) and large numbers of submarines and merchant ships for the advantages to be clear. Then, even if it was realized it's not clear what the appropriate response is until better radar is available

This is not to say that British ASW equipment and training was anywhere near as good as it could have been at the outbreak of war

The RN knew that in 1918, 2/3rds of submarine attacks were at night and when on the surface. They had also done the maths in WW1 that the larger the convoy the better but then forgot that and took till 1943 to work it out again.

Indeed USN submarine doctrine was very constrictive for the first year or so of the pacific war with submarines staying submerged all day and only surfacing at night meaning that they often did not see the enemy resulting in a very poor result from the early war patrols - so the pre war exercises did not help there!

Pre-war, US Sub commanders were criticized in exercises if they were detected/spotted. This led to overly cautious commanders that were eventually replaced.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The RN did have tactical gaming rules that were too optimistic, River Plate should have been over in 30 minutes. US rules seemed to be more realistic in this respect.

Pre-war, US Sub commanders were criticized in exercises if they were detected/spotted. This led to overly cautious commanders that were eventually replaced.

Not sure what you mean by River plate?

Exeter effectively crippled Graf Spee about 15 minutes into the battle destroying her raw fuel processing system with an 8" hit leaving her with about half a days fuel and she had used up most of her ammo in the battle.

Job done

As for the USN sub commanders - so the pre war exercises did have an impact? - just not a positive one?

 

[jsb]

Post WW1 they were cut largely for budgetary reasons. Had they continued

Sorry but did both RN Home and Med fleet not do regular exercise including multiple carrier operations in interwar using C, G &F.....?

The problem is mostly that RN had far too much to do come WWII, it's a 2 Ocean/Sea navy fighting a 4+ Ocean/Sea war..... you can see that in swapping from the ARK and the I class CVs designs mainly for far east IJN to Europe RM threat at short notice as political balances of threats change and never having sufficient for both.

 

[Vanguard45]

The fact the UK did as well as it did is nothing short of a miracle

 

[ArtosStark]

Sorry but did both RN Home and Med fleet not do regular exercise including multiple carrier operations in interwar using C, G &F.....?

I was more referring to the larger scale war gamed type exercises with almost the whole fleet. I figured these were a closer analog to the American Fleet Problems.

But you are right, the Med fleet at least continued to do exercises throughout the interwar, testing scenarios and concepts. The Home fleet may have as well, but I am not as aware of it in their case.

 

[naraic]

As for the USN sub commanders - so the pre war exercises did have an impact? - just not a positive one?

In some areas the lessons drawn from an exercise were incorrect. Overall I do believe that the lessons learned were positive for the US Navy.

 

[jsb]

I was more referring to the larger scale war gamed type exercises with almost the whole fleet. I figured these were a closer analog to the American Fleet Problems.

Did the USN fleet problems use the entire Atlantic and Pacific fleet together? The Med or Home fleets would still be close to 1/2 the RN each in terms of capital ships there are pictures of three CVs for example totally not secretly planning for the raid on Taranto in interwar for example...

 

[Driftless]

Did the USN fleet problems use the entire Atlantic and Pacific fleet together? The Med or Home fleets would still be close to 1/2 the RN each in terms of capital ships there are pictures of three CVs for example totally not secretly planning for the raid on Taranto in interwar for example...

I dunno.... But with the Panama Canal, weren't both kind of variable rosters?

I can't cite a specific reference, but somewhere in the early thirties, one of the fleet excercises involved the carriers, along with some battleships, working in the Caribbean. Big scope of ops. That was a watershed operation, where they determined that in future, the battleships needed to conform to the carriers tactical motions (turning into the wind mostly). The scope of that excercise confirmed a decisive change of thinking, that involved some high level fleet brass.

 

[Simreeve]

The Med or Home fleets would still be close to 1/2 the RN each in terms of capital ships there are pictures of three CVs for example totally not secretly planning for the raid on Taranto in interwar for example...

Taranto... or Toulon?