Would Trey Parker & Matt Stone have still made Team America? Would it be different? Or what they just make a different puppet movie?
Geronimo : What if Osama Bin Laden was killed prior to 9/11?
- Thread starter Iwanh
- Start date
Considering the butterflies, it may not be made at all. A different puppet movie would take its place.
Not really familiar with him. I just heard he was arrested for trying to make a dirty bomb.
Pitty. TTL will never know the awesomeness of the song "America F*ck Yeah!"
Part 21: Unknown Unknowns
Part XXI
Unknown Unknowns
Desert Badger Continued- Day 2
Within the span of 24 hours, the United States had undertaken a major military operation against Iraq with very little warning as to its actions. An initial barrage of missiles and jet strikes targeted a long list of Iraq's military, political, industrial and logistical sites all to “reduce the Iraqi ability to wage war”. All this was in retaliation for the disappearance of an American Jet which the Iraqi state media and some sources inside the Department of Defence attributed to an Iraqi attack. To put the situation lightly it was a stunning set of events and few people felt confident guessing where things would end.
Throughout the night, American forces (with British aid) ran sorties over the region where the plane had been lost, to hopefully find the missing aviators (a pilot and weapons officer) and trigger a corresponding rescue mission. Time was of the essence, two Americans could not hope to survive in Ba’athist Iraq for long, but since the disappearance and assumed crash, U.S. command had only radio silence. Still, Desert Badger continued, while strikes on Iraq’s major cities and population centres slowed after the initial wave, all across Iraq bombs attempted to disrupt (and possibly destroy) Iraqi command and control to squeeze more time out of the situation to find the men and damage the Saddam regime in general.
A U.S. aircraft carrier in the 5th fleet launches jets into Iraq
The world awoke to observe the aftermath of the first day's attack, what they saw was a much more destructive operation than the 2001 or 1998 bombings as the Americans struck far many more targets than expected, the country's airfields, main communications structures, supply bases and fuel depots had been attacked to scramble any Iraqi response. The U.S. attacks were launched with extremely minimal preparation time for the Iraqi military and citizens alike, hundreds of casualties in Baghdad alone by some estimates numbered more than the entire 4-day Desert Fox campaign.
The American public was broadly supportive of the exercise and Bush’s administration's explanations satisfied many, but questions still swirled especially regarding potential escalation, should the President take further action and escalate to more than just an air campaign? There was no real stated policy goal, other than for Saddam to demilitarize and comply with all U.N. resolutions, and to end attacks on allied aircraft. These demands were shared by all domestic politicians, but critics of the administration were aware of the tough talk and defence department leaks regarding Saddam and Iraq and feared that the current conflict was being set up as a pretext for a wider war to remove Saddam Hussein by force. It wasn’t too much of a stretch, considering stated U.S. policy for regime change and depending on how long the bombing campaign was to last it could result in the U.S. on a path toward war. However, the House of representatives showed its support for the ongoing military action by supporting a resolution to support the ‘men and women in our armed forces carrying out their missions’ only 11 representatives opposed the vote including Democrats Barbara Lee and Cynthia McKinney amongst others, Independent Bernie Sanders and the sole Republican detractor Ron Paul.
(Left to Right) Representatives Lee, Sanders and Paul, all critics of the strikes
On the second day, as questions continued to be raised, the Bush administration made some clearer pronouncements as to its aims in Iraq. Rumsfeld was out touting the success of the operation with a map of anti-air bases, terrorist training camps and supposed WMD production facilities that had been hit. From the way Rumsfeld was phrasing it the operation could wrap up any day, satisfied at the “tremendous progress of our air and naval forces in disarming Saddam of his offensive weapons, sustaining zero casualties”, when again questioned on the possibility of further American involvement the Secretary of Defence said, “We are prepared for all options but remain clear that American action will depend on how the Iraqi government goes forward, but I will reiterate that we remain prepared indefinitely”. His words were a sign that the administration was at best remaining vague about the next steps of the operation. The President made a short statement indicating he was pleased with the way the operation was unfolding, describing the attack as “the only way to go after Saddam” equating the strikes as more a punishment for the dictators’ actions than a specific doctrine.
Journalists were a little more combative, a Washington Post report detailed how the strikes in Bagdad on the first day were clearly aimed at more than military sites, and the administration was aiming at destabilizing the regime as a whole. The Iraqi government remained as hostile as ever, accusing the United States of an unprovoked attack, foreign journalists were taken to tour craters in Bagdad and told that the United States had deliberately targeted civilian areas. Iraq also accused the U.S. of targeting Hussein and his family personally in failed strikes, though Rumsfeld disputed any Iraqi claims as to the U.S.’s aims. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, when asked if the U.S. had any intention of taking further military action gave a curious response, first reiterating the many options that the United States had available to them when dealing with Iraq, but he also made it clear that the White House policy was “Regime change, that has been and continues to be our policy” Asked how regime change would be brought about he said “ Well, I say to the Iraqi people that we encourage them to take that action upon themselves,” Which could only be interpreted as the Presidents spokesman encouraging a revolution in Iraq.
White House Press Secretary Fleischer
The tough talk was not unilateral in Washington, as some sought to walk back some of the brinksmanship at play. Secretary of State Powell seemingly absent from the decisions to activate Desert Badger, made a briefing to outline his department's goals in Iraq. He stated that he supported the President’s decision but was less clear about U.S policy towards regime change “With respect to Iraq, that (regime change) has nothing to do with it, speaking with the President he has made it very clear this is everything to do with Iraq’s attacks on coalition aircraft, and we have to compel Iraq to end these attacks … there is no suggestion of regime change, quite the contrary”.
The search for the missing pilots was the unspoken factor in the military operation in Iraq, but it was no secret to the U.S. navy and air force who carried out a massive search hoping to catch radio communique, troop movements and any hints as to a current whereabouts living or dead. By now, U.S. thinking was that it was likely the pilots were in some kind of Iraqi custody either civilian, police or military. The movement near the probable crash site leaned toward that outcome given the less likely alternatives of the pair evading capture in such a hostile region. The rescue operation was dedicated to monitoring the Iraqi forces to spot any attempt to transport the pilots further north, this clashed with the goals of other military strikes as it forced U.S. forces to not attack Iraqi forces around the crash site. U.S. intelligence was quickly roped into the operation to aid in the search translating intelligence and dissecting photographs as well as using whatever sources there were inside Iraq to press them for any information they could get.
Day 3
As the third day of the operation began strikes, flights and surveillance continued across Iraq. And while the various secretaries and executive staff members praised the men and women in the field and touted a list of destroyed targets. There was a fight in the halls of power, various cabinet offices held grievances about being side-lined by an operation that they had as little warning about as the American public at large. The whole operation stank to high heaven of a DoD Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz stage-managed affair no doubt presented to the President as the only possible action available. That was the perspective Secretary Powell certainly held, who as the country's chief diplomat believed he should have been included in the decision to bomb major cities (Powell’s, exclusion from the decision was subsequently denied by members of the Bush administration, but was supported by confidential sources). Others were annoyed by the decision Rumsfeld’s expansion of Desert Badger had been conducted without input from either national security advisor Condoleezza Rice or CIA director George Tenet. Once the full extent of the operation was revealed to them suspicion fell upon Rumsfeld for the action taken, aware of his and his deputy's long-held desires to bring down the dictator.
Inside the White House, there was little time for solemn contemplation about the ongoing operation, as much as Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs, and the President put on their brave faces, infighting over what exactly the next steps were going to be, was consuming the executive branch. Few had been included in the decision to go for Desert Badger, perhaps it was excusable, after all, immediate action was required to prevent the capture of U.S. Airmen but someone should have at least told the Secretary of State and the CIA were only informed of the decision once it had been made, only then to ask for available targets to strike. But as soon as the bombs started dropping everyone clambered to be in the know, to influence the President’s decision making, or at least not to embarrass themselves by contradicting each other.
President Bush meeting his national security team
It was clear that the President was not exactly sure what to do next, he was certain he had made the right moves so far, he had been called upon to act and was damn certain of his decision. He flat out rejected any notion from the media that he had been at all manipulated by Rumsfeld, he was the President, and he made the decisions. But as certain as he was in ordering the strikes, his mind was focused mainly on the rescue operation and not wider Iraqi policy. Bush brought together his national security teams to discuss just that, to determine their objectives and how to achieve them. At the meeting Rumsfeld jumped right into it, listing the many victories of the U.S. forces and listed the former structures inside Iraq, Rumsfeld presented the Saddam regime as crumbling, its army in disarray and leadership on the run he pointed out that they hadn’t seen Saddam since the 1st day hinting that he was likely in hiding. Before he got to his conclusion the National Security Advisor Rice cut him off wanting updates on pilots, and the President agreed. Rumsfeld delivered disappointing news, no change. “We all pray for their safe return,” the President said.
The President asked about next steps, it was an open question that prompted a few exchanged glances “How do we deal with this guy?” a few months ago the President shifted U.S. policy to take an aggressive stance against Iraq, authorizing covert action to aid Iraqi opposition, and harsher enforcement of current policy and now Saddam has defied the U.S. once again “He’s trying to test us, to see what we’re prepared to do, but I’m not backing down”. The President, not the most precise speaker when on the spot, made the room similarly uncertain when he asked. Rumsfeld nodded, screwed up his face to look as pensive as possible and directly said it.
“We should kill him”. It perked up everyone’s ears “We ought to go to Bagdad and either capture or kill him, right now Americans are fighting to defend Americans and to liberate a people, Congress has approved it and the public supports it. We’ve drafted the plans; I say let’s go”. It was the kind of straight talk only the Secretary of Defence could muster, to propose a military operation with the kind of magnitude unseen since the Vietnam war with an almost sarcastic tone of voice. “We use the strikes to destroy Iraq’s defences, hit the regime every which way, while we move the necessary ground forces into Kuwait and drive straight to Baghdad”. Powell looked in pain, the two secretaries' rivalry was legendary and to hear Rumsfeld handwave over the blood and sweat of such an operation as ‘driving straight to Bagdad’ cut Powell deep. Out of everyone he felt personally insulted by Rumsfeld’s actions convinced that he had deliberately cut Powell out of the operations decision to undermine him, but now he was prepared to counter Rumsfeld’s broad assumptions.
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld
“Don you are making a lot of broad assumptions” Powell who had intimately studied the numerous war plans picked them apart “We are going to need more time, more equipment and more allies for something that big”, (estimates were at least half a year for the sufficient ground troops to be in place) the battle between Rumsfeld and Powell wasn’t just ideological but of military doctrine Powel favoured overwhelming force, to guarantee victory before any operation, Rumsfeld was the opposite, he saw risk aversion as a problem and had sought to rip it out of his Pentagon, he fought to raise the risk level had cut costs and troop numbers (Rumsfeld’s war plan slashed the estimated troop numbers for an invasion of Iraq in half, estimating such an operation could begin in 2 to 3 months). Powell’s vision was supported by General Tommy Franks Head of Central Command, who pointed out that the enemy would try to adapt, and may not buckle as Rumsfeld predicted especially against a smaller invasion force. Powell had always referred to Saddam as a kidney stone, uncomfortable, even painful at times but will eventually pass, thus Powell stuck to the containment policy to sufficiently counter Iraq. He would not contradict the President on Desert Badger once the decision had been made, but he strongly pushed to tread lightly and avoid rash decisions, he raised that an invasion would inflame oil markets, heighten tensions in Israel, give strength to anti-U.S. regimes and groups potentially destabilizing U.S. allies “If an American General is running an Arab country, a Macarthur in Baghdad, how long would that last? How do we define the terms of victory? If we take down Saddam until a new government is in place, you will be the government, a country of 25 million will be looking to you for however long it takes to stabilize the country” Powell referred to this as the pottery barn rule, ‘you break it you buy it'. Powell saved the strongest criticism for the unilateralism involved in Rumsfeld’s plan “It would be nice to do things that way, except we can’t, Jordan, Turkey the Saudis and Kuwait need to be on board, we need the access, we need allies and a whole lot else”. Powell described a worst-case scenario where Saddam uses chemical or radiological weapons on U.S. forces, and all this would be taking place during next year’s presidential election. Powell’s cautionary tale hit home with the President, he had ordered military action to defend Americans immediately in danger, but his long term strategy would need to be different. Still, he wasn’t satisfied with giving in and allowing Saddam to walk away and continue persecuting his people and plotting against the United States
The Vice-President sat in a manner that translated his eternal displeasure, he knew that bringing other nations aboard would slow everything down, he presented Saddam not as some obstacle to U.S. hegemony or the moralistic reasons but as a direct threat to Americans, Cheney had taken it upon himself to ‘study’ Iraq and believed that agents of/funded by Iraq were plotting to attack the United States “There is no doubt that Iraq has amassed weapons of mass destruction and is going to use them against us or our allies, Mr President inaction is a far greater risk”. The President nodded along with his deputy
Vice President Dick Cheney
“George what do you have on that?” the President was referring to CIA chief George Tenet, the CIA had stepped up its anti-Saddam activities and had been specifically tasked by the President to find evidence of Saddam’s WMD production as well as any weaknesses to the regime. Such work was slow going, there were few assets inside Iraq, fewer still who could provide reliable intel, and remaining sources were aware of the punishment should they be found conspiring with the United States both for themselves and their families. They would only provide the information with certain guarantees in place, what they had was data, raw unfiltered data, the locations of potential production or storage facilities (a list that the 5th fleet was making its way down as they spoke), rumoured liaisons between Iraq and the weapons black market or terrorist organisations, none of it confirmed, but Tenet knew that the Vice-President was keyed into all of it, his office somehow got it hands-on CIA reports, Cheney had been fixated on this for a while and was convinced that the United States was the target of an Iraqi led plot. Tenet downplayed it.
“Since our last assessment in 2000, we haven’t been able to draw any new conclusions yet but we are confident that Iraq continues to build and expand its infrastructure to produce WMD, we believe that Saddam still has plans for his atomic weapons programme”, it was a dramatic step down from the certainty of Cheney but open enough to leave room for considerable doubt. Cheney growled again.
CIA Director George Tenet
“There is always going to be uncertainty even if there is a one per cent chance we’ll need to respond”, the vice-president showed concern perhaps he took the pieces of data that portrayed Saddam on a wicked death march poised to strike everywhere at once all seriously or perhaps he just disliked pushback in such a setting. Bush absorbed the magnitude of the argument and came to his decision
“I want to know what it is gonna take to get inspectors back, he has to prove the world, and if he can’t – then there’s consequences, that’s our demand if not we keep bombing and we build our coalition, we get everyone on board and I want to see the plans on my desk”.
The White House finally had defined its aims for the ongoing operation in Iraq, both short and long term to end the disarmament crisis, either by forcing Saddam Hussein to readmit and abide by weapons inspections or face a potential invasion by the United States and its allies. All sides agreed that Saddam Hussein was a threat and the best way to keep him in check was the threat of invasion, Powell always insisted that war needed to be on the table and the worst option was to back down. It was a strong decision that left most satisfied, Condoleezza Rice and Andy Card (The WH chief of staff) applauded Powell for his role in putting diplomacy firmly on the table, while the hawks were confident that Saddam was far too deceitful for the diplomatic option to bear any fruit. The President first publicly announced his decision that night, to reporters saying that “The best way to end this, is for Iraq to engage and cooperate fully with the U.N. resolutions, if not then we may have to take a more dangerous path”. The President spoke with Prime Minister Blair regarding the ongoing operation and the two spoke about the path forward, Blair supported the demand for U.N. compliance aware that Saddam’s refusal to do so might lead to war. For his part, Saddam played into the hawk's expectations again reiterating his vow to never ‘compromise or kneel’ in the face of the airstrikes, he hoped to ride out the strikes just as he had many times before.
(Left) President Bush announces his demand for a return to weapons inspections, (Right) President Bush and UK PM Blair
As the administration got its own affairs in order the American public and the wider world continued to reconcile their own. Despite strong support in the immediate afterglow, several days of mixed messages on the U.S.’s goals with the campaign allowed for some descent to build, from anti-interventionists where a few protests built up. When polled, though an overwhelming majority approved of the military action, two-thirds favoured a diplomatic solution. The 11 congressmen and women who slammed the House’s approval questioned the White House’s reasoning, Independent representative Bernie Sanders from Vermont as he had in 1991 and 1998 said he was “Very concerned on the military action taken by the President, despite the fact that the constitution makes it very clear this body (congress) declares war”. Republican Ron Paul called the action “Illegal and unconstitutional, and likely done to distract Americans from the economy, and might lead us into a war and get more servicemen killed”. But further up the ranks, Representative Pelosi said, “While I am eternally grateful for the sacrifices of our men and women in the armed forces, I implore the administration to seek out every diplomatic option before putting more in harm's way”. Senate Leader Daschle (D) who enjoyed at best a frosty relationship with the White House after prefacing his comments with praise for the military said that “I severely hope that the President has not made a rush to war here” his critic drew an attack from former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R) (who had himself been embroiled in a racism scandal after praising former senator Strom Thurmond at his 100th birthday) said that Daschle’s comments showed he had “no interest in protecting Americans” sparking a war of words between Republicans and Democrats. The administration also saw some decent from the news media who doubted the claims of success touted by the Defence Department to dispute the narrative that only military targets were being struck, citing that such targets included breweries and commercial warehouses.
Globally, opposition and protests were much more widespread, in Syria, Jordan, Egypt Palestine and indeed the wider Arab World, protests broke out parred with occasionally violent incidents as well, for instance, Damascus where the U.S. embassy was evacuated for a time, as protesters threatened to storm the building an action that President Assad refused to condemn. President Mubarak of Egypt called for an end to the military action, but most Arab leaders remained quiet on the strikes prompting some protests not just against the U.S. but also their own governments in, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (where descent is heavily restricted) some street action was seen focused against the U.S, in Lebanon anger was projected on the silence of Arab leaders. In the UK significant protests erupted from the Muslim community including a march around parliament.
(left to right) the aftermath of protests in London, anti-US/UK protests in Lebanon, burned cars outside the US Embassy in Damascus
Far away from the beltways, the search for the two aviators continued with minimal results, no trace of attempted communique should the pilots be on the run and no large military manoeuvres that might hint towards moving the captured servicemen from the area they were downed in. The greatest deficiency in the U.S. military was the language barrier, it is easier to train someone to fly an F-14 than to speak Arabic, so trawling through Iraqi cables and radio took time, but then they finally found something pertaining to the pilots, intercepts in the Iraqi military. It revealed the high level of confusion in Iraqi military command after strikes began, as commanders struggled to give out orders as communications were dropped, bases were struck and forces scrambled to adapt. It also provided information regarding the missing soldiers, according to the intercept they were brought to the city of Al-Kut but there was no information on the current condition of the men. The first hint in three days was of some comfort but Kut was still a city of a quarter-million. Nonetheless, the U.S. marines remained prepared at a moment’s notice to raid the city for the men.
Also standing on the sidelines was the Iraqi opposition. The fractured opposition witnessed the bombing campaign with anticipation and expressed much desire to play a role in the conflict with Iraq. They had been provided renewed funding and organization under the direction of the CIA, the leadership had played a considerable role in lobbying legislators and department officials to support the complete toppling of Iraq. They cheered on the select quotes of Ari Fleischer that the United States was prepared to support Iraqi opposition but for now, they wanted to keep up the momentum of the campaign, convince the administration not to let up as it did in the past allowing Saddam to keep control “Give Iraqis the means to take action” said Sharif al-Hussein a member of the Iraqi National Congress (and a claimant to the defunct Iraqi throne). Opposition groups had played a considerable role in lobbying senior Defence department heads and were keenly aware of options available to the President to truly threaten the regime IFR (Iraqi Freedom Activities) including the providing of arms to Iraqi opposition by deploying American trained Iraqi expatriates and the U.S. expelling Iraqi forces entirely from the southern no-fly zone. However, the CIA had crippling doubts as to the ability of the Iraqi opposition, it numbered less than 500 and was generally undisciplined, but the Pentagon ignored these complaints and went ahead with the programme. More than anything the Iraqi opposition needed an endgame, finally with the President's declaration it seemed one may be on the horizon. With the President's demand for a return to inspections made and Saddam’s knee jerk refusal, it looked as if Iraq was on a path for a showdown.
(Left) Meeting of the Iraqi opposition in London, (Right) CNN headlines ongoing events the 'showdown in Iraq'
Unknown Unknowns
Desert Badger Continued- Day 2
Within the span of 24 hours, the United States had undertaken a major military operation against Iraq with very little warning as to its actions. An initial barrage of missiles and jet strikes targeted a long list of Iraq's military, political, industrial and logistical sites all to “reduce the Iraqi ability to wage war”. All this was in retaliation for the disappearance of an American Jet which the Iraqi state media and some sources inside the Department of Defence attributed to an Iraqi attack. To put the situation lightly it was a stunning set of events and few people felt confident guessing where things would end.
Throughout the night, American forces (with British aid) ran sorties over the region where the plane had been lost, to hopefully find the missing aviators (a pilot and weapons officer) and trigger a corresponding rescue mission. Time was of the essence, two Americans could not hope to survive in Ba’athist Iraq for long, but since the disappearance and assumed crash, U.S. command had only radio silence. Still, Desert Badger continued, while strikes on Iraq’s major cities and population centres slowed after the initial wave, all across Iraq bombs attempted to disrupt (and possibly destroy) Iraqi command and control to squeeze more time out of the situation to find the men and damage the Saddam regime in general.
A U.S. aircraft carrier in the 5th fleet launches jets into Iraq
The world awoke to observe the aftermath of the first day's attack, what they saw was a much more destructive operation than the 2001 or 1998 bombings as the Americans struck far many more targets than expected, the country's airfields, main communications structures, supply bases and fuel depots had been attacked to scramble any Iraqi response. The U.S. attacks were launched with extremely minimal preparation time for the Iraqi military and citizens alike, hundreds of casualties in Baghdad alone by some estimates numbered more than the entire 4-day Desert Fox campaign.
The American public was broadly supportive of the exercise and Bush’s administration's explanations satisfied many, but questions still swirled especially regarding potential escalation, should the President take further action and escalate to more than just an air campaign? There was no real stated policy goal, other than for Saddam to demilitarize and comply with all U.N. resolutions, and to end attacks on allied aircraft. These demands were shared by all domestic politicians, but critics of the administration were aware of the tough talk and defence department leaks regarding Saddam and Iraq and feared that the current conflict was being set up as a pretext for a wider war to remove Saddam Hussein by force. It wasn’t too much of a stretch, considering stated U.S. policy for regime change and depending on how long the bombing campaign was to last it could result in the U.S. on a path toward war. However, the House of representatives showed its support for the ongoing military action by supporting a resolution to support the ‘men and women in our armed forces carrying out their missions’ only 11 representatives opposed the vote including Democrats Barbara Lee and Cynthia McKinney amongst others, Independent Bernie Sanders and the sole Republican detractor Ron Paul.
(Left to Right) Representatives Lee, Sanders and Paul, all critics of the strikes
On the second day, as questions continued to be raised, the Bush administration made some clearer pronouncements as to its aims in Iraq. Rumsfeld was out touting the success of the operation with a map of anti-air bases, terrorist training camps and supposed WMD production facilities that had been hit. From the way Rumsfeld was phrasing it the operation could wrap up any day, satisfied at the “tremendous progress of our air and naval forces in disarming Saddam of his offensive weapons, sustaining zero casualties”, when again questioned on the possibility of further American involvement the Secretary of Defence said, “We are prepared for all options but remain clear that American action will depend on how the Iraqi government goes forward, but I will reiterate that we remain prepared indefinitely”. His words were a sign that the administration was at best remaining vague about the next steps of the operation. The President made a short statement indicating he was pleased with the way the operation was unfolding, describing the attack as “the only way to go after Saddam” equating the strikes as more a punishment for the dictators’ actions than a specific doctrine.
Journalists were a little more combative, a Washington Post report detailed how the strikes in Bagdad on the first day were clearly aimed at more than military sites, and the administration was aiming at destabilizing the regime as a whole. The Iraqi government remained as hostile as ever, accusing the United States of an unprovoked attack, foreign journalists were taken to tour craters in Bagdad and told that the United States had deliberately targeted civilian areas. Iraq also accused the U.S. of targeting Hussein and his family personally in failed strikes, though Rumsfeld disputed any Iraqi claims as to the U.S.’s aims. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, when asked if the U.S. had any intention of taking further military action gave a curious response, first reiterating the many options that the United States had available to them when dealing with Iraq, but he also made it clear that the White House policy was “Regime change, that has been and continues to be our policy” Asked how regime change would be brought about he said “ Well, I say to the Iraqi people that we encourage them to take that action upon themselves,” Which could only be interpreted as the Presidents spokesman encouraging a revolution in Iraq.
White House Press Secretary Fleischer
The tough talk was not unilateral in Washington, as some sought to walk back some of the brinksmanship at play. Secretary of State Powell seemingly absent from the decisions to activate Desert Badger, made a briefing to outline his department's goals in Iraq. He stated that he supported the President’s decision but was less clear about U.S policy towards regime change “With respect to Iraq, that (regime change) has nothing to do with it, speaking with the President he has made it very clear this is everything to do with Iraq’s attacks on coalition aircraft, and we have to compel Iraq to end these attacks … there is no suggestion of regime change, quite the contrary”.
The search for the missing pilots was the unspoken factor in the military operation in Iraq, but it was no secret to the U.S. navy and air force who carried out a massive search hoping to catch radio communique, troop movements and any hints as to a current whereabouts living or dead. By now, U.S. thinking was that it was likely the pilots were in some kind of Iraqi custody either civilian, police or military. The movement near the probable crash site leaned toward that outcome given the less likely alternatives of the pair evading capture in such a hostile region. The rescue operation was dedicated to monitoring the Iraqi forces to spot any attempt to transport the pilots further north, this clashed with the goals of other military strikes as it forced U.S. forces to not attack Iraqi forces around the crash site. U.S. intelligence was quickly roped into the operation to aid in the search translating intelligence and dissecting photographs as well as using whatever sources there were inside Iraq to press them for any information they could get.
Day 3
As the third day of the operation began strikes, flights and surveillance continued across Iraq. And while the various secretaries and executive staff members praised the men and women in the field and touted a list of destroyed targets. There was a fight in the halls of power, various cabinet offices held grievances about being side-lined by an operation that they had as little warning about as the American public at large. The whole operation stank to high heaven of a DoD Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz stage-managed affair no doubt presented to the President as the only possible action available. That was the perspective Secretary Powell certainly held, who as the country's chief diplomat believed he should have been included in the decision to bomb major cities (Powell’s, exclusion from the decision was subsequently denied by members of the Bush administration, but was supported by confidential sources). Others were annoyed by the decision Rumsfeld’s expansion of Desert Badger had been conducted without input from either national security advisor Condoleezza Rice or CIA director George Tenet. Once the full extent of the operation was revealed to them suspicion fell upon Rumsfeld for the action taken, aware of his and his deputy's long-held desires to bring down the dictator.
Inside the White House, there was little time for solemn contemplation about the ongoing operation, as much as Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs, and the President put on their brave faces, infighting over what exactly the next steps were going to be, was consuming the executive branch. Few had been included in the decision to go for Desert Badger, perhaps it was excusable, after all, immediate action was required to prevent the capture of U.S. Airmen but someone should have at least told the Secretary of State and the CIA were only informed of the decision once it had been made, only then to ask for available targets to strike. But as soon as the bombs started dropping everyone clambered to be in the know, to influence the President’s decision making, or at least not to embarrass themselves by contradicting each other.
President Bush meeting his national security team
It was clear that the President was not exactly sure what to do next, he was certain he had made the right moves so far, he had been called upon to act and was damn certain of his decision. He flat out rejected any notion from the media that he had been at all manipulated by Rumsfeld, he was the President, and he made the decisions. But as certain as he was in ordering the strikes, his mind was focused mainly on the rescue operation and not wider Iraqi policy. Bush brought together his national security teams to discuss just that, to determine their objectives and how to achieve them. At the meeting Rumsfeld jumped right into it, listing the many victories of the U.S. forces and listed the former structures inside Iraq, Rumsfeld presented the Saddam regime as crumbling, its army in disarray and leadership on the run he pointed out that they hadn’t seen Saddam since the 1st day hinting that he was likely in hiding. Before he got to his conclusion the National Security Advisor Rice cut him off wanting updates on pilots, and the President agreed. Rumsfeld delivered disappointing news, no change. “We all pray for their safe return,” the President said.
The President asked about next steps, it was an open question that prompted a few exchanged glances “How do we deal with this guy?” a few months ago the President shifted U.S. policy to take an aggressive stance against Iraq, authorizing covert action to aid Iraqi opposition, and harsher enforcement of current policy and now Saddam has defied the U.S. once again “He’s trying to test us, to see what we’re prepared to do, but I’m not backing down”. The President, not the most precise speaker when on the spot, made the room similarly uncertain when he asked. Rumsfeld nodded, screwed up his face to look as pensive as possible and directly said it.
“We should kill him”. It perked up everyone’s ears “We ought to go to Bagdad and either capture or kill him, right now Americans are fighting to defend Americans and to liberate a people, Congress has approved it and the public supports it. We’ve drafted the plans; I say let’s go”. It was the kind of straight talk only the Secretary of Defence could muster, to propose a military operation with the kind of magnitude unseen since the Vietnam war with an almost sarcastic tone of voice. “We use the strikes to destroy Iraq’s defences, hit the regime every which way, while we move the necessary ground forces into Kuwait and drive straight to Baghdad”. Powell looked in pain, the two secretaries' rivalry was legendary and to hear Rumsfeld handwave over the blood and sweat of such an operation as ‘driving straight to Bagdad’ cut Powell deep. Out of everyone he felt personally insulted by Rumsfeld’s actions convinced that he had deliberately cut Powell out of the operations decision to undermine him, but now he was prepared to counter Rumsfeld’s broad assumptions.
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld
“Don you are making a lot of broad assumptions” Powell who had intimately studied the numerous war plans picked them apart “We are going to need more time, more equipment and more allies for something that big”, (estimates were at least half a year for the sufficient ground troops to be in place) the battle between Rumsfeld and Powell wasn’t just ideological but of military doctrine Powel favoured overwhelming force, to guarantee victory before any operation, Rumsfeld was the opposite, he saw risk aversion as a problem and had sought to rip it out of his Pentagon, he fought to raise the risk level had cut costs and troop numbers (Rumsfeld’s war plan slashed the estimated troop numbers for an invasion of Iraq in half, estimating such an operation could begin in 2 to 3 months). Powell’s vision was supported by General Tommy Franks Head of Central Command, who pointed out that the enemy would try to adapt, and may not buckle as Rumsfeld predicted especially against a smaller invasion force. Powell had always referred to Saddam as a kidney stone, uncomfortable, even painful at times but will eventually pass, thus Powell stuck to the containment policy to sufficiently counter Iraq. He would not contradict the President on Desert Badger once the decision had been made, but he strongly pushed to tread lightly and avoid rash decisions, he raised that an invasion would inflame oil markets, heighten tensions in Israel, give strength to anti-U.S. regimes and groups potentially destabilizing U.S. allies “If an American General is running an Arab country, a Macarthur in Baghdad, how long would that last? How do we define the terms of victory? If we take down Saddam until a new government is in place, you will be the government, a country of 25 million will be looking to you for however long it takes to stabilize the country” Powell referred to this as the pottery barn rule, ‘you break it you buy it'. Powell saved the strongest criticism for the unilateralism involved in Rumsfeld’s plan “It would be nice to do things that way, except we can’t, Jordan, Turkey the Saudis and Kuwait need to be on board, we need the access, we need allies and a whole lot else”. Powell described a worst-case scenario where Saddam uses chemical or radiological weapons on U.S. forces, and all this would be taking place during next year’s presidential election. Powell’s cautionary tale hit home with the President, he had ordered military action to defend Americans immediately in danger, but his long term strategy would need to be different. Still, he wasn’t satisfied with giving in and allowing Saddam to walk away and continue persecuting his people and plotting against the United States
The Vice-President sat in a manner that translated his eternal displeasure, he knew that bringing other nations aboard would slow everything down, he presented Saddam not as some obstacle to U.S. hegemony or the moralistic reasons but as a direct threat to Americans, Cheney had taken it upon himself to ‘study’ Iraq and believed that agents of/funded by Iraq were plotting to attack the United States “There is no doubt that Iraq has amassed weapons of mass destruction and is going to use them against us or our allies, Mr President inaction is a far greater risk”. The President nodded along with his deputy
Vice President Dick Cheney
“George what do you have on that?” the President was referring to CIA chief George Tenet, the CIA had stepped up its anti-Saddam activities and had been specifically tasked by the President to find evidence of Saddam’s WMD production as well as any weaknesses to the regime. Such work was slow going, there were few assets inside Iraq, fewer still who could provide reliable intel, and remaining sources were aware of the punishment should they be found conspiring with the United States both for themselves and their families. They would only provide the information with certain guarantees in place, what they had was data, raw unfiltered data, the locations of potential production or storage facilities (a list that the 5th fleet was making its way down as they spoke), rumoured liaisons between Iraq and the weapons black market or terrorist organisations, none of it confirmed, but Tenet knew that the Vice-President was keyed into all of it, his office somehow got it hands-on CIA reports, Cheney had been fixated on this for a while and was convinced that the United States was the target of an Iraqi led plot. Tenet downplayed it.
“Since our last assessment in 2000, we haven’t been able to draw any new conclusions yet but we are confident that Iraq continues to build and expand its infrastructure to produce WMD, we believe that Saddam still has plans for his atomic weapons programme”, it was a dramatic step down from the certainty of Cheney but open enough to leave room for considerable doubt. Cheney growled again.
CIA Director George Tenet
“There is always going to be uncertainty even if there is a one per cent chance we’ll need to respond”, the vice-president showed concern perhaps he took the pieces of data that portrayed Saddam on a wicked death march poised to strike everywhere at once all seriously or perhaps he just disliked pushback in such a setting. Bush absorbed the magnitude of the argument and came to his decision
“I want to know what it is gonna take to get inspectors back, he has to prove the world, and if he can’t – then there’s consequences, that’s our demand if not we keep bombing and we build our coalition, we get everyone on board and I want to see the plans on my desk”.
The White House finally had defined its aims for the ongoing operation in Iraq, both short and long term to end the disarmament crisis, either by forcing Saddam Hussein to readmit and abide by weapons inspections or face a potential invasion by the United States and its allies. All sides agreed that Saddam Hussein was a threat and the best way to keep him in check was the threat of invasion, Powell always insisted that war needed to be on the table and the worst option was to back down. It was a strong decision that left most satisfied, Condoleezza Rice and Andy Card (The WH chief of staff) applauded Powell for his role in putting diplomacy firmly on the table, while the hawks were confident that Saddam was far too deceitful for the diplomatic option to bear any fruit. The President first publicly announced his decision that night, to reporters saying that “The best way to end this, is for Iraq to engage and cooperate fully with the U.N. resolutions, if not then we may have to take a more dangerous path”. The President spoke with Prime Minister Blair regarding the ongoing operation and the two spoke about the path forward, Blair supported the demand for U.N. compliance aware that Saddam’s refusal to do so might lead to war. For his part, Saddam played into the hawk's expectations again reiterating his vow to never ‘compromise or kneel’ in the face of the airstrikes, he hoped to ride out the strikes just as he had many times before.
(Left) President Bush announces his demand for a return to weapons inspections, (Right) President Bush and UK PM Blair
As the administration got its own affairs in order the American public and the wider world continued to reconcile their own. Despite strong support in the immediate afterglow, several days of mixed messages on the U.S.’s goals with the campaign allowed for some descent to build, from anti-interventionists where a few protests built up. When polled, though an overwhelming majority approved of the military action, two-thirds favoured a diplomatic solution. The 11 congressmen and women who slammed the House’s approval questioned the White House’s reasoning, Independent representative Bernie Sanders from Vermont as he had in 1991 and 1998 said he was “Very concerned on the military action taken by the President, despite the fact that the constitution makes it very clear this body (congress) declares war”. Republican Ron Paul called the action “Illegal and unconstitutional, and likely done to distract Americans from the economy, and might lead us into a war and get more servicemen killed”. But further up the ranks, Representative Pelosi said, “While I am eternally grateful for the sacrifices of our men and women in the armed forces, I implore the administration to seek out every diplomatic option before putting more in harm's way”. Senate Leader Daschle (D) who enjoyed at best a frosty relationship with the White House after prefacing his comments with praise for the military said that “I severely hope that the President has not made a rush to war here” his critic drew an attack from former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R) (who had himself been embroiled in a racism scandal after praising former senator Strom Thurmond at his 100th birthday) said that Daschle’s comments showed he had “no interest in protecting Americans” sparking a war of words between Republicans and Democrats. The administration also saw some decent from the news media who doubted the claims of success touted by the Defence Department to dispute the narrative that only military targets were being struck, citing that such targets included breweries and commercial warehouses.
Globally, opposition and protests were much more widespread, in Syria, Jordan, Egypt Palestine and indeed the wider Arab World, protests broke out parred with occasionally violent incidents as well, for instance, Damascus where the U.S. embassy was evacuated for a time, as protesters threatened to storm the building an action that President Assad refused to condemn. President Mubarak of Egypt called for an end to the military action, but most Arab leaders remained quiet on the strikes prompting some protests not just against the U.S. but also their own governments in, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (where descent is heavily restricted) some street action was seen focused against the U.S, in Lebanon anger was projected on the silence of Arab leaders. In the UK significant protests erupted from the Muslim community including a march around parliament.
(left to right) the aftermath of protests in London, anti-US/UK protests in Lebanon, burned cars outside the US Embassy in Damascus
Far away from the beltways, the search for the two aviators continued with minimal results, no trace of attempted communique should the pilots be on the run and no large military manoeuvres that might hint towards moving the captured servicemen from the area they were downed in. The greatest deficiency in the U.S. military was the language barrier, it is easier to train someone to fly an F-14 than to speak Arabic, so trawling through Iraqi cables and radio took time, but then they finally found something pertaining to the pilots, intercepts in the Iraqi military. It revealed the high level of confusion in Iraqi military command after strikes began, as commanders struggled to give out orders as communications were dropped, bases were struck and forces scrambled to adapt. It also provided information regarding the missing soldiers, according to the intercept they were brought to the city of Al-Kut but there was no information on the current condition of the men. The first hint in three days was of some comfort but Kut was still a city of a quarter-million. Nonetheless, the U.S. marines remained prepared at a moment’s notice to raid the city for the men.
Also standing on the sidelines was the Iraqi opposition. The fractured opposition witnessed the bombing campaign with anticipation and expressed much desire to play a role in the conflict with Iraq. They had been provided renewed funding and organization under the direction of the CIA, the leadership had played a considerable role in lobbying legislators and department officials to support the complete toppling of Iraq. They cheered on the select quotes of Ari Fleischer that the United States was prepared to support Iraqi opposition but for now, they wanted to keep up the momentum of the campaign, convince the administration not to let up as it did in the past allowing Saddam to keep control “Give Iraqis the means to take action” said Sharif al-Hussein a member of the Iraqi National Congress (and a claimant to the defunct Iraqi throne). Opposition groups had played a considerable role in lobbying senior Defence department heads and were keenly aware of options available to the President to truly threaten the regime IFR (Iraqi Freedom Activities) including the providing of arms to Iraqi opposition by deploying American trained Iraqi expatriates and the U.S. expelling Iraqi forces entirely from the southern no-fly zone. However, the CIA had crippling doubts as to the ability of the Iraqi opposition, it numbered less than 500 and was generally undisciplined, but the Pentagon ignored these complaints and went ahead with the programme. More than anything the Iraqi opposition needed an endgame, finally with the President's declaration it seemed one may be on the horizon. With the President's demand for a return to inspections made and Saddam’s knee jerk refusal, it looked as if Iraq was on a path for a showdown.
(Left) Meeting of the Iraqi opposition in London, (Right) CNN headlines ongoing events the 'showdown in Iraq'
“Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Fool me three times, shame on both of us.” - George W. Bush
Part 22: Dutch Interlude
Part XXII
Dutch Interlude
For the past 8 years, the Netherlands had enjoyed an economic boom, prosperity rose and unemployment shrank. Throughout it, the government a coalition government of left and liberal parties enjoyed strong approval ratings led by Labour Party (PvdA) leader and Prime Minister Wim Kok. Kok was lauded and credited as a founder of the third wave system that President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly used. However, in 2001 in the run-up to the 2002 elections, Kok announced that he would be retiring and would not serve as leader of the PvdA going forward. His retirement made way for his chosen successor Ad Melkert, going into the election it was widely assumed that either Melkert or the centre-right liberals (VVD) led by leader Hans Dijkstal (who had served as deputy PM in the coalition government) would become Prime Minister with either of the two governing parties taking the largest number of seats. The largest challenger to the governing parties was the Christian Democrats (CDA) who had been the strongest party in the country until a string of controversies and infighting resigned it to the opposition, the chances for a resurgence looked slim considering it had only just appointed its leader Jan Balkenende who had only entered parliament 4 years ago widely assumed to be little more than a caretaker leader of the party.Left to right, PM Wim Kok and lead candidates Ad Melkert, Hand Dijkstal and Jan Balkenende
Indeed with three unassuming bureaucrats vying for the top spot, it seemed that the country was not primed for political upheaval, all that was until the introduction of one Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn had crossed the political spectrum throughout his life as a political strategist and commentator originally a Marxist communist In his youth he shifted rightward becoming a social democrat in the ’70s, then in the ’80s became a neo-liberal endorsing the free market and privatisation, this transitioned into radical liberalism promoted a vast slashing of government which over the 90’s he refined into a populist message (though Pim rejected the term) of a general detest for the elite. The ’90s for the Netherlands had also brought about social change, women’s, gay and euthanasia rights had been generally accepted without much contest. Fortuyn said that the changes vast and swift changes had created an ‘orphaned society’ and decried a loss of traditional norms and values though he himself did not advocate a return to conservative norms and retained a liberal stance on many social issues (himself being an open homosexual). With the end of the cold war, Fortuyn identified the new fundamental threat to western society as Islam. To Fortuyn, Islam and Muslim culture were inherently opposed to Dutch values. He enunciated his views in blunt language calling for " a cold war with Islam. I see Islam as an extraordinary threat, as a hostile religion.”. Pim was still little known outside political circles when in August 2001 he threw his hat into the upcoming May elections a move that many saw as a theatrical protest, but Pim made good on his pledge and reiterated his announcement that he would run for parliament. His decision combined with his outspoken, flamboyant, confrontational and highly articulate demeanour made him unlike anything in current Dutch politics, he was the clear opposite to the coalition establishment he tore into every moment he got painting them as one singular party with no real differences between them, and sure enough considering the dull state of the race a whirlwind media blitz plastered him across every paper and television in the country, with every appearance attracting plenty of criticism as well as plenty of praise all without actually announcing which party he would be running for.
Far-right populist Pim Fortuyn
He was invited by Jan Nagel the chairman of the Liveable Netherlands (LN) Party a party that pitched itself as a radical democratic group helmed by those with mostly media backgrounds, Pim took them up on the offer, and began leading the Rotterdam branch of the party (Liveable Netherlands local branches were acted separately from the national party, given its radical democratic ideology). Though he was not the leader of the party his personality and media appearances quickly made him the figurehead and was far better known than the actual lead candidate Fred Teeven. With his political prospects quickly rising in February 2002 Fortuyn issued an ultimatum to the party bosses, he demanded a new leadership election for himself to become the lead candidate and if not he would walk and take his support (roughly 6% in the polls from a party that previously had .5% support) his demand was supported up by the newly expanded membership who had only joined the party due to Pim, but the party chairmen were a lot warier of such a move especially given Pims tendency toward going off script, after a tense meeting of the party leadership the party conceded and Pim was unanimously voted in as the new party leader. Despite his oft controversial attitude toward immigration and Islam he received generally favourable coverage through February, the news often focused on the grassroots and enthusiasm of his campaign. LN received a lot of coverage compared to the rather bland opposition and Pim climbed the polls to 12 per cent the party was now higher than the decade-old green party. As LN rose it took votes away from the governing labour and liberal parties who struggled to adapt to the new state of the race, labour flipped between touting its successes in the past or promoting reform in the future and there was no discussion of immigration, both leading parties were drawn into spitting matches, that Pim a veteran debater with a speaking style the traditional politicians were untrained to counter. As Pims candidacy became more of a reality, national (and international) coverage turned more negative, he was compared to other far-right European leaders such as Jorg Haider of Austria or Le Pen in France whose ultranationalist and neo-Nazi ties were more blatant. He was no longer referred to as a “clown” by the candidates but instead an explicit threat to Dutch liberal democracy. Some decided to take street action and Pim became the victim of mockery, cream pies and in one case was physically assaulted by a bucket of fake blood along with the bucket by an animal rights activist, but he continued to give interviews deflecting the criticism and laughed off the assaults.[1]
Pim Fortuyn speaks after being hit with a cake
Pim celebrated a considerable victory in March during the Rotterdam council elections, Liveable Rotterdam surged to second place slightly behind Labour. A city with a high percentage of immigrants and a growing perception that they were failing to adapt to Dutch society, contributed to rising dissatisfaction levels in highly urbanised areas. Dutch political psychologists called this the ‘bitterness between the tulips’ this combined with Pim's ability to quickly establish a message, and to create and adopt the grassroots campaigns boosted the party even further. During the final run-up to the election as Le Pen was defeated in France, some predicted a similar defeat for Pim and the threat of him seemed to dissipate as the Netherlands seemed to settle into what everyone assumed would be the two-party race between Labour and the liberals, indeed Pim’s one-man crusade against the ‘purple order’ (the collation between red and blue) shifted public opinion on the government and provided an opportunity for other parties to critic the coalition for failing to address public issues. The Christian Democrats notably refused to join the criticism of Fortuyn leading some to suspect they hoped to benefit from Fortuyn and potential enter a coalition with him.
The election day results were a shock to the system, while the Labour party remained the largest by a single seat margin followed by coalition partner the VVD, both parties suffered significant losses to the gain of the Christian Democrats and Liveable Netherlands who topped the polls to reach 13 per cent in the countries election earing 20 seats. The depreciated seats of the government meant that to form a government the Labour party now required the support of the smaller Democrats 66 party the progressive liberal party. Pim heralded the vote as the beginning of a new era in Dutch politics for those who “want to do away with the culture of compromise and coalitions, and a political elite that does nothing for their interests while leaving the door open wide for certain groups to come here, because we all know that we are full up here”
The makeup of the new Netherlands parliament and cabinet following the 2002 election
It wasn’t the runaway victory that Fortuyn promised but to go from political commentator to the leader of the 4th largest party in less than a year was far more than Haider, Le Pen or any other of Europe’s Far-Right was a monumental feat and the unsteady state of the Dutch government meant that Pims promise that “I will be the Prime Minister of this country” was no longer as far fetched as before and it was clear that despite being out of government his onslaught of attacks against the consensus politics of the Netherlands had greatly disrupted the country and potentially Europe.
LN leader Pim Fortuyn and Prime Minister Ad Melkert following a famously heated debate
[1] Without 9/11 Pims rise is altered he is less obviously anti-Islam nat making the famous ‘backward religion’ line that got him removed from Liveable Netherlands and forced him to create his own party. But most importantly he doesn’t get assassinated as he did in OTL
[2] Following 9/11 and Pims death Dutch politics was greatly affected with the defeated Christian democrats sweeping into power with the political climate less heated Pim exceeds TTL expectations but underperforms OTL.
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Gross. Pim sounds like he ran on a platform of bigotry wrapped up in a package meant to scare people into believing a problem that probably didn’t really exist.
Without the War on Terror not happening in this timeline, I wonder what the Iraq War that looks like it's starting is going to pan out.
Part 23: Showdown - Iraq
Part XXIII
Showdown – Iraq
To say tensions were high would be a definite understatement. The United States alongside its ally the United Kingdom had been involved in an extensive bombing campaign throughout all of Iraq going on 4 days now. The stated objective was forcing Iraq into compliance with previous U.N. security council resolutions and specifically readmitting U.N. weapons inspectors. The implicit threat is, that should it not do, the U.S. will raise a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and probably overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. President Bush previewed his demand to the national news the previous day, but no official statements, cables or demands had been made either publicly or privately to the Iraqi government. As gears of state chugged along, war plans were specified and officials were briefed on the new policy, the United States needed to prepare for two possibilities; 1, that Saddam would entertain the U.S. demand and admit inspectors, the second that he would once again refuse and the campaign to remove him would officially begin. The White House was aware that if war should come, preparations needed to begin immediately so that a potential invasion could start by the end of the year or early 04, as no one wanted to launch the war later than that, in the middle of Bush’s re-election campaign, as well as weather restrictions. This meant that war preparations would commence at the same time as diplomatic overtures attempted to resolve the crisis peacefully.U.S. Harrier land on board USS Belleau-Wood
It gave everyone a very short span of time to move things into place. Saddam needed to be issued a new ultimatum preferably through the United Nations, reiterating the U.S. demands, should the demands be rejected the administration then needed to build the necessary global and domestic support for an invasion, which entailed building the case that the regime was in violation of U.N. resolutions, placing the sufficient American troops in place, attaining congressional authorization, and building a coalition hopefully with U.N. security council backing. It was a big challenge, but the administration was confident it could garner sufficient support to succeed. The White House moved to contact its closest allies of the plans currently being drafted, these included the ambassadors and diplomats of allies in the middle east, including Iraq’s neighbours and calls were made across the globe to inform, yes, but also reassure that there was nothing firm on his desk, and that war was not a certainty. The reactions varied from strong support from Britain or Australia, but most of the Arab regional allies were shaky at best, with both the Jordan and Saudi government torn between balancing their desire for regional stability and their security alliance with the United States, all nations agreed that continued diplomacy, as well as the threat of strong military intervention, was necessary to bring Saddam back to the table. The U.S. with the U.K. immediately got to work lobbying the U.N. for a new security council resolution.
While calls were made, missiles continued dropping across Iraq, to many it looked like a war had already begun. The conflict in Iraq had been simmering since the end of the first gulf war in 91 and had recently reignited over a downed U.S. fighter jet patrolling a no-fly zone. The entire bombing campaign had been originally designed to help facilitate a rescue operation to free the potentially captured airmen but after over 3 days the only information central command had on their location was that they were likely being held in the city of Al-Kut. U.S. Marines were on standby for the rescue mission, and jets continued to fly recon, everyone was fully prepared for the fourth day of searching but a spanner got thrown into the works, by a report released by Iraqi state media.
A report was issued, backed by Iraq’s foreign office that detailed its version of the downed jet incident. The report disputed the American line that the Jet had not been struck by Iraqi anti-air fire, claiming that it had actually crashed in Iraq by itself, the report's 'evidence’ included pictures of the crash that supposedly showed no hints towards it being shot down. The report didn’t just contradict the U.S. government's claim but also backtracked Iraq’s own report made several days ago that had celebrated the Iraqi military achievement in bringing down the jet. All this was secondary to the report's key claim, that both the American pilot and weapons officer had been killed in the crash. It was the first official Iraqi statement that acknowledged the missing U.S. servicemen at all. Of course, U.S. central command and the Pentagon were extremely wary of any Iraqi claims and the dispute between the Jet crashing vs being shot down took away plenty of credibility in the eyes of Americans. It also disputed some intelligence they had been monitoring, the U.S. was not in the position to take Iraq's word for it, however, American officials knew that the Iraqi government's support for the report would not be made lightly. The American media covered the death claim and subsequently questioned the administration who declined to lend legitimacy to the report as well as taking the opportunity to take a jab at news sources that ran the report as fact (even though none had). DoD didn’t have to work long to get the confirmation they were dreading in the form of footage and images taken immediately after the crash, sent to the U.S. by the Iraqi military, as well as exchanged phone calls between both governments. After sweeping the evidence U.S. intelligence came to the conclusion that the footage was genuine and it all but confirmed (the government insisted on personal or third-party confirmation later achieved through Vietnam), that the 2 U.S. servicemen who had been missing for 4 days had been killed most likely in the jets crash or shortly after (which the U.S. insisted had been shot down)
Lt. Col. William R. "Salty" Watkins III and Capt. Eric B. "Boot" Das[1]
It was a shocking moment, and it struck the President especially hard. At first, he was in disbelief, assuming that it was a Saddam regime deception but he then gave in to the depressing truth. They were the first combat deaths of his Presidency and gave him the first real understanding of the mission he was preparing to undertake; preparing to totally rid Iraq of Saddam. There were a lot of tough talkers and a lot of egos in Washington but in the end, he made the decisions, it was his singular responsibility, and he knew that. But instead of shrivelling away from his vision or being spooked as he believed Clinton had been when confronted with these tough decisions, it hardened his faith in the justness of his goal. His team were working on lobbying the whole world to his cause, the stakes were higher but the weight on his shoulders was somehow lighter, he had a drive unlike anything since his inauguration. His team was preparing to codify that mission by demanding Saddam’s compliance and threatening the ultimate consequences should he fail. His entire staff were scrambling to arrange for the President to give a speech at the U.N. in mere days where he would request the relevant security council resolution to be voted on and his speechwriters were hard at work preparing, while the state department and relevant diplomats were mobilized to lobby each country to vote accordingly.
But while the executive prepared for war, it should be forgotten that an air war was still underway over Iraq as targets were still being ticked off Rumsfeld’s long list. The President gave no order for gulf forces to stand down even with the deaths confirmed, From DoD’s perspective, the mission was still to go ahead as planned, standing orders remained in place the Iraqi government had not agreed to turn over the bodies and there was every chance that the air force and navy would still be ordered on a recovery mission, after all ‘no man left behind' was still the ethos of the hundreds of marines who had been mobilized, who after 4 days of preparation being told to stand down wouldn’t sit well with, so the bombing runs and missile strikes continued, all streamed right across the world and arousing the passions of many.
A week passed after the revelation of Das and Watkins's deaths had been made public. The President expressed his condolences to the families over the phone and compared to that an address to a special session of the United Nations would be a walk in the park. Just getting the meeting was a hassle, Kofi Annan had to wrestle half the members into agreeing and for a time the White House was considering scrapping the idea and holding a press conference in Crawford instead but after some smooth talking, everyone eventually got on board. As the esteemed delegates arrived in New York, with all the typical fanfare and traffic chaos as usual, where they were greeted by a few hundred peace protestors who managed to surround the U.N. delaying some procedures, though events remained peaceful. Once inside the building, the President delivered his speech laying out the framework for how the world needed to tackle Iraq, in fairly blunt language, he called military action ‘unavoidable’ if Iraq continued to defy international sanctions “The just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable," though remained ambiguous if this meant war or a continuation of limited intervention. He reiterated his argument that Hussein had defied 12 years’ worth of resolutions including those regarding weapons of mass destruction, aiding terror organisations and crimes committed against prisoners in the gulf war, genocide and repression. He said that his administration will press the United Nations to create a plan of action that the Security Council will take up. He stressed the urgency of action, seeking to squash some members' claims that an invasion more immediacy to act. “Inspections need to commence in a matter of weeks not months or years”. The speech was designed to show that the United States sought cooperation, not the unilateralism the delegates feared going in “we have to make sure that the United Nations does not turn into the League of nations that failed to confront Hitler … It is this council’s responsibility to act”
(Left) President Bush addresses the UN, (Right) protest signs outside the UN stating no blood for Oil
The President’s speech was well-received by his supporters and even his critics, for once he seemed to be properly leading the administration and reigning in his secretaries in pursuit of his own vision all in sober and frank language as opposed to the vague utterances of the past. As result, a number of nations began openly supporting the United States' position toward an immediate return to inspections. Prime Minister Blair gave the speech a full endorsement calling it the only logical option. “As we supported President Clinton in disrupting Saddam Hussein’s weapons production, we ought to do the same today, there is little doubt to the urgency of this threat”, and both Russia and China said they supported Bush in principle while pushing for continued diplomacy as outlined by Bush. President Putin of Russia selectively quoted the President’s speech saying, “We agree with the President that diplomacy has not been exhausted yet”. And China's foreign office said that the “UN is the best medium to solve the political problem of Iraq and China is willing to play a role in that process”. Other countries were encouraged by the tone of the speech, German Chancellor Stoiber was especially supportive, “Germany's policy is the return of inspectors, and we support the steps taken, these are the wise actions.”. However, some nations chose to remind the world of the aggressive actions already underway, including the fifth permanent security council member France “It is great that President Bush wants to negotiate but it will be difficult to do so while the bombing continues, the U.N. inspectors will likely not return until that stops”. And Arab leaders such as secretary of the Arab League Amr Moussa said Bush’s overture to the United States is “a good move, but a disingenuous one if the U.S. does not also ease its aggressive actions” and for its part, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister called the speech a “mass of lies and fabrications”.
While the diplomats fought in New York for the support of the world, the battle for the support of the nation began in Washington. If the United States needed to lead a coalition against Iraq the administration decided it would need congressional authorisation, there were differing opinions in the White House on this strategy, the Powell faction thought that it could jeopardize diplomatic efforts by placing the nation on a war footing before the U.N. offered its resolution and threatened a possible veto, and the lawyers argued that since the 1991 congressional authorisation for the gulf war hadn’t been rescinded the President still held the authority to direct force against Iraq, and even without that it wasn’t as if Presidents hadn’t used their war powers extra-legally before and some could argue he was already in breach of the law, but the President agreed with his political advisors that running rings around congress would not aid his coalition-building efforts and could hurt domestic support if a partisan battle erupted inside the United States and a potential war wasn’t over quickly. It could be a hard fight ahead, the Republicans lacked control of either house of congress or should Bush Jr face as much opposition to a resolution as his father did in 1991 it could come down to the wire. The legislative push was made primarily by Chief of Staff Andy Card and Vice-President Dick Cheney (given his legislative background and position as leader of the Senate). As opposed to the streamlined presentation to the U.N. the congressional approach was scattered, a use of force resolution was simultaneously presented to congressmen and women as giving a backbone to U.N. resolutions aiding the peace, while also necessary because of the threat Iraq already posed aiding war preparations. Instead of focusing on the goal of returning weapons inspectors, Cheney reiterated his belief that Saddam Hussein already had W.M.D. insinuating that further resolutions were meaningless, Cheney even went public with his belief potential undercutting the President when he answered an interview question that the United States would have to act “fairly soon” regardless of the U.N. to prevent Saddam from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The lobbying put Iraqi exiles, front and centre just as they were in the battle for the 1991 resolution to tell horror stories about the oppression and genocide under Saddam Hussein and were happy to reiterate Cheney’s claims of Iraq’s weapons capabilities and terror connections.
Vice-President Cheney being interviewed on Meet the Press
The speed of events and the heavy-handed lobbying was not lost on several congressman who had been warning the White House not to rush to war, Senate Majority Leader Daschle told the White House that the security council resolution should come before the congressional resolution as had been done in the Persian Gulf War and many Democrats were especially hesitant to vote until they had been presented the evidence to Cheney’s claims, some took their reservations public including Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois who called such a resolution “poorly timed” , and there were some foibles in the Republican camp also, Senator Lincoln Chafee, a recurring thorn in the Presidents side agreed that he needed to see the evidence before he voted and was joined by Senators Richard Lugar on the foreign relations committee pushed back against some of the White House messaging by saying that any congressional resolution should be tied to a U.N. resolution and was joined by a few other moderates who expressed reservations about pre-empting the United Nations. The opposition meant that a vote might meet a filibuster threat even as they were able to find some Democratic support in arch hawk Sen, Joe Lieberman and a few other conservative Democrats. Bush hoped to find stronger support in the House, where Speaker Gephardt had been previously open about his support for getting rid of Saddam Hussein and as Speaker was eager for Congress to have a strong say in the events in Iraq, but when pursued to help wright a joint resolution with the White House he pushed back against a swift passage of the resolution “The President is right to state our goals and approach the international community” he said in a press conference “but there are a lot of questions still open, we need to keep our goals clear and our allies on side to ensure this isn’t a one country operation … we need to keep a healthy scepticism about the actions of Saddam Hussein, we know that he is not to be trusted, if necessary I would support a resolution but while the diplomatic options are still on the table we may be able to avoid another war”.
(left to right) Senate Leader Daschle and Speaker Gephardt opposed to the push for an immediate authorisation of force
The pushback from the Democratic leadership did not sink a resolution and the Bush team was confident that they could peel off sufficient Democratic support in the House and that Democrats would be spooked from filibustering a war resolution, however right now the Senate would be a dangerous gambit and could quickly devolve into partisan gridlock. Unwilling to risk it, the President opted to wait until they had reached a deal at the security council before pursuing the domestic end.[2]
As the Bush team celebrated the President’s speech, they planned their next moves in lobbying the security council for the new resolution. But another surprise came only four days after Bush’s speech. When Kofi Annan received a letter from the Iraqi foreign minister that invited the U.N. weapons inspector chief, Hans Blix back to Iraq. While Annan could not take the offer up immediately as it laid out a rigid timetable that broke with previous resolutions, Annan did announce he would engage in negotiations with Iraq and said it was a positive step forward. Bush’s U.N. speech and Iraq’s following letter seemed to be significant de-escalations, but Washington was quick to cast doubt on the Iraqi proposal bringing up Iraq’s history of meddling with inspectors and Bush's press secretary made it clear that "inspections are not the same as disarmament". One by one, through the month of May, the United States worked to get the security council onside, it took a lot of negotiations and a lot of rewrites including the specification that Iraq’s failure to comply did not justify invasion nor did it outline any other specific consequences, a significantly lighter proposal than the Gulf War resolution 12 years ago. But the ongoing military strikes angered the key members of the security council Russia, China and France all three threatened to veto if the United States did not commit fully to the diplomatic option and ease the strikes. It was a tough sticking point; the President had publically committed to keeping up the pressure on Iraq and Rumsfeld still said they had targets to hit but with the resolution close to complete and no longer any urgent objectives, Bush privately conceded to the council members and strikes again restricted to the no-fly zones, after over a month Baghdad was no longer a city under siege. Sure enough, a few days later on the 3rd of July 2003, the Security Council voted and passed with 11 votes 3 abstentions (Russia, France and Pakistan), and 1 vote against (Syria)[3], Resolution 1486 declaring Iraq in violation of previous resolutions and offered Iraq an opportunity to comply, soon after Iraq announced it would comply. After 5 years weapons inspectors would be returning to Iraq.
(left) UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq, (right) Iraqi building destroyed by US strikes
[1] The two pilots here flew combat missions in the Iraq war
[2] IOTL the war resolution vote occurred prior to congressional elections, so Democrats hoped by speeding up the process they could focus on domestic politics, here there is no such advantage.
[3] The security council has a rotating 10 non-permanent members which Pakistan and Syria would be serving on at the time
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Could you back to the Feb 26 2003, let President Bush join the 10 anniversary of 1993 world trade center bombing?
Bowling for Columbine will turn out slightly different than in our reality, given that there is a scene in the film that shows United Airline Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade Center.Diane Lane - “And the Oscar goes to … Bowling for Columbine, Michael Moore and Michael Donovan”
Standing ovation as the winner takes to the stage
Michael Moore - “Thank you, thank you very much, on behalf of our producers Kathleen Glen and Michael Donovan from Canada. Um ... I’d like to thank the academy for this, I’m a documentarian, I work in non-fiction but unfortunately, we live in fictitious times, we have fictitious election results, that elects a fictitious president more concerned with giving special favors to Enron, polluters and lobbyists, sucking this state and this country dry for millions! Shame on you George, shame on you! We deserve better!”
That famed moment from the Oscars was received by a partially positive audience, though accompanied by scattered stiltedness and awkward claps. In time, conservative commentators would deride Hollywood's liberal bias, it represented a real moment where politics and the media met. Michael Moore’s fame had ballooned following the release of his 4th film the documentary, Bowling for Columbine a dissection of America's gun culture, the power and influence of the NRA (National Rifle Association) and eaches role in the 1999 Columbine school shooting. It was a smash hit, especially for the genre and the academy would have been foolish to expect Moore not to express his political views on the stage granted him.
Film Director Michael Moore during his Oscars acceptance speech, the cover of his film Bowling for Columbine.
It's a damn shame, the wonderful world montage is such a beautifully tragic piece.
Even Dino Crisis 3 might have that cancelled New York level with dinosaurs running around the city. This was cancelled because of 9/11 and was changed to a spaceship instead.
Weird I didn’t get a notification about the latest update but wow! What a chapter. Sophisticated, thoughtful and plausible work as always