Not really king Muhammed Ali started with doing it even before he was king.
Confederate Victory: When does the Confederacy become a pariah state?
- Thread starter Victor Hatherley
- Start date
Not really king Muhammed Ali started with doing it even before he was king.
Not quite as much as you might think, since this is a common pattern in industrial development--think of Silicon Valley or Shenzhen today, for other examples (albeit not as extreme). There tends to be a kind of positive spiral effect from an industry becoming important in an area, where it drives the concentration of that industry and related industries in that same area. After all, a prominent industry being in a given area means that there are lots of workers that are experienced in working in that industry in that area (so that a new competitor can easily gain access to a skilled workforce), that suppliers of capital goods, raw materials, of components needed by the industry are already well-represented in the area (so that it is easy to get the things needed to make the whatever--and of course this has a reciprocal effect on those industries, which benefit from a concentrated and substantial customer base), and property owners, cities, regulators, and other entities are familiar with the needs of the industry (so there is less difficulty in setting up new factories or other facilities). The degree of consolidation is a bit high, but the overall pattern is nothing special.
Detroit between 1910-1970ish would be another prime example
There was also a severe wartime paucity in edible food, despite the South's prestige as an agricultural powerhouse. The majority of acreage, after all, had been reserved for the cash crops -- cotton and tobacco -- and the more feudal areas of the country had traditionally been sustained by the Midwest for dietary needs, including "beef, pork, corn, flour, fruits, butter, [and] cheese" in the Antebellum. These commodities had been previously shipped by steamboat from the Upper Mississippi or by rail. Now, in wartime, this was impossible.
As the blockade intensified and the Union Armies occupied important counties, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution in 1862 pressing for the planting of consumer crops rather than export-bound staples. Some States made it illegal for farmers to "plant more than two bales of cotton per field hand." The Columbus Sun trumpeted "Plant corn and be free, or plant cotton and be whipped!" Other newspapers likened the planting of corn with patriotism and that of cotton with demonic intent. The majority of States, in order to insure supply of grain for food production, also stifled distillation of alcoholic products.
Some of the millionaire planters, however, argued that cotton-harvesting ought to be intensified for the purpose of diplomacy, the (in)famous 'King Cotton' strategy. Indeed, in 1861 there was in place a voluntary embargo of products in order to incite fiber-starved Anglo-French intervention and/or pressure from Yankee mill owners to recognize the Confederacy in order to resume normal trade relations. It proved a total failure in the aftermath of Sharpsburg/Perryville, even though the cloth-manufacturing sectors of the affected were seriously disrupted, forcing England and France to attempt to develop inferior sources in Egypt/India, which may prove to be more temporary than anything in the ATL. The Lincoln Administration was also pressured to undertake disastrous campaigns in the trans-Mississippi for the same purpose.
Naturally, Davis' government has received significant criticism over this since the beginnings of ACW scholarship, with the notion that Richmond could have directed the exportation of such an abundance of cotton in 1861 as to provide for the foundation of a sound financial system remaining ever-popular. This is wishful-thinking and largely improbable. De Bow himself recommended that the Confederate Government acquire ownership of at least a "million" bales of cotton, purchased with paper, and form a federal bureau in Montgomery to "arrange, order, and organize" its exportation. Already, at the end of 1860, British textile-mills were some four months behind their supply. The planters, with secession imminent, were rushing to sell. Since the crop of 1860-61 had indeed "broken records", many sources inform us that the market was so inundated with cotton that many mills suspended operation and prices were brought to a "standstill". The UK purchased 1,650,000 bales before Fort Sumter and Lincoln's subsequent proclamations of rebellion, volunteers, and blockade. By the conclusion of the fiscal year on August 31, 1861, an estimated 3,127,568 bales had been imported into England and Continental Europe. Thus, even with the increasing accuracy of the Union Navy blockade, the idea that the majority of cotton had been forlornly-withheld and not sold abroad in 1861 is sheer myth. Even so, 'cotton famine' was in progress by Summer 1862, rendering Anglo-French interest in mediation, at the Cabinet level, following Second Manassas all the more potent.
Jeff Davis himself provided an answer to this everlasting conundrum in a letter of his, addressed to his Treasury Secretary, C. G. Memminger, featured in a March 27, 1874, edition of the Charleston News and Courier, which provides the following quote:
"The Confederate Government was organized in February, 1861. The blockade was instituted in May, thus leaving a period of three months in which the whole cotton crop on hand, say 4 million bales, ought, according to this military financier, to have been shipped abroad. This would have required a fleet of four thousand ships, allowing one thousand bales to the ship! Where would these vessels have been procured in the face of the notification of the blockade? And was not as much of the cotton shipped by private enterprise as could have been shipped by the government? When so shipped, the proceeds of the sale were in most cases sold to the government in the shape of bills of exchange..."
He further quoted George A. Trenholm in that by the end of February 1861 some 3 million bales had been received at Southern seaports.
"... the great bulk of it had been exported to Europe or sold to the New England spinners. By the 1st of May, 586,000 bales more had been received and sold. England and the Continent took 3,127,000 bales; the New England spinners 650,000. It will thus be seen that before the new government was fairly organized the entire crop was already beyond its reach! Another crop followed, but the exportation in any quantity was an absolute impossibility..."
The first blockade-runner under government authorization was the SS Fingal, in the autumn of 1861, secured through the representation of J.D. Bulloch. It brought cargo of weaponry, Enfield rifles, ammunition, and such matérial to port at Savannah, causing popular elation throughout the South. Nonetheless, the Fingal would soon find it impossible to return to Britain with her shipment of exchanged cotton. She was then refitted as an ironclad-ram, redesignated the Atlanta, with her subsequent military attempts to punch-through Welles' naval siege resulting in disablement and capture.
The more I read the Confederacy was defeated largely, in part, due to its abysmal transportation system, not to mention a few gubernatorial fellows who willingly deprived the national effort. 1864 ironically witnessed several belated improvements and such, causing me to review Davis with more admiration than before.
EDIT (cont.)
The 1860-61 harvest ultimately amounted to a record-breaking 4.5 million bales, with nearly 3.8 million sold abroad that year. Nonetheless, such quantities continued to decrease annually until only 300,000 were recorded in 1864. President Davis addressed Congress, and informed them with confidence that across the Confederacy, cereal grains were being nourished in "fields no longer whitened by cotton". It was an effort as remarkable as Gorgas' armaments 'miracle'. However, one Confederate quartermaster noted in 1863 that "our battle against want and starvation is greater than against our enemies." For I cannot stress enough that poor transportation was a primary cause of Southern defeat. For enough food was raised domestically to provide for the entire nation, both military and civilian. While Lee anguished over the condition of his most committed veterans and Richmond experienced bread riots, shipments of produce spoiled on terminal platforms and railroad sidings. The same provisions that did reach the market suffered from such inflated prices that most families despaired for want of household staples. Diarist John Beauchamp Jones, a senior War Department clerk, was earning an annual income of $3,000 yet found himself in bewilderment regarding prices, noting a single ham was being sold for $350 in early 1864. Richmond, an archetypal boom-town, experienced significant troubles due to these factors. Sherman, ironically, was perhaps the greatest benefactor of this farming revolution. For sustenance and forage were so abundant in the Georgia interior, albeit unable to be shipped by rail to Lee's front at Petersburg, that the Union commander wrote "Convey to Jeff Davis my personal thanks for abolishing cotton and substituting corn and sweet potatoes."
But what of finance?
As the blockade intensified and the Union Armies occupied important counties, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution in 1862 pressing for the planting of consumer crops rather than export-bound staples. Some States made it illegal for farmers to "plant more than two bales of cotton per field hand." The Columbus Sun trumpeted "Plant corn and be free, or plant cotton and be whipped!" Other newspapers likened the planting of corn with patriotism and that of cotton with demonic intent. The majority of States, in order to insure supply of grain for food production, also stifled distillation of alcoholic products.
Some of the millionaire planters, however, argued that cotton-harvesting ought to be intensified for the purpose of diplomacy, the (in)famous 'King Cotton' strategy. Indeed, in 1861 there was in place a voluntary embargo of products in order to incite fiber-starved Anglo-French intervention and/or pressure from Yankee mill owners to recognize the Confederacy in order to resume normal trade relations. It proved a total failure in the aftermath of Sharpsburg/Perryville, even though the cloth-manufacturing sectors of the affected were seriously disrupted, forcing England and France to attempt to develop inferior sources in Egypt/India, which may prove to be more temporary than anything in the ATL. The Lincoln Administration was also pressured to undertake disastrous campaigns in the trans-Mississippi for the same purpose.
Naturally, Davis' government has received significant criticism over this since the beginnings of ACW scholarship, with the notion that Richmond could have directed the exportation of such an abundance of cotton in 1861 as to provide for the foundation of a sound financial system remaining ever-popular. This is wishful-thinking and largely improbable. De Bow himself recommended that the Confederate Government acquire ownership of at least a "million" bales of cotton, purchased with paper, and form a federal bureau in Montgomery to "arrange, order, and organize" its exportation. Already, at the end of 1860, British textile-mills were some four months behind their supply. The planters, with secession imminent, were rushing to sell. Since the crop of 1860-61 had indeed "broken records", many sources inform us that the market was so inundated with cotton that many mills suspended operation and prices were brought to a "standstill". The UK purchased 1,650,000 bales before Fort Sumter and Lincoln's subsequent proclamations of rebellion, volunteers, and blockade. By the conclusion of the fiscal year on August 31, 1861, an estimated 3,127,568 bales had been imported into England and Continental Europe. Thus, even with the increasing accuracy of the Union Navy blockade, the idea that the majority of cotton had been forlornly-withheld and not sold abroad in 1861 is sheer myth. Even so, 'cotton famine' was in progress by Summer 1862, rendering Anglo-French interest in mediation, at the Cabinet level, following Second Manassas all the more potent.
Jeff Davis himself provided an answer to this everlasting conundrum in a letter of his, addressed to his Treasury Secretary, C. G. Memminger, featured in a March 27, 1874, edition of the Charleston News and Courier, which provides the following quote:
"The Confederate Government was organized in February, 1861. The blockade was instituted in May, thus leaving a period of three months in which the whole cotton crop on hand, say 4 million bales, ought, according to this military financier, to have been shipped abroad. This would have required a fleet of four thousand ships, allowing one thousand bales to the ship! Where would these vessels have been procured in the face of the notification of the blockade? And was not as much of the cotton shipped by private enterprise as could have been shipped by the government? When so shipped, the proceeds of the sale were in most cases sold to the government in the shape of bills of exchange..."
He further quoted George A. Trenholm in that by the end of February 1861 some 3 million bales had been received at Southern seaports.
"... the great bulk of it had been exported to Europe or sold to the New England spinners. By the 1st of May, 586,000 bales more had been received and sold. England and the Continent took 3,127,000 bales; the New England spinners 650,000. It will thus be seen that before the new government was fairly organized the entire crop was already beyond its reach! Another crop followed, but the exportation in any quantity was an absolute impossibility..."
The first blockade-runner under government authorization was the SS Fingal, in the autumn of 1861, secured through the representation of J.D. Bulloch. It brought cargo of weaponry, Enfield rifles, ammunition, and such matérial to port at Savannah, causing popular elation throughout the South. Nonetheless, the Fingal would soon find it impossible to return to Britain with her shipment of exchanged cotton. She was then refitted as an ironclad-ram, redesignated the Atlanta, with her subsequent military attempts to punch-through Welles' naval siege resulting in disablement and capture.
The more I read the Confederacy was defeated largely, in part, due to its abysmal transportation system, not to mention a few gubernatorial fellows who willingly deprived the national effort. 1864 ironically witnessed several belated improvements and such, causing me to review Davis with more admiration than before.
EDIT (cont.)
The 1860-61 harvest ultimately amounted to a record-breaking 4.5 million bales, with nearly 3.8 million sold abroad that year. Nonetheless, such quantities continued to decrease annually until only 300,000 were recorded in 1864. President Davis addressed Congress, and informed them with confidence that across the Confederacy, cereal grains were being nourished in "fields no longer whitened by cotton". It was an effort as remarkable as Gorgas' armaments 'miracle'. However, one Confederate quartermaster noted in 1863 that "our battle against want and starvation is greater than against our enemies." For I cannot stress enough that poor transportation was a primary cause of Southern defeat. For enough food was raised domestically to provide for the entire nation, both military and civilian. While Lee anguished over the condition of his most committed veterans and Richmond experienced bread riots, shipments of produce spoiled on terminal platforms and railroad sidings. The same provisions that did reach the market suffered from such inflated prices that most families despaired for want of household staples. Diarist John Beauchamp Jones, a senior War Department clerk, was earning an annual income of $3,000 yet found himself in bewilderment regarding prices, noting a single ham was being sold for $350 in early 1864. Richmond, an archetypal boom-town, experienced significant troubles due to these factors. Sherman, ironically, was perhaps the greatest benefactor of this farming revolution. For sustenance and forage were so abundant in the Georgia interior, albeit unable to be shipped by rail to Lee's front at Petersburg, that the Union commander wrote "Convey to Jeff Davis my personal thanks for abolishing cotton and substituting corn and sweet potatoes."
But what of finance?
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Many NA tribes in Oklahoma sided with the CSA hoping to get a better deal. Jefferson Davis also had an impeccable record with dealing with Native Americans going back to the Black Hawk War when he personally prevented the mistreatment of captives.
Largest Jewish population before the late 19th century immigration was in Charleston and New Orleans and they were well assimilated. Judah Benjamin CSA SEC. of State and War at various times was Jewish.
Can't add too much to what the above posters have said other than to re-iterate their points that the South actually had a fairly robust industrial base during the Civil War, far more than people would initially give them credit for. The fact that they were able to not only fight a total war against the North for over four years, but do so while also suppressing multiple internal insurrections/unrest, speaks to that. Indeed the South also enjoyed a fairly robust logistics and governance system, to the point that even Georgia, while Rosecrans and then Sherman were invading the state, was able to operate a food distribution program for war widows, and expand that welfare service to include the general poor.
I will add that at least in the post-war period the South is likely to benefit from the Second Industrial Revolution pretty handsomely. Peoples' notions of the South as a backwards and impoverished land are usually clouded by things like the Depression and Reconstruction, but before the Civil War the South was actually a well-off part of the country. Mississippi in 1860 had more millionaires per capita than New York, for instance.
Assuming the South wins sometime in 1861/1862 like in TL-191, then it's core territories (AL, GA, SC, NC, and most of VA) will be left relatively untouched by the war. This is important for a couple of reasons: 1) the South would have far more capital available for future projects, and 2) the South would be starting off with a much more intact manufacturing, transportation, and agricultural base than IOTL. Despite common misconceptions, many Southerners demonstrated a willingness to invest in industrial pursuits before and during the war, most notably perhaps in places like the Atlanta-Chattanooga corridor, which developed a fairly advanced iron industry in the latter Antebellum period. Columbus, GA was also the site of significant industrial investment by sons of wealthy planters, and these factories would in turn supply the CSA with a multitude of weapons, gun casements, and other items during the Civil War. Keeping this all intact would go a long way towards building up an industrial base postwar.
The large planter class could actually be something of a benefit for future industrial growth in the South. With the old elites occupying a lot of the land, their well-off children could thus be attracted to investing in manufacturing, mining, oil, etc. as ways to earn money after being shut out from agriculture. Certainly this is a trend that was beginning as early as the 1830s with the development of works such as the ones around Etowah and Chattanooga (which granted saw considerable investment from Northerners), and there's no reason it wouldn't continue after the war.
Likewise, the South has a variety of strategic economic advantages that make industrialization likely to happen. The South has plentiful sources of raw materials, most notably iron, coal, limestone, timber, and eventually oil further down the line. What's more, these deposits tend to be located in close proximity to each other (especially in the northern Alabama and Georgia areas), whereas similar deposits in the North are further spread apart. This would greatly reduce logistical complexities for Southern businessmen. Secondly, the South has an ample pool of domestic labor in the form of its poor white and slave populations. Whereas the North relied heavily on immigrants to work in it's mines and factories, IOTL the South saw much of it's needs met by poor white farmers and sharecroppers moving off the farms. With the boll weevil likely to depress agricultural production, and mechanization, the South would theoretically have a large body of potential laborers to work in it's budding manufacturing sector. It's also important to note here that Southern literacy rates were much higher than stereotypes might have one believe, and the vast majority of at least white males in the South were literate, so arguments that none of these people would be able to work in complex sectors like manufacturing don't hold weight (besides, Southerners did it IOTL during and after the war).
We also have to remember that ITTL the South is an independent nation, and thus can pursue its own economic/trade policy separate from the North. The South can enact protectionist measures like the US did IOTL to foster the growth of a manufacturing base. A tariff or the added costs/hassle of international trade on imported fabric, for example, might compel planters in South Carolina to fund the construction of a domestic textile mill, which is something that happened IOTL anyways without the added barrier of international borders. Contrary to what most people might think, Southern leaders demonstrated a surprising willingness to exercise centralized control over industrialization efforts, albeit under the extenuating circumstances of war. The Augusta, GA powder works (one of the largest in the world at the time) was done almost entirely at the government's behest, just as one example. So, there is precedence for Southern leaders being willing to enact measures/policy designed to foster domestic industrial self-sufficiency, especially in the face of an external threat (like a revanchist North might pose postwar).
The issue of education is a little murkier, since much of the effort towards establishing public schools in the South came on the part of Northern Reconstruction governments. However, there were many domestic advocates for the expansion of education opportunities in the South, at least at the collegiate level. Many universities were founded in the South before and immediately after the Civil War, and the South saw an expansion in new colleges in the 1880-1940 timeframe as a result of growing demands from agriculture, textile manufacturing, and later heavy manufacturing. Mississippi State, Clemson, Auburn, the University of Georgia, etc. were founded in large part due to the initiative of Southern leaders (although with the caveat that much of the money for their construction came from federal funds. A lot also came from the states and private investors, however, so it's a very nuanced scenario. It's likely without those federal funds many of those schools would not have existed, or would be smaller than IOTL, but it's always possible the Confederate government might set up its own version of the Land Grant system, if only to compete with the North). As for primary and secondary schools I personally think it's inevitable the South develops a public system. Increasing industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture, and rural development throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s would pretty much necessitate it.
The thing with graphics like this is they're often times misleading. When you just compare the populations of the Northern states and territories to the South, it looks like the North had a clear advantage, but that's not taking into account a lot of things:
1) Union troops from western regions like California and Kansas were often times kept west of the Mississippi to contend with Indians, and no significant amount of them fought in any theater.
2) The Confederacy was able to enlist tens of thousands of people from the border states into it's armies, most notably from Missouri and Kentucky. Maryland sent more troops to the Confederacy than Florida, as an example. Although the actual number of border state regiments in CSA outfits were rather small, a great number of border state residents opted to fight in Confederate state regiments instead. For example, there is the interesting story of Company G, 15th Tennessee Infantry (CSA) which was comprised of men from Illinois. There are also many anecdotes of Indianians, Ohioans, Delawareans, Pennsylvanians, Coloradans, and even Californians who fought for the South. Kansas sent a few regiments' worth of men to fight for the CSA, which given the state's contribution to the Union war effort elsewhere isn't insignificant. Pemberton, of Vicksburg infamy, was a Pennsylvanian. A majority of West Virginia counties voted for secession in 1861, and the state sent a significant number of men to serve in Virginia regiments during the war. Estimates for Marylanders are as high as 25, 000 serving in the Confederate military at some point, the vast majority of them serving in Virginia regiments (the CSA did create two Maryland regiments, the 1st Maryland Infantry and the 2nd Maryland Infantry when the terms of enlistment for the 1st ended). There is also the issue of guerrillas, and the disproportionate number of Union forces tied down chasing after them. Of course, many thousands of Southerners also served in the Union armies, most notably from North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, but the point is to say that it isn't as black and white as merely counting up the census figures for the Northern states and the Southern states and seeing who has more people.
3) The Union struck a variety of deals with border state governments to keep units raised from those states within their own territories. For example, the vast majority of Marylanders recruited by the Union were kept as garrison troops around the state and did not participate in battles against Lee's army. The Confederates rarely did this, except for individual state militias and home guards units.
4) You can't just ignore the slave population since although the Confederacy did not allow them to serve in a combat role until very late in the war, slaves were still used to dig fortifications, provide war materiel, act as orderlies and general laborers with the armies, etc. In the North those roles were all taken by Union soldiers, so in effect this meant that the South could use a far greater proportion of their men under arms in combat roles.
5) The census of 1860 likely undercounted the number of Southern manufacturing enterprises, possibly by a fairly substantial degree (an interesting read is the paper mentioned here - https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3453&context=cwbr). Many Southern manufacturing enterprises were oriented towards supplying local needs and were under individual ownership as opposed to a company or partnership, which made them easy to miss or hide. However, although smaller and less advanced than most Northern enterprises at the time, they still formed an important role in industrial capacity during the Civil War, as evidenced by the fact that the South was able to last for more than four years fighting against the North and several internal revolts at the same time.
I will add that at least in the post-war period the South is likely to benefit from the Second Industrial Revolution pretty handsomely. Peoples' notions of the South as a backwards and impoverished land are usually clouded by things like the Depression and Reconstruction, but before the Civil War the South was actually a well-off part of the country. Mississippi in 1860 had more millionaires per capita than New York, for instance.
Assuming the South wins sometime in 1861/1862 like in TL-191, then it's core territories (AL, GA, SC, NC, and most of VA) will be left relatively untouched by the war. This is important for a couple of reasons: 1) the South would have far more capital available for future projects, and 2) the South would be starting off with a much more intact manufacturing, transportation, and agricultural base than IOTL. Despite common misconceptions, many Southerners demonstrated a willingness to invest in industrial pursuits before and during the war, most notably perhaps in places like the Atlanta-Chattanooga corridor, which developed a fairly advanced iron industry in the latter Antebellum period. Columbus, GA was also the site of significant industrial investment by sons of wealthy planters, and these factories would in turn supply the CSA with a multitude of weapons, gun casements, and other items during the Civil War. Keeping this all intact would go a long way towards building up an industrial base postwar.
The large planter class could actually be something of a benefit for future industrial growth in the South. With the old elites occupying a lot of the land, their well-off children could thus be attracted to investing in manufacturing, mining, oil, etc. as ways to earn money after being shut out from agriculture. Certainly this is a trend that was beginning as early as the 1830s with the development of works such as the ones around Etowah and Chattanooga (which granted saw considerable investment from Northerners), and there's no reason it wouldn't continue after the war.
Likewise, the South has a variety of strategic economic advantages that make industrialization likely to happen. The South has plentiful sources of raw materials, most notably iron, coal, limestone, timber, and eventually oil further down the line. What's more, these deposits tend to be located in close proximity to each other (especially in the northern Alabama and Georgia areas), whereas similar deposits in the North are further spread apart. This would greatly reduce logistical complexities for Southern businessmen. Secondly, the South has an ample pool of domestic labor in the form of its poor white and slave populations. Whereas the North relied heavily on immigrants to work in it's mines and factories, IOTL the South saw much of it's needs met by poor white farmers and sharecroppers moving off the farms. With the boll weevil likely to depress agricultural production, and mechanization, the South would theoretically have a large body of potential laborers to work in it's budding manufacturing sector. It's also important to note here that Southern literacy rates were much higher than stereotypes might have one believe, and the vast majority of at least white males in the South were literate, so arguments that none of these people would be able to work in complex sectors like manufacturing don't hold weight (besides, Southerners did it IOTL during and after the war).
We also have to remember that ITTL the South is an independent nation, and thus can pursue its own economic/trade policy separate from the North. The South can enact protectionist measures like the US did IOTL to foster the growth of a manufacturing base. A tariff or the added costs/hassle of international trade on imported fabric, for example, might compel planters in South Carolina to fund the construction of a domestic textile mill, which is something that happened IOTL anyways without the added barrier of international borders. Contrary to what most people might think, Southern leaders demonstrated a surprising willingness to exercise centralized control over industrialization efforts, albeit under the extenuating circumstances of war. The Augusta, GA powder works (one of the largest in the world at the time) was done almost entirely at the government's behest, just as one example. So, there is precedence for Southern leaders being willing to enact measures/policy designed to foster domestic industrial self-sufficiency, especially in the face of an external threat (like a revanchist North might pose postwar).
The issue of education is a little murkier, since much of the effort towards establishing public schools in the South came on the part of Northern Reconstruction governments. However, there were many domestic advocates for the expansion of education opportunities in the South, at least at the collegiate level. Many universities were founded in the South before and immediately after the Civil War, and the South saw an expansion in new colleges in the 1880-1940 timeframe as a result of growing demands from agriculture, textile manufacturing, and later heavy manufacturing. Mississippi State, Clemson, Auburn, the University of Georgia, etc. were founded in large part due to the initiative of Southern leaders (although with the caveat that much of the money for their construction came from federal funds. A lot also came from the states and private investors, however, so it's a very nuanced scenario. It's likely without those federal funds many of those schools would not have existed, or would be smaller than IOTL, but it's always possible the Confederate government might set up its own version of the Land Grant system, if only to compete with the North). As for primary and secondary schools I personally think it's inevitable the South develops a public system. Increasing industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture, and rural development throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s would pretty much necessitate it.
The CSA was also a major producer of rice too and some sugar caine.
The thing with graphics like this is they're often times misleading. When you just compare the populations of the Northern states and territories to the South, it looks like the North had a clear advantage, but that's not taking into account a lot of things:
1) Union troops from western regions like California and Kansas were often times kept west of the Mississippi to contend with Indians, and no significant amount of them fought in any theater.
2) The Confederacy was able to enlist tens of thousands of people from the border states into it's armies, most notably from Missouri and Kentucky. Maryland sent more troops to the Confederacy than Florida, as an example. Although the actual number of border state regiments in CSA outfits were rather small, a great number of border state residents opted to fight in Confederate state regiments instead. For example, there is the interesting story of Company G, 15th Tennessee Infantry (CSA) which was comprised of men from Illinois. There are also many anecdotes of Indianians, Ohioans, Delawareans, Pennsylvanians, Coloradans, and even Californians who fought for the South. Kansas sent a few regiments' worth of men to fight for the CSA, which given the state's contribution to the Union war effort elsewhere isn't insignificant. Pemberton, of Vicksburg infamy, was a Pennsylvanian. A majority of West Virginia counties voted for secession in 1861, and the state sent a significant number of men to serve in Virginia regiments during the war. Estimates for Marylanders are as high as 25, 000 serving in the Confederate military at some point, the vast majority of them serving in Virginia regiments (the CSA did create two Maryland regiments, the 1st Maryland Infantry and the 2nd Maryland Infantry when the terms of enlistment for the 1st ended). There is also the issue of guerrillas, and the disproportionate number of Union forces tied down chasing after them. Of course, many thousands of Southerners also served in the Union armies, most notably from North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, but the point is to say that it isn't as black and white as merely counting up the census figures for the Northern states and the Southern states and seeing who has more people.
3) The Union struck a variety of deals with border state governments to keep units raised from those states within their own territories. For example, the vast majority of Marylanders recruited by the Union were kept as garrison troops around the state and did not participate in battles against Lee's army. The Confederates rarely did this, except for individual state militias and home guards units.
4) You can't just ignore the slave population since although the Confederacy did not allow them to serve in a combat role until very late in the war, slaves were still used to dig fortifications, provide war materiel, act as orderlies and general laborers with the armies, etc. In the North those roles were all taken by Union soldiers, so in effect this meant that the South could use a far greater proportion of their men under arms in combat roles.
5) The census of 1860 likely undercounted the number of Southern manufacturing enterprises, possibly by a fairly substantial degree (an interesting read is the paper mentioned here - https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3453&context=cwbr). Many Southern manufacturing enterprises were oriented towards supplying local needs and were under individual ownership as opposed to a company or partnership, which made them easy to miss or hide. However, although smaller and less advanced than most Northern enterprises at the time, they still formed an important role in industrial capacity during the Civil War, as evidenced by the fact that the South was able to last for more than four years fighting against the North and several internal revolts at the same time.
In terms of education and literacy, I've read the War caused essential abandonment of planned libraries, college and university expansion, as well as for hospitals and other charitable institutions. Existing schools fell into disrepair, leaving thousands of children without proper instruction.
The issue of education in the South postwar is very complex. Yes, the Civil War destroyed a lot of what the South had, but it also laid the framework for the construction of new, and larger, institutions of higher learning. Many of the proponents of this came from right-populist figures like Benjamin Tillman, who was a strong advocate for the creation of agricultural and mechanical colleges, in part as a way to produce a future workforce capable of working in the region's booming agricultural and textile fields, and part as a way to counteract what he perceived to be an elitism in existing Southern education instutions. The creation of domestic Southern colleges was also seen by many as an act of almost patriotism as it was meant to compel wealthy Southerners to keep their kids and educate their kids in the South as opposed to sending them to Europe or the Northern Ivy Leagues, which had historically been the case (and the case for Northern elites). Many of these Southern colleges differed from their Northern counterparts in that they tended to have what we could consider a more trades-oriented curriculum and were meant more for workforce preparation than anything else. Of course, there were notable exceptions to this, and there remain many Southern liberal arts colleges (most of which have their start in the Antebellum period).
I would imagine if the Southern public education system follows that sort of trend, you could see something more akin to the European model pop up in Southern schools; kids go to an elementary and maybe junior high school, but by the time they reach senior high they begin to either go down a path for tradeschool/apprenticeships or college. There might be a distinction between A&M colleges which would really be vocational schools (and later engineering ones as the 20th century wears on), and the more traditional liberal arts-oriented colleges/universities.
I could also see something of a Southern Ivy League developing, especially if Southern elites end up sending most of their kids to schools in the South as opposed to Europe or the North. Schools like Tulane, Duke, etc. could be contenders for this list.
Why? That doesn't make any sense
The South was literally founded against centralization,
Stop being an apologist.
Amazing that you only seem to care about the slave issue when it's about wanking the Confederacy.
How does talking about public education in the south make someone an apologist?
He's basically arguing from a "The South will be literally like the North" perspective, ignoring all of the Southern issues
Yes, however, as the war went on, they had experienced centralization and its merits and decided to weaponize centralization to a much greater extent than the Union as a desperate efforts to salvage their sorry war economy (well, and to thoroughly suppress internal dissents and abolitionism).
In a TL where the CSA really gets away scot free, your point would be correct, they would get stuck with the weak Constitution.
I see no sign of being an apologist. Indeed I see a rather well thought out factual examination.
There are things like a new nation facing the difference between the ideals and cold hard reality. Look at the US of 1776 when it was against centralization and 1800 where it was MUCH less so There's is no reason the Confederacy wouldn't evolve once it won its independence and a lot of varied views within it to suggest it would.
There are also more people on these boards who assume the Confederates will make every stupid mistake, never reconsider anything or evolve and fail miserably because they're a bunch of stupid people we don't like than who want to wank them.
The op's entire question is based of this.
It is a strawman argument. The technical term 'stupid' also describes this type of argument.
Cato did an admirable of bringing a ton of evidence to the argument to combat stupid.
What does that even mean?
When your country is built off white supremacy (Something that Confederate-wankers sweep under the rug or think it's good) , that's what you get.
If you really want to have an honest discussion about the Confederacy, there's only one possible way of doing it. Analysing the suffering of the Black population in that country. Really go fucking deep on how each decision the CSA did affected its Black folks. Any other way is turning an eye from what the Confederacy was always meant to be.
As a brazilian i always liked the idea of an independent confederacy becuse of how it would parallel latin american countries in many different ways, really shows how impactful the settler/exploitation colony divide is.
That said i am both happy and mad someone beat me to it, i was considering writing what imo is a more realistic and interesting take on the CSA than 'Southern Victory copy number 160(now with golden circle)'
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Augusta Academy very much is representative of the developments of the northern South in the education sphere. It was founded in the 1749 to educate mainly wealthy teens and after the Revolution they changed their name to Liberty Hall academy. It became a hot bed of gradual emancipationist sentiment and enrolled its first free black man John Chavis a Revolutionary War veteran. George Washington gave the academy $20,000 enough to convert it to a college which took on his name Washington College.
The school started moving away from being a gradual emancipationist hotbed into a fire eater hotbed in the 1830s thru 50s as regional tensions built and northern abolitionist tactics changed. The Civil War left the college broken and destitute. Lee stepped in and saved the college after the Civil War. But, the South didn't have enough capital at that point to save the college and he had to rely in no small part on northern industrialists. One goes there today one can find statues to these industrialists like Cyris McCormick as donations over $10K seemingly won one a statue or a building name. The McCormick money was used to expand the college into the hard sciences to advance manufacturing, architecture, and agricultural techniques to get the South off feudal farming.
The college which later renamed Washington and Lee came to promote the development of manufacturing and industrial advancement. Would that have happened if an independent South existed, or would the college have followed Jefferson's University of Virginia track of supporting 'agrarian ideology' and the development of a farmer class across the South with new technologies Jefferson had hoped would in time end the need for endless stoop labor?
My suspicion is the duration of the war matters here. The longer the war the more federal power and industrial power proves itself useful.
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