I don't know about the rest of you, but I'd certainly watch the Yes, Comrade episode that touches upon the Supersonic Booze Carrier Tu-22.
A Sound of Thunder: The Rise of the Soviet Superbooster
- Thread starter nixonshead
- Start date
Post 5: Shuttle Studies
Post 5: Shuttle Studies
- Statement by President Nixon, 5th January 1972
I have decided today that the United States should proceed at once with the development of an entirely new type of space transportation system designed to help transform the space frontier of the 1970's into familiar territory, easily accessible for human endeavor in the 1980's and '90's.
This system will center on a space vehicle that can shuttle repeatedly from Earth to orbit and back. It will revolutionize transportation into near space, by routinizing it. It will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics. In short, it will go a long way toward delivering the rich benefits of practical space utilization and the valuable spinoffs from space efforts into the daily lives of Americans and all people...
A newspaper article dated January 29, 1972 about the newly authorised Space Shuttle program. Note that the illustration is already outdated by the time of publication. Source: Andrew LePage
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The American decision to develop the Space Shuttle at first had little impact on Soviet space planning. During the US studies of the late ‘60s, the lead Soviet space bureaus under the Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) already had more than enough on their plates. Chelomei was focussed on the Proton launch vehicle and Almaz space station, and Mishin worked to deliver the N-1 and its associated lunar landing and MKBS space station projects.
The Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) had kept a team at Artyom Mikoyan’s MMZ Zenit bureau working on a small air-launched spaceplane since 1966. Called Spiral or “Product 50-50”, this was a three stage vehicle, which would see a small lifting body spaceplane boosted to orbit with an expendable stage launched from a hypersonic carrier aircraft. However, the military were never convinced of the need for Spiral, and following the death of Mikoyan in 1970 the project coasted on at a low level without political support. The minister responsible for MAP, Pyotr Dementyev, didn’t want to divert his resources to space projects, considering them to be a MOM responsibility. Conversely, Sergei Afanasiev at MOM felt that, as an aerospace system, any spaceplane project should clearly be led by MAP.
Despite a November 1970 directive from the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) for the two ministries to develop a draft plan for a Soviet reusable space system, few resources were spent on this activity, which was seen as a distraction from other, more urgent projects. This attitude remained even after President Nixon gave the official go-ahead to NASA to develop the American Space Shuttle.
Following the US announcement, the VPK organised a meeting with representatives of MOM and various military research and operational organisations on 31st March 1972, but no agreement was reached on the need for a Soviet response to the American initiative. A further meeting in April, at which Mishin, Chelomei and Glushko were all present, concluded that there were no economic or operational benefits to be gained from a reusable system, and that the Soviet Union had no requirement for the payload return capability that was one of the selling points of the Shuttle. A series of studies were initiated to meet the letter of the VPK’s directive, but they were not prioritised. When they finally reported back in June 1974 their conclusion was that, even with a very high flight rate, there were no cost savings to be had from a Shuttle-type system.
Before this conclusion could be presented, the VPK had already commissioned an additional set of three parallel studies at the end of 1973. These studies were split into three strands, with one each being assigned to Rostislav Belyakov’s MMZ Zenit, Mishin’s TsKBEM, and Valentin Glushko’s new NPO Energomash[1].
The Zenit approach was to scale up the Spiral lifting body to 20 tonnes, sized for launch by a Proton rocket. This would have an extremely limited payload compared to the American shuttle - no more than a few tonnes - but would be well suited to the role of space station ferry. The approach took advantage of work already done on the aerodynamics of Spiral, including a number of launches and re-entries performed by the sub-scale BOR-1 and 2 vehicles in 1969-1972. Technical risk was further reduced by avoiding the development of a new, dedicated launcher, so it could be expected to have the system ready to go before the American Shuttle could fly.
The MiG-105 lifting body, developed as part of the Spiral system, was the basis for MMZ Zenit’s shuttle proposal. Source: Uncertain. Taken from Reddit.
At NPO Energomash, Glushko shared his predecessor’s lack of interest in a space shuttle. His immediate priority was on getting the Almaz programme back on track, and on the development of a new family of “Rocket Flight Apparatus” (RLA) launch vehicles. Having opposed Korolev’s use of “cryogenic” propellants in the 1960’s, Glushko had made an abrupt about-face and embraced the use of kerosene/oxygen in his launch vehicle designs. Partly this was due to his concern over losing out to Kuznetsov as the premier provider of rocket engines in the USSR, but it also came down to the simple reality that cryogens gave superior performance, and with the experienced Glushko had gained in staged-combustion engines with storable propellants, he now felt confident in applying those lessons to a kerolox design. His intention was to develop a modular series of launch vehicles to first replace Proton, then scale up to create a superior alternative to N-1. Glushko was already lobbying hard to have TsKBEM’s large MKBS space station merged with Almaz Phase 2 and placed under his control, and similarly hoped to use RLA as leverage to wrest the lunar project away from Mishin.
A reusable spaceplane didn’t fit into Glushko’s wider vision, and so it was assigned a low priority at NPO Energomash. Their proposal in response to the VPK directive was similar in shape to the US Shuttle, but scaled down to the 20 tonnes also proposed by Zenit. Launched on the RLA replacement of Proton, Energomash’s shuttle would be used for crew rotation and resupply of Glushko’s space stations, while heavy payloads would continue to use expendable rockets.
TsKBEM’s proposal was the least detailed of the three studies, with their report describing a vehicle only slightly smaller in size and payload capacity to the American Shuttle, but designed for launch atop the N-1. Mishin saw little value in developing an all-new heavy lifter to carry a spaceplane when they had finally, after great efforts, managed to bring a rocket of similar capability into operation. The study talked vaguely about options for adding re-usability features to the N-1 Blok-A, such as air-breathing jets for a powered soft landing, but didn’t settle on a final concept, and in its basic form proposed to leave the N-1 essentially unmodified.
TsKBEM’s shuttle orbiter concept exhibited some limitations from the need to be compatible with N-1, with the most serious constraint arising from the aerodynamics of the stack. To avoid a complete re-design of the N-1, the shuttle vehicle would have to be mounted on top of the rocket, in the position originally intended for the L3 stack. Centre of pressure concerns ruled out putting a US-style big winged orbiter in this position, and even a Spiral-type lifting body would be challenging. This led to TsKBEM’s proposed spacecraft having a roughly cylindrical shape, with small deployable wings that would swing down to control re-entry, before the whole craft made a final vertical descent under parachutes. This sacrificed cross-range capability, as well as introducing a significant question mark over how the vehicle was to be returned to the launch site, but it would make for a simple, robust design that more closely approached the Americans’ up- and down-mass capabilities.
By 1975 the Soviet military was starting to take serious notice of the progress of the US Space Shuttle. In particular, questions were being asked about what exactly the Americans expected to do with their new spaceship. NASA was still claiming to be aiming at up to 60 Shuttle launches per year. Soviet analysts struggled to identify a mission that would require an increase of US annual launch capability from 150 tonnes per year to over 1700 tonnes per year. Of even greater concern was the question of what the new 180 tonnes of annual downmass capability would be used for. Analysis by the TsNIIMash research institute confirmed the view that the Shuttle could never become economically viable on the basis of NASA’s publicly stated missions, and a report by the Soviet Academy of Sciences concluded that “we do not see any sensible scenario that would support the shuttle for scientific uses.” When pressed, the scientists identified some possible military uses for the Shuttle, such as the orbiting and retrieval of large experimental anti-missile lasers or, more fancifully, a surprise orbital nuclear bombing run on Moscow and Leningrad, but there was no consensus on how realistic these possibilities really were. When tasked with assessing the military potential of the Shuttle, the TsNII-50 research institute produced two reports - one confirming the Shuttle’s military potential, and the second refuting it.
In an attempt to cut through this confusion, Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov summoned Mishin to his office to discuss the options. Mishin, still unenthusiastic about the project, instead sent his deputy in charge of shuttle studies, Valeriy Burdakov[2]. In contrast to his boss, Burdakov was enthusiastic about the possibilities of a Soviet shuttle, and he and Ustinov spoke at length over the military capabilities of such a system. Together with reports from KGB chief Yuri Andropov emphasising the Shuttle’s military potential, this seems to have swung Ustinov behind the case for a Soviet space shuttle as insurance against the Americans opening up a capability gap and revealing some surprise mission that the Soviets had been unable to identify.
On 17th February 1976, the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers issued a joint decree “On the Development of a Reusable Space System and Future Space Complexes”. This directed MOM to lead the development of a reusable space system able to launch up to 30 tonnes into a 200km orbit, and bring back payloads massing up to 20 tonnes. Following the decree, the role of prime contractor for the shuttle was given to TsKBEM. Over his objections, and in parallel to the ongoing lunar programme, Vasily Mishin was now put in charge of delivering a Soviet space shuttle.[3]
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[1] Chelomei’s TsKBM has been combined with Glushko’s KB Energomash to form NPO Energomash. IOTL a similar merger between KB Energomash and TsKBEM gave us NPO Energia, but I want to avoid the name Energia ITTL to reduce confusion (as if keeping TsKBEM/TsKBM straight up to now had been simple!).
[2] IOTL, Burdakov was in charge of shuttle studies at TsKBEM under Mishin, then demoted after Glushko took over and merged his KB Energomash bureau with TsKBEM to form NPO Energiya. Glushko was also uninterested in a shuttle IOTL, and so sent Burdakov to Ustinov instead of going himself, making this a case of In Spite of a Nail.
[3] This chapter is heavily based upon information contained within the excellent book “Energiya-Buran” by Bart Hendrickx and Bert Vis.
...that's a lot of chutes. I'm having nightmare visions of them tangling up on the way down. Given the payload requirements (30 up, 20 down), the TsKBEM seems the most likely starting point for a Soviet shuttle design, but something might still come up. I wonder if they couldn't carry it back to the launch site after landing with a supersized helicopter--Mil V-12 or some derivative.
I'm really hoping that the ATL Buran doesn't get funded here... Surely Mishin can save us from this fate.
Otherwise we will need someone to deflate the Space shuttle before it inflates and consumes what is left of the Soviet Space budget and deny us more glorious rocket launches of the N-1, maybe strapping the shuttle to the top of the N-1 superbooster will truly 'fix' the issue of finding the rocket booster needed to launch this thing.
Otherwise we will need someone to deflate the Space shuttle before it inflates and consumes what is left of the Soviet Space budget and deny us more glorious rocket launches of the N-1, maybe strapping the shuttle to the top of the N-1 superbooster will truly 'fix' the issue of finding the rocket booster needed to launch this thing.
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So Paranoia looks to be forcing a Soviet Response to STS after all. That is some In Spite of a Nail there, and not just for the reason given...
Then, Glushko isn't Chelomei, so I can't see him trying to build a TTL-LKS behind the Leadership's backs.
And for some reason, I can't get the image of StarShipSki outta my mind when I read about how the TsKBEM design is "intended" to be placed atop the N1, even though he likely hasn't even started school yet at this point...
Just what's gonna happen next? Especially given Mishin's go-to for dealing with Stress...
Then, Glushko isn't Chelomei, so I can't see him trying to build a TTL-LKS behind the Leadership's backs.
And for some reason, I can't get the image of StarShipSki outta my mind when I read about how the TsKBEM design is "intended" to be placed atop the N1, even though he likely hasn't even started school yet at this point...
Just what's gonna happen next? Especially given Mishin's go-to for dealing with Stress...
That was one of the reasons it wasn't accepted and also the heating of such a dense object with limited surface area was a major issue. On the other hand said 'density' would have allowed a metallic TPS system which could have handled the heating load and the mass of the parachutes was enough so that a turbine or rocket based landing systems might trade quite well. (As an example NASA studied the "PLAME" {Propulsive Lift Concept for the Descent and Landing of Manned Entry Vehicles} as means to land a spacecraft and found it traded pretty well if you didn't for some reason want wings on larger spacecraft... but why would you NOT want wings? Oh ya, that center-of-pressure thing, right
)A multi-stage fan driven by a RCS propellant rocket thruster (an airturborocket set up) would be even lighter and higher performance than an actual jet engine so it would likely work for a larger vehicle.
Randy
This is why the United States won the Cold War. As only it has the wealth and pigheadedness to browbeat people into thinking "Propulsive Lift Concept for the Descent and Landing of Manned Entry Vehicles" can be acronymized as PLAME. Our greatest weapon is the English language. Gaze upon it and tremble in fear.(As an example NASA studied the "PLAME" {Propulsive Lift Concept for the Descent and Landing of Manned Entry Vehicles} as means to land a spacecraft and found it traded pretty well if you didn't for some reason want wings on larger spacecraft... but why would you NOT want wings? Oh ya, that center-of-pressure thing, right
Yep. Just like OTL
The recovery problem is one we'll see explored more as the project develops, but you're quite right, those bunches of parachutes look dicey.
It has been Decreed, so it must be done! Or at least, it must be kept formally on the books until it is delivered or whithers away from lack of interest
But with the KGB pushing the threat of the US Shuttle and the Defence Minister convinced, don't expect the Soviet shuttle programme to disappear any time soon.OTOH (and assuming Mishin gets his way), there will be no new heavy lift rocket developed for the Soviet shuttle ITTL, with no new large hydrolox engines or high performance kerolox boosters needed, nor their associated test facilities. This significantly reduces the effort and risk of the programme compared to OTL - at least, until the Devil starts emerging from the details
Glushko, of course, has his own heavy lift dreams, independent of the shuttle...
Also, given the recent Interlude, I must admit I had Bernard Woolley's voice in my head when I first read your comment: "Er, you can't deflate something before it inflates, Minister. There's no air inside to remove, so you'd just... <makes sucking noises>"
Yeah, Glushko's got other fish to fry for the moment, and wasn't convinced of the need for a Shuttle (as he wasn't IOTL either, which was a big factor in Energia being designed to operate without the Buran orbiter). His focus is on delivering the military stations he's commited to from Chelomei's days, and putting that upstart Kuznetsov back in his place regarding who is the premier builder of rocket engines in the USSR.
SpaceX's Super Heavy has been compared to N-1 quite a lot, in particular with respect to the (insane?!) number of 1st stage engines it uses. I'm looking forward to eventually seeing a hot fire test of SuperHeavy with all 33 Raptors firing at once. Hopefully they'll prove more reliable than the NK-15, and not have the associated aerodynamic problems (computational fluid dynamics having presumably advanced significantly in the last 50 years).
We'll be coming back to check on Mishin's progress with the shuttle in a few weeks, but just to point out that TsKBEM's initial proposal at the time of the Joint Decree authorising the shuttle is still quite superficial. It will evolve as the serious engineering work begins.That was one of the reasons it wasn't accepted and also the heating of such a dense object with limited surface area was a major issue. On the other hand said 'density' would have allowed a metallic TPS system which could have handled the heating load and the mass of the parachutes was enough so that a turbine or rocket based landing systems might trade quite well. (As an example NASA studied the "PLAME" {Propulsive Lift Concept for the Descent and Landing of Manned Entry Vehicles} as means to land a spacecraft and found it traded pretty well if you didn't for some reason want wings on larger spacecraft... but why would you NOT want wings? Oh ya, that center-of-pressure thing, right
A multi-stage fan driven by a RCS propellant rocket thruster (an airturborocket set up) would be even lighter and higher performance than an actual jet engine so it would likely work for a larger vehicle.
Randy
"Comrade, we must redouble our efforts to match the Americans in this field! We cannot allow an Acronym Gap (AG)!"
Reminds me of an exchange in the "Red Lightning" story from Cold War Hot, in which two Soviet officials at a high level presentation bemoan the fact that all the Soviet projector viewgraphs are black-and-white, while the Americans are known to have full colour pictures in their briefings.
Oh yeah, how do we even deflate something that hasn't been inflated yet?
I guess you could just puncture holes into it instead...
It has been Decreed, so it must be done! Or at least, it must be kept formally on the books until it is delivered or whithers away from lack of interest
OTOH (and assuming Mishin gets his way), there will be no new heavy lift rocket developed for the Soviet shuttle ITTL, with no new large hydrolox engines or high performance kerolox boosters needed, nor their associated test facilities. This significantly reduces the effort and risk of the programme compared to OTL - at least, until the Devil starts emerging from the details
No RD-170 is a bit of a tragedy but on the other hand having the NK-33 remain in production and hopefully continue being developed is some compensation.
Well as the article notes the OTHER choice was "Propulsive Lift Landing Aid for Entry Vehicles" and while "PLLAEV" was bad enough "PLCDSLMEV" would likely have triggered the apocalypse of some sort I'm sure
Then there's the "military mind-set" (which of course transfers quite well over to organizations like NASA-et-al
) which insists on finding the "oddest" way to pronounce an acronym, and the individuals which will find more 'interesting' ways to pronouncing it.Really it's officially "AF-ARTS" not "A-FARTS"
Randy
No, no you need to "Bureaucratically" imagine the result; it would be we must initiate an Acronym Resulting, Gap Hiding plan. ARGH!
The 'gap' would be Acronym Gap Addressing Increasing Numbers or AGAIN.
I may have worked for the government for a bit to long at this point in my life
Randy
NASA is a national disgrace in this regard. While the Air Force is a next-level operator of nested acronyms and one of the premiere combatants in the Acronym Wars, NASA can't even keep up with the Europeans in the realm of space-related acronyms. Then again, the ESA is itself a premiere combatant in the Acronym Wars, so perhaps the comparison is not apt.Then there's the "military mind-set" (which of course transfers quite well over to organizations like NASA-et-al
Really it's officially "AF-ARTS" not "A-FARTS"
No, no, no!
These are our most formidable weapon against the Reds. And, even more dangerous still, the Francophones. You must respect the English language's natural flow. Which means it'd be Acronym Gap Addressed by Increasing Numbers (AGAIN). Or Acronym Gap-Addressing Increase in Numbers (AGAIN).
Keep in mind that military operators gets as good as they do by tending to ignore the 'natural' flow of language. Sirius Rocket Unit is rather 'normal' so of course any government or military agency would mix that up as Rocket Unit: Sirius. And any shipping container will state "R.U. Sirius"
Randy
Post 6: Lightning Strikes
Post 6: Lightning Strikes
“First, inevitably, the idea, the fantasy, the fairy tale. Then, scientific calculation. Ultimately, fulfilment crowns the dream.”
- Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskii
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Following the success of the N1-7L launch, there was a hiatus in further Groza missions as TsKBEM worked on the upgraded, “production” version of the N-1, called N-1F. This would keep the aerodynamic shape of vehicle 7L, but replace the NK-15 engines with new, more powerful NK-33s. As well as various improvements to increase thrust and enhance reliability and testability, the NK-33 was tuned to work with a specialised formulation of kerosene called “sintin”. When used with super-chilled, densified propellants, these upgrades would increase Groza’s payload to orbit from 90 tonnes to up to 105 tonnes. Also, in a direct response to the issues found on N1-7L, the control program of the Blok-A was modified to shut down the central NK-33s in pairs rather than all at once, to avoid the shockwave and resultant fire that had almost ended the flight of 7L. These improvements would all make their debut with vehicle N1-8L.
The payload chosen for N1-8L was the same as that for 7L, namely a full-up L3 stack, including functional models of the LOK spacecraft and LK lander. Assuming no recurrence of the Blok-D issue that had caused “Zond-9” to overshoot the Moon, the plan was a full uncrewed rehearsal of the L3 mission profile all the way to landing of the LK on the surface, and then a lift-off of the LK ascent stage back to lunar orbit. An automatic docking of the LOK and LK was not planned, but mission controllers wanted to see how close the two craft could rendezvous based on purely automatic systems. This capability would be needed for the rendezvous of the L3M GB-1 rocket stage and GB-2 lander, and would also be critical for the Mars 5NM sample return mission then in development. There were also those at TsKBEM, including Vasiliy Mishin, who still held out hopes that a successful automatic landing might pave the way for an L3 mission carrying cosmonauts, as a precursor to the later L3M missions.
To support the N1-8L landing attempt, October 1973 saw the launch of the Luna 22/Lunokhod 3 space probe[1]. This was the latest in NPO Lavochkin’s series of robotic rovers, launched by Proton-K and placed on the lunar surface by a Ye-8 descent stage. The first of the Lunokhod probes had been the victim of an early Proton launch failure in February 1969, resulting in radioactive polonium from the rover’s heating unit joining the Proton’s unburnt toxic propellant in being dispersed across the landscape, but two follow-on missions had been completed successfully in November 1970 and January 1973. With Lunokhod 3, the programme would at last be fulfilling part of its original design mission, that of surveying a safe landing site and providing a radio beacon to guide an LK lander to the surface. Naturally, this role was not included in the press release celebrating the landing of Lunokhod 3 in the Mare Vaporum on October 18th, 1973.
With Lunokhod 3 confirming the suitability of the landing zone, preparations for the launch of N1-8L continued apace, and the rocket was rolled out to Pad 37 at the Raskat launch complex at Baikonur in mid-December 1973. Ground support technicians worked through the bitter winter cold to ensure that there would be no repeat of that disaster with vehicle 8L.
The launch on 21st January, 1974 proceeded far more smoothly than those that had come before, validating Mishin’s assurances to the leadership that N-1 had put its early problems behind it. One of the the thirty Blok-A NK-33 engines did suffer a failure 90 seconds into the flight, but the KORD system immediately reacted to shut down the opposing engine, balancing the thrust and extending the burn to compensate, and staging occurred just a few seconds later than expected, with no significant impact on the mission. The Blok-B and Blok-V stages both performed perfectly, and a final nudge from the Blok-G vernier thrusters was enough to place the L3 complex into a stable low Earth orbit.
Over 22nd-26th January the combined vehicle coasted uneventfully towards the Moon, as ground control continued to monitor. Two minor course correction manoeuvres were performed exactly to plan, suggesting that the Blok-D was behaving itself this time. When the time came for the critical lunar orbit injection manoeuvre, Blok-D once again performed flawlessly, putting the reduced stack into a 175km parking orbit around the Moon. After completing an initial programme of lunar surface photography from the LOK, on the 27th January the Blok-D fired again to bring the complex into an elliptical orbit dipping from 85km to a minimum altitude of 16km above the lunar surface.
On 28th January, the LOK orbiter and LK launch shroud gently separated from the Blok-D and LK, pulling the LK out like an arm from a sleeve. The LK was powered up, while on the lunar surface Lunokhod 3 was commanded to activate its beacon. Controllers were delighted to see the LK confirm reception of Lunokhod’s signal. All indications from the LK were within tolerances, and so it was time to take the next and most critical step: landing.
On 29th January, 1974, the command was sent for the 8L Blok-D to perform this final manoeuvre. Exactly to plan, the stage decelerated its LK payload into a trajectory aligned with Lunokhod 3’s beacon. The Blok-D engine cut out at an altitude of 1552m, well within tolerances, and then completed the last of its many duties by separating from the LK to crash onto the surface below.
The LK’s Blok-E RD-858 descent engine now took up the load, as the ship’s digital computer guided the ship on its final dash to the surface. With no cosmonaut on-board, the hover at 110m lasted a mere fraction of a second before the LK made the final drop. Just as it had on three Earth orbital test flights, the little lander performed its duties flawlessly. Less than thirty seconds after separating from Blok-D, the LK’s landing contact sensors were triggered, and four upwards-facing solid landing rockets fired, pressing the LK’s landing legs firmly into the lunar soil. At long last, the L3 Programme had succeeded in landing on the Moon.
After just a few hours on the surface - simulating the time that would have been needed for its sole cosmonaut crew to perform his moonwalk - the Blok-E’s twin redundant RD-859 engines fired, lifting the LK cabin up and away from its landing gear, which was left sitting on the surface. With confirmation of successful ignition, the LK’s digital computer shut down one of the engines, completing a burn to orbit on a single RD-859, as designed. The quality of the Yangel Design Bureau’s work shone through again, as the LK completed this final major burn as flawlessly as the rest of its mission.
With the LK back in lunar orbit, the LOK tracked the lander’s rendezvous beacon and was able to manoeuvre to within 500m of the LK before holding its approach. This gave confidence that, on a crewed mission, the LOK pilot would indeed be able to complete the rendezvous and snag the LK with the Kontakt capture mechanism, allowing his comrade to spacewalk across and enter the LOK’s habitation module (BO). For this automated mission though, a capture was deemed too risky, and so the LOK and LK slowly separated in their orbits as preparations were made for the LOK’s return.
On a crewed mission, after both cosmonauts were safely in the LOK, the BO and attached LK ascent stage would separate from the rest of the ship. This was because the Kontakt system was not designed to be disengaged, and the LOK’s S5.51 main engine was not powerful enough to bring the BO/LK combination into an Earth transfer orbit with the rest of the LOK.
Despite Zond 10 not completing the docking with the LK, it was still planned to detach the BO before making the Earth return manoeuvre, and it was here that the mission suffered its first major failure. The explosive bolts designed to separate the BO from the descent module appear to have worked as designed, but the umbilical connector between the two modules did not detach as planned. This left the BO hanging from the rest of the LOK but a thick, flexible cable. Attempts were made to jerk the connector free by backing the LOK away using its attitude control thrusters, but the cable remained stubbornly in place.
With the minutes dwindling to the planned TEI burn, the decision was taken to attempt the burn as planned and hope that the BO would fall away once full thrust was applied. This scheme almost succeeded, but before the cable ripped free, it pulled the BO into a collision with the LOK’s propulsion module, damaging the delicate radiator panels covering the surface of the module. The collision also affected the direction of the burn, which would require a significant correction manoeuvre to ensure the LOK hit its narrow Earth re-entry window. In the event, the LOK never got the chance to attempt this, as, despite efforts to shut down all non-essential systems and save power, the inability to reject the heat generated by the ship’s fuel cells caused the LOK to overheat and shut down on 31st January, 1974. The ship would go on to swing past the Earth and continue out into deep space.
Despite this late failure, Mishin and his engineers were upbeat following the mission. The upgraded N-1F had performed flawlessly, and all manoeuvres in the complicated mission plan had been executed up to BO separation. There were five more LOKs and four LKs that had been completed before the switch to L3M, and Mishin felt confident that this provided enough vehicles to complete a test programme and land a cosmonaut on the surface by the end of 1976. This would provide a propaganda and morale boost, as well as lunar surface experience, before the triumphal landing of L3M in 1978.
A Soviet man on the Moon was almost within reach.
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[1] IOTL the Luna 22 designation was given to an orbiter mission launched in June 1974. ITTL, the addition of Lunokhod 3, and the later designation of the LK as Luna 23, means the orbiter ITTL will be named Luna 24, with knock-on effects down the programme.
Should the first cosmonaut happen to land on the Moon in early July 1976, I am sure it will be purely for engineering and mission planning considerations. Because absolutely nothing historically relevant was occurring about that time and the Soviets weren't terribly interested in scoring propaganda points, right?
...right?
...right?