Baltic Blunder: Europe at war in 1727 (the 2nd Edition)

Once again the Habsburgs, It grieves me to say that, are being miopic and arrogant: their aspiration to always come on top of everything, everywhere will spell their doom: they want to be on top in Poland, on top in Germany, while lacking the strenght and money to do so; their costant shenigans on the back of their allies will end up leaving them isolated and distrusted: if the were smart they would accept that they NEED the Russians and that they NEED to be on friendly terms with Prussia; they would therefore accept Russian primacy over Poland and maybe think of partitioning Saxony with Prussia, before the prussians turn against them, and they would realize as well that, no matter what, when Charles dies someone will object to Maria Theresia's succesion and a war will eventually erupt; once that happens you better have friends covering your back.
I concede, btw that Charles VI was one of the very worst Habsburgs emperors ever: a true uppity, incompetent idiot
 
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Once again the Habsburgs, It grieves me to say that, are being miopic and arrogant: their aspiration to always come on top of everything, everywhere will spell their doom: they want to be on top in Poland, in top in Germany, while lacking the strenght and money to do so; their costant shenigans on the back of their allies will end up leaving them isolated and distrusted: if the were smart they would accept that they NEED the Russians and that they NEED to be on friendly terms with Prussia; they would therefore accept Russian primacy on Poland and maybe think of partitioning Saxony with Prussia, before the prussians turno against them, and they would realize as well that no, matter what, when Charles dies someone will object to Maria Theresia's succesion and a war will eventually erupt; once that happens you better have friends covering your back.
I concede, btw that Charles VI was one of the very worst Habsburgs emperors ever: a true uppity, incompetent idiot
If this is any consolation, think about the mental capacities of those who kept sticking to the alliance with <list of your own definitions above> for more than a century regardless repeated negative experiences of these alliances. Look at the whole history of the Russian-Austrian relations from the late XVII till early XIX. Who were the greater idiots?
 
If this is any consolation, think about the mental capacities of those who kept sticking to the alliance with <list of your own definitions above> for more than a century regardless repeated negative experiences of these alliances. Look at the whole history of the Russian-Austrian relations from the late XVII till early XIX. Who were the greater idiots?
Ahahah
 
The Austrians did help the Russians against the Ottomans in 1737 and 1788. Now admittedly they were quite incompetent in those wars, but still, that was an important part of the purpose of the alliance and they did follow through and tie down Ottoman forces.
 
The Austrians did help the Russians against the Ottomans in 1737 and 1788. Now admittedly they were quite incompetent in those wars, but still, that was an important part of the purpose of the alliance and they did follow through and tie down Ottoman forces.
But in both cases, they were forced to sue for peace because of events elsewhere.
In the case of 1737 it was the combination of Spanish ambitions in Italy and French plans for Poland-Lithuania
In the case of 1788 it was the Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic to restore their stadholder as well as the Belgian Revolt
In both cases, Russia still managed to gain advantage over the Ottomans, and had the French Revolution (and later Napoleon) not come along, its likely the Hapsburgs would've found themselves friendless against a Russia determined to rule the Balkans and a Prussia intent on uniting Germany if not wholly then at least in part. They didn't trust the British, they feared the Spanish (ironic as the family once ruled Spain) and loathed the French despite their alliance. They might've been forced to swallow what would for them be the bitter pill of an understanding with the Ottomans as the only possible ally left for them.
 
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But in both cases, they were forced to sue for peace because of events elsewhere.
In the case of 1737 it was the combination of Spanish ambitions in Italy and French plans for Poland-Lithuania
In the case of 1788 it was the Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic to restore their stadholder as well as the Belgian Revolt
In both cases, Russia still managed to gain advantage over the Ottomans, and had the French Revolution (and later Napoleon) not come along, its likely the Hapsburgs would've found themselves friendless against a Russia determined to rule the Balkans and a Prussia intent on uniting Germany if not wholly then at least in part. They didn't trust the British, they feared the Spanish (ironic as the family once ruled Spain) and loathed the French despite their alliance. They might've been forced to swallow what would for them be the bitter pill of an understanding with the Ottomans as the only possible ally left for them.
In 1737, I would say that Spain and France didn't impact the Turkish settlement (the war with Spain and France ended in 1735, even if negotiations lasted longer). The 1737 war saw literally everything that could go wrong, go wrong for the Hapsburgs. This war can't really be blamed on Charles VI, because the individual mistakes made by his generals were quite frankly astonishing. There is a reason that many Hapsburg officers were cashiered or even imprisoned when the War of the Austrian Succession broke out. I believe KA Roider covers this war and the Hapsburg role in it very well.
 
38: Memories of the Grand Siecle
38: Memories of the Grand Siecle
330px-Jean-Marc_Nattier_%281685-1766%29_-_Portret_van_maarschalk_hertog_Richelieu_-_Lissabon_Museu_Calouste_Gulbenkian_21-10-2010_13-34-54.jpg

Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, a possible author of "Means to defend the liberty of Poland"

Once France had finally and definitely settled on Stanislaus Leszczynski as its favored candidate for the next King of Poland, the many bureaucracies and councils that Louis XIV had constructed or reformed to power and support his war machine reawakened for the second time in five years. The energy and excitement that permeated through that war machine were far greater than that which France held in 1727. The generals, intendants, and statement could feel that this war would be different despite the fact that most of France's top posts remained filled with the same individuals who had led France into a dismal performance in Empress Catherine's War. Even with almost everyone in France expecting Britain to stay out of this war rather than committing tens of thousands of soldiers onto the Continent, the French imagined that this war would go much better than the last. At the same time, the French were not cowed by the possibility that Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Prussia would all unite in opposition to Stanislaus and France. So much seemed to be going against France yet France carried with it a prideful confidence reminiscent of the reign of Louis XIV.

The unsettling difference in France's vigorous and determined sentiment in 1732 relative to its lethargic and unfocused approach to Empress Catherine's War is the result of a series of small yet incredibly significant changes in France since 1727. The first of those changes was the transition in the leadership of the war party from Marshal d'Huxelles to Marshal Villars. Although Marshal d'Huxelles was arguably an even more dedicated servitor of Louis XIV and his visions for France than Marshal Villars, by 1727 d'Huxelles was an old and beaten man. Just a decade earlier his fervent defense of a Franco-Spanish alliance had ended in disaster when Spain's Cellamare plot against France was discovered. In the wake of that event, d'Huxelles was forced to submit himself entirely to the Duke of Orleans and even had to kiss the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which directly targeted Spain. Afterward, d'Huxelles receded and grew old. By the time that France was being dragged into Empress Catherine's War, d'Huxelles lacked the energy to oppose Cardinal Fleury's toothless war effort in the north. Nor was d'Huxelles very interested in designing a strategy for Marshal Berwick that might cripple Spain, a country that d'Huxelles still considered to be France's natural ally. Although d'Huxelles would show some gusto during the Parmese Succession Crisis he lacked the strength to assert himself over Fleury. Instead, Fleury's strategy to withhold support from Spain and negotiate separately from Britain is the one that France followed. This final failure proved to be too much for d'Huxelles to carry on and he died in late 1731.

The death of d'Huxelles allowed the hero of the War of the Spanish Succession, Marshal Villars, to become the new leader of the war party. Even though Villars was not much younger than d'Huxelles, just a year younger, he had much more energy late in life than his late brother-in-arms. Additionally, Villars unlike d'Huxelles had never been publically humbled and humiliated so he remained an unabashed and proud disciple of Louis XIV's France. For these two reasons, when war was once more on the horizon Villars was willing to stand up and directly oppose the pacific tendencies of Fleury and the pragmatic calculations of Chauvelin. Even though Villars early on was bought off by visions of one final campaign into the heart of Germany, as soon as the opportunity presented itself for him to champion an even more aggressive and patriotic vision he did just that. Villars pushed that vision with so much fire and zeal that this time he forced both Fleury and Chauvelin to bend to his will rather than either of theirs. Besides Villars' greater spirit, his legendary status among the people and nobility of France allowed him to succeed where d'Huxelles failed. Thus, this singular change in the leadership of the war party facilitated a push toward war and one that was more in line with the France of old. With the glorious goal of re-establishing the prestige of the House of Bourbon, the old servitors and soldiers of Louis XIV's France that held positions throughout France's government were roused into hungry aggression like they had not been since Louis XIV himself led them.

The other change in France that helped bring back the France of old was even more subtle than the succession of d'Huxelles by Villars. This second change was the quiet but steady ascendancy of Chauvelin. Since he was first placed in a position of great power in 1727, he had slowly gained more and more power within France's government. By the time Augustus II had died and a succession crisis began, Chauvelin was viewed as the equal of Cardinal Fleury by many outside of France. Some even suspected that Chauvelin had achieved superiority over Fleury. Of course, the truth is far from this as Fleury still retained King Louis XV's ear and dominance over most of France's government. Still, the perceptions of Chauvelin as Fleury's equal revealed that Chauvelin had obtained an incredible amount of power within France [1]. The foreign ministry seemed to be entirely in his hands and the army was more responsive to him than its actually minister, d’Angervilliers. As a consequence, one would have expected that Chauvelin could have determined France's path into a war over Poland. However, Chauvelin lost to Villars. This loss was not the consequence of a forfeit but rather a true defeat.

It is important to realize that Chauvelin was a member of a new breed of French statesman. These new French statesmen recognized the errors of Louis XIV much like Orleans had and Fleury did. However, these statesmen also rejected the fearful and self-restraining ideals of Orleans and Fleury that often put France at the mercy of British leadership. This breed was not the same as the dynastic servitors of the House of Bourbon and loyalists to Louis XIV's memory that Villars represented [2]. Despite these differences and despite Chauvelin's defeat, he and the other members of this new, revisioned France such as René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d'Argenson, were not intent on hamstringing France's war efforts as Fleury did during Empress Catherine's War. Instead, even if Chauvelin disagreed with the way in which France was finding itself at war, he still agreed that a war against the Hapsburgs was the correct course of action for France. Whether fighting in the name of Friedrich August or Stanislaus, a Polish election offered the perfect excuse to break the Hapsburgs and reassert the power of France. For this reason rather than sabotage the war as Fleury might have, Chauvelin poured all his energy into planning and preparing for it. With this type of support from the very top, the rest of France's war machine could be unleashed.

Evidence of the reanimated zealotry of France's war machine is best seen in a series of anonymous French memoirs, unofficial French government policy documents [3]. The first of these memoirs was titled "Means to defend the liberty of Poland" but its contents described anything but a defense of Poland. Instead, the memoir called for the orchestration of a European wide alliance to overwhelm and crush the Hapsburgs from every direction. The very first pages of the memoir made this goal clear by brazenly calling for France to engage and ally with both Wurttemberg and Lorraine, traditional servants of the Hapsburg-led Holy Roman Empire. According to the memoir, France should offer to raise Eberhard Ludwig of Wurttemberg to the title of Imperial Elector, award him with Swabian towns, and reopen the question of who should get to succeed his family once his sickly son passed. The former two of these offers called back to half-hearted negotiations between Eberhard Ludwig and France during the War of the Spanish Succession whereas the latter offered Eberhard Ludwig an opportunity to decide his future. For Lorraine, France recalled a plan of James Stanhope to reallocate the Southern Netherlands from the Hapsburgs to the Lorrainers. In return, France would receive the whole of Lorraine and Bar and Francis Stephen marrying a Frenchwomen instead of Maria Theresa. From these two passages alone it was clear that the author of the memoir wanted to completely disrupt the established status quo of the Holy Roman Empire and break the standing loyalty of the Imperial princes to the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor.

This idea was further hammered in by the memoir's approach to the Wittelsbach Union. The memoir vehemently defended Palatinate-Sulzbach's right to succeed in Julich and Berg instead of Brandenburg. For the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria, France was to offer the rich fortress of Mantua. Behind each Palatinate and Bavaria, their ecclesiastical brothers in Mainz and Cologne were expected to follow. However, the memoir did hint at offering bribes to the two Archbishop-Electors as needed. This strong argument over the extremely contentious issue of Julich-Berg and the call for Wittelsbachs in Italy emphasized the author's desire to significantly repaint the European map. That desire was also illustrated by the memoir's unexpected call for a reorganization of northern Germany. There, France would promise Schleswig to Holstein, Oldenburg to Brunswick-Luneburg, and Emden to the Dutch Republic. Although the memoir suggested that the wars against Denmark-Norway and East Frisia that these sessions required would be delayed until after the Polish war, the memoir did demand that recipients of these lands avail their armies to France immediately.

Already the memoir had described substantial changes to European politics, but these changes paled in comparison to the memoir's vision of eastern Europe and Italy. In eastern Europe, the French would first compensate Prussia for losing out on Julich-Berg by giving them Thorn, Elbing, and Marienburg from Poland. Next, as additional rewards for Prussia's betrayal of the Emperor, Lusatia was to be transferred from Saxony to Brandenburg. Saxony would also lose Grubenhagen to Brunswick-Luneburg to compensate King George II for bringing the Hessians into the war. Finally, the memoir proposed to steal Russia away from its alliance with the Hapsburgs by allowing a Russian readjustment of its borders with Poland. In Italy, the memoir planned for the complete ejection of the Hapsburgs. Already, the memoir had given Mantua to Bavaria. After that, the memoir gave the Milanese to Savoy but in return, the geographic Duchy of Savoy would fall to France. Meanwhile, Spain would be drawn into the war by the incredible offer of Naples, Sicily, and the Cremonese all for Duke Carlo of Parma.

Overall, this first memoir was a very ambitious one that detailed a plan to unite France, Britain, Spain, Prussia, Russia, the Dutch Republic, Brunswick-Luneburg, Bavaria, the Palatinate, Mainz, Cologne, Finland, Bremen-Verden, Wurttemberg, Lorraine, and Parma all against the Hapsburgs and Saxons. Through a series of land exchanges and conquests across Europe, France was supposed to buy the allegiance of this coalition. The ultimate goal of the memoir was to create a Europe in which France was again the premier and leading power. The memoir wanted to make France a hegemon in all but name. Proof of this goal can be seen in how the memoir was also organizing future wars against Denmark-Norway and Frisia. The war against Denmark-Norway could have helped France achieve influence over Baltic trade whereas the war against Frisia would have demonstrated that France, not the Holy Roman Emperor, was the most important arbiter in Germany. With such lofty goals and somewhat reasonable means of achieving them, the initial memoir was well-received in France's court. Many saw it as a perfect means of regaining France's glory, disabling the Hapsburgs, and showing the British who was the leader of their alliance. Some courtiers including the youthful Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, went so far as to call for the memoir to be used as a blueprint for the war. Despite this warm response, the author of the memoir never came forward to reveal himself.

One reason for the author's continued anonymity was probably the fact that the premier of France and his lieutenant had a very different reaction than the rest of France. At the very top of France, Fleury and Chauvelin were both alarmed and disturbed by the memoir. For Fleury, the memoir clearly demanded a full-out war, the idea of which Fleury could not stand. Fleury not only abhorred the idea of throwing the countless lives away necessary to fulfill the memoir he also feared that the memoir would send France spiraling back in time. Fleury feared that led by memoirs such as that one, France would once again chase after unachievable goals and ruin itself in the process. For Chauvelin, the memoir seemed amateurish and misguided. The memoir's belief that Russia could be bought off so easily or that France needed to fight both Denmark-Norway and the Saxons seemed ludicrous. The Russians dominated Poland for years so if they had wanted Polish land then they would have taken it already. Denmark-Norway was an ally of Britain with a large army and competent navy, which would serve France much better as allied forces rather than enemies. Finally, even though France had reneged on its Polish promise toward Saxony, France could still retain the friendship and alliance of Saxony with the right incentives. This pragmatic response to the memoir seemed to trickle down to the level of memoir writers as a succeeding memoir contained ideas similar to those of Chauvelin.

This second anonymous memoir, "Means to use against the Tsar", suggested that the ideas of "Means to defend the liberty of Poland" carried some merit in the Low Countries, Western Germany, and Italy. However, in northern Germany and in eastern Europe, "Means to use against the Tsar" suggested that the Russians could not be purchased with Polish lands. In fact, the Russians could not be bought at all because just as France was driven by memories of Louis XIV, Russia was driven by memories of Peter I. Accordingly, Russia wanted to do more than just take from Poland, it wanted to dominate eastern Europe and the Baltic. For this reason, Russia needed to be regarded as an enemy to be defeated not a rival to be bought. To achieve this defeat, the second memoir offered Karelia and Saint Petersburg to the Kingdom of Finland and its Russian Tsarevna. Denmark-Norway would be included in this anti-Russian alliance by allowing it to keep Schleswig. Meanwhile, Sweden would be drawn into the war by promises of Livonia and Estland but the King of Sweden would also be asked to bring into the war his Hessian army. Next, rather than Poland giving land to Russia, it would retake Courland, Smolensk, and Ukraine all from Russia. Finally, in the south, the Ottomans were supposed to launch a massive invasion that conquered the Caspian and Caucasus with brief mentions of missions against Belgrade and into Poland. Through this plan, Russia was going to be reduced to a second-tier power while Finland, Sweden, Poland, and the Ottomans were turned into an unbreakable wall against Russia's westward ambitions. Further west, the memoir sought to include Saxony by giving it the bulk of Silesia as compensation for Poland. Meanwhile, Britain was to be brought into the war by returning Grubenhagen to Brunswick-Luneburg and Prussia was to be purchased with a few bailliages in northern Silesia.

This second memoir much like the first one was well-received by the French as it had played on the idea that Russia was a would-be hegemon just like the Hapsburgs that needed to be beaten down. At the same time, this memoir being viewed as a revision to the first memoir was seen as much more realistic by individuals like Chauvelin and d'Argenson. Nevertheless, those sentiments did not stop further memoirs were popping up. Some called for more ambitious plans such as annexing the Southern Netherlands to France. Altogether, these memoirs served as a powerful representation of the feelings among France's elite about the state of the nation and the goals that they expected the government to pursue. Clearly, despite Fleury, the French elite still considered France a powerful country that could determine Europe's politics with its arms and its diplomacy. Although some courtiers admitted that Louis XIV's policies had gone too far and bankrupted France, few thought that Orleans and Fleury's austere foreign policy was still necessary. Beyond just believing that France was capable of pursuing a more robust policy, the elite seemed to believe that France should pursue a more robust and aggressive policy. For some, it was an issue of pride, for others it was France's destiny, but whatever the reason the majority of France's nobility and officer corps thought that France should take advantage of the Polish crisis to do more than just help install Stanislaus on the throne. Just as Spain had used Empress Catherine's War to claw back its place in Europe as a primary power, France needed to use a Polish war to retake its place as Europe's first power.

[1] These perceptions are based mainly on the OTL British view of France's internal politics.
[2] The way I see it, there are really two main factions in France at this time. One is the old servitors of Louis XIV who served at least some time under Louis XIV and fully embraced his ambitious and sometimes unwieldy world view. The other faction is represented by Chauvelin and is often mistake for the former faction. The latter faction views France as strong and capable and thinks France should use its strength to impose its will on Europe, similar to Louis XIV. However, this new group is nuanced and pragmatic in its approach. Whereas Louis XIV had some unbending points, this new group and Chauvelin are much more willing to compromise to push France forward. Fleury is obviously in neither of these factions and represents a pacific, clerical aberration at the head of French politics.
[3] Unofficial memoirs are essentially French white papers at this time and are used to publicize the viewpoints of second-tier statesmen rather than individuals like Fleury and Chauvelin. The memoirs in this chapter are fictitious but have basings in real memoirs written ahead of and during the War of the Polish Succession.

Word Count: 3039
 
In 1737, I would say that Spain and France didn't impact the Turkish settlement (the war with Spain and France ended in 1735, even if negotiations lasted longer). The 1737 war saw literally everything that could go wrong, go wrong for the Hapsburgs. This war can't really be blamed on Charles VI, because the individual mistakes made by his generals were quite frankly astonishing. There is a reason that many Hapsburg officers were cashiered or even imprisoned when the War of the Austrian Succession broke out. I believe KA Roider covers this war and the Hapsburg role in it very well.
I'll need to check that out, then
 
38: Memories of the Grand Siecle
330px-Jean-Marc_Nattier_%281685-1766%29_-_Portret_van_maarschalk_hertog_Richelieu_-_Lissabon_Museu_Calouste_Gulbenkian_21-10-2010_13-34-54.jpg

Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, a possible author of "Means to defend the liberty of Poland"

Once France had finally and definitely settled on Stanislaus Leszczynski as its favored candidate for the next King of Poland, the many bureaucracies and councils that Louis XIV had constructed or reformed to power and support his war machine reawakened for the second time in five years. The energy and excitement that permeated through that war machine were far greater than that which France held in 1727. The generals, intendants, and statement could feel that this war would be different despite the fact that most of France's top posts remained filled with the same individuals who had led France into a dismal performance in Empress Catherine's War. Even with almost everyone in France expecting Britain to stay out of this war rather than committing tens of thousands of soldiers onto the Continent, the French imagined that this war would go much better than the last. At the same time, the French were not cowed by the possibility that Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Prussia would all unite in opposition to Stanislaus and France. So much seemed to be going against France yet France carried with it a prideful confidence reminiscent of the reign of Louis XIV.

The unsettling difference in France's vigorous and determined sentiment in 1732 relative to its lethargic and unfocused approach to Empress Catherine's War is the result of a series of small yet incredibly significant changes in France since 1727. The first of those changes was the transition in the leadership of the war party from Marshal d'Huxelles to Marshal Villars. Although Marshal d'Huxelles was arguably an even more dedicated servitor of Louis XIV and his visions for France than Marshal Villars, by 1727 d'Huxelles was an old and beaten man. Just a decade earlier his fervent defense of a Franco-Spanish alliance had ended in disaster when Spain's Cellamare plot against France was discovered. In the wake of that event, d'Huxelles was forced to submit himself entirely to the Duke of Orleans and even had to kiss the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which directly targeted Spain. Afterward, d'Huxelles receded and grew old. By the time that France was being dragged into Empress Catherine's War, d'Huxelles lacked the energy to oppose Cardinal Fleury's toothless war effort in the north. Nor was d'Huxelles very interested in designing a strategy for Marshal Berwick that might cripple Spain, a country that d'Huxelles still considered to be France's natural ally. Although d'Huxelles would show some gusto during the Parmese Succession Crisis he lacked the strength to assert himself over Fleury. Instead, Fleury's strategy to withhold support from Spain and negotiate separately from Britain is the one that France followed. This final failure proved to be too much for d'Huxelles to carry on and he died in late 1731.

The death of d'Huxelles allowed the hero of the War of the Spanish Succession, Marshal Villars, to become the new leader of the war party. Even though Villars was not much younger than d'Huxelles, just a year younger, he had much more energy late in life than his late brother-in-arms. Additionally, Villars unlike d'Huxelles had never been publically humbled and humiliated so he remained an unabashed and proud disciple of Louis XIV's France. For these two reasons, when war was once more on the horizon Villars was willing to stand up and directly oppose the pacific tendencies of Fleury and the pragmatic calculations of Chauvelin. Even though Villars early on was bought off by visions of one final campaign into the heart of Germany, as soon as the opportunity presented itself for him to champion an even more aggressive and patriotic vision he did just that. Villars pushed that vision with so much fire and zeal that this time he forced both Fleury and Chauvelin to bend to his will rather than either of theirs. Besides Villars' greater spirit, his legendary status among the people and nobility of France allowed him to succeed where d'Huxelles failed. Thus, this singular change in the leadership of the war party facilitated a push toward war and one that was more in line with the France of old. With the glorious goal of re-establishing the prestige of the House of Bourbon, the old servitors and soldiers of Louis XIV's France that held positions throughout France's government were roused into hungry aggression like they had not been since Louis XIV himself led them.

The other change in France that helped bring back the France of old was even more subtle than the succession of d'Huxelles by Villars. This second change was the quiet but steady ascendancy of Chauvelin. Since he was first placed in a position of great power in 1727, he had slowly gained more and more power within France's government. By the time Augustus II had died and a succession crisis began, Chauvelin was viewed as the equal of Cardinal Fleury by many outside of France. Some even suspected that Chauvelin had achieved superiority over Fleury. Of course, the truth is far from this as Fleury still retained King Louis XV's ear and dominance over most of France's government. Still, the perceptions of Chauvelin as Fleury's equal revealed that Chauvelin had obtained an incredible amount of power within France [1]. The foreign ministry seemed to be entirely in his hands and the army was more responsive to him than its actually minister, d’Angervilliers. As a consequence, one would have expected that Chauvelin could have determined France's path into a war over Poland. However, Chauvelin lost to Villars. This loss was not the consequence of a forfeit but rather a true defeat.

It is important to realize that Chauvelin was a member of a new breed of French statesman. These new French statesmen recognized the errors of Louis XIV much like Orleans had and Fleury did. However, these statesmen also rejected the fearful and self-restraining ideals of Orleans and Fleury that often put France at the mercy of British leadership. This breed was not the same as the dynastic servitors of the House of Bourbon and loyalists to Louis XIV's memory that Villars represented [2]. Despite these differences and despite Chauvelin's defeat, he and the other members of this new, revisioned France such as René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d'Argenson, were not intent on hamstringing France's war efforts as Fleury did during Empress Catherine's War. Instead, even if Chauvelin disagreed with the way in which France was finding itself at war, he still agreed that a war against the Hapsburgs was the correct course of action for France. Whether fighting in the name of Friedrich August or Stanislaus, a Polish election offered the perfect excuse to break the Hapsburgs and reassert the power of France. For this reason rather than sabotage the war as Fleury might have, Chauvelin poured all his energy into planning and preparing for it. With this type of support from the very top, the rest of France's war machine could be unleashed.

Evidence of the reanimated zealotry of France's war machine is best seen in a series of anonymous French memoirs, unofficial French government policy documents [3]. The first of these memoirs was titled "Means to defend the liberty of Poland" but its contents described anything but a defense of Poland. Instead, the memoir called for the orchestration of a European wide alliance to overwhelm and crush the Hapsburgs from every direction. The very first pages of the memoir made this goal clear by brazenly calling for France to engage and ally with both Wurttemberg and Lorraine, traditional servants of the Hapsburg-led Holy Roman Empire. According to the memoir, France should offer to raise Eberhard Ludwig of Wurttemberg to the title of Imperial Elector, award him with Swabian towns, and reopen the question of who should get to succeed his family once his sickly son passed. The former two of these offers called back to half-hearted negotiations between Eberhard Ludwig and France during the War of the Spanish Succession whereas the latter offered Eberhard Ludwig an opportunity to decide his future. For Lorraine, France recalled a plan of James Stanhope to reallocate the Southern Netherlands from the Hapsburgs to the Lorrainers. In return, France would receive the whole of Lorraine and Bar and Francis Stephen marrying a Frenchwomen instead of Maria Theresa. From these two passages alone it was clear that the author of the memoir wanted to completely disrupt the established status quo of the Holy Roman Empire and break the standing loyalty of the Imperial princes to the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor.

This idea was further hammered in by the memoir's approach to the Wittelsbach Union. The memoir vehemently defended Palatinate-Sulzbach's right to succeed in Julich and Berg instead of Brandenburg. For the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria, France was to offer the rich fortress of Mantua. Behind each Palatinate and Bavaria, their ecclesiastical brothers in Mainz and Cologne were expected to follow. However, the memoir did hint at offering bribes to the two Archbishop-Electors as needed. This strong argument over the extremely contentious issue of Julich-Berg and the call for Wittelsbachs in Italy emphasized the author's desire to significantly repaint the European map. That desire was also illustrated by the memoir's unexpected call for a reorganization of northern Germany. There, France would promise Schleswig to Holstein, Oldenburg to Brunswick-Luneburg, and Emden to the Dutch Republic. Although the memoir suggested that the wars against Denmark-Norway and East Frisia that these sessions required would be delayed until after the Polish war, the memoir did demand that recipients of these lands avail their armies to France immediately.

Already the memoir had described substantial changes to European politics, but these changes paled in comparison to the memoir's vision of eastern Europe and Italy. In eastern Europe, the French would first compensate Prussia for losing out on Julich-Berg by giving them Thorn, Elbing, and Marienburg from Poland. Next, as additional rewards for Prussia's betrayal of the Emperor, Lusatia was to be transferred from Saxony to Brandenburg. Saxony would also lose Grubenhagen to Brunswick-Luneburg to compensate King George II for bringing the Hessians into the war. Finally, the memoir proposed to steal Russia away from its alliance with the Hapsburgs by allowing a Russian readjustment of its borders with Poland. In Italy, the memoir planned for the complete ejection of the Hapsburgs. Already, the memoir had given Mantua to Bavaria. After that, the memoir gave the Milanese to Savoy but in return, the geographic Duchy of Savoy would fall to France. Meanwhile, Spain would be drawn into the war by the incredible offer of Naples, Sicily, and the Cremonese all for Duke Carlo of Parma.

Overall, this first memoir was a very ambitious one that detailed a plan to unite France, Britain, Spain, Prussia, Russia, the Dutch Republic, Brunswick-Luneburg, Bavaria, the Palatinate, Mainz, Cologne, Finland, Bremen-Verden, Wurttemberg, Lorraine, and Parma all against the Hapsburgs and Saxons. Through a series of land exchanges and conquests across Europe, France was supposed to buy the allegiance of this coalition. The ultimate goal of the memoir was to create a Europe in which France was again the premier and leading power. The memoir wanted to make France a hegemon in all but name. Proof of this goal can be seen in how the memoir was also organizing future wars against Denmark-Norway and Frisia. The war against Denmark-Norway could have helped France achieve influence over Baltic trade whereas the war against Frisia would have demonstrated that France, not the Holy Roman Emperor, was the most important arbiter in Germany. With such lofty goals and somewhat reasonable means of achieving them, the initial memoir was well-received in France's court. Many saw it as a perfect means of regaining France's glory, disabling the Hapsburgs, and showing the British who was the leader of their alliance. Some courtiers including the youthful Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, went so far as to call for the memoir to be used as a blueprint for the war. Despite this warm response, the author of the memoir never came forward to reveal himself.

One reason for the author's continued anonymity was probably the fact that the premier of France and his lieutenant had a very different reaction than the rest of France. At the very top of France, Fleury and Chauvelin were both alarmed and disturbed by the memoir. For Fleury, the memoir clearly demanded a full-out war, the idea of which Fleury could not stand. Fleury not only abhorred the idea of throwing the countless lives away necessary to fulfill the memoir he also feared that the memoir would send France spiraling back in time. Fleury feared that led by memoirs such as that one, France would once again chase after unachievable goals and ruin itself in the process. For Chauvelin, the memoir seemed amateurish and misguided. The memoir's belief that Russia could be bought off so easily or that France needed to fight both Denmark-Norway and the Saxons seemed ludicrous. The Russians dominated Poland for years so if they had wanted Polish land then they would have taken it already. Denmark-Norway was an ally of Britain with a large army and competent navy, which would serve France much better as allied forces rather than enemies. Finally, even though France had reneged on its Polish promise toward Saxony, France could still retain the friendship and alliance of Saxony with the right incentives. This pragmatic response to the memoir seemed to trickle down to the level of memoir writers as a succeeding memoir contained ideas similar to those of Chauvelin.

This second anonymous memoir, "Means to use against the Tsar", suggested that the ideas of "Means to defend the liberty of Poland" carried some merit in the Low Countries, Western Germany, and Italy. However, in northern Germany and in eastern Europe, "Means to use against the Tsar" suggested that the Russians could not be purchased with Polish lands. In fact, the Russians could not be bought at all because just as France was driven by memories of Louis XIV, Russia was driven by memories of Peter I. Accordingly, Russia wanted to do more than just take from Poland, it wanted to dominate eastern Europe and the Baltic. For this reason, Russia needed to be regarded as an enemy to be defeated not a rival to be bought. To achieve this defeat, the second memoir offered Karelia and Saint Petersburg to the Kingdom of Finland and its Russian Tsarevna. Denmark-Norway would be included in this anti-Russian alliance by allowing it to keep Schleswig. Meanwhile, Sweden would be drawn into the war by promises of Livonia and Estland but the King of Sweden would also be asked to bring into the war his Hessian army. Next, rather than Poland giving land to Russia, it would retake Courland, Smolensk, and Ukraine all from Russia. Finally, in the south, the Ottomans were supposed to launch a massive invasion that conquered the Caspian and Caucasus with brief mentions of missions against Belgrade and into Poland. Through this plan, Russia was going to be reduced to a second-tier power while Finland, Sweden, Poland, and the Ottomans were turned into an unbreakable wall against Russia's westward ambitions. Further west, the memoir sought to include Saxony by giving it the bulk of Silesia as compensation for Poland. Meanwhile, Britain was to be brought into the war by returning Grubenhagen to Brunswick-Luneburg and Prussia was to be purchased with a few bailliages in northern Silesia.

This second memoir much like the first one was well-received by the French as it had played on the idea that Russia was a would-be hegemon just like the Hapsburgs that needed to be beaten down. At the same time, this memoir being viewed as a revision to the first memoir was seen as much more realistic by individuals like Chauvelin and d'Argenson. Nevertheless, those sentiments did not stop further memoirs were popping up. Some called for more ambitious plans such as annexing the Southern Netherlands to France. Altogether, these memoirs served as a powerful representation of the feelings among France's elite about the state of the nation and the goals that they expected the government to pursue. Clearly, despite Fleury, the French elite still considered France a powerful country that could determine Europe's politics with its arms and its diplomacy. Although some courtiers admitted that Louis XIV's policies had gone too far and bankrupted France, few thought that Orleans and Fleury's austere foreign policy was still necessary. Beyond just believing that France was capable of pursuing a more robust policy, the elite seemed to believe that France should pursue a more robust and aggressive policy. For some, it was an issue of pride, for others it was France's destiny, but whatever the reason the majority of France's nobility and officer corps thought that France should take advantage of the Polish crisis to do more than just help install Stanislaus on the throne. Just as Spain had used Empress Catherine's War to claw back its place in Europe as a primary power, France needed to use a Polish war to retake its place as Europe's first power.

[1] These perceptions are based mainly on the OTL British view of France's internal politics.
[2] The way I see it, there are really two main factions in France at this time. One is the old servitors of Louis XIV who served at least some time under Louis XIV and fully embraced his ambitious and sometimes unwieldy world view. The other faction is represented by Chauvelin and is often mistake for the former faction. The latter faction views France as strong and capable and thinks France should use its strength to impose its will on Europe, similar to Louis XIV. However, this new group is nuanced and pragmatic in its approach. Whereas Louis XIV had some unbending points, this new group and Chauvelin are much more willing to compromise to push France forward. Fleury is obviously in neither of these factions and represents a pacific, clerical aberration at the head of French politics.
[3] Unofficial memoirs are essentially French white papers at this time and are used to publicize the viewpoints of second-tier statesmen rather than individuals like Fleury and Chauvelin. The memoirs in this chapter are fictitious but have basings in real memoirs written ahead of and during the War of the Polish Succession.

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Its gonna be interesting to see what course French policy will ultimately take.
I do hope their alliance with Britain remains intact, even if possibly bent to the point of breaking (but not breaking)
What will ultimately be interesting to see is how the courts of Europe react to both memoirs.
 
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