4. Apportionment and Annexation
4. Apportionment and Annexation

“The flurry of legislation enacted by President Clay and the Whigs in 1841-1842 was designed to quickly alleviate America’s economic woes. The national bank, coupled with new spending on internal improvements and a law allowing individuals to voluntarily declare bankruptcy, had brought a surge of investment into the economy. On the campaign trail in 1840, the Whigs had promised “relief and reform,” and by and large they had delivered. The number of bank closures and farm bankruptcies had dwindled since Clay’s inauguration. Elections in 1841 had seen the Whigs successfully defend state legislatures and governorships from Maine to Mississippi, a clear sign that voters were, on the whole, satisfied with the country’s direction.

In late 1842, elections to the House of Representatives and state legislatures were held. The Apportionment Act of 1842 reduced the size of the House from 242 to 223, with all states required to draw single-member Congressional districts. Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire had attempted to skirt the ruling, but the Whig congress refused to seat representatives elected on general tickets.

Despite the improving economy, rural voters favored Democrats and rejected Whig economic policies. This was somewhat counterbalanced by Whig gains in pro-tariff states like Pennsylvania, but the Democrats gained a total of 17 seats. The Whigs lost 28 seats [1] due to eliminated districts as well as Democratic gains, leaving them with a slim majority of 114. In the Senate, the Whigs held a reduced majority of 27, losing three seats. While Clay would be unable to expand significantly upon his accomplishments, the results were hardly a stinging rebuke – the Whigs had maintained their governing trifecta, if narrowly.

For his part, Clay was disappointed by the losses in the House, but was relieved that the Whigs had held both chambers. He also prided himself on having implemented the bulk of his agenda, opining that “although majorities are fickle things, canals and banks endure.”"

-From THE CLAY ERA: TRANSFORMING A NATION by Edmund Sellers, published 2017

“The Apportionment Act of 1842’s prohibition of multi-member districts and statewide general tickets sparked controversy in 1843, when the new Congress convened. The Whigs had barely held their House majority. Four states – Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire – defied the Apportionment Act and held congressional elections on general tickets, with all four states sending all-Democratic delegations to Washington.

A number of Whigs, led by Massachusetts Congressman (and former President) John Quincy Adams, objected to seating the 22 general-ticket Democrats. “The question of the admission of the members from four States, elected by general ticket, must be discussed,” Adams stated during his bid to open debate on the issue at Congress’s opening session. He then submitted a petition, signed by 50 congressmen, to prevent the 22 representatives in question from being seated. With the support of Speaker White, the Whigs decided to task the Committee on Elections with investigating the matter. The Whig majority view would be presented by Garrett Davis of Kentucky, the Democratic minority view by freshman Stephen Douglas.

While Douglas denounced the Apportionment Act as unconstitutional and called for the seating of the representatives, Davis presented a slippery slope: if states could ignore the Apportionment Act, then that would surely embolden states to nullify other federal laws, and what would that mean for the Union?

When the report was presented to the rest of the House, fierce debate ensued. Democrats denounced the effort to deny the 22 their seats as tyranny, with Douglas emerging as their leading defender. However, the Whigs held the majority, and, on February 14, 1844, the House voted not to seat the 22 representatives until the four states they hailed from implemented single-member districts [2].

Cowed by the stern response from Congress, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire obeyed the Apportionment Act. In a series of special elections held over the spring and summer of 1844, Democrats held 16 of the disputed seats, while Whigs flipped 6, increasing their majority to a more comfortable 120. The struggle was an important victory for voting rights in the United States, but the Whig Party would not show such a strong commitment during Abolition…”

--From FRANCHISE: THE STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS by Thaddeus Flagg, published 2021

“With President Clay firmly opposed to annexing Texas, Sam Houston and the Texian government decided to explore other avenues. Houston’s ultimate goal was for the United States to admit Texas as a state, but until Clay reversed course or a more expansionist President was elected, he decided to put pressure on the American government to open negotiations. In 1843, Houston entered into negotiations with Great Britain and even Mexico to force Clay’s hand [3]. He ostentatiously withdrew his offer of annexation and his ambassador to the United States, Isaac Van Zandt, hinted that Britain and France would mediate peace with Mexico, giving Texas powerful foreign benefactors and removing the need for annexation by the United States.

News that Texas might seek an accommodation with Great Britain proved worrying to many Americans. Britain was still loathed and feared by them, memories of the Revolution and the War of 1812 still fresh. Furthermore, the United States was at that point embroiled in boundary disputes with British Canada in northern Maine and the Pacific Northwest. For a neighboring country to form an alliance with the British was therefore unthinkable. For southerners, the prospect was made worse by Britain’s firm opposition to slavery. If Texas was placed in the British sphere, the thinking went, then Britain could easily exert pressure on the United States to abolish slavery and President Clay refused to budge, but the prospect of an Anglo-Texas alliance sparked dissent in Congress. Senator John Calhoun, a pro-slavery firebrand, claimed that British designs on Texas would have the ultimate effect of ending American slavery: “[the British] are determined to abolish slavery throughout the continent… the effects would be disastrous.” As a protective move, he called for the annexation of Texas. Of course, Britain had no plans to force Texas or the United States to abolish slavery, as Lord Aberdeen, the British foreign secretary, assured Edward Everett, the U.S. minister to the United Kingdom.

Despite these assurances, a bipartisan alliance of southern Democrats and Whigs continued to raise concerns over Texas. Clay forcefully insisted in his 1844 message to Congress that “the annexation of Texas would do more to disturb the tranquility of the Union than enhance it… the expansion of our borders can only exacerbate sectional tensions.” With Clay firmly opposed, at least for the time being, the matter of Texian annexation was shelved, though it would certainly play a large role in the 1844 election.”

-From EXPANDING FRONTIERS by John Freeman, published 1989

“The Texas quagmire was not the only foreign policy dilemma that presented itself during Clay’s first term. The United States had two long-running border disputes with Great Britain – in the northeast and in the Oregon Country. Numerous efforts had been made in the past to resolve them, but none had been successful. Clay dispatched his Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, and Minister to the United Kingdom, Edward Everett, to settle the matters. While Clayton quickly became bogged down in long negotiations over Oregon, Everett was tasked with resolving the northeast dispute.

The 1783 Treaty of Paris had established the New York/Vermont-Canadian border as the 45th parallel, but the survey line used in the treaty was inaccurate, and an American fort was constructed north of the actual 45th parallel. As a result, the United States wanted to readjust the border to be along the original, inaccurate survey line rather than the actual parallel. Britain acquiesced to this, and also to a compromise border in Maine. In 1839, northern Maine was the site of confrontations between lumberjacks over logging rights, and the new Maine state government heavily lobbied the federal government to push for a favorable resolution to the dispute. Ultimately, a line roughly in between the American and British extremes was outlined by Everett and his British counterparts, which also ceded the disputed Indian Stream to the United States. The Everett-Ashburton Treaty also guaranteed both the United States and Great Britain use of Great Lakes, established the location of the border at the 49th parallel in the American west until the Rockies, where the still-disputed Oregon Country lay. [4]

Secretary Clayton, meanwhile, fared little better than his predecessors at resolving the border in Oregon…”

-From THE GREAT GAMES: A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY by Kathleen Michaels, published 1996

[1] Many OTL Whig losses are reversed due to a more unified party and a stronger economic recovery.
[2] OTL, the Democrats held the majority, and they allowed the 22 representatives to take their seats over the objections of Adams and his allies.
[3] OTL, Houston made such a move in order to pressure the Senate to ratify Tyler’s annexation treaty.
[4] All OTL.
 
Yeah, Texas managing peace with Mexico... good luck.

Though now I'm wondering that if Texas last long enough for the CSA to appear and Texas sides with them, Mexico will side up with the Union for it.
 
Yeah, Texas managing peace with Mexico... good luck.

Though now I'm wondering that if Texas last long enough for the CSA to appear and Texas sides with them, Mexico will side up with the Union for it.
Texas isn't serious about making peace on its own, its just a pressure tactic so America annexes them.
As for how long Texas is independent for... I'm keeping that under wraps for now :)
 
Texas isn't serious about making peace on its own, its just a pressure tactic so America annexes them.
As for how long Texas is independent for... I'm keeping that under wraps for now :)
I figured, but man not even the Americans woud be that gullible in thnking Texas could try and keep peace with Mexico on the subject matter. Fascinated by the timeline so far! Good luck and let me know how I can help if need be!
 
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I figured, but man not even the Americans woud be that gullible in thnking Texas could try and keep peace with Mexico on the subject matter. Fascinated by the timeline so far! Good luck and let me know how I can help if need be!
There would definitely be a crisis with Mexico, but Clay wouldn't goad them into a war like Polk did.
And thanks so much!
 
Yeah, by this point the number one objective of the Texan government is American annexation.

My hope is it gets kicked down the curb enough the USA misses the boat. Could turn out better for Mexico too with an independent Texas being a weaker neighbor than Texas the US state.
 
5. Rematch
5. Rematch

“Clay did not immediately declare his intention to seek a second term. Rather, in early 1844, he undertook a tour of the south in order to shore up support in the region he was weakest. He also took great care not to make his visit seem like campaigning [1]. First, he visited New Orleans and Baton Rouge, where he spoke to large crowds. Louisiana was more supportive of Whig policies than the rest of the south, as the state’s large sugar industry benefited from high tariffs. He departed Louisiana for Washington by way of Mobile, Macon, Savannah, Raleigh, Petersburg, and Norfolk, meeting local dignitaries and addressing crowds along the way.

Due to Clay’s somewhat advanced age (he would be 67 on inauguration day, 1845), some particularly ambitious Whigs anticipated that he would decline to seek a second term. In particular, Clay’s intra-party rival Daniel Webster was plotting a challenge at the convention. The efforts of his rivals to depose him were dashed when Clay officially announced his intention to run for a second term in early March of 1844. Webster grumpily instructed his surrogates to endorse Clay, believing that the party had to show unity in support of the incumbent.

With his rivals unwilling to divide the party, President Clay was unanimously nominated for a second term at the Whig Convention in May. Despite an attempt by southern Whigs to replace Vice President Fillmore with someone viewed as more pro-slavery, like North Carolina’s Senator William A. Graham, the forces of William Seward and Thurlow Weed united to keep their rival out of New York politics. Despite strong southern support for Graham, Fillmore was easily nominated once more as Clay’s running mate. The Whig platform made no mention of Texas, as Clay believed that making a definitive stance would divide the party. Instead, the platform focused on tariffs and continued internal improvements.”

-From THE CLAY ERA: TRANSFORMING A NATION by Edmund Sellers, published 2017

“Former President Martin Van Buren was widely expected to attempt a rematch with Clay, and so it was unsurprising when he began actively campaigning for the Democratic nomination. However, Van Buren had emerged as a leading opponent of annexing Texas. Southern Democrats were therefore determined to block his nomination. Several anti-Van Buren candidates contested the convention, chiefly former Michigan Governor Lewis Cass, Pennsylvania Senator James Buchanan, and former Virginia Senator John Tyler.

Senator Calhoun, one of the loudest voices for annexation, supported Tyler, a former Whig who rejoined the Democrats after the chartering of the third National Bank. In some ways, Tyler’s political evolution was strikingly similar to that of Calhoun, who had started out as an avid nationalist before becoming a full-throated champion of slavery, states’ rights, and southern sectional interests.

In 1840, the convention had eliminated the requirement for a candidate to obtain 2/3 of the delegates in order to win the nomination. Senator Robert Walker of Mississippi and James Buchanan of Pennsylvania moved early on to reinstate the 2/3 rule. Despite many Van Buren delegates supporting the rule change, the motion was defeated by a vote of 136-128. With this primary obstacle removed, Van Buren’s nomination was increasingly likely. Predictably, the former President was nominated on the first ballot with 146 votes. In order to appease the restive expansionists, Van Buren’s supporters knew they needed a southerner and annexationist to balance out the ticket.

…Polk, the former Governor of Tennessee and former Speaker of the House, was both ardently expansionist and a staunch Van Buren supporter who had worked to build southern support for Van Buren. While he had been largely unsuccessful in swaying southern delegates, Van Buren trusted him and saw an opportunity to extend an olive branch to the southern Democrats. Thus, he instructed his delegates to support Polk, who was easily nominated on the first ballot.

Presidential vote1Vice-Presidential vote1
M. Van Buren146J. Polk203
L. Cass94J. Buchanan38
J. Tyler29J. Tyler15
Minor Candidates8Minor Candidates2


Despite strong opposition from southern and pro-annexation delegates, Martin Van Buren was nominated for the third consecutive election by the Democratic party. The result infuriated southern delegates, with Calhoun denouncing Van Buren as an abolitionist and radical. John Tyler mulled an independent presidential run, but ultimately decided to focus on an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to unseat Senator William Cabell Rives in Virginia. Calhoun quietly organized a write-in campaign in the south, and Van Buren began his bid for a second non-consecutive term with a significant section of his party working to defeat him.”

-From IN THE SHADOW OF JACKSON by Michelle Watts, published 2012

SewardsFolly said: I’ve been reading the excellent In the Shadow of Jackson, and a moment of divergence just jumped out at me: the 1844 Democratic national convention nearly voted to make the nomination require a 2/3 majority, but this narrowly failed. Had it passed, Martin Van Buren would never have won on the first ballot, and likely would have failed to secure the nomination. Who would have been the nominee if Van Buren was unable to get the 2/3 majority – Cass? Buchanan four years early? John Tyler? A dark horse candidate?

VanRuin said: I think Buchanan didn’t quite have the stature to secure the nomination in ’44 – it was his ardent expansionism and palatability to the south, especially after Van Buren came up short a second time, that won him the nomination in 1848. Cass had southern support and could have assembled a required majority, especially if Tyler or Buchanan drops out and endorses him, which I think would happen on the fifth or sixth ballot.

Feet of Clay said: I think Cass or Buchanan could have beat Clay – he won Pennsylvania, Virginia, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi by less than 5% OTL, and flipping those five states would give the Democrats 152 electoral votes to Clay’s 123.

Whitelaw said: I think you’re discounting Van Buren’s OTL running mate, Polk. He was a loyal Van Burenite and if Van Buren flames out then I could see him turning to Polk. This guy was also an ardent expansionist who wanted both Texas and 54’40, so he could balance the southern and northern factions of the Democrats.

Feet of Clay said: Polk is… a possibility, but if the convention wants a balanced candidate. I think they’d turn to either Buchanan, even if it is a tad early for him, or Cass. Polk was a nobody, and the other big southern guy was John Tyler, who nobody except Calhoun were particularly enthusiastic about.

SewardsFolly said: Had it been Cass I could see the election going both ways, but if it was Tyler, I think Clay would still have won. The interesting thing there is that Clay could well take a different position on Texas annexation. Tyler was ardently in favor of it, so I could see Clay taking a much firmer stance against annexation than his OTL caution. My guess, though, is that he would have done better in the north, likely winning New York and possibly Maine or New Hampshire, but losing Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and likely Louisiana as well.

Conscience said: I think people are underestimating Clay’s strengths. Sure, he had a weak opponent in 1844, but that covers up the strength of Whig organization, which improved even from 1840. His allies like Thurlow Weed expanded their mailing list system, disseminating tons of campaign lit and pamphlets, and the campaign tactics of Clay’s surrogates were honed, and their schedules optimized. And while you may think his Alabama Letters were wishy-washy and cowardly, but they show Clay as a masterful fence-straddler – the north was placated by Clay’s unwillingness to inflame sectional tensions and the south was reassured that he wouldn’t rule out the expansion of slavery. Sure, he was mocked for staking out the middle ground, but he was able to convince enough people that he was on their side to win. It’s as our current President said: “you can fool some of the people all of the time, or you can fool all of the people some of the time,” and Clay did the latter expertly.

Zollverein [MOD] said: I agree with what you said, Conscience, but please refrain from dragging current politics into this discussion.

-From WI 2/3 RULE INSTATED IN 1844? on whatif.net, posted 2021

“Both Clay and Van Buren wanted to contest the election on policy – Clay stood for a continuation of his successful American system, while Van Buren campaigned on a reduction in the tariff. However, the issue of Texas was what gripped the public imagination, and they clamored to hear what Clay and Van Buren thought of annexing the small republic. Van Buren had made his stance eminently clear: Texas should not be annexed, lest it inflame sectional tensions and tear the union apart.

Clay had remained cagey throughout 1843 and early 1844, having opposed entering into negotiations with Houston but refusing to rule out a future annexation. He had hoped to keep the election focused on the American system, but Texas’s efforts to join the union had sharply divided the nation. The south was in favor, the north generally opposed, and Clay had to walk a fine line to avoid angering either faction. Finally, on July 27th, he published a public letter outlining his opinion of the matter.

In the ‘Alabama Letter,’ Clay stated his personal support for the annexation of Texas but expressed reservations over inflaming sectional tensions. “It would be unwise to bring Texas into the Union with the present state of affairs,” Clay wrote, but he laid out the circumstances under which he would pursue a treaty of annexation. First, Texas would have to be balanced out by a favorable resolution to the Oregon dispute with the United Kingdom. Second, both north and south had to approve of the annexation for Clay to move forward with it, to ensure that the nation’s unity would not be disturbed [2]. Van Buren wanted to attack Clay over the letter, seeing an opening to make him look indecisive and opportunistic, but to do so would emphasize Van Buren’s staunch opposition to annexation. The Democrats were already divided over renominating Van Buren, and he did not want to aggravate it and alienate the south by emphasizing his stance over Texas. This left the abolitionist Liberty Party to take the attack to Clay, with their nominee, James Birney, accusing the President of seeking détente with the slave power. Meanwhile, the south was only partially mollified by the Alabama Letter, but with the southern Whigs emphasizing Van Buren’s anti-annexationism, Clay’s position seemed the better of the two.

In the north, the Liberty Party emerged as a threat to Clay’s chances in states like New York and Pennsylvania. James Birney claimed that Clay was no better than the Democrats on the issue of slavery, and that slave power ruled the country. Clay felt forced to respond, lest Birney split the northern Whig vote and allow Van Buren to win. In a second public letter, he reiterated that Texas would only be annexed in conjunction with territory in Oregon – a slave state and a free territory [3]. Clay accused the Liberty Party of “fomenting domestic strife” with their rhetoric, and his ally Thurlow Weed led a media campaign in the north that attacked Van Buren on the tariff issue, with one pamphlet warning that “should Mr. Van Buren be victorious, his ruinous trade policies will leave half the mills in the Union bankrupt and the other half with cut wages.”

While in the north the Whigs fought a scorched-earth campaign against Van Buren with a narrow focus on tariffs and internal improvements, southern Whigs waged a very different fight. There, the focus rested on Van Buren’s anti-annexationism, with southern Whig pamphlets calling him an abolitionist. In order not to disrupt the efforts of Weed and Seward to build Clay’s image as a defender of northern interests, southern Whigs rarely mentioned Clay by name on the issue of Texas, but instead focused on Van Buren [4].

Henry ClayMartin Van Buren
Electoral Vote19175
Popular Vote1,334,8191,225,226
Percentage51.446.8


Henry Clay won election to a second term by a slightly increased margin, losing Michigan and New Jersey to Van Buren but winning Pennsylvania and Alabama, and narrowly holding Van Buren’s electorally rich home state of New York. Nationwide, he defeated Van Buren by a margin of 110,000 votes. Across the south, Clay’s victories were aided by significant numbers of write-in votes for local Democratic tickets, with a write-in campaign for John Calhoun nearly edging out Van Buren in Louisiana. Meanwhile, South Carolina’s General Assembly cast the state’s 9 electoral votes for Calhoun to protest Van Buren’s anti-annexationism [5]. The Whigs rode Clay’s coattail to slightly expanded majorities in the House and Senate, gaining 7 seats in the House and 2 in the Senate.

Despite this victory, the increasing volume of the calls to annex Texas threatened to divide the Whigs and make Clay’s second term rockier than his first…”

-From THE EVOLUTION OF THE WHIGS by James Welter, published 1997

[1] Clay used a similar tactic in OTL 1844.
[2] Clay’s stance here is similar in some ways to James Buchanan’s IOTL.
[3] It’s important to note that the annexation of Texas, while important and polarizing, is not as polarizing as it was OTL. Without Tyler loudly leading the charge and with Clay instead studiously ignoring and downplaying the issue, the discourse is (aside from the Liberty Party) less vitriolic.
[4] Without John Tyler to leave the Whigs rudderless for four years, the party is much more cohesive in 1844 and runs a more efficient campaign as a result.
[5] Similar to 1832, where South Carolina cast its electoral votes for John Floyd of the Nullifier Party in protest of Jackson’s tariff and subsequent attempted Force Act.
 
This is getting good - and I'm really enjoying the dive into antebellum American politics. It's actually an era that I'm fascinated by, though I'll admit that its bee some years since I really dug into it. Have you read much Remini by chance? Though I haven't read his biographies of Jackson, I adore his works on Clay and Webster.
 
This is getting good - and I'm really enjoying the dive into antebellum American politics. It's actually an era that I'm fascinated by, though I'll admit that its bee some years since I really dug into it. Have you read much Remini by chance? Though I haven't read his biographies of Jackson, I adore his works on Clay and Webster.
Thanks so much! I haven't read Remini, but I'll check him out. So far his Clay biography is quite good.
I'm a huge fan of the Liberty Party and feel it's underutilized! Is the current president Al Sharpton 😱?
Thanks, though I can't say they'll stick around much longer than OTL.
Sharpton isn't the current president, as I adhere kinda strictly to the butterfly effect and start using fictional characters ~40-50 years in.
 
Really liking this so far! I would imagine that if the Oregon dispute remains unresolved, and the Oregon Trail is shortened because of the expanded rail network, that American settlers would pour into the region fast enough to give the US a really strong position if a hardcore expansionist president gets in after Clay.
 
Really liking this so far! I would imagine that if the Oregon dispute remains unresolved, and the Oregon Trail is shortened because of the expanded rail network, that American settlers would pour into the region fast enough to give the US a really strong position if a hardcore expansionist president gets in after Clay.
A very interesting idea - I don't want to give anything away, but the fates of Oregon and Texas will be settled in the next chapter.
 
6. The Compromise of 1846
6. The Compromise of 1846

“Shortly after his second inauguration, President Clay was faced once more with the issue of Texas. President Anson Jones made a public request for annexation in May of 1845, putting increased pressure on the Administration in Washington D.C. In a meeting with southern Whigs, Senator Ephraim Foster of Tennessee informed Clay that, “we cannot proceed without some clear resolution of the Texian Question. The Democrats will make us out to be weak, and our party will be rent in two by the issue unless a compromise is brokered.”

Clay was inclined to agree – Martin Van Buren had lost in part because many southern Democrats refused to support him, most prominently John Calhoun. The Democratic split had meant that many Whigs were elected to southern congressional seats, giving southern Whigs new influence within the party [1]. Like Senator Foster, Clay knew that the south would grow agitated unless Texas was annexed, but the north was largely opposed to such a move. In talks with a bipartisan group of prominent legislators (Senator Thomas Hart Benton, an anti-annexation Democrat from Missouri, Congressman Alexander Stephens, a pro-annexation Whig from Georgia, Senator Robert J. Walker, a pro-annexation Democrat from Mississippi, Senator Daniel Webster, an anti-annexation Whig from Massachusetts, and Congressman Milton Brown, a pro-annexation Whig from Tennessee), Clay worked to build support for a compromise: the north would acquiesce to the annexation of Texas, and the south would accept the organization of as much of Oregon as the United States could negotiate from Britain into a free territory [2].

Stephens and Benton agreed to the proposal, viewing it as an acceptable compromise. Webster and Walker were the most skeptical – Webster believed that any moves towards Texas would aggravate Mexico and instigate conflict, while Walker was unenthused about the prospect of annexing large portions of Oregon, which could easily be split into two or more free territories. Clay hoped that uniting the rest of the Whigs would pressure Webster to toe the line, while Walker held out for additional concessions. Frustrated, Clay gambled that presenting Congress with settled agreements would force them into action, and he entered into simultaneous negotiations with Britain and Texas.

…News of Secretary Clayton’s success with Lord Aberdeen reached Washington just weeks after the conclusion of negotiations with Texas. A formidable negotiator, Clayton had managed to, at long last, extract Britain’s assent to fixing the Oregon border along the 49th parallel. This had long been the desired goal of the United States, but British opposition had dashed any hope of a resolution, until Lord Aberdeen’s involvement in the process. Meanwhile, Alexander Stephens was sent by Clay to negotiate with Anson Jones in Texas. The annexation treaty proved more complicated than one might assume, as Texas wanted assurance that the United States would support them in the border dispute with Mexico. Clay was reluctant to make such an open-ended commitment, as he was already uneasy with the addition of Texas and Oregon and was unwilling to leave open the possibility of a war with Mexico or the addition of even more territory. Thus, Stephens was instructed to caveat the defense clause with provisions making it defensive-only and establishing that the United States would not actively seek to expand the borders.

The presentation of the twin treaties to Congress sparked furious debate. Southern politicians, regardless of political affiliation, united in favor of annexing Texas. Most northern Whigs and not a few northern Democrats came out in opposition. Daniel Webster remained studiously opposed, leaving Clay and Benton to try and ratify both treaties. Benton proposed a compromise amendment to the Texas annexation treaty, designed to appease northerners. However, the additional Oregon treaty presented another facet to the issue. Here, northern Whigs were in favor and a large contingent of southerners were opposed.

Clay had hoped that the north would support the annexation of Texas and the south Oregon as a fair compromise, but holdouts on both sides narrowed the two treaties’ paths to ratification. Daniel Webster refused to budge along with a majority of northern Whigs. Benton was able to wrangle a key endorsement, however: David Wilmot, a Pennsylvania Democrat. Wilmot, though opposed to slavery, was a strong supporter of expansionism and, a widely-read editorial, called the two treaties “the last, best opportunity for this nation to expand our horizons and become a truly great nation – one Union, from shore to shore.” Though a Congressman, Wilmot’s endorsement was used to persuade northerners to support the treaties. James Buchanan, a Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania, held a more favorable view of slavery than Wilmot, and he quickly became a loud supporter for annexation. If Texas was brought into the union, Buchanan argued, then it would sate the south’s appetite for expansion and calm sectional tensions. Oregon, he believed, was a small price to pay for the “rich land of Texas.” Vice President Fillmore was also dispatched to convince northern Whigs to support ratification, in one of his few serious actions as Vice President.

Alexander Stephens quickly established himself as Clay’s ambassador to southern holdouts. He was joined by the surprise announcement of Robert Walker, who had previously been opposed. Walker reasoned that Texas was too great a prize to pass up. Given that Clay had already promised to allow it into the union as a slave state, Walker called the treaties “a great victory” for the south. Clay was confident he had the votes, and the two treaties were put up for a vote on November 4th, 1845. The Texas treaty was brought up for a vote, as more southerners supported it than northerners supported Texas, and Clay hoped to use Oregon to prod northerners into falling in line. With the south, both Whigs and Democrats, united in support and the north divided, the annexation treaty passed 37-17, with barely more than two-thirds of the Senate in support. Then, the Oregon treaty was put to a vote. This passed by a wider margin of 40-14, with most of the opposition coming this time from southerners.

…Anson Jones asked the Texas legislature to approve the American offer of annexation, and this was given near-unanimously. There was some debate over the apparent unwillingness by the Americans to fully commit to supporting Texas’s claims in Mexico, but the fraught negotiations in Washington convinced the legislature that these were the best terms they could get. Thus, on February 17th, 1846, Texas assented to the annexation and, upon President Clay’s signing of the instrument of annexation, joined the union on March 3rd as the 28th state. The joint Anglo-American occupation of Oregon was officially ended shortly after, making all of Oregon south of the 49th parallel American territory.

Though both treaties had been ratified, it was a hollow victory for President Clay. The negotiations had revealed the stark sectional divide within the Whigs, and indeed the President had relied heavily on Democrats to provide the necessary votes for ratification.

Curiously, the Whigs actually gained 7 House seats in the 1846 congressional elections, though they narrowly lost control of the Senate. In the north, antislavery Whigs emphasized their opposition to Texas and their support for bringing in Oregon. The abolitionist faction within the Whigs therefore made gains by campaigning against the southern faction, further dividing the party. Clay was roundly criticized by abolitionists for the Compromise, and several prominent anti-slavery northern Whigs won over their "doughfaced" pro-south opponents – in New York, the anti-slavery Hamilton Fish secured the gubernatorial nomination and was narrowly elected over the incumbent, Silas Wright. The battle over the two treaties left Clay exhausted and his party even more divided than before. Shortly before his death in 1854, Clay declared that the annexation of Texas was his greatest regret.”

-UNEASY SILENCE: AMERICA IN THE ANTEBELLUM by John Erwin, published 2021

MARVIN DAVIS: So, on the show today to discuss a recent petition put before the Bank of the United States asking for Henry Clay’s portrait to be removed from the $10 bill, are Thaddeus Flagg, author of Franchise! and Isabelle Carpenter, the Director of the Bank. Mr. Flagg, Director Carpenter, thank you both for joining us on Counterweight.

THADDEUS FLAGG: Thank you for having me.

ISABELLE CARPENTER: Yes, It’s great to be here.

DAVIS: Let’s start with you, Mr. Flagg, you’re the author of Franchise! You’ve long been an advocate for what you describe as “a collective confrontation with the past” in your works. Why do you believe Henry Clay should no longer have his portrait on the $10 bill?

FLAGG: Ultimately, Henry Clay was a slaver. He owned slaves; he fought a long legal battle to recover a slave of his who sued for her freedom. Worst of all, he helped embolden the slave-owning south with his ‘Compromise of 1846’, which expanded the influence of slave states in the Union with the annexation of Texas. He, ultimately, was no friend of the abolitionists, no friend of human rights, and therefore undeserving of the honor of being on United States currency.

DAVIS: Interesting. And Director Carpenter, you have refused to consider the petition made by Mr. Flagg. Why does Henry Clay belong on American currency?

CARPENTER: First to Mr. Flagg’s argument about slavery – everyone from the south owned slaves back then. George Washington owned slaves, should we take him off of the dollar bill? What about William Seward? He didn’t own slaves, but he let the south keep slavery – should his statue be in the Congress building’s rotunda? Secondly, Henry Clay was one of the most influential Presidents in history. He led the effort that chartered the Bank of the United States, which has been the bedrock of the American economy since 1841. Regardless of slavery, that accomplishment…

FLAGG: But do any of his accomplishments overpower the fact that this is a man who believed he was entitled to own slaves?

CARPENTER: It was 1840 or 1850, we shouldn’t be applying modern day morals to antebellum society. I think we have to take Clay’s life and actions in the context of the time and place he lived in.

FLAGG: If we were discussing dueling or something, I would understand. But slavery wasn’t acceptable in the north in 1840, so why should we absolve Clay, or other slaveowners, of their actions? Slavery was considered reprehensible by people like Seward or Abraham Lincoln. Seward managed to contain it, even if he didn’t abolish it. Henry Clay made no such effort, and indeed strengthened slavery’s hold over the United States. And even though slavery was abolished, that oppressive, racist influence still lingers.

CARPENTER: Now hold on just a second…

DAVIS: If you wouldn’t mind holding that thought, Director, we need to take a quick break to hear a word from our advertisers. We’ll be back in a minute with more of this very interesting discussion…

-From COUNTERWEIGHT with Marvin Davis on NBS, aired on March 5th, 2021

“With the annexation of Texas, the United States inherited its latest state’s long-running territorial disputes with Mexico. President Clay hoped to settle the issue with peaceful negotiations with Mexico, even though it was crippled by political instability and an intensely nationalistic public mood. Nevertheless, President Jose Joaquin de Herrera, a moderate, sought to negotiate with Secretary Clayton over the Texas border.

Herrera was given the authority to raise troops by the Mexican Senate, and war seemed likely. But President Herrera preferred to take a more moderate course and agreed to secret talks. Clayton arrived at the bargaining table with demands for the entirety of the lands claimed by Texas under the disputed Treaty of Velasco. Herrera was in no position to concede this – he was risking enough by merely negotiating. Clay and Clayton had expected this, and indeed President Clay did not want to acquire that much land. The United States was willing to concede to a border on the Nueces River up to Carrizo Springs, then a straight line to the Rio Grande until its confluence with the Pecos. From the head of the Pecos, a straight line was drawn north to the border established by the 1819 Adams-Onis Treaty. This placed almost the entirety of Texas's arable land in the United States and left the arid areas and anti-independence Hispanophone towns within Mexico. For this territory, Clayton offered $6 million [3] in annual $2 million installments, as well as the American assumption of $3 million in debts Mexico owed to American citizens.

Herrera successfully negotiated a payment of $8 million in installments and signed the Clayton-Herrera Treaty on May 13th, 1846. News of the agreement sparked fury in Mexico City and Herrera was nearly kidnapped by a furious mob, but he defused the situation and was able to ward off a potential coup d’état. After furious debate, Herrera was able to persuade a thin majority of the Mexican Senate that this treaty would stave off further territorial losses. With the U.S. Congress’s approval of the treaty and appropriations bill for the payments to Mexico, President Clay had brought about a peaceful resolution to the Texas border. But the deeper sectional problems remained, and would only worsen with time…”

-From EXPANDING FRONTIERS by John Freeman, published 1989

[1] Clay would like to be more cautious, but he’s facing pressure from both the Democrats and a large contingent of Whigs so he decides that annexing Texas and Oregon will smooth tensions and allow him to keep the party united.
[2] Similar to OTL’s Compromise of 1850, when California was admitted as a free state to balance out Texas.
[3] OTL, the US offered $15 million for the whole Mexican cession. These pieces of Texas are much smaller, but I imagine that Clay would overpay in order to avoid war.
 
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Herrera successfully negotiated a payment of $8 million in installments and signed the Clayton-Herrera Treaty on May 13th, 1846. News of the agreement sparked fury in Mexico City and Herrera was nearly kidnapped by a furious mob, but he defused the situation and was able to ward off a potential coup d’état. After furious debate, Herrera was able to persuade a thin majority of the Mexican Senate that this treaty would stave off further territorial losses.
Yay! Will we get a map?
It looks like the Whigs might collapse just like in OTL. I could be wrong though (and I'm terrible at predicting things).
That would be extremely unfortunate - I wonder if the Liberty Party could be in a position to take advantage of it, if it happens.
 
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It looks like the Whigs might collapse just like in OTL. I could be wrong though (and I'm terrible at predicting things).
I can say for sure the Whigs survive, but in a modified form...
Yay! Will we get a map?

That would be extremely unfortunate - I wonder if the Liberty Party could be in a position to take advantage of it, if it happens.
I'm going to make a more formal map, but here's a very crude one I whipped up:
canvas(1)(1)(1).png
 
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