Nice update, again.
Might be irrelevant for your story. But I hope the Dutch submarines can show their tactics againts the Japanese invasion fleets, in this time line. There are 24 subs of which 18 modern or brand new. Probably only enough for one or two attacks, since the doctrine was based on risking the submarines
IJN ASW was poor during the war but they were largely let of the hook by:

Poor pre-war USN doctrine along with the well known issues with their torpedoes that crippled 'early pacific war' USN Submarine operations - particularly in the first year of the war.


And the British had stripped the East for their war in the Med and had no subs particularly the T class

So a large number of more aggressive Dutch boats could come as something of a shock
 
IJN ASW was poor during the war but they were largely let of the hook by:

Poor pre-war USN doctrine along with the well known issues with their torpedoes that crippled 'early pacific war' USN Submarine operations - particularly in the first year of the war.


And the British had stripped the East for their war in the Med and had no subs particularly the T class

So a large number of more aggressive Dutch boats could come as something of a shock
Also even though American tactics were poor in 1941-42, if the 200 + (Over 100 were MK X torpedoes for S Boats) lost at Cavite were not lost, things may have been better. Also a better relationship with British submariners could improve American attitudes
 
Also even though American tactics were poor in 1941-42, if the 200 + (Over 100 were MK X torpedoes for S Boats) lost at Cavite were not lost, things may have been better. Also a better relationship with British submariners could improve American attitudes
If the Dutch Navy Admiral, Helfrich, believed in the submarine doctrine, the Dutch navy developed during the past 20 years, and if the subs and their flyboats were deployed as was trained, their succses might inflence the USA submarine doctine a year earlier. The USA wolfpack tactics might be developed in 1942 instead of 1943/44 and subsequently disrupt Japanese war logistics much earlier
 
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If the Dutch Navy Admiral, Helfrich, believed in the submarine doctrine, the Dutch navy developed during the past 20 years, and if the subs and their flyboats were deployed as was trained, their succses might inflence the USA submarine doctine a year earlier. The USA wolfpack tactics might be developed in 1942 instead of 1943/44 and subsequently disrupt Japanese war logistics much earlier

Maybe we need a set of officer exchanges between UK, Dutch and US Submarine forces?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Whats all this talk about submarines, British, Dutch, American, torpedos, tactics.... So far the USN is keeping its distance, (there's an election on don't you know) and there are no agreements made with the Dutch, (yet). So as my old mum would say, You'll have to hold your horses!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Why not Brooke-Popham

OK, I did expect my choice of Lord Gort would create debate, having seen plenty of old posts on various forums that seek to find someone better than Brooke Popham. And obviously some of the same old names that are put forward are deserving of merit. So, here’s my two pennyworths take on it and why I chose Gort, mostly based on some very sketchy observations and Wiki entries. Any and all informed opinion is welcome, regardless of whether it corrects my thoughts or supports them.

Firstly, the position of Commander-in-Chief Far East Command, was, I think, quite a unique post in having command over both the Army and RAF in the Far East Theatre, but not the Royal Navy. Brooke Popham was appointed, and held the rank of Air Chief Marshal, RAF, equivalent to General or Admiral, so I’m going to presume that was the correct rank for this position. His opposite number in the Royal Navy, commanding the China Station was Vice Admiral Layton, but his predecessor had been Admiral Sir Percy Noble, and he was followed, abet very shortly by Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Furthermore, although Brooke-Popham was replaced by Lt Gen Henry Pownall, I’m not sure Pownall ever took the post, it was quickly folded into the ABDACOM, under General Archibald Wavell. So, with some reservations, I’ve chosen to only consider officers with a rank of Air Chief Marshal or General, or a rank lower, but deserving of promotion.

So why not keep Brooke-Popham, he, as most people in senior roles, was not without some good points, as well as the bad ones we all point out. He’d proven to be a very able administrator, a key player in the infant RAF’s development. His tenure as Governor of Kenya, had given him experience of dealing with the colonial office, and governance in the colonies. He’d then returned to active service, being instrumental in the birth of the BCATP (British Commonwealth Air Training Program). So, he was good at building RAF programs, could work with civilian administrators, didn’t rock the boat, in short, an ideal safe pair of hands. I can’t replace him simply because of what we know now, using just hindsight would be simply wrong. And as a RAF commander, it's hard to get past him.

Keeping this bit simple, the Singapore Strategy of the 1920s and 30’s, which sought to defend British Empire interests in the Far East from Japanese aggression, was based on building a naval base out there, which could service the British main fleet, when it was sent to those waters in times of conflict, saving having to build and maintain a second fleet. An impressive defence of the Naval Base with big coastal guns, and lots of minefield provided local defence of the base, and the infant RAF would provide air cover, with airfields on Singapore Island. Clever heh!

Works fine if you only have one enemy to contend with but by the late 1930s, German rearmament and Fascist Italy were giving great cause for concern, raising questions as to the viability of the plan, but politically it couldn’t be scrapped, especially with Australia’s defence so dependent on it. So, we British do what we do best, we fudge, and the RAF is given the task of defending the Naval base until the fleet can arrive, who’s timespan was increasingly being rolled back, 90 days, then 180 days. The other thing, with the continuous development of the aeroplane, with ever increasing range and payload, the need to keep the enemy’s aircraft at arms reach meant first Johore and then the rest of Malaya had to be defended to safeguard the base. This explanation is very simplistic, there’s lots more, as many of you know. With me so far?

OK, so now the RAF will defend the base, and Malaya too, and the local RAF commander came up with a total figure of 566 front line aircraft. This in 1940, when Britain is fending off a possible invasion. The Chiefs of Staff trimmed this down to 336 aircraft, but even this was going to take time to provide, with the requirements of the Home Front and North Africa having priority by a long way. In the meantime, the Army is left holding the baby in Malaya, being given responsibility for its defence, while the RAF continues to build the airfields for the expected aircraft, airfields the Army will have to defend.

Churchill, on coming to the conclusion that he has to make the Army and RAF work together, appoints a commander, and historically chose a RAF officer, because, my assumption, this was about building a RAF command that would defend Malaya - Singapore. However, in my ‘What If’, irked by Newell’s performance, and the fact the Army was now the primary defender, Churchill chose an Army commander, Brooke-Popham is gone.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
So now, why Lord Gort

OK so we are looking for an Army commander, General, or someone who has held Lt Gen for some time, but remembering Home Front and North Africa are respectively, key to our survival, and hope for the future, the best commanders go there. So, Dill, CIGS since 26 May 1940 is out, Brooke, CinC Home Forces, is out, Wavell, CinC Middle East is out. Then there are a number of Lt Gen’s, Auchinleck, is being lined up for CinC India, the incumbent, General Sir Robert Cassels is retiring in January. This will mean promoting him up to General, but he is an Indian Army man, through and through, and should do well there. Another is Lt Gen is Maitland Wilson, who is commanding in North Africa, and currently planning Operation Compass. The other three Lt Gen’s are, Bernard Paget, Bernard Montgomery and Harold Alexander, who’s Commands all likely to be engaged if the German invasion happened, and their units are still under trained and equipped, while their personal experience of higher command is extremely short.

To my mind, that just leaves us with two big hitters, Ironside and Gort. From 1938, both were played by the then Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, and both maneuvered for the role of commander of the British Expeditionary Force, while more able commanders, Dill and Wavell were ignored. War comes and Hore-Belisha is so desperate to see Gort go, and indeed Gort is desperate to leave London, that Gort is given command of the BEF, while Ironside, Inspector General of Overseas Forces, a kind of pre curser of the role of commander of the BEF, totally surprised, isn’t, and given the CIGS role instead. Ironside struggles through the Norway Campaign, frustrated at the dealings he’s having with Churchill, who wants to micromanage everything. The failure of the Norway Campaign, along with the Fall of France, see both men out of favour, tinted with the Army’s failures and not getting on well with Churchill.

To be fair to them, few got on with Churchill, Dill certainly didn’t do any better in managing Churchill, so I don’t necessarily see that as a character failure on either of their parts. Both had enough of a military mind to know right from wrong, Ironside predicted the Polish Army would be quickly overrun, and acted promptly on the evacuation of British troops from central Norway, before they were lost. As we know Gort had the strength of character to bring the BEF north to Dunkirk and allow it to escape, so, I rate both their generalships as competent. However, Ironside struggled to get on with a lot of people, made enemies, while Gort didn’t, although he also didn’t particularly impress people. And finally, later, Gort was prepared to take on lower command roles, and serve his country, while Ironside took himself off to his Norfolk home and made no further meaningful contribution to the war effort, even failing to stay and appraise Brooke, his replacement, on the current situation. So Ironside, for me, effectively rules himself out, leaving me with Gort.

I’d have liked to have had someone else, and indeed in a ‘What If’, you pretty much can, but it has to be tempered with realism. Ideally, I’d have liked Auchinleck, and took a long time before deciding that he’d have never got the job, if Churchill had turned to an Army officer to command.
 
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Why not a colonial? Australia was a key contributor to the defence of Singapore and had a round need for it to work, having bought the English excuses as to why they should contribute to building the base... an Australian choice would also allow the English to blame someone else if something went wrong.
 
Whats all this talk about submarines, British, Dutch, American, torpedos, tactics.... So far the USN is keeping its distance, (there's an election on don't you know) and there are no agreements made with the Dutch, (yet). So as my old mum would say, You'll have to hold your horses!
Your mum was right, sorry😄
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Why not a colonial? Australia was a key contributor to the defence of Singapore and had a round need for it to work, having bought the English excuses as to why they should contribute to building the base... an Australian choice would also allow the English to blame someone else if something went wrong.
Colonial, what!, I do say old chap, that's rather taking it a bit far, we can't have one of them hairy, uncouth fellows in charge, we have standards you know. No, no, no, where ever did you get such a ridiculous idea from. Gads Tooth man, you'll be mentioning Americans next!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Having an officer from another nation command your troops, aircraft, ships, is always a contentious issue. The idea that this could happen with commonwealth units, would seem quite reasonable, all have the same or very similar doctrine, equipment, phrases of command etc, and all part of the greater British Empire, what's the problem. But it seems it was always a British officer commanding, abet some were part of the British Indian Army.

Indeed the colonial nations had to argue hard to ensure they units were kept together as much as possible, and the danger of the British fighting to the last Australian, avoided. The case in example is Operation Crusader, check out the New Zealand Division, and the South African 5th Brigade.

The other point is Colonial officers with good experience of commanding large numbers of men, were but a handful, and they had to develop during the war to become that. So there were few that could be put forward as candidates, although Freyberg, and a couple of the Australian could have been considered as Corps commanders in North Africa.

The way they worked around it was for a colonial officer to join the Royal Navy, RAf or British Army, gain the experience, and then be loaned back to their own nation to command those forces, but still acting as an officer of the British forces, Vice Adm Sir John Gregory Crace being an example.

But I take your point, and who knows where this 'What if' goes (Spoiler alert, I know!)

PS, I'd love some more informed opinion on this subject
 
The matter of a new commander for Singapore and Malaya is just coming up in the Peerless Air Ministry Time line, I have chosen to send Sir Keith Parks, He is a colonial, fought at Gallipoli and has recently won an air campaign. As Ground troop Commander he is being joined by one B. Montgomery, Chosen by the Chiefs of Staff for his ability a whipping units in to shape and for his tendency to run roughshod over anybody who stands in the way of getting his men ready.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Someone like a Freyberg would be useful, but one who got a little more senior before the war His Wikipedia says that he was destined for higher purposes before medical issues arose and he was (apparently) fored to retire in 37

Yes, that's interesting, if he hadn't been medically retired out of the British Army in 1937, having already made Major Gen in 1934, he's got to be looking at a corps command at least.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The matter of a new commander for Singapore and Malaya is just coming up in the Peerless Air Ministry Time line, I have chosen to send Sir Keith Parks, He is a colonial, fought at Gallipoli and has recently won an air campaign. As Ground troop Commander he is being joined by one B. Montgomery, Chosen by the Chiefs of Staff for his ability a whipping units in to shape and for his tendency to run roughshod over anybody who stands in the way of getting his men ready.
Ok are these are posts Percival and Pulfords, or is Park replacing Brooke Popham?

For replacing Pulford, Park must be the choice for just about every 'What If'. Successful, available, disenchanted with RAF politics, very hard not to pick him.

Montgomery, hmm, wonder how your gonna swing that, sending a star to such a backwater, his famous ability to upset people is going to have to have a major event to perform at! Did he get on with the Australians ok, would look forward to seeing how he works with Gordon Bennett.
 
So now, why Lord Gort

OK so we are looking for an Army commander, General, or someone who has held Lt Gen for some time, but remembering Home Front and North Africa are respectively, key to our survival, and hope for the future, the best commanders go there. So, Dill, CIGS since 26 May 1940 is out, Brooke, CinC Home Forces, is out, Wavell, CinC Middle East is out. Then there are a number of Lt Gen’s, Auchinleck, is being lined up for CinC India, the incumbent, General Sir Robert Cassels is retiring in January. This will mean promoting him up to General, but he is an Indian Army man, through and through, and should do well there. Another is Lt Gen is Maitland Wilson, who is commanding in North Africa, and currently planning Operation Compass. The other three Lt Gen’s are, Bernard Paget, Bernard Montgomery and Harold Alexander, who’s Commands all likely to be engaged if the German invasion happened, and their units are still under trained and equipped, while their personal experience of higher command is extremely short.

To my mind, that just leaves us with two big hitters, Ironside and Gort. From 1938, both were played by the then Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, and both maneuvered for the role of commander of the British Expeditionary Force, while more able commanders, Dill and Wavell were ignored. War comes and Hore-Belisha is so desperate to see Gort go, and indeed Gort is desperate to leave London, that Gort is given command of the BEF, while Ironside, Inspector General of Overseas Forces, a kind of pre curser of the role of commander of the BEF, totally surprised, isn’t, and given the CIGS role instead. Ironside struggles through the Norway Campaign, frustrated at the dealings he’s having with Churchill, who wants to micromanage everything. The failure of the Norway Campaign, along with the Fall of France, see both men out of favour, tinted with the Army’s failures and not getting on well with Churchill.

To be fair to them, few got on with Churchill, Dill certainly didn’t do any better in managing Churchill, so I don’t necessarily see that as a character failure on either of their parts. Both had enough of a military mind to know right from wrong, Ironside predicted the Polish Army would be quickly overrun, and acted promptly on the evacuation of British troops from central Norway, before they were lost. As we know Gort had the strength of character to bring the BEF north to Dunkirk and allow it to escape, so, I rate both their generalships as competent. However, Ironside struggled to get on with a lot of people, made enemies, while Gort didn’t, although he also didn’t particularly impress people. And finally, later, Gort was prepared to take on lower command roles, and serve his country, while Ironside took himself off to his Norfolk home and made no further meaningful contribution to the war effort, even failing to stay and appraise Brooke, his replacement, on the current situation. So Ironside, for me, effectively rules himself out, leaving me with Gort.

I’d have liked to have had someone else, and indeed in a ‘What If’, you pretty much can, but it has to be tempered with realism. Ideally, I’d have liked Auchinleck, and took a long time before deciding that he’d have never got the job, if Churchill had turned to an Army officer to command.

Since this is your thread and I'll respect your decision about you choosing General Gort but why he shouldn't be in command of Far East Command.

I recommend you read Pillbox Affair (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillbox_affair?wprov=sfla1 ) and you will see how he would do things that won't help the army.

During this time Gort played a part in a political manoeuvre, the Pillbox affair, that led to the dismissal of War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha. Unimpressed by his qualities for command, Hore-Belisha described Gort as: "utterly brainless and unable to grasp the simplest problem".

Now Churchill would not give him another command of what happened in France. "Gort went on to serve in various positions for the remainder of the war, but the chaotic rout of the BEF under his command from France had convinced Winston Churchill, the newly installed British Prime Minister, that he was an undesirable as a British Army General Staff field commander, and he was side-lined to non-combatant posts."

Now General Edmund Ironside didn’t take decision of the Norway Campaign, but did order the withdrawal of the British forces from Norway.

here you can read both biography of General Gort and General Ironside:



hope this will help out
 
Since this is your thread and I'll respect your decision about you choosing General Gort but why he shouldn't be in command of Far East Command.

I recommend you read Pillbox Affair (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillbox_affair?wprov=sfla1 ) and you will see how he would do things that won't help the army.

During this time Gort played a part in a political manoeuvre, the Pillbox affair, that led to the dismissal of War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha. Unimpressed by his qualities for command, Hore-Belisha described Gort as: "utterly brainless and unable to grasp the simplest problem".

Now Churchill would not give him another command of what happened in France. "Gort went on to serve in various positions for the remainder of the war, but the chaotic rout of the BEF under his command from France had convinced Winston Churchill, the newly installed British Prime Minister, that he was an undesirable as a British Army General Staff field commander, and he was side-lined to non-combatant posts."

Now General Edmund Ironside didn’t take decision of the Norway Campaign, but did order the withdrawal of the British forces from Norway.

here you can read both biography of General Gort and General Ironside:



hope this will help out.

Having read the recommended entries, given the thinly-veiled hate between Gort and Hore-Belisha, I would be hesitant to assume either's description of the other accurate on its service and that perhaps looking to other service details may provide better insight. In that context when I compare Gort's distinguished service record (including anVC in WW1) to Hore-Belisha's later inability to even keep his own political party's nomination (which appears to have resulted in him changing political parties not once but twice), there appears nothing in his biography that would indicate Gort was wrong in his assessment (per the Pillbox Affair) that Hore-Belisha was unsuitable (due to his inability to lead/motivate teams of men) for his position. In stark contrast, after France, Gort's being awarded the Sword of Honour by the people there due to his leadership during the Seige of Malta appears to reinforce he was completely capable of motivation and leading teams of men.....

I'll gladly defer to others who have a more in-depth knowledge of either biographies.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Since this is your thread and I'll respect your decision about you choosing General Gort but why he shouldn't be in command of Far East Command.

I recommend you read Pillbox Affair (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillbox_affair?wprov=sfla1 ) and you will see how he would do things that won't help the army.

During this time Gort played a part in a political manoeuvre, the Pillbox affair, that led to the dismissal of War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha. Unimpressed by his qualities for command, Hore-Belisha described Gort as: "utterly brainless and unable to grasp the simplest problem".

Now Churchill would not give him another command of what happened in France. "Gort went on to serve in various positions for the remainder of the war, but the chaotic rout of the BEF under his command from France had convinced Winston Churchill, the newly installed British Prime Minister, that he was an undesirable as a British Army General Staff field commander, and he was side-lined to non-combatant posts."

Now General Edmund Ironside didn’t take decision of the Norway Campaign, but did order the withdrawal of the British forces from Norway.

here you can read both biography of General Gort and General Ironside:



hope this will help out
Firstly, thank you.

Have a look at Leslie Hore-Belisha, and I would read how his biographer described his character.

By the end of 1939, the entire Army hated him, and they used the Pillbox Affair to make his position untenable. What really leaves a bad taste in all this was the antisemitism on display, and so Gort is tarred with that. Gort wasn't a brilliant mind like Wavell, but was prepared to continue to serve his country, taking lesser roles, and working hard in those roles.

Referring back to Ironside, if you think giving Gort the Far East, is a questionable choice, and I don't say it isn't, how would you justify Ironside as the choice, given the enemies he made, and the way he finished, effectively shutting the door on his career.
 
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Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Having read the recommended entries, given the thinly-veiled hate between Gort and Hore-Belisha, I would be hesitant to assume either's description of the other accurate on its service and that perhaps looking to other service details may provide better insight. In that context when I compare Gort's distinguished service record (including anVC in WW1) to Hore-Belisha's later inability to even keep his own political party's nomination (which appears to have resulted in him changing political parties not once but twice), there appears nothing in his biography that would indicate Gort was wrong in his assessment (per the Pillbox Affair) that Hore-Belisha was unsuitable (due to his inability to lead/motivate teams of men) for his position. In stark contrast, after France, Gort's being awarded the Sword of Honour by the people there due to his leadership during the Seige of Malta appears to reinforce he was completely capable of motivation and leading teams of men.....

I'll gladly defer to others who have a more in-depth knowledge of either biographies.
CB13, I make you and me on the same page with this
 
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