Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

Such are the cruel fortunes of war.
Media tells us that it's the people who have the big dreams that are killed, the people who have clear plans for the post-war world and their place in it. Memoirs tell us that those guys make it out okay, the ones who die are those who are convinced they will die.

A concerted Allied bombing campaign against Romania and continued fighting in Greece could well strengthen the Bulgarian Air Force. Historically they were really not particularly credible, mostly equipped with tired out 109Es and nicked D.520s, but with Allied bombers constantly thundering overhead and ground forces in active contact they might get more German aid. Perhaps a license/kit-build arrangement for Bf 109s like Hungary and Romania did? Another possibility might be spare Me 210Cs, after the debacle of the 210A and the redesign to the 410, the Hungarians quietly knocked out a few hundred 210Cs with overhauled aerodynamics but the smaller engines. The license agreement gave the Luftwaffe a third of these aircraft, but they seem to have been prejudiced against them and didn't use them much, eventually regifting them back to Hungary. They're perfectly functional multi-role heavy fighters that nobody wants, and Bulgaria is the Axis member nobody asked for. Surely a match made in heaven?
 
he license agreement gave the Luftwaffe a third of these aircraft, but they seem to have been prejudiced against them and didn't use them much, eventually regifting them back to Hungary. They're perfectly functional multi-role heavy fighters that nobody wants, and Bulgaria is the Axis member nobody asked for. Surely a match made in heaven?
I like this idea, and propose to use it, with a twist or two. If they are defending against bombers on the Ploesti run, how would they fare against the P-38F or G? I'd assume the Lightning would have the advantage at least on paper.
 
Media tells us that it's the people who have the big dreams that are killed, the people who have clear plans for the post-war world and their place in it. Memoirs tell us that those guys make it out okay, the ones who die are those who are convinced they will die.

A concerted Allied bombing campaign against Romania and continued fighting in Greece could well strengthen the Bulgarian Air Force. Historically they were really not particularly credible, mostly equipped with tired out 109Es and nicked D.520s, but with Allied bombers constantly thundering overhead and ground forces in active contact they might get more German aid. Perhaps a license/kit-build arrangement for Bf 109s like Hungary and Romania did? Another possibility might be spare Me 210Cs, after the debacle of the 210A and the redesign to the 410, the Hungarians quietly knocked out a few hundred 210Cs with overhauled aerodynamics but the smaller engines. The license agreement gave the Luftwaffe a third of these aircraft, but they seem to have been prejudiced against them and didn't use them much, eventually regifting them back to Hungary. They're perfectly functional multi-role heavy fighters that nobody wants, and Bulgaria is the Axis member nobody asked for. Surely a match made in heaven?
Given Bulgaria does not have an aircraft industry, not very plausable for them to even build kits. Its hard to see them getting much better equipment than OTL, simply due to it being a rob Peter to pay Paul scenario. Planes Bulgaria gets , someone else has to lose.
 
Given Bulgaria does not have an aircraft industry, not very plausable for them to even build kits. Its hard to see them getting much better equipment than OTL, simply due to it being a rob Peter to pay Paul scenario. Planes Bulgaria gets , someone else has to lose.
It did actually have an aircraft industry, produced a handful of bombers and some trainers. The Germans outright refused a Bulgarian request to locally produce Avia B135
 

Driftless

Donor
Extract from A History of Modern India by Warren Semyonoff

(snip) Politically, then, the year passed in a state of outward tranquility, disguising frantic activity...
Superb comment on politics and diplomacy. Sometimes the reverse is true as well - A state of outwardly frantic appearing activity masking a state of paralysis.
Cordell Hull said privately, ‘Indochina does not have importance enough to warrant so much as harsh words to anyone. Once the war is over I hope never to hear about it again.’
If only......
 
I like this idea, and propose to use it, with a twist or two. If they are defending against bombers on the Ploesti run, how would they fare against the P-38F or G? I'd assume the Lightning would have the advantage at least on paper.
Pretty much any modern single seat fighter should be all over them, they're not brilliant. The early Lightning's disadvantages in dive and roll performance aren't exactly strengths of the 210, you'd need a pretty bad pilot match up for the 210 to win. They'd make good night fighters for use against British strategic bombing if they had AI radar sets, but I suspect they won't receive any and they certainly can't make their own, which relegates them to a three dimensional game of blind man's bluff over Sofia.
Given Bulgaria does not have an aircraft industry, not very plausable for them to even build kits. Its hard to see them getting much better equipment than OTL, simply due to it being a rob Peter to pay Paul scenario. Planes Bulgaria gets , someone else has to lose.
I more or less agree on the finite number of aircraft the Axis can access, but there's enough slack in German aircraft use that they could probably pry free some extra single seat fighters if they felt it necessary. Things like extra D.520s or other French captures, or else battle-weary Bf 109E/Fs. More or less as OTL, just in greater quantity.

Bulgaria really doesn't have much of an aircraft industry, but at the point that divergences really start to affect Bulgaria in Spring 1941 with a different Greek campaign, Weiss-Manfred have built a few hundred crap biplanes and MAVAG are learning to build Re.2000s by kit assembly, while IAR is mid-way through an ambitious programme to stick shrunken SM.79 wings on a PZL.24 tail and a French engine and hope nobody eighty years later notices that this isn't really indigenously designing a fighter. Both of these manufacturing consortiums managed to turn out a Bf 109G-6 by spring 1944, so I don't feel like Bulgaria's standing start completely disqualifies them from building something or another at some point. I don't expect miracles though.
 
@spkaca the Congress stayed put initially not because of indecisiveness but rather because they hated the Nazi and Fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini as earnestly as the British because the colonial rule was just like the feeling what the oppressed people under the Nazi regime suffered.

If Churchill stays like the hardliner he was a movement similar to Quit India was inevitable. Talks of Dominion status after the way is garbage to Indians as they know the British said the same during the previous war. ITTL there hasn't even been an attempt to copy Indians like the Cripps mission so the British are rapidly burning through their goodwill and soon the building energy would damage the reputation of the League too or a movement like Quit India.

The League gained strength as the Congress ministries resign when way was declared without consent of the legislature. I am not sure if that has happened.

The 'Pakistan' discussed in 1940 was an abstract idea and no one was sure what it meant an independent country, an all India federation, an autonomous region and most believed that it was a bargaining chip of the league , a familiar example can be like SDI was to the Reagan administration. Position wasn't inevitable until Direct Action Day in 1946.

Who is this General Chaudhari? Surely not JN Chaudhuri right?
 

marathag

Banned
Bulgaria really doesn't have much of an aircraft industry, but at the point that divergences really start to affect Bulgaria in Spring 1941 with a different Greek campaign, Weiss-Manfred have built a few hundred crap biplanes and MAVAG are learning to build Re.2000s by kit assembly, while IAR is mid-way through an ambitious programme to stick shrunken SM.79 wings on a PZL.24 tail and a French engine and hope nobody eighty years later notices that this isn't really indigenously designing a fighter. Both of these manufacturing consortiums managed to turn out a Bf 109G-6 by spring 1944, so I don't feel like Bulgaria's standing start completely disqualifies them from building something or another at some point. I don't expect miracles though.
Since most stressed skin aluminium alloy aircraft construction really didn't change from the early '30s, the main limit is the design, and given the imperfect understanding of aerodynamics, the 'If it looks good, it should fly good' applies more than many would think.

Elliptical or laminar wings are just more labor intensive but not really harder or needing new tech to make than the really old standard Clark Y.
What is beyond them, even if given the blueprints and tooling, is the aluminum/magnesium welding processes. That's US only in WWII, and that allowed faster assembly, along with far less drag than even flush riveting
 
ITTL there hasn't even been an attempt to copy Indians like the Cripps mission so the British are rapidly burning through their goodwill and soon the building energy would damage the reputation of the League too or a movement like Quit India.
Without the Cripps Mission, would the Quit India movement have happened so soon, though? Is it plausible to postpone it into 1943?
The League gained strength as the Congress ministries resign when way was declared without consent of the legislature. I am not sure if that has happened.
Yes, as the PoD is after the declaration of war.
The 'Pakistan' discussed in 1940 was an abstract idea and no one was sure what it meant an independent country, an all India federation, an autonomous region and most believed that it was a bargaining chip of the league , a familiar example can be like SDI was to the Reagan administration.
Even if intended as a bargaining position, things like the Lahore Declaration have a way of creating their own dynamic. Leaders become trapped by their own rhetoric. The Lahore Declaration seems to me to have something in common with the Balfour Declaration. Both adumbrated the idea of a distinct homeland, without specifying that it should be an independent nation-state. But having made the declaration, a pathway opened up, and any conflict of any kind (whether violent or not) would tend to amplify maximalist interpretations of the declaration.
Who is this General Chaudhari? Surely not JN Chaudhuri right?
That's who I had in mind. He served with 5th Division OTL, and that formation will appear in an important role later in the story.
 
Part 12.7
Extract from ch.11, The Gray Waves: a history of the Battle of the Atlantic, Walter Schluter


The heavy demands on Allied escorts, especially destroyers, for Mediterranean operations in June 1942 - February 1943 had given the U-boats a last hurrah in the Atlantic. But March 1943 brought them frustration, and April brought disaster...

Convoys SC122 and HX229 both came under attack during their crossing. In total, they had 14 escorts of which half were destroyers (five more escorts joined later), against 34 U-boats. The battle saw sixteen ships sunk, an extremely painful loss, but Doenitz had hoped for more - indeed for annihilation. Two U-boats were lost. ‘This was a maximum effort by the enemy, and it was not enough for their purposes,’ wrote Churchill later. ‘The fact is that thanks to the splendid efforts of our Navy, Coastal Command and our Allies, the U-boat peril never frightened me in this war as much as in the first.’ Admiral Godfroy agreed, commenting: 'having to attack convoys more frequently was, in a sense, a reverse for the U-boats, since for most of the war, most merchant ship losses were independent sailing vessels. But now the U-boats had fewer easy targets, so had to attack convoys more often. Mass attacks on convoys could attain results under favourable circumstances, but the downside risk for them was mass casualties to the U-boats themselves. We first saw this with the action on the Dakar convoy at the end of March, when our escorts sank four U-boats without loss.'

Then in April, the release of warships from the Mediterranean saw losses of U-boats increase sharply while their kills fell. ‘They smothered us in destroyers,’ complained one U-boat captain. That month, only 30 ships were sunk in the Atlantic, and 19 U-boats were destroyed. ‘If we had known in January that we would have such an April, we might have found it harder to argue against a cross-Channel invasion this year,’ noted General Brooke. ‘Though I still believe we made the right choice.’

Early May saw the odds tilt even more heavily against the Germans, with U-boat losses exceeding merchant ship losses. In the second week of May Doenitz recalled the U-boats from the North Atlantic. He suffered some criticism for this, with talk at OKW insinuating that he wanted to save his son, whose U-boat had been about to go on patrol. The matter damaged him politically, though cool military assessments - on both sides - agreed that the decision was correct. The U-boats had lost the battle of the Atlantic.
 
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The heavy demands on Allied escorts, especially destroyers, for Mediterranean operations in June 1942 - February 1943 had given the U-boats a last hurrah in the Atlantic. But March 1943 brought them frustration, and April brought disaster...

Admiral Godfroy agreed, commenting: 'even having to attack convoys at all was a reverse for the U-boats...'

Umm. Until the deployment in 1943 of jeep carriers, H2X radar, and additional VLR patrol aircraft, the key to the OTL Battle of the Atlantic was whether the Allies were reading U-boat Enigma. When U-boat Enigma was secure, the Germans scouted for convoys, and when they located a convoy, massed U-boats for a "wolfpack" attack. This tactic was extremely successful in 1940 and early 1941; failed in late 1941, when the British broke the Kriegsmarine's HYDRA key; succeeded in 1942, after the U-boats were given the separate TRITON key; failed after Turing broke TRITON in November 1942; succeeded in March 1943, when a German tweak briefly shielded TRITON; and never succeeded again.

The U-boats also preyed upon unescorted vessels, and the deployments above largely put an end to that as well, while inflicting very heavy losses on them. But in fact after mid-1943, that was pretty much all the U-boats could do. Not attacking convoys was a defeat.

...but now the U-boats had to attack convoys if they were to attack at all...
Why? The Allies never convoyed all vessels. The overhead of convoying was a greater cost than the loss of a few vessels.
 
Without the Cripps Mission, would the Quit India movement have happened so soon, though? Is it plausible to postpone it into 1943
Maybe it gets delayed a few months but a movement even if smaller and peaceful ( unlike Quit India which though unarmed was a full blown revolt) is inevitable. It may get postponed but a successful Cripps mission is possible in 1943 ITTL. The OTL Cripps Mission came during the peak of the Axis with Japanese trips on the border but this time it would be clear that the Axis would loose and the ground is away from India. It would make Churchill capable albeit slightly more of compromise and the soften the negotiating position of Congress, so a compromise is very much possible.
Even if intended as a bargaining position, things like the Lahore Declaration have a way of creating their own dynamic. Leaders become trapped by their own rhetoric. The Lahore Declaration seems to me to have something in common with the Balfour Declaration. Both adumbrated the idea of a distinct homeland, without specifying that it should be an independent nation-state. But having made the declaration, a pathway opened up, and any conflict of any kind (whether violent or not) would tend to amplify maximalist interpretations of the declaration.
The partition was an extremely complicated thing occurring because many things became right since 1906 but it didn't become inevitable until late1946. The Congress resigning, making the League the largest party, especially the Quit India in which the Congress perished for all intents and purposes till the end of the war which allowed the League to build its base otherwise the 1946 elections are lost. They gained ground in Punjab and Bengal only because of economic promises and not Pakistan and the electorate consisting of the top 15% of the population. If Cripps succeeds ITTL Pakistan is butterflied. Even minor butterflies can reduce their seat share by 50% in both Punjab and Bengal and loose them every provincial government. Like the 1932 Weimar elections for Hitler the 1946 one was a one time chance for the league to succeed.
That's who I had in mind. He served with 5th Division OTL, and that formation will appear in an important role later in the story.
Well we are used to seeing good Generals in your TL so a man who almost lost India a war was unexpected. India managed to win in 1965 only due to the political will and the capability of the junior officers. Had he had his way it would have been a decisive defeat.
 
The U-boats also preyed upon unescorted vessels, and the deployments above largely put an end to that as well, while inflicting very heavy losses on them. But in fact after mid-1943, that was pretty much all the U-boats could do. Not attacking convoys was a defeat.

Why? The Allies never convoyed all vessels. The overhead of convoying was a greater cost than the loss of a few vessels.
On reflection I think the quote as originally written was poorly phrased, so I've edited it. I wrote it having just read Payson O'Brien's comments about convoying in How the War Was Won, so wanted to convey the point that unescorted ships were always at the biggest risk, but didn't phrase it well.
The Congress resigning, making the League the largest party, especially the Quit India in which the Congress perished for all intents and purposes till the end of the war which allowed the League to build its base otherwise the 1946 elections are lost.
With a later & smaller QI movement, I suspect the government doesn't jail Congress. Could the 1945-6 elections come sooner (or later) in the altered circumstances, and what effect might that have? The other question I have to think about relates to the communal constituencies - presumably the prospect is that with Congress able to maintain political momentum, the League does not manage to unite all Muslim votes such that Congress manages to win more of the seats reserved for Muslims. And of course if the League knows its likely future position is weaker, that makes them more amenable to compromise in 1943.
The OTL Cripps Mission came during the peak of the Axis with Japanese trips on the border but this time it would be clear that the Axis would loose and the ground is away from India. It would make Churchill capable albeit slightly more of compromise and the soften the negotiating position of Congress, so a compromise is very much possible.
Certainly the Cripps Mission had the smell of desperation about it from the start which probably doomed it OTL. I suspect that Churchill agreed to it as a sop to Washington and Labour, but never expected it to succeed, and did what he could to ensure it didn't. The tricky part is finding a compromise that would have gained general assent in 1943 - tentatively I'd suggest Dominion status at some early date (say late 1944) and a firm date for postwar independence (no later than OTL, maybe earlier, say January 1947). That last part would have been the trickiest bit to get past London, though.
Well we are used to seeing good Generals in your TL so a man who almost lost India a war was unexpected.
There have been mentions of Fredendall and Percival in passing. Anyway, this is his sole appearance.
 
Part 12.8
Article by Colonel Basil Ioannou in Athinaika Nea newspaper, 4th May 1953

So much nonsense has been talked about the American raid on Ploesti ten years ago, in April 1943, that I feel the time has come for me to correct some of the misconceptions around my part in it, and the part played by the men under my command. The occasion for this is the display in Athens of the painting The Interception by Mr. Barclay, together with some of the commentary that has accompanied it. Particularly egregious in this respect was the exalted nonsense written by Mr. Hines, of New York, which has been translated and reprinted in several Athens journals, whose editors should know better...

…the painting certainly was created with the noblest of intentions, and executed with consummate skills. But it does not present an accurate picture of the air battle in which I and my comrades fought, and the commentary around the battle not only confuses the issue but misses its significance. Perhaps some background is in order, since contradictory accounts of the events have appeared in print.

Most of the readers of this newspaper will recall how, in early 1943, “the day of the Americans” transformed Attica, already a vast armed camp, into a vast airfield also. Three wings of USAAF heavy bombers came in during January. They sought to achieve an annihilating blow against the vital Axis fuel supplies from Ploesti, in Romania. Earlier efforts by the British and French in this direction had proved unavailing. Now it was the Americans’ turn.

My squadron had recently been withdrawn from frontline service, after much action in the skies above Thessaly, during the glorious liberation of that beautiful region. In passing, I should note that the story of our air-fight with the Germans above Mount Olympus, in February, has also received much ornamentation. We were not in fact outnumbered twenty to three on that occasion, nor did we destroy more than (at most) four of the enemy ourselves; British fighters shot down several more. But all allowances must be made for the difficulties of accurate reporting and the stories inspired by wartime propaganda.

We handed over our beloved but hard-worn Type 81s to a training unit, and received instead new P-38s, the great gift of the USA to the freedom-loving nations, the same type that the French “Storks” had made famous. With some emotion we beheld them painted in our national colours. Here, we all felt, was a machine indeed, with which we could write a glorious page in our history. We spent some weeks getting to know our new machines, which took much getting used to after the nimble Type 81. We found that new machines needed new tactics. In between times I and my pilots took the opportunity to visit loved ones. At the end of March we received our orders: we were to return to the fight. We guessed we would soon have occasion to fight alongside the Americans, as their planes were flying into Attica continually.

We deployed to a fresh base near Olympus, according to our unit diary, on the 5th April. We shared with a British unit, 92 Squadron, with whom our Air Force maintains fraternal connections to this day. During the second week of the month we carried out several aggressive patrols over Bulgarian airspace, without any serious encounters until the 14th, when we engaged the enemy - Me109s - in the vicinity of Plovdiv, shooting down two without loss, though we suffered a sad loss on our return to base when Lieutenant Mikellides crashed on landing. He had been a friend of mine since our days in training, and we had often walked together with our wives along the coast near Megara, his home town. Even now I write this with emotion.

On the morning of the 18th, we received orders to fly to a point thirty kilometres due east of Sofia, and rendezvous there with friendly aircraft returning from a raid on Ploesti. Only when we arrived did we realise the full scale of the raid: we saw dozens and dozens of American aircraft shining in the bright sun. Some, though, were glowing with an altogether more sinister light, the light of burning engines, and others trailed behind. Attacking them were enemy fighters, some single-engined types and some twin-engined, with yet others approaching the scene. Among these latter we recognised some as Me210s. Our intelligence had warned us of their likely presence, but this was our first encounter with them. They bore Bulgarian markings.

As I said to begin with, several misconceptions have accreted around these events, and Mr. Barclay’s fine painting does not appear to dispel them. The painting depicts only four of my squadron engaging the enemy, though in fact there were ten of us present. The particular Me210s we engaged were not in fact blazing away with all their guns at the B-24s, but were some way distant. The battle emphatically did not take place in the sky above Sofia, as repeated ad nauseam in all the Athens newspapers, but, as I said above, some thirty kilometres to the east. Although I am certain that we made several kills - I was credited with two, and my comrades claimed four more between them - we did not ‘wipe out’ the enemy, as Mr. Hines states. In fact most of the enemy disengaged quickly. Post-war analysis has shown that the Bulgarian Me210s lost only three machines that day, though several suffered heavy damage. This phenomenon of over-claims affected all sides.

I cannot escape the feeling that in both Greece and the United States this event received more attention than it deserved, I believe for propaganda reasons. The fact is that the raid on Ploesti, despite the large preparations, achieved less success than hoped, albeit more than earlier efforts. The bombers found the target intermittently obscured by low clouds and smokescreens, and the enemy had prepared formidable defences. The German formation with responsibility for the Balkan theatre was Luftflotte 4 (4th Air Fleet), which also covered the southern portion of the Eastern Front. At this point (that is, in April - May 1943) the Germans had stationed an actual majority of the fighters in Luftflotte 4 near Ploesti, along with many Romanian machines. Therefore, for all their courage and skill, few of the bombers managed to bomb accurately, and many suffered damage. Historians differ on this point, but I side with those who believe that enemy spies in Athens had given detailed early warnings of the operation. In any event, the operation disappointed expectations. Not long after the B-24s were all sent to Italy, where they found other employment, due to the heavy German counter-attack against the Americans, the notorious battle of Valmontone. Thus, for more than one reason, the need for a positive story to emerge from the raid of the 18th.

When all is said and done, I do not really begrudge the celebration of this event. All concerned did their duty nobly, and that deserves celebration. What I will say is this: my unit achieved a success in immediate tactical terms, both in damaging the enemy and preventing further losses to our allies, but we achieved greater tactical successes on many other occasions, which have received little or no attention. Most of all I regard as foolish the nickname ‘Boulgaroktonos’ which I received, since this was almost the only occasion when we engaged Bulgarian aircraft. After all, by war’s end I had received credit for seventeen kills, all the rest of them German.
 
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Very nice update, only what is OM2?
My attempt at translating 'Fighter Group 2' - since Google Translate gave me 'omáda machitón' and I took the second element to be an acceptable translation of 'fighter' (in the sense of aircraft) since the translation for 'fighter aircraft' was 'machitiká aeroskáfi'. Please correct me if there's a better translation. I realise I haven't translated any other military term in this update (as @Aristomenes points out), so it's also a little inconsistent.

Nice touch, especially as his name is Basil.
:)
 
My attempt at translating 'Fighter Group 2' - since Google Translate gave me 'omáda machitón' and I took the second element to be an acceptable translation of 'fighter' (in the sense of aircraft) since the translation for 'fighter aircraft' was 'machitiká aeroskáfi'. Please correct me if there's a better translation. I realise I haven't translated any other military term in this update (as @Aristomenes points out), so it's also a little inconsistent.
Fighter aircraft does translate this way. But organization wise you have this HAF closely followed RAF organizational patterns. So as HAF put it themselves

WingΠτέρυγα - Pteryga
GroupΣμηναρχία - Smenarchia
SquadronΜοίρα - Moira
FlightΣμήνος - Sminos

Now in OTL WW2 you did not have enough squadrons to actually form wings and groups.
 
Fighter aircraft does translate this way. But organization wise you have this HAF closely followed RAF organizational patterns. So as HAF put it themselves

WingΠτέρυγα - Pteryga
GroupΣμηναρχία - Smenarchia
SquadronΜοίρα - Moira
FlightΣμήνος - Sminos

Now in OTL WW2 you did not have enough squadrons to actually form wings and groups.
Thanks, I've amended the post to simply say 'squadron', in order to be consistent. Evidently in the ATL there will be more than one fighter Pteryga in the RHAF.
 
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