January 17th - May 10th – 1940 – The Low Countries and France - Planning
Garrison
Donor
January 17th - May 10th – 1940 – The Low Countries and France - Planning
The attack on the Low Countries had as mentioned previously originally been scheduled for January, that Case Yellow wasn’t launched until May reflected both the need for greater preparation and the infighting amongst the Generals of the Heer over the shape of Case Yellow. There were two basic proposals. One envisioned a drive through the Low Countries that hooked east, getting behind the Allied defences, potentially opening the way for a hook to the east to attack Paris and seizing much of the Channel coast to provide bases for the Luftwaffe and U-Boats to attack Britain. This version originated with Colonel-General Franz Halder. It shared many similarities with the WWI Schlieffen Plan, which its critics used as a basis to attack it. Those who supported the plan would point out that the failure in WWI could be attributed to soldiers on foot simply not being able to maintain the pace required to make it work. The Wehrmacht had Panzer divisions now, they could achieve what the Army of Imperial Germany could not [1].
On the other side you had officers like Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein and later Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian. Manstein initially proposed carrying out the same drive into the Low Countries as the OKH plan, but with the addition of a thrust towards Sedan, advancing south before turning north and striking into the rear of the Allied forces. This plan was certainly bolder than the Halder version and it reached the ears of Hitler courtesy of members of Manstein’s staff and a distinctly unauthorized personal meeting with the Fuhrer. Hitler expressed some interest, but it still didn’t quite resonate with Hitler as the swift, decisive strike that would swiftly finish the French that he truly wanted. His interest was cooled considerably once the General staff got their hands on Manstein’s ideas. OKH were of the firm opinion that once Manstein’s ‘hook’ turned north it would be completely exposed to a counterattack unless substantial further divisions were taken from the primary attack into Belgium to cover it. Significantly the General Staff invoked the spectre of a much stronger British deployment providing substantial reserves that could pivot to counter such a move. OKH had revised their estimates of projected British strength in France upwards from 10-12 divisions to 18-20. This was a significant exaggeration of the actual British deployment in the BEF and it is hard not to conclude that this was done deliberately to pour cold water on Manstein’s plan. In this OKH succeeded, for now at least. This rejection nearly resulted in Manstein’s sacking as Chief of Staff of Army Group A owing to his having bypassed the chain of command to present his plan. Fearing though that this decision would anger Hitler OKH thought better of it.
It was only in January that Heinz Guderian entered the picture to assist Manstein in reshaping his plan. He should have arrived in Koblenz some weeks earlier as commander of the XIX Army Corps. The night before his departure Guderian had attended a dinner with several of his fellow officers and suffered a serious bout of food poisoning. He spent several weeks recovering in hospital and chafed as the doctors refused to certify him as fit to return to duty for far longer than he judged necessary. By January he was fully recovered and in Koblenz, to the point where he joked that, ‘The chef must have been a Frenchman trying to sabotage the war effort’. In 1940 one could make such jokes in the Reich, had it been 1943 the Gestapo might have made life very uncomfortable for the unfortunate chef. Guderian had heard of Manstein’s proposals and now in a series of informal discussions Guderian helped develop the plan into its final form. This envisioned the attack on Sedan as the primary axis of attack, with the thrust into the Low Countries simply acting as diversion to draw the best of the Allied forces forward while the main thrust drove for the coast and severed the lines of communication of the British and French forces. They finalized their plan by the middle of February, which left the small matter of bringing it to the Fuhrer’s attention [2].
This revision of the plan was certainly the kind of bold move that would appeal to Hitler, unfortunately for Manstein and Guderian forewarned was forearmed as far as OKH were concerned, meaning that they intended to ensure that any ideas about Case Yellow only reached Hitler after it had been properly evaluated, which in the case of Manstein’s bright ideas OKH intended to take its time over. Even so Hitler was intrigued by the plan and its opponents had to work overtime to dissuade the Fuhrer, and this time Manstein was fired, temporarily at least. OKH portrayed the plan as reckless, overextending the Panzer forces, and leaving them vulnerable to the powerful French reserves positioned to protect Sedan (There were indeed significant French forces in reserve, but as will be explained they were most assuredly not there to protect Sedan) and that a counterattack could wipe out the entire force. The plan was the subject of much discussion between Hitler and OKH, who delayed things long enough to play their trump card, namely that any radical changes to the plan at this point would mean postponing Case Yellow until June or even July. Frustrated with the repeated delays that he already endured this finally persuaded Hitler to commit to the Halder Plan. He did insist however insist on allowing Manstein to continue refining his plan, and retaining his post, to use as diversion or follow up attack. There was much grumbling at OKH. This though would prove to be one of the few times, arguably even the only time, that Hitler’s strategic meddling benefitted the Wehrmacht. OKH did modify their plan to include a mobile force built around a single Panzer Division, to exploit any opportunities that might arise in the Sedan area and more importantly to placate the Fuhrer [3].
For all their talk of bold advances the final force disposition decided on by Halder and his planners only committed six Panzer Divisions to the initial assault, with three in reserve and one assigned to Manstein’s potential ‘diversionary attack’ from Sedan. The logic of holding the three divisions back was that committing them in the first wave of attack would overcrowd the battle space. Also, these fresh divisions could be used to maintain momentum as other formations suffered the disorganization and exhaustion inevitable from engaging in a rapid battle of manoeuvre. These formations would intervene decisively in the battle, just not in the way that Halder was thinking [4].
The final disposition of forces saw Army Group A under Von Rundstedt assigned for the main thrust into Belgium with and forty-five infantry divisions, including six Panzer Divisions and three Motorized Divisions. Army Group B under Bock contained twenty-nine divisions, including one Panzer Division and was positioned to counter any French moves north from Sedan or to carry out a diversionary attack based on Manstein’s plan, though in reality they were regarded as little more than reserves and saw no action in the opening phases of the battle. Likewise, the nineteen divisions of Army Group C under Leeb faced the Maginot Line and were not expected to take part in the initial stages of the battle. In reserve were three Panzer Divisions and forty-five infantry divisions.
On the British and French side this choice of strategy was fortuitous, as it was the one they had shaped all their plans to counter. They had dismissed the idea of a German attack on the Maginot Line as even the Germans wouldn’t be so foolish as to attack those ‘impenetrable’ fortresses and the Ardennes were judged impassable, despite considerable evidence to the contrary. What the Allies had formulated was called the Dyle Plan or Plan D. It envisioned an Allied advance through Belgium to hold any German offensive along the line of the river Dyle. It was a simple plan and given its convergence with German intentions it seemed entirely feasible, with a high likelihood of success. In reality Plan D was riddled with problems.
The first and most basic issue was that the British and French forces weren’t in Belgium. The Belgians had insisted on maintaining strict neutrality after the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Even after Poland and Norway, they still adamantly refused to let any foreign troops on their soil. There seems to have been some anti-British and anti-French sentiment at work and a belief that any foreign troops would constitute an occupation. This meant that instead of being able to deploy at once to the Dyle Line the Allies would face crossing much of Belgium, potentially fighting their way through refugees heading the other way. This problem was compounded by an assumption made by the Allies that they would have six days warning of German mobilization for an attack. This might have been true in January when the original attack was called off, by May much of the German forces had been left in forward positions that meant the Allies could expect three days warning at most [5].
As for the powerful reserve that had so concerned Halder it was being held to either reinforce the Dyle Plan or possibly counter any attacks that threatened the Maginot Line. There was no consideration of using it in the Ardennes either defensively or offensively. It had even been suggested that this reserve be reduced to reinforce Plan D. Gamelin, blessed with an abundance of caution, dismissed this idea. Though as the fighting in Belgium went on this reserve would be steadily whittled away [6].
There was a more fundamental flaw in Plan D, one that had nothing to do with jumping off points or timing. This flaw was that it was entirely defensive in nature. There were no contingencies to go onto the offensive if the Allies repulsed the German attack or simply checked the initial advance. To put it another way Plan D was entirely reactive plan and lacked any flexibility. Much the same could be said of the French command structure. The French high command expected their subordinates to obey orders to the letter. The German commanders expected their subordinates to show initiative in achieving their objectives. This difference explains much of what happened during May.
To face the German attack there were eight regular Dutch divisions plus two of reserves, eighteen regular Belgian divisions plus four reserve divisions. The BEF consisted of thirteen infantry divisions (the British forces were the only one to be fully motorized at this time) and the rough equivalent of one division of armour though not organized as such initially. One further British Division was assigned to the French forces along the Maginot line. The British did have several further divisions of infantry and more armour that could have been deployed, but they had been held back partly owing to concerns about the logistics chain supporting them and partly in the hope they might be deployed for offensive operations in Norway. For Plan D the French deployed the 7th Army under Giraud, consisting of seven divisions, including one light mechanized division and one motorized division. Further south was 1st Army Group under Billote consisting of twenty divisions, including one light mechanized division. In reserve were some twenty-five divisions, including three armoured divisions, one motorized division and one light mechanized division. It seemed the odds favoured the Allies, if they could co-ordinate their actions with the neutral Belgians and Dutch and if they could move quickly enough to hold the Germans at the Dyle. Neither of these preconditions for success were met [7].
[1] It does sound like a very WWI plan, but it was probably realistic given that most of the Heer was still a WWI army.
[2] So yes, I’ve derailed ‘Sickle Cut’ for the time being, but given how much of a one man, or two man, band it was I don’t feel it would take that much for the entire scheme to falter.
[3] Meaning Sickle Cut is down but not out.
[4] You may feel free to guess where those Panzers turn up.
[5] And none of this is invented, even if the Germans do exactly what they expect the Dyle Plan is a big ask.
[6] In OTL the reserve was reduced to reinforce Plan D after Mechelen, making the capture of those plans the single worst intelligence ‘coup’ of the war.
[7] So other than the British the Allied/neutral forces are as OTL and with the same lack of co-ordination or unified command as OTL. Essentially the Germans have been handicapped here but the French are still stuck with Gamelin and the British are going to have to conform to the plans of the senior partner for the time being.
