World of the United Front Continued - A graphics TL of China and the world

Pakistan, late 2000s
Pakistan, late 2000s

Indonesia's particular brand of "reform Islam" never caught on in a big way outside of Indonesia, but did serve as a vague inspiration for other reform movements outside the country. Even these other movements often remained small and largely devoid of influence (or even actively suppressed) in many areas, but in some other areas, they saw greater growth. One such region was Pakistan

The "Islamic Worker's Party" (and associated satellite groups) emerged as the main political vehicle for the reform Islam movement in Pakistan. Pakistan had a history of Islamic socialism, with figures like Liaquat Ali Khan advocating for some form of it. The Bhuttos and the Pakistani People's Party (PPP) had also at times advocated for Islamic socialism, though after a while, they began to shift in a watered down centrist direction in regards to economics, and began pandering more to the conservative and fundamentalist strains of Islam while sidelining the the more liberal/reformist elements. The shift to neoliberal economics and conservative pandering from the PPP, in addition to interspersed periods of authoritarian military dictatorship, saw a move away from the PPP among some quarters. A somewhat awkward coalition of urban and rural poor, ethnic minorities, and urban intellectuals disaffected with the PPP began to emerge, both as a social movement and political force. 1996 saw the creation of the most recent political party to represent this movement, the Islamic Worker's Party (IWP)

Reform Islam in Pakistan took some influences from Indonesia, but had a different character. The reform movement in Indonesia was often explicitly state-supported, with the communist party there seeking to shift values in a more progressive direction by using (at times novel and unorthodox) interpretations of Islam. In Pakistan, on the other hand, there was no state support to assist and direct the movement, and matters of socialist economic change and assistance to the needy tended to take focus over social issues, where (while having a place for more progressive sorts) the public rhetoric has generally been one with a vaguely libertarian stance focusing on opposition to fundamentalist social views. As time has passed, the majority of the movement and its party have shifted to at least vaguely socially liberal stances, and there's a faction of very progressive sorts, but it also retained a somewhat conservative-leaning minority, in contrast to the Indonesian movement

By the 90s, the movement's adherents were estimated to make up around 10% of the population of Pakistan. Since then, the movement has grown further. As for the movement's political organization, the IWP has gone from a very minor thing to one of the major parties in Pakistan

iwp ib.png


In 1999, the military in Pakistan staged a coup, with general Pervez Musharraf taking power. The 2002 elections saw him retain power (albeit with claims of fraud levelled at his government). The mid 2000s saw his popularity decline, and as the 2008 election approached, it looked like some sort of opposition coalition would have a good shot at taking power. The November 2007 state of emergency, and Musharraf's declaration of indefinite postponement of elections, hurt the regime's popularity even more (despite the regime reversing that decision a week later and allowing elections)

The campaign was shaken up by two events. In late December, PPP leader Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, former PPP leader who was elected and then executed after a military coup) was assassinated, with Taliban claiming responsibility but also with accusations that Musharraf's regime may have played a role, via denying Bhutto security or perhaps an even more direct role. Then, in early January, Asif Ali Zardari - Benazir Bhutto's widow and the co leader of the PPP after her death - was assassinated too. In the aftermath, the PPP (now led by Ameen Faheem, poet and leftist) skyrocketed in the polls. In the election itself, the PPP ended up with a much narrower lead - but still had a solid win, as the largest party in terms of seats and popular support, with the second largest party having over 10% less support

As the election campaign began, a coalition between the PPP and PML (N) (the primary conservative party, also opposed to the Musharraf regime) was the expected result. But Faheem, preferring to take a more left leaning orientation than his party took in past years, instead opted for a different route. The results gave the PPP and IWP a combined 168 seats - just four short of a majority. Faheem thus sought a PPP-IWP minority coalition, which was able to take power with additional support from liberal and leftist parties like the Awami National Movement, Muttahida Quami Movement, National People's Party, and Pakistani People's Party - Sherpao

2008 pakistan election ib.png


Faheem and his coalition took office with a bold agenda for social and economic reform - but faced economic disaster with the global economic downturn hitting Pakistan especially hard. At the start, some viewed the election results as something of a "poisoned chalice" for the coalition. But through seizing diplomatic opportunities, the coalition was able to achieve significant success

On one hand, after the Sino-Indian war, the Socialist Republic of China had looked on at Pakistan with increased interest as a pragmatic way to gain some advantage if Indian revanchism led to a rematch. China had already begun to increase ties and relations with Pakistan, and the new left leaning government, while not a communist party like the rulers of China, was nonetheless rather more ideologically aligned than the old government, too, which was conducive to further closeness. On the other hand, the United States had relations with Pakistan, and interest in the area, due to the War on Terror, having gotten the Musharraf government involved. With both the Americans and Chinese having interest in the country, and with those two countries having somewhat chilly relations, Faheem and his coalition sought to extract aid from the both of them, and engaged in diplomacy to try and maximize what could be gained

Some figures in American intelligence and leadership had already been calling for significant increases in foreign aid to Pakistan, suggesting as much as $50 billion in aid to the country (nearly a third of the nation's GDP at the time). Through a lobbying offensive with promises and threats regarding continued involvement in the War on Terror and ties with China among other things, Faheem managed to attain an agreement with America for a large aid package, which was marketed politically as a sort of "Pakistani Marshall Plan", and presented by American leadership as a sort of shift from a more militarist to a more diplomatic approach to the War on Terror. The Chinese, having not really taken the sort of economic hit that many other advanced economies took during the recession, were rather easier to convince - while the government was ideologically opposed to the Americans, it was more focused on domestic affairs and expanding diplomacy and green initiatives in Africa than on directly opposing the US, and didn't actually have any particularly strong issue with Pakistan simply having positive relations with both China *and* the US. So the Chinese, seeing the opportunity for a boost to their international reputation, having not been hit hard by the recession, and having a larger economy by the US anyway and thus having money to spend, simply matched the US investments

Immediately after the 2008 election, economic analysts expected that the Faheem coalition's left-leaning orientation would create a less positive environment for investors and slow economic growth. But the acquisition of foreign aid, primarily domestic rather than military, equating to around 2/3rds of the entire Pakistani GDP, had essentially supercharged the Pakistani economy, making it easier for major economic growth and modernization to coexist with significant left leaning economic reforms. Pakistan was thus able to see significant economic growth and a large reduction of poverty. Furthermore, the economic boom saw a decline in support for fundamentalism and terrorist groups in the hinterlands, with less in the way of poverty to pressure the desperate in that direction, and the governing coalition was able to take advantage of its popularity from the foreign agreements (Faheem somewhat played up the difficulties in negotiating for the aid to the public, to increase his coalition's political gain from it) to pass social reforms while avoiding (or at least limiting) backlash over such reforms

pakistan bailouts ib.png


(also, here's a larger version of the map from the 2009 election)

2008 pakistan election map.png
 
Last edited:
United States Politics, 1952-1960

In the 1930s, the American public largely focused inward and embraced isolation. After the Second World War, and establishment of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, American politics began to turn outward, motivated by anti-communism to coordinate more with other western capitalist countries

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Communist Party of China took a gradualist stance, emulating the NEP of Lenin and intending to maintain it for a longer period of time than the USSR under Stalin did, with their own "Socialist Market Economy". As part of this, the Socialist Republic of China pursued a policy of significant trade with the West. The USA and other western countries were more than willing to engage in this trade, out of hopes of sowing division between the Chinese and Soviets, as well as in hopes of undermining Chinese (and Korean) socialism. The 1940s, however, saw an increase in voices criticizing the trade relationship as merely aiding Chinese economic growth, and criticizing the broader isolation of the 30s and failure to stop the spread of socialism in Europe and Asia

In the 1940s, the force of anti-communism had not yet come to dominate American politics, with incumbent Harry Truman managing to win a surprising victory in 1948 despite heavy criticism from Thomas Dewey. Even in the early 50s, it wasn't necessarily certain how things would later end up - in the 1952 Republican primaries, conservative Robert Taft only narrowly beat moderate Dwight Eisenhower

Taft did beat Eisenhower, however, and in the general election, the Taft-McCarthy ticket was able to solidly beat the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket. After 5 consecutive losses, the Republicans had finally taken back control. Taft himself was a solid conservative, but when he died just months into his Presidency, his successor pursued an even more strongly conservative agenda, and used the bully pulpit (and federal forces) for very aggressively anti-communist rhetoric and action

1952 1956 elections ib.jpg



McCarthy was far from the sole figure responsible for the "Second Red Scare", but he and his administration were a major factor in letting it reach the heights it did. The aggressive rhetoric encouraging an atmosphere of paranoia, federal agencies playing dirty with numerous denials of due process, encouragement and cooperation with heavy-handed state and local government efforts, and public support for the militias all played notable roles in spurring on the Red Scare. Of course these acts also played on already existing sentiments among the general population - many dissidents or suspected dissidents would die in the poor conditions of the government detention camps and asylums, or would be executed judicially or killed by law enforcement, but many more would be killed by patriotic militias or by spontaneous acts of violence in communities or by individuals

second red scare ib.png



Support for McCarthy and the Red Scare was far from unanimous . Even before the period of highest intensity, in McCarthy's second term, Estes Kefauver was able to present a strong challenge to the President, with McCarthy winning in 1956 by a much narrower margin than Taft had won four years earlier. But it was only partway through his second term that the opposition was able to really gain momentum, and when the general public began shifting in a big way against McCarthy and the Red Scare. McCarthy was able to narrowly avoid impeachment, but ended up censured by Congress, and ended up a lame-duck in the latter 1950s, with a coalition of Democrats and Republicans cobbling together a veto-proof supermajority to largely bypass the embittered President, and force some federal reforms to try and prevent the excesses of the Red Scare from happening again in the future

The total death toll from the Red Scare would not be determined. Though there was a broad recognition that things had gone too far, opinions varied wildly, from those who thought that there was certainly excess but that strong action against communism was nonetheless justified by the insurgencies, to those who held that the whole thing was a massive overreach of authority and militant zealotry that proved that far more reforms than those that were passed were needed, with some even suggesting that the leftist insurgents were justified by the oppressive cultural and political atmosphere. As such, due to hopes of moving forward and avoiding harsh political conflict over the particulars, an official, in-depth government inquiry was not launched until years later, at which point the passage of time had made it hard or impossible to determine a very clear image of the particulars and numbers. Modern official and academic numbers for those killed in the Red Scare, and for how, vary significantly from source to source and methodology used

Going into the 1960 elections, both parties found themselves with significant concerns and weaknesses.

The Republicans found themselves with major popularity issues due to their association with Joseph McCarthy (himself term-limited, still loudly commentating on politics, but increasingly ignored in the years before his 1962 death from liver failure brought on by alcoholism), as well as conflict within the party on the way forward. Richard Nixon, California Senator, early supporter of McCarthy who later shifted to a strong critic, with a strong Cold War rhetoric but also a fairly moderate domestic policy, was able to restore some respectability to the Republican Party, avoid causing too much controversy with any of the wings of the party, and make things competitive. Also helping make things competitive was the conflict within the Democratic Party

The party was facing conflict from the conservative and segregationist wings of the party who were relatively more favorable to Red Scare policy and the Cold War on one hand, and the left-wing of the party who were strongly critical of McCarthy, strongly pro-civil rights, and generally supportive of a less aggressive Cold War with more diplomatic efforts and an arguably more isolationist bent. Nominee John F. Kennedy, a moderate liberal taking a hard stance on Cold War foreign policy and taking Senate leader LBJ as his running mate to try to keep the south in line, while also endorsing a moderately left-leaning, pro-civil rights and liberties domestic platform, was ultimately unable to fully please either wing fully, and just like in 1948, the Democrats would see not one but two third party candidacies that largely took votes from their party. Leftist William H. Meyer, on the revived Progressive Party ticket, was able to pull away a sizable chunk of the left-wing vote out of dissatisfaction with the relatively moderate stances the Democratic Party took in the wake of the national crisis, getting nearly 10% of the total vote and failing to win any states but playing 'spoiler' in multiple states. The segregationist Dixiecrats took a much smaller amount of the vote, but that vote was concentrated in several southern states, and the Dixiecrats were thus able to win several electoral votes

1960 election ib.png



The election results were extremely close. Indeed, due to the particulars of how the state of Alabama carried out their elections, it isn't even certain which candidate won the popular vote. As the results came in on election night and the day after, the winner was unclear, with the Progressives acting as something of a 'spoiler' for Kennedy, letting Nixon win various states like Illinois and California with well below 50% of the vote, and with Dixiecrats winning 15 electoral votes in the South and potentially sending the election to the House of Representatives with no majority winner in the electoral college. Kennedy, however, was able to very narrowly win a majority of electoral votes outright. Afterward, seeing the close results in Alaska, Nixon would express bitter regret in taking the advice of his advisors to not carry out his initial '50-state strategy' plan (though pundits would later point out that even if he did take time to campaign in Alaska and won the state, it could have cost him states like Illinois that he was able to narrowly win with his more targeted approach). At any rate, Kennedy was sworn in, speaking of a New Frontier for a new decade, poised to push ambitious foreign and domestic policy to tackle problems at home and abroad, though also facing the potential for struggles with getting his agenda through Congress
Can you tell us more about the low level conflict that occurred after the second red scare? Cool timeline by the way!
 
(small commentary on the low-level post second red scare conflict)
Can you tell us more about the low level conflict that occurred after the second red scare? Cool timeline by the way!
Thanks, and sure

The idea is that it was kind of like the end of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, in regards to the paramilitaries in the red scare and after - the paramilitary leadership and vast majority of the rank and file accept disarmament and stand down, when the backlash to the red scare is in full swing and Congress is overriding McCarthy's vetoes, putting an end to the excesses of government, and pushing for the paramilitaries to stand down. But there's a fringe on both sides that split off and carry out sporadic violence, against each other, against their former enemies (or sometimes allies) who disarmed and stood down, against random people deemed (by the remnant anti-communist paramilitaries as well as some factions among law enforcement) to be communists, civil rights advocates, and in some cases even the less political (as compared to the more leftist paramilitaries, activist groups, and student organizations) red scare victim advocates (who would often get lumped in with the communists and other leftist groups by the far right and to a lesser extent by some factions among law enforcement)

Also, with the backlash in the late 50s against the red scare, the violence dropped off significantly, but in the later 60s and 70s, there'd be something of a resurgence - with the right wing paramilitary remnants and associates having some role in things like violence against civil rights activists, violence against anti-war protesters, retributions against communities with major riots, and so on, and left wing paramilitary remnants and associates having involvement with some of the more radical elements of the student protests groups like the Black Panthers, Weather Underground, and things along those lines. Those things and other violence in the 60s and 70s weren't just a growth out of the remnant red scare violence, but that remnant violence did contribute
 
LGBT Rights in China (and elsewhere), to 2010
LGBT Rights in China (and elsewhere), to 2010

Homosexuality in China has been documented going back millennia. Historically, the situation was complicated, with a degree of acceptance for certain classes and at certain points of time, and less acceptance at others. During the Qing era, the government enacted the first official ban on consensual homosexual relations, and during the "Self Strengthening Movement" after the Opium Wars, historical instances of homosexuality in China were increasingly ignored or censored. After the "Xinhai Revolution" establishing the Republic of China, explicit legal bans on homosexual relations were abolished, though at the same time the Republic period saw a degree of intensification of homophobia in society

With the establishment of the Socialist Republic of China in 1934, homosexuality remained legal. The ruling Communist Party itself had mixed opinions on the matter but generally leaned in favor of gay rights in theory. Some of the largest cities saw a degree of open advocacy for gay rights, with informal Party protection in those areas. Through much of China and among the masses, however, homosexuality was seen in a rather negative light. In order to pander to the masses, lessen dissent, and aid in the strengthening of party control, the Party took what was (then) moderate stance of refusing to outright ban it, but considering it to be an "abnormality" and "mental illness" (though not necessarily an urgent public health crisis), and refusing to make any public support for gay rights (though local party branches in some particularly progressive areas were informally allowed to take a different stance)

Socialist China in the 30s was far from a perfect place for LGBT people, but was nonetheless a place some ended up seeking refuge in. Georgy Chicherin was one such example. A Bolshevik and former Menshevik, and a gay man, he had for a time been the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the USSR, and had been trusted by Stalin. But things would take a turn for the worse, with his criticism of certain politicians contributing in part to him losing favor among Soviet leadership, and with the recriminalization of homosexuality in the USSR in 1933, he found himself largely sidelined. After being accused of Trotskyism and with an impending trial for that and homosexuality, he fled from the USSR (with a group of Trotskyites, though he himself was not one at that time) and was quietly granted refuge within China. At around the same time, the Nazis were rising to power in Germany and had (among many other things) suppressed the "Scientific-Humanitarian Committee" and the "Institute for Sexual Science", organizations that studied sexuality and advocated for LGBT rights. A number of figures associated with the organizations fled to China, and while Magnus Hirschfeld himself (the founder of those organizations) went into exile first in France, he visited China and later took up residence there, with the Chinese government being interested in funding sexual research of their own. As the 30s progressed and Nazi repression increased, the Chinese government was one of the most open countries when it came to accepting refugees, regarding this issue and more broadly as well

Government-funded research ended up showing that homosexuality was apparently natural and unharmful, which helped contribute to a solidifying of (at least theoretical) support for gay rights among the Communist Party leadership. But the Party in the 30s, 40s, and 50s was in no mood to push major change on that front - it was enough to balance other matters like industrialization, expansion of education and infrastructure, and more prioritized social reforms like women's liberation (given higher prioritization due to the potential to significantly boost production with women increasingly entering the workforce - a sort of "two birds, one stone" situation). Those decades saw a slow shift in opinions among the cities, but continued conservative stances in the countryside, with conservative sentiment periodically bubbling over into incidents of mass homophobic hysteria and mob violence. In an attempt to appease the rural conservatives and also minimize harm done, the Party enacted a "public health campaign" in areas with such conservative sentiment, snatching up those accused of homosexuality, and placing them in "curative mental sanitoriums". Though marketed to the public as places that would use science to turn people heterosexual, the sanitoriums were run by the Ministry of Health and Mental Hygiene (which had accepted the science backing the pro-homosexual rights arguments), and in actuality largely acted as secluded gay communities where those who were well and truly rejected by their communities could find some covert refuge. With the end of these "public health campaigns" and the shifting social and legal winds, most of the sanitoriums would be closed down, but some such areas had grown so large that the opening-up would see significant LGBT communities remaining in the area

The 60s saw an acceleration of social change in China. Access to, quality of, and level of education had grown significantly since the conditions immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War and the declaration of the Socialist Republic. The economy had significantly expanded, with the increasingly educated and literate population having more access to information (including social science/psychology publications, such as those increasingly being published suggesting that the "homosexuality as mental illness" approach was not appropriate). And the "down from the mountains and up from the countryside" phenomenon was in full swing - a combination of workers seeking industrial work (with mechanization and improved farming techniques leading to greater agricultural output from fewer workers) and youth seeking education in the higher-quality urban schools had led to a sharp uptick in urbanization. Among other things, research showed that simply being in the cities, for a number of reasons including greater exposure to a diversity of people and ideas, led to both a base shift in favor of more progressive stances and increased openness to attempts by the Party to further push social progress. For these reasons and others, the 60s saw a rise in social activism, particularly among youth and students but also among urban areas in general, for further social progress, including on LGBT rights. By 1969, the Party felt secure enough to officially declassify homosexuality as a mental illness, and to shift from appeasement of rural conservatives to a more robust protection of the right of homosexuals to openly exist across the country without fear of retribution or need to be relocated

The Party was cautious in advocating for further rights. But with an increased ability for pro-gay public advocacy at the grassroots, and with the party quietly supporting the movement through side-channels even as it publicly still tended to avoid talking about the issue, public opinion would continue to shift in the 70s. By 1972, military regulations were changed to explicitly allow for openly gay persons to serve (with instances of service in the Chinese intervention in the Second Indochina War getting some attention and use by the movement to shift hearts and minds), and in 1974, reforms were passed broadly banning discrimination regarding sexual orientation. In 1979, civil unions were established to give gay partnership rights, and in 1984, the Party made the national marriage code gender-neutral, while also legalizing adoption to non-straight couples. China thus became the first country to legalize gay marriage (with Korea soon-after becoming the second). Further developments in the expansion of LGBT rights would occur, with the 90s seeing transgender protection and identity laws, non-discrimination legislation for gender identity and expression, and transitioning surgery being added to the national universal healthcare system

lgbt rights in china ib.png


Party leadership desired to encourage LGBT rights abroad as well, but in the 70s and 80s, this just was not a practical possibility. By the 90s, however, public opinion in other countries had begun to shift, to the point where there could be room for China to have an impact. It became a matter of some debate within the Party and country - China entered the 90s strong and on a good trajectory, but the fall of the USSR and its bloc left China feeling rather isolated and afraid of rocking the boat. Plus the 90s also saw a strong shift in China in favor of promoting green policy at home and abroad. Some in the party suggested leveraging the use of foreign aid in order to promote LGBT rights abroad, but this was seen as potentially further isolating the country and threatening the global green development solidarity aid efforts. So the Party in the 90s went with a "soft touch" approach, with limited attempts to somewhat influence things abroad here and there, but generally trying to avoid taking risks

The 2000s saw a further shift abroad, however, with opinion in various areas shifting even more towards acceptance of LGBT rights. The Party began to do more, with the creation of a "two tier" economic aid system - giving some development aid to various poorer countries regardless of their civil rights stances, but giving more aid to those countries that were willing to enact legislation to protect human rights (not just LGBT rights, though the political shift in the Party coincided with a global shift in attitudes on that issue as well as domestic discourse over desires to do more to promote LGBT rights in particular), or remove/reduce restrictions if in place. The Party also took other measures, such as the creation of the "Chicherin Brigades" (named after the Soviet refugee, who became a notable advocate for gay rights after immigrating to China), all-LGBT subdivisions of the Solidarity Corps, with the intent to expand representation in areas assisted overseas. LGBT people could of course also serve in the regular Solidarity Corps groups, and plenty did, with less risk of danger by being able to blend in with the crowd, but the Chicherin Brigades (as well as all-woman units, for a similar purpose regarding promotion of feminist ideas abroad) nonetheless had some success in somewhat shifting opinion in some areas. And the Party was able to exert a fair amount of soft power for influence via the Chinese media empire, as well

chicherin brigades ib.png


By the end of the 2000s, the LGBT rights movement had seen a fair amount of success around the globe, Various parts of the Americas, Oceania, and Europe had also seen expansions of rights. Even areas like Africa and Asia, which saw substantial opposition overall, saw some successes. In Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and particularly communist Angola followed South Africa in the direction of substantial LGBT rights legislation and initiatives (in some part, but not only, due to Chinese involvement in the region), and other areas saw at least some limited reforms. In Asia, communist Indonesia stood out as a major success for the movement, and under the Faheem government, Pakistan had reduced penalties and showed potential for further reductions. The LGBT movement entered the new decade with the potential for even more success

world laws pertaining to homosexual rights and expression template.png


As for within China itself, by the end of the 2000s, legal rights and protections had been in place for LGBT people for years and in many cases decades. By this time, the laws were strongly enforced. And the general public was generally supportive of LGBT issues - some opposition remained, particularly in the rural areas, but that opposition had been rendered irrelevant as a social force of any strength, and individual incidents were steadily on the decline even in those areas

____________________________________________________

(and a larger version of the map in the thing)

ufc world map lgbt rights 2010.png


(note that it uses a midyear 2010 map as a base, there's some cases where the base had colorings that don't necessarily make sense according to what I can see, like Pakistan having "life in prison" when the law doesn't actually appear to have been as such, so the coloring of Pakistan here represents lessened penalties vs what the base map had, despite the current version of the map showing even lesser penalties than this one despite no apparent actual legal change since when the base map was made. I considered just changing it to be more accurate, but since that would have meant having to double check every country in order to satisfy a half-assed sense of perfectionism, I opted to instead go for a half-assed attempt at "authenticity")

(which kinda flies out the window with the whole "foreign marriages recognized" color, since that wasn't a thing until 2012, and has ceased to exist... I actually made a version of this map for the present day back in like 2019 or something, before they changed it to purple, and what can I say, I just like the older color more so I stuck with it)
 
Last edited:
If I may ask, what's going on with Iowa in there? And what do "Restrictions of expression" mean?
For "restrictions of expression", think China of OTL, or Russia after the mid 2010s. So homosexual intercourse and informal relationships are legal (behind closed doors at least), but not only are relationships given zero official recognition, but there's also a degree of legal suppression against LGBT stuff, some combination (depending on the particular are) of stuff like banning telling kids about LGBT stuff or covering such topics in schools, banning of general media depictions of LGBT things, banning public demonstrations in support of LGBT rights, banning the sort of public displays of affection among LGBT people that would be accepted if done by non-LGBT people, and so on

Now the US more broadly has ended up about as liberal as the US of OTL at the time (as seen by the states with gay marriage or civil unions), but that's come after sharper and nastier conservative turns (as seen by the second red scare in the 1950s us politics post a while back in the TL, and with the "restrictions of expression" states). China had major pro LGBT shifts and achievements in the 70s and 80s, but the rest of the world (other than Korea, which was strongly integrated with China at that point) didn't jump on the bandwagon, and America in particular looked on with no small amount of horror (plenty of conservative US pundits, given the year of some of those big reforms, made plenty of claims that China was L I T E R A L L Y 1984). An anti-LGBT wave swept many parts of the nation, with several states enacting various restrictions. Bans on intercourse itself were struck down nationally in 2003 by the national Supreme Court in Lawrence v Texas, but lesser restrictions, like censoring media depicting LGBT as "obscenity", banning the teaching and discussion of LGBT matters in schools, banning LGBT people from being teachers, and so on, had managed to be upheld in an initial series of court challenges

More recently, a wave of court cases at the state level have been striking down gay marriage and LGBT expression bans and ruling more in favor of LGBT rights. The Iowa Supreme Court made a surprise ruling in 2009 in favor of marriage equality. Currently (as of the post's endpoint of mid 2010) there's ongoing new legal challenges to the expression restrictions, in Iowa and elsewhere, and there's a general expectation that either the state or national Supreme Court will strike down such laws, though there's some uncertainty - the Iowa case ITTL narrowly ruled in favor of marriage equality in a way that some judicial pundits suggest might leave the door open to allowing at least some expression restrictions and unequal treatment

(Why is it just Iowa? I wasn't entirely sure what to do, I considered having a few other states with split decisions like that. I let RNG decide and it chose just Iowa. So it's just Iowa at that snapshot in time - though as other court cases in other states proceed, some other states also have the possibility to go through at least some period of time with a split "marriage equality or civil unions but with some restrictions of expression also allowed" situation)
 
What was ww2 like in this timeline? How long did it last? What was the extent of US involvement?
Without Japan having been defeated in the second Sino-Japanese war, they have a more minor role, they invade Vichy Indochina to attack China again but there's no Pearl Harbor as a catalyst for US involvement. The US under Roosevelt still gave increasing support such as Lend-Lease and so on, though. At some point (let's say in 1942 or 1945) German intensification of the U-boat campaign, and resulting incidents with multiple sinkings of US ships, leads to the US entering the war anyway. Without involvement in the Pacific, the US is able to put more focus on Europe, but the combination of the US entering the war later and China on the other hand allows for the end of the war in Europe to result in borders and situation similar to OTL

The US at the end of the war is more leaning towards isolationism, due in part to the greater controversy over US entrance into the war (I'm assuming that the blatant all-out attack on Pearl Harbor in OTL would have been seen as more of a unifying justification for entering the war than even multiple Lusitania and Reuben James style events), but the beginning of the Cold War pushes the US out of isolationism in the late 40s and early 50s anyway

(Maybe it is a bit lame to have WWII go that way with a result where things in Europe and the US end up so similar despite things in Asia having the potential to make things go different in various different ways. A larger Soviet sphere in Europe, with knock-on effects for the cold war, seems like one plausible outcome for example. But as I mentioned in the first post in the thread, part of the intention from the start was to get to a present-day that is pretty is pretty similar to our own despite having some differences, and substantially changing the European theater in WWII, and the resulting borders and such, just felt like too big a thing to mess around with)
 
A very interesting Timeline!
So I have some questions
1. What Relationship does Indonesia have with China?
2. How is Indonesia relations with it's neighbors?
3. Is ASEAN still formed?
3. How is this Communist Indonesia conditions compared to OTL Indonesia?
 
Last edited:
Really interesting timeline.
Thanks :D

A very interesting Timeline!
So I have some questions
1. What Relationship does Indonesia have with China?
2. How is Indonesia relations with it's neighbors?
3. Is ASEAN still formed?
3. How is this Communist Indonesia conditions compared to OTL Indonesia?
Thanks! As for your questions...

Long story short:
1. Pretty positive
2. Mixed, on a modestly positive trajectory
3. Yes, though it is smaller
4. Somewhat better with economics/standard of living. Politically/socially, on one hand more progressive, and with more freedoms in some ways, but on the other hand it is a one party state with a degree of authoritarianism

To expand a bit:

1. After the communists took power in Indonesia, they took a stance of leaning towards the Soviet and Chinese blocs to help secure themselves from western intervention, while also trying to avoid getting themselves involved internationally that much (contrast to Cuba, for example, with their interventions in Angola and elsewhere) so they could focus inward on stabilizing and developing the country. In times of Sino-Soviet splits, Indonesia tried to remain friendly with both sides, and was in effect the largest/strongest independent communist country

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, Indonesia and China have grown even closer - the lack of the USSR removes any need to be somewhat aloof to China in order to balance the two, and the major decline in global communism gives the remaining communist countries more desire to stick together. Indonesia isn't as close to China as Korea, Indochina, and (after their revolution) Nepal are, though. Those three have high degrees of economic, military, cultural, diplomatic, and political integration with China, whereas Indonesia still has rather more independence

2. The aftermath of the communist takeover in Indonesia left neighboring countries very concerned, especially with some elements of the Indonesian Communist Party supporting a "Greater Indonesia" idea including Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. But the party eventually came to the decision that it would be safer to try to avoid conflicts with other countries, and that it would be better to focus on domestic affairs for the most part. Over time, relations between Indonesia and its neighbors normalized. The Indonesian government is still far from loved by its neighbors, with Australians disliking the one-party state and having concern over the country's rather larger population, and with some elements in Malaysia having similar concerns as well as issues with the social permissiveness and untraditional sort of Islam common in Indonesia and supported by its government. But a guarded peace exists

3. ASEAN is still created, with Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore as the original members. It retains more of an anti-communist orientation, so even with the end of the Cold War, with united Indochina and Indonesia remaining communist, those areas don't join ASEAN like Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia did OTL after the Cold War

4. With initially weak control over the country, the Indonesian communists take an economic path somewhat similar to TTL's China. So, various reforms, but also a "socialist market economy" for the short to medium term rather than a more rapid collectivization that might risk disruption and weakening of control. Similarly to TTL's Chinese communists, without disruptions and abuses like those seen under Mao OTL to cause a major lack of faith in the system, or Stalinist purges and ossification, the communist party in Indonesia manages to remain committed to implementation of socialism despite taking a gradual approach. With that, and aided by foreign aid from the USSR (while it existed) and the Chinese bloc, modern communist Indonesia has an overall larger economy and less poverty than OTL Indonesia

Indonesia is a one-party state, though a degree of democratic aspects exist within the party and within parts of the economy. The party suppresses opposition, though after the fall of the Soviet bloc and protests in Indonesia and elsewhere at the same time, there's been reforms to ensure more in the way of individual freedoms and protections against arbitrary punishment, with government focus more on surveillance, social engineering, and targeted intervention largely against organized and/or particularly dangerous opposition, rather than a broader use of authority. Outside of political matters, there's more in the way of social and media freedom. The party's co-opting of religion and support for a reformed sort of Islam led to some short term traditionalist backlash aand insurgency against the government (and security measures in reaction), but in the longer term has helped contribute to the country having a pretty secular and progressive-leaning social situation, with the country having gained some notability as the first Islamic-majority country to grant civil unions and antidiscrimination protections to LGBT people (except for in the Papuan autonomy, though civil unions performed in the rest of the country are recognized in the autonomy), as well as a more equal situation regarding women's rights and cultural/societal conditions, for example
 
Last edited:
Thank you for the Answer!
So more questions!
1. What is the status of Yogyakarta Special Region? Are the sultan still reigning as a governor?
2. How about Pancasila? did Indonesia still use it or use something else?
3. How is the condition of Political climate in Indonesia? Are the political dynasty has significant influence in government and politics?
4. How serious the corruption level in Indonesia? Are they at the OTL New Order level? Or lower?
5. How is Bali condition? Are the Island still a Major Tourist spot?
6. How is the rest of the world view Indonesia? Especially the Great power?
7. What about Timor Leste? Are they still conquered by Indonesia or become Independent?

Sorry for the grammar, still learning English
 
Last edited:
the only thing that saddens me in this TL is that the USSR didn´t fall behind the chinese block in the 50´s

could be a spinoff, titled ´´the east is really red´´
 
Thank you for the Answer!
So more questions!
1. What is the status of Yogyakarta Special Region? Are the sultan still reigning as a governor?
2. How about Pancasila? did Indonesia still use it or use something else?
3. How is the condition of Political climate in Indonesia? Are the political dynasty has significant influence in government and politics?
4. How serious the corruption level in Indonesia? Are they at the OTL New Order level? Or lower?
5. How is Bali condition? Are the Island still a Major Tourist spot?
6. How is the rest of the world view Indonesia? Especially the Great power?
7. What about Timor Leste? Are they still conquered by Indonesia or become Independent?

Sorry for the grammar, still learning English
1. I imagine the communist government would not have been accepting of hereditary governors. And as far as I can tell (and to be fair, I am very much far from an expert on Indonesian history!) the sultan until 1988, Hamengkubuwono IX, had worked with both Sukarno and Suharto otl, I'm not exactly sure how he'd respond to a communist government in the first place. I've seen some characterization of him as a pragmatist, maybe he'd have been able to get along with a pragmatic communist government, perhaps in some role as a ceremonial regional figure, or perhaps stripped of noble title but allowed to remain a public figure of some sort in some way

2. Pancasila is still a concept that the Indonesian government gives some attention to. The implementation has been rather different compared to the New Order implementation, however. Instead, the communists have upheld the idea merely as part of the "Indonesian path of revolutionary development", and as time has passed since the communists first took power, it has been somewhat sidelined compared to more explicitly communist rhetoric. Also, the requirement to believe in one god was eventually modified to simply require "belief in something greater than one's self", not requiring explicitly religious belief and being inclusive of the irreligious and polytheistic

3 and 4. Corruption is rather lower than the New Order levels, and has been on the decline. In the early days of communist rule, the communists generally sought to root out corruption, but also would sometimes use measures like bribing opposition figures to shut them up. As the communists have cemented their control, and as younger generations have grown up and shifted the public opinion spectrum, such measures have become less necessary. As for political dynasties, those generally don't occur in this Indonesia, with the communist party being weary of such things from the standpoint of potential corruption/nepotism

5. Bali remains a significant tourist spot. In the short term after the communists took power, tourism saw a decline, but as relations between Indonesia and neighbors normalized and it became clear that the new Indonesian government was focusing inward rather than outward, the stream of tourists resumed

6. Much of the rest of the world doesn't necessarily have strong opinions on Indonesia. Like China, the other remaining communist countries generally have a positive view of the country. The USA has a vaguely negative view, though the country also doesn't get much of a focus in US foreign policy. In the Muslim world, Indonesia is often seen quite negatively, with its progressive version of Islam being seen as a bizarre, heretical, apostate bastardization of "real Islam" by conservatives and fundamentalists, though some reformers, liberals, secularists, and modernists in the area have a more positive view to some degree or another. India also has a somewhat negative view of Indonesia, due to Indonesian friendliness with China. Europe and Russia have generally neutral views of Indonesia

7. Some in Indonesia supported trying to annex Timor Leste, but that idea remains in the minority. The Indonesian communists at the time of Portuguese decolonization had positive relations with FRETILIN, and gave support to the new leftist government. Without the bad blood from the OTL occupation, and with more ideological compatibility, Timor Leste quickly grows very close to Indonesia, and has a large degree of economic and cultural ties with Indonesia


What are the feelings of those Indians in the areas occupied by the Chinese?Are relations between China and Europe overall cordial?

1. Mixed and variable. There's opposition (including some armed opposition) with nationalists who want restored Indian rule, there's separatists who see the Chinese as a potential for their own national aspirations, there's Indian leftists who see China as a country to stick by regardless of what final status the Chinese eventually decide for the territory, there's folks who are ambivalent to or somewhat opposed to the Chinese occupation but who are kept somewhat quiet by Chinese investment in the area as well as Chinese authorities publicly harshly dealing with instances of abuse by Chinese troops against the occupied population, and so on. Also, as time goes on and things occur in India (which may or may not be covered in a "current politics-era" extension thread in pol-chat, I have some general plans for that, but who knows if I'll find the time to get around to it), opposition to Chinese occupation may lessen somewhat, in seeing the alternative

2. Yes, generally cordial. I have a future update planned that will maybe touch a bit on Sino-European relations, but without getting too much into that, in Europe there's some weariness towards China given their communist party rule, their growing soft power, and so on, but with a much more benevolent China compared to OTL, they are generally able to retain a positive working-relationship. With China TTL's China having been more market-based from the start but also transitioning more to a socialistic economy as the decades have passed, on one hand China developed an earlier economic relationship with places like Europe, but on the other hand as the Chinese economy has grown to be the world's largest and with a higher level of development at present compared to OTL and there's been more of a shift away from China being seen as the place where people import cheap products from, and things along those lines

the only thing that saddens me in this TL is that the USSR didn´t fall behind the chinese block in the 50´s

could be a spinoff, titled ´´the east is really red´´

I figure that even with a rather different economic path, China just wouldn't be able to surpass the USSR as early as the 1950s. Maybe things could have gone different with the succession to Stalin, in a way that led to the USSR falling behind more. Not really something I was thinking of, as a plan for this TL, but there could certainly be interesting ideas along those lines. I frankly don't have the time or energy to do any spinoff TLs like that myself, I don't even have as much time as I'd like to do things like this TL and some other little or not so little ideas I've had (alternate history or otherwise), but if someone else wanted to do some sort of spinoff, I'd certainly welcome it
 
i meant 80´s haha
sorry, never bothered to correct it
Oh, gotcha

I'm not sure of the exact timeframe (I have a broad idea, but for some things I do, I kinda chart out an outline for the stats for my own sake even if I don't directly add it to a post or thing I do) but I'm imagining that by the 1980s, the USSR had fallen behind China economically, but with the Chinese having focused far more on domestic development and reforms rather than the military buildup and foreign affairs that the Soviets engaged in, so the Soviets still have a strong world spanning power bloc and influence that way (until it starts to fall apart in the latter 80s) whereas the Chinese bloc is far smaller in terms of allied/client states and power projection ability, with a military focused on defense and nuclear deterrent rather than much in the way of offensive/overseas power projection capabilities
 
Chinese Domestic Affairs and International Relations after the First Cold War
Chinese Domestic Affairs and International Relations after the First Cold War

The Communist Party of China had taken a stance of women's equality since before the establishment of the Socialist Republic of China. In the early years, however, the Party took a slow approach on such matters, putting most focus in this policy area on increasing women's participation in the labor force, with the idea that this would kill two birds with one stone, increasing economic productivity (giving some opportunity for reduction of backlash among traditionalists, by using some nationalistic messaging) while also naturally expanding women's status and opportunities in society at the same time. As the years and then decades passed, and the Party felt somewhat less constrained by the threat of conservative opposition and traditionalist dissent, pro-woman policy would be expanded. The 60s and 70s, for example, saw sizable anti-discrimination initiatives and a greater push for equality in education and the workplace

In the mid-1990s, China experienced a wave of feminist protests. The spark was a series of public accusations of sexual misconduct by military officers against female soldiers, as well as by law enforcement officers, with incidents of potential cover-ups or minimal treatment for offenders. Other incidents of misconduct got attention as well, as did broader factors of inequality in society. The Communist Party was not particularly opposed to the protesters, but was somewhat caught off-guard by the intensity of the protests and how quickly they'd bubbled up from a small number of victims making public demands to being mass protests in the streets. There had been a growing weariness among women regarding gender role expectations in society and culture, inequality in parenting and other domestic affairs, and so on - a trend that the Party had noticed and was gradually acting on, but the Party had underestimated the strength of that sentiment among the public

The Party was overall sympathetic to the protesters and their goals. The Party established committees and opened up increased dialogue with women's groups and protesters and eventually investigations were launched, military and law enforcement reforms were passed, greater campaigns on the cultural/social engineering front were enacted, offenders were increasingly held accountable, and protesters gradually went home, largely satisfied with the increased efforts. Some more conservative members of the Party and society spoke out against some or many aspects of the protests and the response, but the outright opposition (contrasted to a larger sort of apathy or mixed opinion) was not a strong force, and the elements in the Party with opposition saw further isolation from relevance (with opposition within the Party being seen primarily among the RDVL and CPFL, which had already long been in decline in regards to their influence within the Party)

The whole incident was not a particularly shocking or immensely polarizing one within China itself. But by the end of the incident, many in the rest of the world felt... at least some concern...

protests or purge question marx ib.jpg


Some conspiracy theories emerged among the "west" that the incident was nothing but a false flag by the Party in order to institute a purge along the lines of the Great Soviet Purge of the 1930s. The Party response to the protests certainly included increased efforts at legally combating sexual misconduct, which resulted in a sizable amount of arrests, including some high profile figures in Chinese society - conspiracy theorists, however, would suggest that the Party abandoned any concept of rule of law and had actually arrested and possibly killed millions of people. Initially, these theories gained some traction among the general public in the "west". The Chinese government managed to assuage most of the concerns by ensuring measures of transparency were in place, but even with all that, a degree of western concern remained, with some worry about just how far the Chinese government was going to take their ideas of social equality, and concerns as to whether the conspiracy theories were necessarily completely wrong about the potential for the government to have done away with some dissidents using the protesters' demands as cover

There was another noteworthy factor, as well. When the protests began, there had been a lot of western media and pundit suggestions that the protests may be the beginning of the end of the Chinese government - that Communist Party rule may end in the Chinese bloc as it had half a decade earlier in the Soviet bloc. But as things progressed, it became clear that the Chinese government wasn't really in any danger at all, and that if anything the protests in this case were actually to a large degree aligned with the overall ideological leaning of the Party. There was thus something of a disappointment in the west with how things turned out. China had been seen as the less worrisome of the two major communist blocs, with the lack of human rights abuses seen in the USSR, so it wasn't so demoralizing that it survived. But the disappointment of its survival, combined with some concerns over the sort of social change occurring in China, vague insinuations of purges like those in the USSR (even though those insinuations were largely debunked), and certain economic developments, helped ensure that relations between China and the west would remain cordial enough to avoid significant conflicts but also somewhat awkward and chilled

__________________________________________________

The 1997 United Kingdom general election can serve as an example for some broader political trends in Europe around the turn of the millennium

Europe remained somewhat to the left of places like the United States, but had seen a similar trend towards "neoliberalism" and a more market-oriented and deregulating center-left as the US had. At the same time, various Eurosocialist and Eurocommunist organizations and parties remained existent and with at least some support from the population. The Eurocommunists had taken something of a hit from the fall of the USSR, but had on the other hand already been shifting away from the USSR in decades prior, and had also (before and after the fall of the USSR) had some trends towards pro-China stances, with some among them critical to China and merely presenting it as a better alternative to the USSR, and others among them seeing China as more of an outright positive example of a Communist Party managing to bring major social and economic change to a large part of the globe. With this, the Eurocommunists tended to be able to maintain a base of representation in various national legislatures, and weren't utterly despised by the rest of the public, but still tended to be shunned to some degree by the rest of the public due in part to continued western concern over China, and with the more mainstream left-leaning parties generally being unwilling to form coalitions with the Eurocommunists and instead forming grand coalitions or other more center/center-right oriented coalitions

Such was seen with the 1997 UK election. After some years in the political wilderness and suffering from some splits, the Labour party, led by Tony Blair, had taken a polling lead with a centrist "New Labour" campaign and was poised to become the largest party in Parliament. When election day came, Labour did indeed end up the largest party, but came somewhat short of a majority. Labour could theoretically have formed a majority coalition with the Red-Green party, itself an alliance between some ex-Militant and other former-Labour leftists along with various other Marxists, environmentalists, and other leftists. But the aforementioned discomfort towards the further left was as strong in Britain as elsewhere in Europe, and Blair was genuinely committed to his "New Labour" project. So Blair instead negotiated with and formed a coalition with Paddy Ashdown and his Liberal Democrats, who themselves had seen a major breakthrough in the election and had a stronger than expected performance considering Britain's "first past the post" electoral system

1997 uk election ib.jpg

__________________________________________________

When the Communist Party initially took power in China, the country had a largely agrarian economy that lagged far behind the "west". But the Chinese economy has grown to be not just the world's largest in terms of raw GDP (something it could do with population alone), but also one with a fairly high level of individual wealth and quality of life. In addition, while the economy initially held a NEP-like embrace of markets, it has shifted over time in a rather more socialistic direction

At present, private employment still exists in China, but a mix of state-operated enterprises and cooperatives combined make up a significant majority of employment in China. The People's Federation of Cooperatives is the largest coop in China, being a massive coalition of worker-self-managed businesses from various different sectors, and its employees make up a little over 70% of the total number of Chinese employed in coops. The federation began focused in China, but has expanded overseas with nearly 7 million employees in other countries. This sort of overseas expansion has also occurred with Chinese Unions. The People's International Federation of Trade Unions started off as the primary Chinese trade union. But over time, some in the Chinese government began pushing more for the "one big union" concept, and sought to expand the Chinese union federation abroad, with a fair amount of success. the PIFTU not only includes the vast majority of Chinese workers, but also over a hundred million workers overseas

The expansion of Chinese coops and unions abroad (as well as business from various state-owned enterprises) is an example of the growth of Chinese 'soft power' abroad. It is also something that has mixed reception, with some appreciating the Chinese support for workers' rights and ethical businesses abroad, but others fearing the expansion of these Chinese institutions abroad, with their association with and support from the Chinese government. Some countries outright ban these institutions from operating within their borders, some others haven't taken it that far but have seen political pressure to ban such institutions, have passed regulations on them, have put increased intelligence focus on them, or have even seen anti-Chinese riots, boycotts, and other incidents. But in much of the world, these examples of Chinese economic soft power continue to slowly expand, despite the grumbling from some circles

coops and unions ib.png


__________________________________________________

(and a note or clarification... about halfway through making this, it occurred to me that there might be a chance that the whole "some folks in the west think China did an atrocity but actually that was just a conspiracy theory" thing, with the protests and the rejected info-box edit and all, might potentially look like some sort of comparison or dog whistle to current events in China. Just in case there's any doubt, this China is a very different China from OTL, and any potential resemblances to or suggestions of real-life denialism of human rights violations in Xinjiang are unintended. The conspiracy theory ITTL is just a conspiracy theory without being commentary on OTL in any such sort of way, I had the idea of showing an AH event through different perspectives via different edits of a wikipedia page and that's what's going on there. Maybe I'm being overly cautious in saying this, and maybe those of you who read this post had no suspicions of anything along those lines and think it would be a stretch to make such a comparison: if so, cool. But I am perhaps a bit prone to anxiety so I am just saying this anyway)
 
Top