Part 10.5
Extract from ch.9, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
The deficiencies of the Japanese plan for the attack on Midway have received endless discussion. Those deficiencies, however, dovetailed with the tactical limitations of the IJN in such a way as an earlier age might have called providential. When one also considers that the Doolittle raid, the precipitating factor for operation MI, caused trifling damage, one can only conclude that the entire story would be considered unacceptably improbable in a work of fiction...
The Japanese fleet arrived in its strike position on schedule on 3rd June, and Midway Island would have to endure a sore ordeal over the next twenty-four hours. By the end of the day, three successive Japanese air strikes had left it apparently in ruins. Admiral Nagumo felt deep concern over the casualties to his air groups - the American defences, mainly AA fire, had hurt them badly, with over fifty aircraft shot down or damaged so badly as to be beyond immediate repair. Hiryu had only two of her dive-bombers still operating. This would seriously impair his striking power if the US fleet appeared. However, since the first stage of the operation had gone roughly according to plan, he felt he had no choice but to allow the landing attempt to go ahead the next day.
A catastrophe resulted. Although the aircraft, airfield buildings and AA gun positions had been destroyed or suppressed, American casualties had been light. The Midway garrison worked through the night to make good such damage as they had suffered, and as day broke all but a handful of the island’s guns and machine guns were in working order. Naval gunfire support from the Japanese cruisers offshore was curiously ineffectual - in some cases even counter-productive, as at least one landing craft was destroyed by it. The Japanese attackers found themselves trying to wade ashore under a hail of fire. A troop of light tanks made short work of the few invaders who reached the Marine defensive positions. Few even of the Japanese landing craft managed to escape the fiasco. This, combined with the failure on Sumatra, marked the effective end of Imperial Japan’s amphibious capability.
By midday all was over on the atoll, and a bizarre conference ensued aboard the Akagi, in which Admiral Nagumo and his staff tried to make reality conform to the plan. However, at this point the US Pacific Fleet made its presence felt. The Japanese reconnaissance first report of Admiral Fletcher’s forces came in at almost the same time as the first American air attacks.
Fletcher had suffered some delays owing to uncertain intelligence, the need to provision four carriers and to change its command arrangements at the last minute. But as matters developed his timing proved perfect. The Japanese strike forces had suffered severe losses attacking Midway; the Japanese fighters had been distracted by the need to give air cover to the landings; and the American strike, though ill coordinated, came in such strength as to overwhelm the IJN’s early warning and fighter direction capabilities, not to mention its AA defences. The FAA had shown the limitations of these in its night attack on 2nd Carrier Division in January. They were now shown to be inadequate by day as well as night.
Lexington’s strike drew first blood, with incapacitating hits on the Soryu. In the opinion other commander, her repairs had not brought her back to full efficiency. ‘She was never as sharp as before after Borneo,’ Captain Yanagimoto had complained, and now the Blue Dragon was left burning from multiple hits. Her half-sister Hiryu had hastily launched all the Zeroes on her deck and these pursued the retreating bombers, but failed to intercept a further wave of bombers, hidden by cloud, which struck their mothership. Meanwhile bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise crippled the Akagi and Kaga…
The disaster was complete. With all four carriers out of action - two of them to sink before midnight - there was nothing to protect Admiral Tanaka’s Occupation Force, detected by PBYs from Midway. A further strike from TF17 savaged Tanaka’s ships as they retreated, with six transports and a destroyer being sunk by the victorious American flyers. Only navigational errors by TF16’s aircraft saved Tanaka from total annihilation… With Midway evidently secure, and the Japanese fleet having suffered catastrophic losses, Fletcher took his fleet back to Pearl Harbor. The only slight damage suffered by his ships in the whole operation came when Lexington collided with one of her escorts on the return home. Henceforth the Allies would enjoy the initiative in the Pacific - and beyond.
The deficiencies of the Japanese plan for the attack on Midway have received endless discussion. Those deficiencies, however, dovetailed with the tactical limitations of the IJN in such a way as an earlier age might have called providential. When one also considers that the Doolittle raid, the precipitating factor for operation MI, caused trifling damage, one can only conclude that the entire story would be considered unacceptably improbable in a work of fiction...
The Japanese fleet arrived in its strike position on schedule on 3rd June, and Midway Island would have to endure a sore ordeal over the next twenty-four hours. By the end of the day, three successive Japanese air strikes had left it apparently in ruins. Admiral Nagumo felt deep concern over the casualties to his air groups - the American defences, mainly AA fire, had hurt them badly, with over fifty aircraft shot down or damaged so badly as to be beyond immediate repair. Hiryu had only two of her dive-bombers still operating. This would seriously impair his striking power if the US fleet appeared. However, since the first stage of the operation had gone roughly according to plan, he felt he had no choice but to allow the landing attempt to go ahead the next day.
A catastrophe resulted. Although the aircraft, airfield buildings and AA gun positions had been destroyed or suppressed, American casualties had been light. The Midway garrison worked through the night to make good such damage as they had suffered, and as day broke all but a handful of the island’s guns and machine guns were in working order. Naval gunfire support from the Japanese cruisers offshore was curiously ineffectual - in some cases even counter-productive, as at least one landing craft was destroyed by it. The Japanese attackers found themselves trying to wade ashore under a hail of fire. A troop of light tanks made short work of the few invaders who reached the Marine defensive positions. Few even of the Japanese landing craft managed to escape the fiasco. This, combined with the failure on Sumatra, marked the effective end of Imperial Japan’s amphibious capability.
By midday all was over on the atoll, and a bizarre conference ensued aboard the Akagi, in which Admiral Nagumo and his staff tried to make reality conform to the plan. However, at this point the US Pacific Fleet made its presence felt. The Japanese reconnaissance first report of Admiral Fletcher’s forces came in at almost the same time as the first American air attacks.
Fletcher had suffered some delays owing to uncertain intelligence, the need to provision four carriers and to change its command arrangements at the last minute. But as matters developed his timing proved perfect. The Japanese strike forces had suffered severe losses attacking Midway; the Japanese fighters had been distracted by the need to give air cover to the landings; and the American strike, though ill coordinated, came in such strength as to overwhelm the IJN’s early warning and fighter direction capabilities, not to mention its AA defences. The FAA had shown the limitations of these in its night attack on 2nd Carrier Division in January. They were now shown to be inadequate by day as well as night.
Lexington’s strike drew first blood, with incapacitating hits on the Soryu. In the opinion other commander, her repairs had not brought her back to full efficiency. ‘She was never as sharp as before after Borneo,’ Captain Yanagimoto had complained, and now the Blue Dragon was left burning from multiple hits. Her half-sister Hiryu had hastily launched all the Zeroes on her deck and these pursued the retreating bombers, but failed to intercept a further wave of bombers, hidden by cloud, which struck their mothership. Meanwhile bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise crippled the Akagi and Kaga…
The disaster was complete. With all four carriers out of action - two of them to sink before midnight - there was nothing to protect Admiral Tanaka’s Occupation Force, detected by PBYs from Midway. A further strike from TF17 savaged Tanaka’s ships as they retreated, with six transports and a destroyer being sunk by the victorious American flyers. Only navigational errors by TF16’s aircraft saved Tanaka from total annihilation… With Midway evidently secure, and the Japanese fleet having suffered catastrophic losses, Fletcher took his fleet back to Pearl Harbor. The only slight damage suffered by his ships in the whole operation came when Lexington collided with one of her escorts on the return home. Henceforth the Allies would enjoy the initiative in the Pacific - and beyond.
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