Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

As I recall the main idea was that bunches of British and French scientists jumping up and down in front of the Americans screaming 'this is important: you have to act now' gets them going quicker.
It might work, I haven't decided whether the Joliot-Curies stay in Paris in the ATL - just possibly their prestige might have some impact - but without a strong rationale I have my doubts this would make enough of a difference.
In all probability to get clearer title to shared nuclear secrets, both Britain and France must contribute more scientists and engineers to locate in New Mexico or the other MP sites. That might accelerate work a bit, but I suspect the project had plenty of top level minds working on it OTL and adding 10 or 20 percent more won't result in commensurate acceleration.
This is where I end up on this question I think.
Not an auspicious start to their deployment.....
I don't feel any more confident than poor Sqn/Ldr Maxwell...
 
Part 8.2
8.2
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.12


The Allies had long-cherished ideas for a heavy blow against Ploesti. The French had noted the failure of British efforts, but believed they now had the means for a meaningful strike. They now had two groups of B-24 bombers operating in the central Mediterranean, and these were now transferred eastwards… On January 8th the B-24s flew into Crete in the evening. The next day they mounted operation PAUL, having received a favourable weather report. It was hoped that only Italian and perhaps Bulgarian aircraft would be encountered, a hope that proved delusory… All the bombers had been told they could make only one bomb run - they would have no time to waste over the target.
Beginning over Bulgaria, the formation came under fighter attack. Heavy flak disrupted the formation and caused many casualties. Low clouds blew in during the approach and obscured the target to most of the bombers, so that most of the bombs fell wide, many of them hitting the city instead of the oil targets.
On the return flight, several aircraft had to ditch, including the raid commander himself, who ditched ten miles north of Crete and was pulled out of the Aegean by HMS Imperial. German fighters harassed the bombers over the sea as far as Limnos until fresh fighters, RAF Spitfires and Beaufighters, arrived to provide relief. In total, then, the French lost thirty aircraft out of 80 used, a heavy loss for the poor results gained. ‘Lessons to be learned about carrying out operations at the edge of capability,’ noted General Olry, and the French aircraft returned to Tunisia. But the raid had re-awakened German anxieties about their oil supply…

The demands of the new war in the East impacted the Mediterranean immediately. The Council recognised that it would make most sense to reinforce the East mostly by sending British assets, as these in general were already stationed further east. Initially it was hoped that this would not impede the build-up for further offensive action in early 1942. ‘As 1941 ended, we still hoped to make further forward movements in the Aegean and central Mediterranean in the first half of 1942,’ commented Mandel. ‘But the unexpected deadliness of the Japanese attacks meant we soon abandoned this notion.’
The appetite for Aegean operations had also faded, in part because the Ploesti raid had shown that attacking German oil supplies would be more difficult than expected. Furthermore the perceived need for the Black Sea route to Russia had reduced thanks to the Soviet victory before Moscow. The Council, Mr. Churchill especially, felt disappointed that the fall of Rhodes had produced no change in Ankara’s attitude. ‘Not a whit altered,’ he wrote, ‘despite their hints. They seem determined to stay aloof. But now we have supply lines to the Bear running through Persia and the Arctic, we can make do without Turkey.’ The French agreed. ‘If Hitler falls upon the Turks this year, no doubt they will beg us for aid,’ wrote de Gaulle. ‘Perhaps it would be no bad thing. The Germans will get stuck in the mountains with a supply line a thousand kilometres long and a metre wide.’
The French had further reasons to draw satisfaction from the cooling of London’s Aegean ambitions. It meant air and amphibious assets could concentrate in the central Mediterranean, where their own preferences lay for 1942. ‘Whatever else happens, we must carry out CHARLEMAGNE, and its associated operations, this year,’ noted Mandel. ‘This is a political necessity, especially because of the Americans.’ The demands on British assets for the East meant that for some months the French had to carry the main burden of the air and sea war in the central Mediterranean themselves. It was during this period that French fighter groups provided the mainstay of Malta’s air defence, and the P-40s of GC12 gained a legendary reputation, making a hundred claims for less than twenty losses. This was all the more necessary. During the winter weather, the Germans could use fewer aircraft on the Eastern front, and transferred large numbers to Sicily and Greece. Malta and Athens therefore suffered their heaviest air attacks of the war, and the Axis regained air superiority in the Greek theatre. It was not long before the question arose of how best to exploit this new situation…
 
Part 8.3
Leoni, La Follia, ch. 9


By January my health had recovered enough that I could resume my duties. Fate now took me to the Comando Supremo. I found a remarkably buoyant attitude there: the war in Asia now kept the enemy busy. Also large numbers of German aircraft had redeployed to our front - evidently the winter weather in Russia did not favour flying! The enemy had thus lost air superiority, and we could think of offensive plans again, for the first time in many months.
Even I fell in a little with this mood. We developed schemes for an offensive on the Greek mainland, or for the recapture of Rhodes, and an assault on Malta. On January 12th I went with the General and several staff officers to meet the Germans at Villa Volkonsky. The General commented, ‘now our dear partners have taken a beating at Moscow, they will suddenly want to gain a victory in the Mediterranean theatre, for propaganda reasons.’ The General had read the situation well…
As far as I am concerned, I rarely experienced a more unpleasant meeting. The Germans tried to show a facade of politeness, but I felt an undercurrent of contempt. Here we are, they seemed to say, carrying the weight of the war against Bolshevism, defending in the West from the Anglo-Saxons, and fighting by air and sea here; and what have you done but beg for help? They took little account of the sacrifices of our men in the Atlantic and in Russia for the sake of Axis solidarity. They listened to our proposals for Malta, but their heads shook. ‘Malta leads nowhere, it has no value but to stroke their vanity,’ said one of them to another in German - thinking perhaps that I could not understand. Or perhaps, again, they did not care if we knew what they thought of us. In any case they claimed they could not provide the air support needed.
This rebuff came not altogether unwelcome to the General. Privately, I knew he disliked the Malta option, though the Duce had insisted on our presenting it. ‘The enemy have too many men and guns there,’ the General had said to me, ‘and these new French fighters are very troublesome. The enemy have fortified all the decent landing-places.’ We turned therefore to the Aegean.
Here they were a little more receptive, as we could point to the need to keep Turkey in a friendly or at least neutral attitude. ‘Turkey will not join us now that America is in,’ said the General to them. ‘But we can keep them where we want them.’ The Duce had shown himself keen to redeem the loss of our territory. However, when we looked at the necessities for amphibious operations, we all understood that we could not retake the Dodecanese, even with the enemy’s sea power reduced. We therefore had to look at the mainland.
I suspect the operation was attractive to the Germans since they were still concerned for the Romanian oilfields. General Mackensen summed up their thinking. The recent French air raid had concerned Berlin greatly. The enemy had put much work into improving the airfields in Greece, Crete and were starting to do so in Rhodes, he said. These were disturbing signs that the English were thinking of bringing their big new bombers to the theatre, which could only mean renewed attacks on Ploesti. And we should think of what the Americans might try, they too had four-engined bombers.
However when we came to details the meeting turned unpleasant again. They did not propose to commit more than six divisions of ground troops to the assault. ‘The Fuhrer will not hear of any more air assaults after last year,’ added the Ambassador. ‘We are providing 300 aircraft. That ought to suffice.’
Much wrangling followed before we came to a reasonably firm proposal. We decided we must offer our sole airborne regiment as an earnest of our determination. Two of our best-equipped mobile divisions would strike the Greeks on the Epirus front. The General grumbled in the car back to HQ, but in truth we had got as much as we could hope for. Later the same day, I was walking through the Piazza di Spagna, and I passed a group of youths. Despite the war, there still seemed to be plenty of youths with nothing better to do than lurk on street corners, chatting and gambling and occasionally harassing passers-by. One of them saw my uniform. ‘Eh, eh, ritorneremo, eh?’ he said, and laughed. I paused briefly. ‘Maybe sooner than you think,’ I said, and went on.
 
"ritorneremo" means 'we will return', for the people who don't speak Italian. Including, shamefully, me. Oh, my Nonna is turning in her grave!
 
Part 8.4
Extract from A Song at the Sacrifice, ch.12, by Theo Barker

The war in the Far East halted our plans for Lemnos, but George had been plotting schemes for raids on the enemy coast between Olympus and Salonika, so 11 Commando moved to the mainland in the New Year. I returned to Athens for the first time in nine months. Though everyone still seemed determined to keep up the fight, the war had really taken the shine off the place; all the men were in uniform, many of them visibly mutilated, all the women seemed to be working in munitions. Most people’s faces showed signs of short commons. Rations, I had heard, had become better in the autumn, when the big American shipments had come in, but had just been cut again, as shipping had been diverted to the Far East. ‘But it’s nothing,’ people said, ‘compared to how things are in Salonika. Sometimes people escape, and they tell us all about it.’

The German air raids got steadily heavier in late January. By February we started to become really concerned. There seemed little we could do to keep them off, as so many of our planes had gone East. One day George and I were talking and he filled me in on the gen.
‘The Poles are going back to Rhodes. Higher-ups think the Boche might want a crack at it,’ he said. ‘To be honest, they seem a bit baffled.’ Of course we now know why the fog of war descended so heavily at this time: ULTRA had stopped delivering the goods for the time being.
‘Leaves us a bit out on a limb,’ I said. ‘The Aussies and Indians are gone, the best of the French troops too, and the new lads haven’t settled in.’
He sighed, the first time I had ever seen him do so. His spirits were low. ‘The higher-ups have forgotten about us,’ he said. ‘The front here hasn’t moved in months, and everyone knows we won’t march on Berlin from Olympus. They’ve got plans for everywhere but here. Things are headed for a smash-up.’

We were hoping for more ack-ack at least, but nothing came. I chatted to one RA type in the city one day. ‘All going East,’ he said. ‘We’ll have to make do with what we’ve got. You know, the heavy batteries are rationed to ten shells per day.’ That’s as far as the conversation went, because at that point there was another air raid…
But in all these wider schemes we had to try to carry on with our own business, so we began to rehearse. I remember that on the 25th I had gone along with a company along the coast, just behind the front line. We saw yet another air raid coming in. None of our planes about of course. But then things started to happen differently. Some of our chaps came running up to say that they’d been strafed - there hadn’t been many low-level attacks up to that point. Then we got a signal to get back to HQ immediately…

George seemed oddly cheerful. ‘Well, they’re here now, so at last we can have a pop at the blighters,’ he said. Italian troops had landed by air behind our lines in several places. There was a report of parachutists a mile or so north, and also a report of troops landing by caique on a beach nearby, so he was taking two companies to counter-attack the latter while he sent me with a scratch force of rear-echelon types for the beach.
There was no-one there, of course, but while we were turning round a couple of Army trucks pulled up. ‘Save yourselves,’ they shouted, ‘the Panzers have broken through.’ They drove off in a great hurry, evidently having remembered an urgent appointment elsewhere. The noise of planes going overhead was constant…
I saw George again as we pulled back. He’d taken a head wound and he was bandaged up. ‘We gave them a bloody nose at least,’ he said. ‘Not many of their parachutists got away. But Theo, I don’t think we’re doing very well elsewhere. Get back to HQ and see the General.’ He gave me a message and told me to take a couple of men with me - we couldn’t assume the roads were safe…

It was just our bad luck what happened next. I took my little party back to battalion HQ and we picked up a vehicle, but on the way back to the city we were shot up by enemy planes. None of us were hurt, but our truck was burning, and before we could get very far on foot we bumped into a squad of Italian paratroopers. They seemed as confused as we were, and for a minute we weren’t sure who had captured who, but then an officer turned up with more men and we had to surrender. ‘We saw the truck burning, and thought you must be somewhere near,’ he said in perfect English… I hadn’t believed the story about Panzers, it seemed typical panic. But an hour or two later we saw tanks and half-trucks with black crosses, so it turned out true.

So that was that for the time being. They took us to a village where most of their paratroopers had assembled. They looked pretty smashed up - lots of wounded men kept coming in, they had a sort of field hospital set up next to the POW pen. But lots of our chaps kept coming in as well. We made ourselves as comfortable as we could - not a lot in the way of food or shelter, but the locals fed us a bit, kind souls - and spent our first night in captivity. The worst part was waking up in the morning and remembering what had happened…

A couple of days later they moved us to a bigger pen, and there we found George and the rest. ‘No use,’ he said, ‘nothing we could do. Any time we moved we got bombed and strafed.’ He looked round to check no Italians were listening. ‘We could have beaten these so-and-sos,’ he said, ‘we must have knocked out most of their paratroopers, but the bombers hit us just when we formed up.’ Not long after he fainted - I don’t think he had had any water all day.
On the whole, the Italians treated us about as well as they treated their own men - not brilliant, but from all accounts, better than most other Axis. Considering how badly we’d knocked them about, it was as good as we could expect…

You probably know the story that explains the fiasco. The Auk was a good general, but he couldn’t or wouldn’t bang heads together when needed. Some of our troops had gone into the line, relieving the Australians. Unforgivably, the staff hadn’t done their job - the comms with the New Zealanders barely existed, and at least one general had some kind of prejudice against the French, so they weren't talking to them either. Anyway, after doing pretty well against the initial German attack, this military genius ordered a withdrawal, despite Auchinleck’s orders, apparently believing that the Kiwis had retreated, which of course they hadn’t. You don’t offer German Panzers an opportunity like that without trouble following, and so it had.

The entire army had to fall back to Thermopylae, and the Hoplites had to fight a delaying action in the Vale of Tempe, losing almost all their tanks in the process. The Germans pursued with their customary ruthlessness, but ran up against the reserves holding prepared defences at Thermopylae - the Auk got that right - and it turned out Panzers can’t get along goat-paths… Likewise the Greeks had to fall back. I remember hearing that their 1st Division, covering the retreat, sacrificed themselves at the bridge of Arta, and thinking that the old song had turned into a prophecy…

In the years since I have had plenty of time to reflect on these events. I have read all the books of course, and fellows arguing this way and that, and I have come to the firm conclusion that Thessaly was more or less deliberately sacrificed. With both our land and air power reduced so badly, the risk of an Axis counter-stroke was evidently very great. We did not have enough for safety in both Greece and the Far East. Anyway, they should have seen it coming, and not left such a vital sector to inexperienced formations under untried commanders. When I say “they” I mean not only the Auk, or HQ in Athens, but the Supreme War Council itself.
 
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Driftless

Donor
^^^ I can picture a post-war tweed sport coat clad Theo sitting in his study back in England, sipping a good scotch - neat - and dictating that account to a steno taking down notes for his memoir
 
Thank you

Interesting suggestion, as I did consider having a sort-of French expy of Flashman (or possibly someone like Blackadder). But I couldn't think of a way to make the idea rise above mere pastiche.
Hmmm perhaps a descendent of brigader gerard is around too
 
Definitely a plausible screw up, and we shall have to see how things turn out but I suspect correct decision making from the Supreme War Council. Thessaly is of fairly limited value to the Allies, and if they can use the diverted reinforcements to hold Singapore, Burma and the main Indonesian chain, I really think they're in a far better position.

I also note the losses of the Italian airborne, I really wonder if Girolamo Leoni is going to see this as the same Axis success that Theo Barker does.
 
^^^ I can picture a post-war tweed sport coat clad Theo sitting in his study back in England, sipping a good scotch - neat - and dictating that account to a steno taking down notes for his memoir
A glass or two of something strong to get him in the mood, for sure, but not in England. He's such a philhellene (and we know he has a Greek wife, per part 4.3) that I imagine him settling back in Athens. But it's a long road for him first.
Hmmm perhaps a descendent of brigader gerard is around too
I had someone like him in my ASB TL, who I always imagined being played by Jean Reno. My idea for this TL was a Serbian or Russian emigre serving in the Legion Etrangere, the Count of Czerny-Gadika, but couldn't quite make him work.
Definitely a plausible screw up, and we shall have to see how things turn out but I suspect correct decision making from the Supreme War Council. Thessaly is of fairly limited value to the Allies, and if they can use the diverted reinforcements to hold Singapore, Burma and the main Indonesian chain, I really think they're in a far better position.

I also note the losses of the Italian airborne, I really wonder if Girolamo Leoni is going to see this as the same Axis success that Theo Barker does.
I felt we had to have an alt-Gazala in this TL, and this seemed like the right place for it. On the one hand, whatever German general pulled this off (not Rommel; the Russians got him) will be Goebbels' darling for some weeks, a good distraction from the disasters on the Eastern Front. On the other hand, Girolamo - and OKW - probably look at the map after this and think, "gee, thanks. We get some real estate of limited strategic value and a longer supply line." Very like their thoughts after OTL Gazala, in fact.
 
Part 8.5
Extract from Marianne and John by Charles Montague, ch.13


With the Japanese now enjoying air and naval superiority, the course of events in Indochina could hardly now alter. Having consolidated the north, the IJA pushed south along the coast, their 5th Division leading, repeatedly outflanking French positions either by inland movements or by small-scale amphibious operations. General Georges fought a skilful delaying action, avoiding encirclements, but lacked the strength to hold any line. Admiral Esteva begged the British to interfere with the Japanese amphibious attacks, but Cunningham refused to bring his main forces within range of Japanese land-based air, not to mention potential intervention by the heavy carriers of the Combined Fleet. Instead he sent his T-class submarines and a destroyer flotilla, and together with the remaining French ships they imposed some attrition and delay; but they too suffered painful losses, with three RN destroyers lost in January and three more in early February, all to air attack. ‘The Jap dive-bombers sank the poor Defender in five minutes,’ commented Cunningham. ‘Most of our other ships wouldn’t last much longer. I constantly make the point that we are weaker, so must maintain a fleet in being strategy.’
General Wavell protected his naval chief from incessant demands from London for more decisive action. ‘The enemy retains the initiative in the Indochina area,’ noted Wavell, ‘we cannot keep our ships on station constantly, and as soon as they withdraw they mount another of these amphibious operations. Besides they are just as adept at flanking through the hills and jungle.’
Once Vinh fell (mid-January), the Japanese sent one division across the mountains into Laos and this too pushed south, though more slowly, and French forces stood firm at Pakse and inflicted a small but severe reverse on them in February. However, by this time the Imperial Guards under the formidable General Yamashita had pushed south past Da Nang and gained airbases within range of Cam Ranh, forcing its abandonment by the remaining French naval forces. These now all withdrew to Singapore.
At this point XL Corps under General Slim entered the fray with British 18th and Indian 4th Divisions. ‘It may already be too late,’ wrote Wavell, ‘but at least we are getting into action now.’ Slim tried to hold a line at Pleiku, but faced the same problems as the French, chiefly the enemy’s air superiority and the flanking movements enabled by this. The RAF squadrons which entered the battle quickly suffered terrible attrition.
In late February Saigon itself came within range of enemy aircraft. The British had now sent 32nd Army Tank Brigade and these proved invaluable in extricating troops from Japanese encirclements, but could not stop the rot. The Japanese now also resumed their offensive in the Mekong valley and pushed into Cambodia…
The Council ordered the Governor to leave on February 28th. The few surviving serviceable RAF aircraft - less than twenty out of ten squadrons sent - flew out the same day, soon followed by the handful of remaining French aircraft. General Slim’s chief concern now lay in extricating what forces he could. Japanese forces were now racing for both Saigon and Phnom Penh. ‘Evacuation by sea not contemplated,’ wrote Wavell to the Council, ‘as this crisis coincides with the crisis in Borneo and Java Sea region. All fleet units committed there - cannot cover evacuation in face of superior enemy air power and strong naval presence.’ Slim therefore agreed with Georges that he should abandon Saigon and concentrate his forces in Cambodia. Saigon accordingly fell on March 3rd…
Slim and Georges still had some 80,000 British, Indian and French troops under command, though the Indochinese element among the French forces was dissolving. After heavy air raids against Phnom Penh on 4th and 5th they ordered these forces to retreat into Thailand and accept internment. They considered whether to share their fate, but the Council ordered them to fly out, which they did on March 6th in a hair-raising flight across the Gulf of Thailand. ‘Lots of Jap planes about, but luckily none of them caught us,’ Slim noted. Not all Allied aircraft were so lucky: one squadron of Blenheims, reduced to five machines by constant action, was caught by fighters just as it left Saigon and all the remaining planes shot down. On 10th March all organised resistance came to an end, and some 50,000 Allied troops went into internment in Thailand. ‘A bitter pill,’ said M. Mandel, ‘after so many other losses.’ Mr. Churchill replied, ‘this too shall be redeemed.’
 
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50,000 Allied troops interred in Thailand is very interesting. If the cards are played right, can they be kept in fighting shape and be reactivated to defend Thailand? Would that work or be an implicit expectation for a neutral in this situation?

The timeframe is obviously different, but are Malaya and Signapore still ultimately screwed or is that alleviated?
 
Without Thailand joining the war on the Japanese side the invasion of Burma at least is far harder and slower. Which surely means it holds in the short to medium term at least.
 
Without Thailand joining the war on the Japanese side the invasion of Burma at least is far harder and slower.
As in just about impossible. Japanese troops would have grave difficulty just reaching the Thailand-Laos border, much less advancing west in strength.
Extract from Marianne and John by Charles Montague, ch.13
... some 50,000 Allied troops went into internment in Thailand.
I can't see the British committing large forces to Indochina when the outcome is almost certain defeat (Japanese air superiority, mainly).
 
50,000 Allied troops interred in Thailand is very interesting. If the cards are played right, can they be kept in fighting shape and be reactivated to defend Thailand? Would that work or be an implicit expectation for a neutral in this situation?
Bangkok has a useful extra card to play, at this point. They will have strong incentive to look after them as an asset, though at first the Thai authorities would certainly be overwhelmed.
The timeframe is obviously different, but are Malaya and Signapore still ultimately screwed or is that alleviated?
OTL Singapore had fallen three weeks earlier than Phnom Penh in the ATL. The Japanese timetable is looking tight. Soon we will see what Wavell meant by "the crisis in Borneo and Java Sea". In war everything goes on all the time, and it is particularly difficult to tell a coherent narrative of such a vast theatre with multiple simultaneous developments. This section I found the hardest to write as I kept having to cross-check that I hadn't teleported units or ships.
I can't see the British committing large forces to Indochina when the outcome is almost certain defeat (Japanese air superiority, mainly).
I think it's a virtual certainty, on diplomatic/ political grounds. The prospect of the French losing another vast territory without substantial British assistance would horrify Churchill. In the ATL the British have more resources available than OTL, which makes it harder still to resist deploying them. I can hear the memo being dictated now: 'we cannot endure seeing the valiant French brought low in Indochina while our copious forces sit idle within reach,' etc. The British/ Imperial forces available are such (because there is no North Africa campaign, only a relatively small Greek commitment, and fewer Middle Eastern commitments) that Wavell can afford to send Indian 4th and British 18th on a weak hope of stabilising the situation in Indochina, and still have stronger forces than OTL available to defend Malaya, North Borneo and the western DEI. For example, he should have Indian 5th & 10th, British 6th and Australian 9th divisions, none of which he had OTL.
 
I think it's a virtual certainty, on diplomatic/ political grounds. The prospect of the French losing another vast territory without substantial British assistance would horrify Churchill.
Yabbut 50,000 men is a helluva lot to throw away on a gesture.

"Substantial assistance", yes. Aircraft, some troops, naval forces... But once the Japanese have pushed past 17N, and there is no real chance of stopping them - no more troops and evacuate everything possible (including French troops). Even the French have withdrawn their ships.

Also, a large British army being driven into internment like that? Churchill would, with good reason, fear the British reaction to such a debacle.
 
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