Part 7.2
Extract from Marianne and John by Charles Montague, ch.12
Few disputes during the war consumed more of the Council’s time than the question of how and how much to assist Indochina. Very early on all parties agreed that Hanoi could not be held in the face of Japanese numerical and air superiority. ‘We can hold it until Christmas, perhaps the New Year,’ commented de Gaulle. ‘But we must try as far as possible to preserve fighting strength for the fight further south.’ The French pinned their hopes on holding a line midway down the coast, roughly as far south as Hue or Da Nang. However this would require heavy reinforcements which at this point could only come from British imperial resources. ‘Wavell faces several simultaneous demands, and while his resources are considerable and growing, he cannot fulfil all of them,’ noted General Brooke in London. ‘As long as the enemy retain the initiative, the risk is that we dissipate fighting strength in futile defensive efforts, which risk a complete collapse of our position in the theatre. We can fight only delaying actions in Indochina. But political complications severe.’
During December the Council worked out a compromise. General Georges wanted at least two divisions, preferably three, and hundreds of aircraft. ‘Without these Indochina cannot be held,’ he said. M. Mandel, though privately suspecting that Indochina could not be held in any case, put forward this view. Wavell had already agreed to send Indian 4th Division, and the first elements began arriving in Saigon by Christmas. His other experienced Indian division, 5th, he insisted on retaining to intimidate Thailand. ‘If Phibun throws in his lot with Japanese, entire position becomes untenable,’ he wrote in late December. ‘We believe British 6th Division also needed for MATADOR, if needed. Two of its brigades arrived and training for it, now massed in the Kra isthmus in readiness.’ British 18th Division had been intended for Greece, but was also now heading for the East. This division Wavell wanted in North Borneo, evidently the next target.
That left the Australians. They had four divisions available; 6th and 7th had seen much hard fighting in Greece, while 9th had been preparing for operations in that theatre. All these had now been sent east, though they would take time to arrive. At least two divisions were needed to guard Australia itself and its northern approaches. Australian 9th Division was at that time preparing to go to Makassar, though Wavell privately believed the Japanese were likely to get there first. ‘We are too weak to hold Celebes, Dutch garrison is weak and too distant from our main bases,’ he wrote. ‘Essential not to fritter away 9th Australian on lost cause.’ From a naval point of view Cunningham agreed. ‘We cannot operate Eastern Fleet so far from Singapore - Japanese advance in DEI resembles a trident - we may blunt the western prong, but central and eastern prongs too distant, risk excessive.’ Wavell therefore preferred to keep Australian 9th on Java, anticipating a Japanese thrust in that direction once Makassar and Balikpapan fell.
Wavell therefore proposed to send the two available brigades of Australian 8th Division to Indochina. However, the Australian government disliked sending forces to Indochina, believing the risk too great. ‘Public opinion here favours fighting in the islands,’ argued Mr. Curtin, ‘we believe this offers much better prospects.’ The British therefore felt compelled to send the 18th Division to Indochina instead, even though some of its advance elements had already gone to North Borneo. ‘Question is how long until Japanese move against Borneo,’ noted Mr. Churchill. ‘We cannot defend it with present forces there, and too great a prize to yield without a fight.’ After heated debate, the Australians agreed to send most of 8th Division there, though Mr. Curtin did so under protest. ‘We note this deployment is essential to security of Singapore and therefore to Australia, but is only necessary because of British commitment to French. Australian government is not a formal party to the Union and does not accept that Union considerations should dictate Australian policy.’ In saying this, Mr. Curtin spoke from his great anxiety for New Guinea, anxiety which the sequel proved justified. Several RAAF and RAF squadrons, Hurricanes, Hudsons and Catalinas, were also sent to Borneo, despite the airmen’s concerns about the quality of bases there. ‘We can only operate from Borneo bases for brief period,’ noted Air Marshal Longmore. ‘A brief period may be all that is required,’ countered Churchill.
Few disputes during the war consumed more of the Council’s time than the question of how and how much to assist Indochina. Very early on all parties agreed that Hanoi could not be held in the face of Japanese numerical and air superiority. ‘We can hold it until Christmas, perhaps the New Year,’ commented de Gaulle. ‘But we must try as far as possible to preserve fighting strength for the fight further south.’ The French pinned their hopes on holding a line midway down the coast, roughly as far south as Hue or Da Nang. However this would require heavy reinforcements which at this point could only come from British imperial resources. ‘Wavell faces several simultaneous demands, and while his resources are considerable and growing, he cannot fulfil all of them,’ noted General Brooke in London. ‘As long as the enemy retain the initiative, the risk is that we dissipate fighting strength in futile defensive efforts, which risk a complete collapse of our position in the theatre. We can fight only delaying actions in Indochina. But political complications severe.’
During December the Council worked out a compromise. General Georges wanted at least two divisions, preferably three, and hundreds of aircraft. ‘Without these Indochina cannot be held,’ he said. M. Mandel, though privately suspecting that Indochina could not be held in any case, put forward this view. Wavell had already agreed to send Indian 4th Division, and the first elements began arriving in Saigon by Christmas. His other experienced Indian division, 5th, he insisted on retaining to intimidate Thailand. ‘If Phibun throws in his lot with Japanese, entire position becomes untenable,’ he wrote in late December. ‘We believe British 6th Division also needed for MATADOR, if needed. Two of its brigades arrived and training for it, now massed in the Kra isthmus in readiness.’ British 18th Division had been intended for Greece, but was also now heading for the East. This division Wavell wanted in North Borneo, evidently the next target.
That left the Australians. They had four divisions available; 6th and 7th had seen much hard fighting in Greece, while 9th had been preparing for operations in that theatre. All these had now been sent east, though they would take time to arrive. At least two divisions were needed to guard Australia itself and its northern approaches. Australian 9th Division was at that time preparing to go to Makassar, though Wavell privately believed the Japanese were likely to get there first. ‘We are too weak to hold Celebes, Dutch garrison is weak and too distant from our main bases,’ he wrote. ‘Essential not to fritter away 9th Australian on lost cause.’ From a naval point of view Cunningham agreed. ‘We cannot operate Eastern Fleet so far from Singapore - Japanese advance in DEI resembles a trident - we may blunt the western prong, but central and eastern prongs too distant, risk excessive.’ Wavell therefore preferred to keep Australian 9th on Java, anticipating a Japanese thrust in that direction once Makassar and Balikpapan fell.
Wavell therefore proposed to send the two available brigades of Australian 8th Division to Indochina. However, the Australian government disliked sending forces to Indochina, believing the risk too great. ‘Public opinion here favours fighting in the islands,’ argued Mr. Curtin, ‘we believe this offers much better prospects.’ The British therefore felt compelled to send the 18th Division to Indochina instead, even though some of its advance elements had already gone to North Borneo. ‘Question is how long until Japanese move against Borneo,’ noted Mr. Churchill. ‘We cannot defend it with present forces there, and too great a prize to yield without a fight.’ After heated debate, the Australians agreed to send most of 8th Division there, though Mr. Curtin did so under protest. ‘We note this deployment is essential to security of Singapore and therefore to Australia, but is only necessary because of British commitment to French. Australian government is not a formal party to the Union and does not accept that Union considerations should dictate Australian policy.’ In saying this, Mr. Curtin spoke from his great anxiety for New Guinea, anxiety which the sequel proved justified. Several RAAF and RAF squadrons, Hurricanes, Hudsons and Catalinas, were also sent to Borneo, despite the airmen’s concerns about the quality of bases there. ‘We can only operate from Borneo bases for brief period,’ noted Air Marshal Longmore. ‘A brief period may be all that is required,’ countered Churchill.
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