German Spring Offensive succeeds-how does President Wilson react?

[CalBear]

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David T. Zabecki​

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Articles by David T. Zabecki​

• Military Developments of World War I

Publications by David T. Zabecki in Bibliography​

• Zabecki, David T.: Steel wind. Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the birth of modern artillery, Westport 1994: Praeger.
• Zabecki, David T.: The German 1918 offensives. A case study in the operational level of war, London; New York 2006: Routledge.
• Foley, Robert: Hermann von Kuhl, in: Zabecki, David T. (ed.): Chief of staff. The principal officers behind history's great commanders. Napoleonic Wars to World War I, volume 1, Annapolis 2008: Naval Institute Press, pp. 149-161.

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See your own irony here?

If not, I don't see any further merit in continuing this already vapid conversation.

Well so much for the warning.

Let's try this -

Kicked for a week.

I would STRONGLY suggest you change your posting style to one that proves the respect that other members are offering.


If you can not debate in good faith with at least the level of decorum that is expected in Jr. High classrooms. don't debate at all.

Simply put, stop being a jerk.

 

[mranibanerjee]

President Wilson's overall health during that time was often fickle depending on the current situation.

Perhaps news of any successfull German offensive causes his various conditions to finally snap and either severely incapacitate or kill him.

Who knows?

 

[Karelian]

But why are they forced to 'scuttle' from the continent like the 1940 BEF?

I'm probably missing something but i don't see blind panic causing the British to throw in the towel even with the (likely temporary) loss of Amiens or Hazelbrouck.

Because otherwise their horses would be threatened with starvation.
The monthly tonnage requirements in November 1918 for the BEF were the following (Source: Rawson, The British Army 1914-1918)

The routes they were shipped in to the trenches really did have the bottlenecks mentioned by Zabecki:

All these railheads, base depots, regulating stations, divisional refilling points and brigade dumps and trench stores required a constant, undisturbed flow of these vital supplies to enable the British forces using them as their source of supply to stay in the field.

Ammo stockpiles did exist, but horse fodder and field ratios were another thing.

Quickly rerouting them or moving significant stockpiles from point A to point B was logistically extremely challenging because of the bottle-necked structure of these supply networks:

Third Army Traffic Map: June 1918.

First World War map of the Somme area

www.bl.uk

Now, the Entente had the resources to eventually remedy these operational setbacks. I also personally believe that they'd have the political will to continue the war in the face of German aggression. But an apparent operational success followed by an olive branch?

The German General Staff in OTL never yielded to reasonable peace terms. Haig, on the other hand, apparently feared a German credible promise of an immediate truce and pre-1914 borders for Belgium and France more than anything.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Because otherwise their horses would be threatened with starvation.
The monthly tonnage requirements in November 1918 for the BEF were the following (Source: Rawson, The British Army 1914-1918)
View attachment 677656
The routes they were shipped in to the trenches really did have the bottlenecks mentioned by Zabecki:
View attachment 677658
View attachment 677657

All these railheads, base depots, regulating stations, divisional refilling points and brigade dumps and trench stores required a constant, undisturbed flow of these vital supplies to enable the British forces using them as their source of supply to stay in the field.

Ammo stockpiles did exist, but horse fodder and field ratios were another thing.

Quickly rerouting them or moving significant stockpiles from point A to point B was logistically extremely challenging because of the bottle-necked structure of these supply networks:

Third Army Traffic Map: June 1918.

First World War map of the Somme area

www.bl.uk

Now, the Entente had the resources to eventually remedy these operational setbacks. I also personally believe that they'd have the political will to continue the war in the face of German aggression. But an apparent operational success followed by an olive branch?

The German General Staff in OTL never yielded to reasonable peace terms. Haig, on the other hand, apparently feared a German credible promise of an immediate truce and pre-1914 borders for Belgium and France more than anything.

Good points.

But hubs are not the same as the whole chain. There are always workarounds, especially as these towns do not fall instantly. Nor do horses die on day 1 after their fall.

I think we probably agree that the disruption to British military capabilities will be substantial. But do they need to instantly evacuate the Continent? Why can't they hold the Channel ports? And the line of the Seine? How do the Germans push on quickly, or at all?

 

[kham_coc]

Why can't they hold the Channel ports

Have you ever played battleship?
Have you ever played it while your space is a quarter of the other guys?
And that's presupposing that the BEF is up for trying - Gallipoli was a disaster after all.

 

[mranibanerjee]

Have you ever played battleship?
Have you ever played it while your space is a quarter of the other guys?
And that's presupposing that the BEF is up for trying - Gallipoli was a disaster after all.

One thing is almost certain to me from reading the Zabecki thesis PDF, and it's that the Channel ports could not have held out independently as long as they were within the artillery range of the Germans, similarly to how capturing the Villers-Bretonneux heights would have allowed German artillery to fire heavily on Amiens, disrupting the Allied lines of communication and rendering their hold on the rail station there highly volatile.

 

[NoMommsen]

In his state, could he have a hart atack, it could happen.

President Wilson's overall health during that time was often fickle depending on the current situation.

Perhaps news of any successfull German offensive causes his various conditions to finally snap and either severely incapacitate or kill him.

Who knows?

At this point of time Wilsons health doesn't seem to be as derailed as it was in late 1918.
At this point of time he also doesn't felt too much affected personally by the events in far far away Europe that it might cause physiological upsetting to him.

Putting him to death at this stage looks to me a ... wee bit of handwaving ??

 

[NoMommsen]

...

Is this thesis available online, through JSTOR or Google Scholar? Anyone know of academic reviews of Zabrecki's book?
...

Here : https://bootcampmilitaryfitnessinst...t-the-german-1918-offensives-zabecki-2004.pdf you can find openly accessable the "blueprint" of Zabeckis in 2006 published book.

Which might be available on the net through ... well ... not sooo clearly legaly undisputed ways 🤫 of some russian and icelandic based sites.

 

[mranibanerjee]

Here : https://bootcampmilitaryfitnessinst...t-the-german-1918-offensives-zabecki-2004.pdf you can find openly accessable the "blueprint" of Zabeckis in 2006 published book.

Which might be available on the net through ... well ... not sooo clearly legaly undisputed ways 🤫 of some russian and icelandic based sites.

That site's perfectly legal, by the way.

At this point of time Wilsons health doesn't seem to be as derailed as it was in late 1918.
At this point of time he also doesn't felt too much affected personally by the events in far far away Europe that it might cause physiological upsetting to him.

Putting him to death at this stage looks to me a ... wee bit of handwaving ??

After all, Roosevelt's various strokes throughout 1940 could quite easily have proven fatal.

 

[Lucius Verus]

One thing is almost certain to me from reading the Zabecki thesis PDF, and it's that the Channel ports could not have held out independently as long as they were within the artillery range of the Germans, similarly to how capturing the Villers-Bretonneux heights would have allowed German artillery to fire heavily on Amiens, disrupting the Allied lines of communication and rendering their hold on the rail station there highly volatile.

The thesis doesn't talk about how Germany will supply the saliants, how it will bring up supplies with no rail on foot/by mule across an active battle with craters, uncleared obstructions and active artillery fire an extra 20km than IOTL. It ignores that the vanguard has gone several days with only what food they carried on their backs and is in no state to defend. The Entente became passive panicking children while the Germans handwave logistics and casualties. It's a wank in a PhD thesis, designed to buckle the trend and make some academic noise for a student.

The plan is reliant on the Entente being passive, not ordering counter-attacks and shelling that will slow the advance and distrupt logistics, and requiring the Entente to helpfully play along and pull back, then pull back further cause clearly it's obvious that the few shells the Germans can drag across 60km of no man's land not to mention the giant artillery pieces themselves means the ports are doomed (and not you know, just patch up the damage the few lucky shells that hit like we did all war up to now)
with selective correspondence from Hague while ignoring the context IOTL that the Entente made Foch supreme leader who was holding back and waiting for a time to strike and that Whitehall wouldn't have allowed it.

Be a bit more critical, academics disagree all the time, they prefer to buckle the trend since there's less prestige in affirming the existing consensus,
and thousands of history student thesis are written every year, accepting one as the sole basis for discussion is folly or just fine if you have an agenda.

 

[mranibanerjee]

The thesis doesn't talk about how Germany will supply the saliants, how it will bring up supplies with no rail on foot/by mule across an active battle with craters, uncleared obstructions and active artillery fire an extra 20km than IOTL. It ignores that the vanguard has gone several days with only what food they carried on their backs and is in no state to defend. The Entente became passive panicking children while the Germans handwave logistics and casualties. It's a wank in a PhD thesis, designed to buckle the trend and make some academic noise for a student.

The plan is reliant on the Entente being passive, not ordering counter-attacks and shelling that will slow the advance and distrupt logistics, and requiring the Entente to helpfully play along and pull back, then pull back further cause clearly it's obvious that the few shells the Germans can drag across 60km of no man's land not to mention the giant artillery pieces themselves means the ports are doomed (and not you know, just patch up the damage the few lucky shells that hit like we did all war up to now)
with selective correspondence from Hague while ignoring the context IOTL that the Entente made Foch supreme leader who was holding back and waiting for a time to strike and that Whitehall wouldn't have allowed it.

Be a bit more critical, academics disagree all the time, they prefer to buckle the trend since there's less prestige in affirming the existing consensus,
and thousands of history student thesis are written every year, accepting one as the sole basis for discussion is folly or just fine if you have an agenda.

Zabecki writes that the German supply system was mainly through their rail system, not by truck or by horse. He actually states that the first and second salients formed during Operations Michael and Georgette could be supplied to the fact that the German rail system was more advanced than that of the Allies, and that contrary to popular post-war myths, the German supply situation only began to fully unravel in May 1918 due to striking too deep into the Allies' strategi depths by striking towards strategically useless objectives during Operation Blucher.

He also acknowledges the very real possibility that the Entente will counterattack, but then rebuts this popular thesis by writing about just how impossible Franco-British co-ordination would become rapidly without Amiens and Hazebrouck.

Again, one thing is very clear to me from viewing Zabecki's list of his own sources, and it's that none of the other authors that you are describing are writing with even the mere acknowledgement of the OHL/Prussian General Staff archives in the former East German Potsdam, which, as the OP previously posted, was previously thought lost during the Allied bombing of Potsdam in 1945.

 

[ArtosStark]

Zabecki writes that the German supply system was mainly through their rail system, not by truck or by horse. He actually states that the first and second salients formed during Operations Michael and Georgette could be supplied to the fact that the German rail system was more advanced than that of the Allies, and that contrary to popular post-war myths, the German supply situation only began to fully unravel in May 1918 due to striking too deep into the Allies' strategi depths by striking towards strategically useless objectives during Operation Blucher.

He also acknowledges the very real possibility that the Entente will counterattack, but then rebuts this popular thesis by writing about just how impossible Franco-British co-ordination would become rapidly without Amiens and Hazebrouck.

Again, one thing is very clear to me from viewing Zabecki's list of his own sources, and it's that none of the other authors that you are describing are writing with even the mere acknowledgement of the OHL/Prussian General Staff archives in the former East German Potsdam, which, as the OP previously posted, was previously thought lost during the Allied bombing of Potsdam in 1945.

True on him using some untapped sources. That is in fact his strongest point.

Zabecki writes like a German staff officer. That is not surprising. His own career was as an operations and staff officer and his academic career since then has been focused on German Army staff work.

If you look through almost any German Staff plan for a WW1 offensive (or really almost any staff plan for any army) you will notice that the objectives set are more often than not not reached. The staff officers job is to set a direction and objectives so that the planning can proceed. In most cases the actual assaults did not match up to the objectives set. German Staff officers in this period are perhaps particularly known for grand objectives but you see it in all armies planning (just look at the Flanders offensive).

Equally, Staff officers are rarely able to look at the planning documents of their enemy. Which parallels Zabecki who’s sources on the mindset and planning of the British tends to come from the Official History (which is good but questionable on officers mindset) and Tim Travers (who has an axe to grind and often cherry picks his information to grind it).

Zabecki’s thesis is interesting, his basic premise (that Amiens and Hazebrouck are the best operational goals and expanding operations should have been avoided if possible to focus on the main objective) is, I think, quite valid, his credentials are solid. That does not mean he is definitely correct. Every thesis is presented as a new perspective on history, not the definitive edition on how it was.

The alternative plan laid out by Zabecki is given in the form of an operational plan, not an alternate timeline. It has the same assumptions and the same (possibly required for initial operational planning) ignorance of the enemy response. And in any operation, the enemy gets a vote. It is assumed that further planning will adjust as the situation on the ground changes.

 

[David Flin]

If you look through almost any German Staff plan for a WW1 offensive

I cite as an example von Papen's plan to invade Canada from the USA in 1914 using 600,000 German-American and Irish-Americans recruited from among the US populace, who would go disguised as cowboys.

German Staff plans and reality isn't always a 100% correlation.

 

[Mikestone8]

The Germans have to do a public peace offensive to get the more weary French and British to stop fighting.

This is what Haig most feared.

On Jan 2, 1918 he told King George V that British soldiers understood that they were fighting to liberate Belgium and maintain the independence of France, and were willing to fight on as necessary to achieve this. OTOH he cautioned that they were totally indifferent as to whether Strasbourg should be French or Trieste Italian, and that should the Germans agree to our stated war aims, there would be a deep sense of betrayal in the British Army should it be ordered to go on fighting for such lesser objectives.

Sounds as if it might have paid the Germans to make such an offer, whether they intended to keep their word or not

 

[ArtosStark]

Sounds as if it might have paid the Germans to make such an offer, whether they intended to keep their word or not

I don’t know if they would have gotten away with faking it, but that seems to have been the sticking point with the US as well.

 

[Mikestone8]

I don’t know if they would have gotten away with faking it, but that seems to have been the sticking point with the US as well.

I think Haig's concern was that Entente governments would respond with a flat rejection and a demand for Alsace-Lorraine,, reparations and a pile of other things. This could have been highly damaging to morale in the BEF, if they got the idea that they were being required to go on getting slaughtered over issues that were nothing to do with them. And such a state of affairs on the eve of Michael could have been disastrous.

When the chips were down. the war could well be decided by the feelings of the *soldiers*, not the generals, and certainly not the politicians. If the men in the trenches decided that the game wasn't worth the candle, that would be game over.

Fortunately for the Entente governments, the Germans let them off the hook by not making such an offer.

 

[Post]

Zabecki writes that the German supply system was mainly through their rail system, not by truck or by horse. He actually states that the first and second salients formed during Operations Michael and Georgette could be supplied to the fact that the German rail system was more advanced than that of the Allies, and that contrary to popular post-war myths, the German supply situation only began to fully unravel in May 1918 due to striking too deep into the Allies' strategi depths by striking towards strategically useless objectives during Operation Blucher.

If the Germans are depending on supply by rail, then the further they advance, the more difficult their supply would get, because I assume that during a WW1 battle/advance not much would stay intact. So on the gained ground there's no more working railwaysytem. You kinda say that yourself in your quote.

 

[Riain]

IMO this thread rather shows how easily posters on this forum are able to ignore the topic of a thread to advocate one or another ... believe/position as historical events 'only' can go.

... what does NOT show some 'unimportance' of the topic but rather - aside named ignorance - seems to hint at some uneducatedness of the topic which in this thread should be Wilson and an american reaction to a certain possible turn of events regardless of its eventual probability (as long as there isn't any outright ASB intervention involved).

That was answered very early on with the question: What could he do?

In March 1918 Wilson/US had no ace card up their sleeve. They had declared war and were waiting for their Army to reach combat capability, and even then the AEF would be far from the dominant force on the Western Front. If the the BEF is forced to retreat, partly to the sea to be evacuated and partly overland back towards the Somme and the French fall back as a result of this and German offensives on their front in March-June 1918 the AEF lacks the combat power to do anything about it. Because of this France could sue for peace and there's nothing Wilson could do about it because the AEF simply isn't powerful enough.

 

[Karelian]

Fortunately for the Entente governments, the Germans let them off the hook by not making such an offer.

On the German side of the no-mans-land, the loss of lives had also been staggering as well.
Publicly offering to give up occupied territories of Belgium and France before, during or after an attack that had been sold to the attacking troops as the war-winning offensive would have been a huge gamble. It would amount to essentially admitting that every German soldier killed at the Western Front had essentially died in vain.

 

[kham_coc]

That was answered very early on with the question: What could he do?

In March 1918 Wilson/US had no ace card up their sleeve. They had declared war and were waiting for their Army to reach combat capability, and even then the AEF would be far from the dominant force on the Western Front. If the the BEF is forced to retreat, partly to the sea to be evacuated and partly overland back towards the Somme and the French fall back as a result of this and German offensives on their front in March-June 1918 the AEF lacks the combat power to do anything about it. Because of this France could sue for peace and there's nothing Wilson could do about it because the AEF simply isn't powerful enough.

This could indeed have backfired totally.
Because while the AEF might have rallied french morale, they would have to fight, and if the AEF went up against a Heer that felt like it was winning, well.
WW1 had a harsh learning curve, and OTL, the Americans never had time to learn - I doubt they would have this time either.