Part 2.5
Memorandum of the Joint Economic Planning Office to the Supreme War Council
30/10/40
HAUT SECRET/ TOP SECRET
Sirs, some weeks ago you requested our comment regarding the inter-connected questions of strategic transport, shipping, iron & steel production, and shipbuilding...
2. The chief source of iron ore now available to the Union is North Africa. To illustrate the point, we note that in the last full year of peace, British iron ore imports were just over 5 million tons, half of this from continental Europe, the other half from North Africa, with some other minor supplies.
3. British iron and steel production therefore must make do with half its pre-war level of ore. Scrap can compensate for this only in part. However, this illustrates the importance of the Union - without North Africa, British primary iron & steel production (i.e. from ore) would eventually almost cease.
4. We can also partly address the gap through the import of finished iron & steel goods, chiefly from the USA. We have placed very large orders and will continue to do so. However, both for wartime and peacetime purposes, we consider it desirable to avoid as far as possible excessive dependency on US supply.
5. Evidently, iron ore is a bulk product and shipping space is our most critical scarce resource, even more so than manpower. We have therefore explored the possibilities of expanding refinery capacity in North Africa itself, clearly there would be great advantages to exporting bar iron rather than iron ore. However, for the technical reasons outlined in annex B, we do not believe this can make a significant contribution to the easing of shipping requirements in the next two years…
8. You asked specifically about the problems of reinforcing the Far East. A great easing of strategic transport requirements will arise from our possession of the entire North African coastline, once attained. From an economic point of view this is much the most valuable effort that the Union can make in the next 6 months, and no other considerations should be permitted to reduce its likelihood. The transport of goods to the Middle and Far East will become easy via the Mediterranean, though heavy sea and air escort will be necessary in the Sicilian Narrows.
9. We understand that the military advice is that the Narrows will be too risky for troop transports as long as the enemy holds Sicily and Sardinia. This implies some such approach as follows: disembark troops at Algiers, travel overland to the Gulf of Gabes or Tripoli, then re-embark for Egypt & points east. This in turn implies the need to upgrade the North African railways and connect the Tunisian line to the Libyan, once captured. This will require large investments, but can probably be made effective during the present war, if sufficient American help is forthcoming. The advantages of this over using the Cape route will be obvious…
11. Shipyard capacity remains another limiting factor. The demands of convoy escort manufacture, the repair of merchantmen, the construction of landing craft, and the completion of the new major fleet units, mean that British yards cannot themselves perform all the works needed on French units. The technical problems of completing the Jean Bart seem insuperable, and we recommend exploring her conversion to an aircraft carrier in the USA, if this can be made to fit in with military requirements...
We are, sirs, yours etc.
BEVERIDGE
MONNET
PLEVEN
ZUCKERMAN
30/10/40
HAUT SECRET/ TOP SECRET
Sirs, some weeks ago you requested our comment regarding the inter-connected questions of strategic transport, shipping, iron & steel production, and shipbuilding...
2. The chief source of iron ore now available to the Union is North Africa. To illustrate the point, we note that in the last full year of peace, British iron ore imports were just over 5 million tons, half of this from continental Europe, the other half from North Africa, with some other minor supplies.
3. British iron and steel production therefore must make do with half its pre-war level of ore. Scrap can compensate for this only in part. However, this illustrates the importance of the Union - without North Africa, British primary iron & steel production (i.e. from ore) would eventually almost cease.
4. We can also partly address the gap through the import of finished iron & steel goods, chiefly from the USA. We have placed very large orders and will continue to do so. However, both for wartime and peacetime purposes, we consider it desirable to avoid as far as possible excessive dependency on US supply.
5. Evidently, iron ore is a bulk product and shipping space is our most critical scarce resource, even more so than manpower. We have therefore explored the possibilities of expanding refinery capacity in North Africa itself, clearly there would be great advantages to exporting bar iron rather than iron ore. However, for the technical reasons outlined in annex B, we do not believe this can make a significant contribution to the easing of shipping requirements in the next two years…
8. You asked specifically about the problems of reinforcing the Far East. A great easing of strategic transport requirements will arise from our possession of the entire North African coastline, once attained. From an economic point of view this is much the most valuable effort that the Union can make in the next 6 months, and no other considerations should be permitted to reduce its likelihood. The transport of goods to the Middle and Far East will become easy via the Mediterranean, though heavy sea and air escort will be necessary in the Sicilian Narrows.
9. We understand that the military advice is that the Narrows will be too risky for troop transports as long as the enemy holds Sicily and Sardinia. This implies some such approach as follows: disembark troops at Algiers, travel overland to the Gulf of Gabes or Tripoli, then re-embark for Egypt & points east. This in turn implies the need to upgrade the North African railways and connect the Tunisian line to the Libyan, once captured. This will require large investments, but can probably be made effective during the present war, if sufficient American help is forthcoming. The advantages of this over using the Cape route will be obvious…
11. Shipyard capacity remains another limiting factor. The demands of convoy escort manufacture, the repair of merchantmen, the construction of landing craft, and the completion of the new major fleet units, mean that British yards cannot themselves perform all the works needed on French units. The technical problems of completing the Jean Bart seem insuperable, and we recommend exploring her conversion to an aircraft carrier in the USA, if this can be made to fit in with military requirements...
We are, sirs, yours etc.
BEVERIDGE
MONNET
PLEVEN
ZUCKERMAN
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