TheSwedishHistorian
Banned
Polish or Lithuanian independence with German or Habsburg Princes? They would give a fair bit of a buffer eastward for Germany, while not changing the geopolitical landscape of Europe very much.
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Road Less Traveled: WW1 negotiated peace in 1916/17
- Thread starter DominusNovus
- Start date
I'm interested in British railway history, so naturally I'm wondering what will happen here with a shortened war. It was clear that there couldn't be a return to the pre-war setup, but the question was just what the new one would look like, as this article explains.
@NOMISYRRUC, do you have any ideas?
@NOMISYRRUC, do you have any ideas?
I don't think you can assume that: the flu likely started in Kansas, and was probably circulating quite a bit before it before it became a global pandemic. It might be somewhat milder if the world isn't in as rough a position, but you never really know.
Yeah, I think this likely avoids a Bolshevik revolution, but I'm not sure it avoids some kind of anti-Tsarist uprising, and a potential civil war. An end to the war is going to help stabilize things somewhat, but it's still a very bad situation domestically, and you're going to have a lot of soldiers coming home with whatever illusions of patriotism they had shattered.
One upside is that a moderate government (Kerensky-style or otherwise) that arises after the peace won't have the war to deal with.
I do think that the international balance of power here would be pretty stable; it was probably more stable than it was given credit for before 1914, which was more of a worst-case scenario than the inevitability that it's usually portrayed as. Increasingly integrated economies and a mobile population is probably going to lead to a general dip in nationalism in the next generation; the war will be especially useless without the pretense of victory.
That said, they're all going to be looking outward in terms of expansion, with a lot more manpower.
I think that might be optimistic for Russia. Less terrible than the Revolution, sure, but a long, bloody struggle between the regime and revolutionaries of various sorts could get and stay ugly. Russia is going to be marginalized here, too: not quite abandoned by its western allies, but certainly not prioritized. It may also look like fertile grounds for European industrialists looking to extract concessions, without any clear allies.
Yeah - I think France is not going to be in a position to demand it, but there might be some kind of negotiated settlement, with some Francophone territories going back to France.
cardcarrier
Banned
Maybe a voluntary population transfer, although my brief experience with people of Alsace, has given me some impression that they consider themselves a distinct identity that isn't entirely French; but given the large sums of cash the Reichstag was pumping into A/L to modernize it's infrastructure, and to fully integrate them into the Reich, I would be very dubious of even a 1/4 of the population choosing to relocate to France; QOL and economic prosperity/opportunity for young families was much higher under German management at that time period
It showed up first in military camps, ie, with lots of men in crowded accommodation, and then only in early 1918. Very likely IMO it only shows up as mildly-worse-than-average flu run, rather than the utter pandemic we got IOTL.
According to the well-cited book in question, yes, almost every power had key leaders anxious for a negotiated peace. About the only ones not eager were the Hindenberg and Ludendorff, and, depending on the day of the week, Lloyd George.
The Road Less Traveled
Bethmann Hollweg repeatedly and formally confirmed the Germans were willing to evacuate Belgium.
Maybe, but it was Kerensky’s refusal to abandon the war that allowed the reds an opening, and they didn’t face much backlash for peace in particular - granted, with all the chaos, who is to say?
According to the book, the Germans were open to negotiation over A-L, but they were unlikely to give up the whole territory.
My understanding is that even though they remained in the war, the failed Kerensky offensive is what really set the ball rolling. This was at least partially motivated by the American requirement for active fighting as a prerequisite for American material aid.
I was under the impression this was always more a ploy than him actually being prepared to evacuate Belgium
AJP Taylor in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe says 'Bethmann understood by compromise the status quo of 1916: Germany would retain at least the iron-fields of Lorraine and military control of Belgium; she would receive additional colonies and perhaps part of Poland'. P. 552
Stevenson in The History of the First World War also backs this up saying 'The consensus among Germany's leaders was more or less as the September Programme envisaged: that Belgium should not be annexed, but its sovereignty should be restored in name only'. P. 131
For the sake of the argument I'm willing to accept that Germany withdraws for a negotiated peace, its just that nothing I've read on the topic indicates they were willing to do so, though I'm happy to be corrected.
Zelikow makes a compelling case that these were legit offers, and given that his is the most recent writing on WW1 I’ve read, I’m inclined to believe him. Plus, he’s an actual diplomat. There’s so much in the book that I’m not qualified to summarize.
TDM
Kicked
The problem with the Initial question is not so much was such and such an offer made in earnest, it's that for a peace to actually happen you need all the major players to want it at the same time and for long enough to sell it to all concerned and then make it happen. Since there is no looming defeat on either side, and sunk cost fallacy in play in spades on all sides I don't see it happening.
IIRC Zelikow doesn't ever really say a small tweak of change was all that was needed. Isn't his point more that despite overtures being made and received there was a systemic failure to make anything of it.
I think the best chance for peace would be a scenario where everything in Europe runs more or less the same into 1916, but Teddy Roosevelt wins in 1912. He was better at diplomatic endeavors than Wilson, and had garnered plenty of prestige in already having brokered a peace conference between Russia and Japan. On top of that, even TR would be hesitant to run in 1916, so, as a lame duck, his hands would be freer than Wilson’s were prior to the election.
Plus, I hate the idea of Wilson’s legacy being improved.
He makes a very compelling case that the Brits were on the verge of having to end the war due to financial constraints and the US was perfectly positioned to cut them off - and was doing just that until Germany resumed USW and the US did an about face on financing the Entente.
With Germany and the UK willing to come to the peace table, everyone else has to come along for the ride. Zelikow points out that there were many in the Asquith government and quite a few in Lloyd George’s who were keenly aware that their odds of getting a better peace in 1917/18 than they would at a negotiated peace conference after 1916 were very slim, even before considering the Americans’ ability and willingness to force them to the table.
But, of course, I’m paraphrasing a book by an expert in foreign affairs.
Plus, I hate the idea of Wilson’s legacy being improved.
He makes a very compelling case that the Brits were on the verge of having to end the war due to financial constraints and the US was perfectly positioned to cut them off - and was doing just that until Germany resumed USW and the US did an about face on financing the Entente.
With Germany and the UK willing to come to the peace table, everyone else has to come along for the ride. Zelikow points out that there were many in the Asquith government and quite a few in Lloyd George’s who were keenly aware that their odds of getting a better peace in 1917/18 than they would at a negotiated peace conference after 1916 were very slim, even before considering the Americans’ ability and willingness to force them to the table.
But, of course, I’m paraphrasing a book by an expert in foreign affairs.
True, but I still think that leaves us with a camel awaiting the final straw.
TDM
Kicked
The Brits had options (they just didn't like them and much preferred the terms they were getting, lots of threads in this forum on this, and no matter what as bad as the situation was for Britain it was worse for Germany), and the US wasn't going to cut them off since they had already invested so heavily in the Entente
The problem here is there's a difference between the US wanting to broker peace and the US suddenly cutting off the entente to force one.
Only the German's weren't willing. again a few overtures here and there isn't the same as being wiling to end the war in the kind of 'no one really wins' way described.
The German government/Kaiser/Army command actually have a big issue if they take a peace without winning big. This was their big chance before what they saw as the pressures of democracy and liberalism removed their chance, and they're not going to get another. Especially if they end up delivering two years of horrendous casualties with little to show for it which if anything will undermine their position. i.e. they need to bring home the big win.
In 1916/17 they still think they can win
On top of that if they don't win big they know France, GB ad Russia etc are going to be even more committed to constraining them in the future.
Again the US wasn't going to force anyone. They're backing the entente. Ultimately I think you mistaking preference for peace for a willingness to force it to happen.
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If anyone is making a mistake, its Zelikow. He points out that the Federal Reserve strongly discouraged unsecured loans to the Entente shortly before Germany resumed USW. Then it did a 180. If Americans were not willing to finance the Entente, the Entente would go broke trying to pay for the war.
Wilson was perfectly willing to use this pressure to bring them to the table, until he wasn’t.
Edit: and again, I’m paraphrasing what Zelikow is arguing. I can’t really do justice to his argument, the best I can do is suggest you read some reviews or listen to some interviews with him on the book. His read of the events is very different from the popular history. For purposes of this discussion, we should assume he’s right.
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Wilson did instruct the Reserve to discourage unsecured loans to foreign interests, which did close that avenue of finance to the entente, and damaged the confidence of borrowers in general in lending to entente interests. From what I can tell, this was indeed an attempt to force the European powers to the negotiating table. He was very convinced of the American destiny of bringing the squabbling European powers to civilized discourse in a similar fashion to getting children to play nicely with one another. However, the move said nothing specifically about secured loans. This would depend on the ability of the Entente to come up with suitable collateral (American or neutral securities and gold mostly).
It is also true that the British Treasury's report on the financial situation at the time was somewhat bleak. However, we have gone over this issue a few times on this forum and a couple things do look different on closer inspection of the British situation. Specifically, the Treasury report shows the situation to be unsustainable under the current rules. IOTL after the US entered the war, the British government more actively pursued, and eventually sequestered, American securities held by British citizens. They were able to find enough that they likely could have funded the war for some time if they could achieve anything close to the collateral-to- capital rate that they had received thus far. They also had a considerable amount of gold in the vaults of a section of the private banks that did not really need it for the discharge of their (now mostly domestic) business. France still had a very considerable amount of gold that they were loath to touch as they believed it was important to securing the Franc post-war (not an unreasonable belief but they did not end up needing all of it by far AIUI).
In short, the ability of the Entente to continue the war, even in the environment that Wilson's instructions to the Fed had created, was still significant. It would have required more disruption than was preferred to the financial institutions of Britain and France but not necessarily more than they could handle. However, it is possible that even with this reserve there to be found, the belief in the impossibility of continuing could have brought the combatants to the table. The success of the negotiations would then depend on the willingness of those involved to compromise and, to a smaller degree, the Entente not realizing that they have more in the tank then they thought.
On the whole, I think the idea of diplomatic talks occurring is at least plausible, but I am not so sure that even if they did, they would be successful.
I am not sure if TR would take the same path as Wilson when it came to trying to force the Entente to the table. If he was trying to reach a negotiated end of the war it seems like he would work more by personal and presidential appeal to the warring powers and offers to mediate. Its also possible he simply commits the US to making as much money off the conflict as it can while trying to stay out of it and improving their own forces as insurance should he fail.
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TDM
Kicked
The reality is the US is already financially committed to the entente, if the entente loses or even doesn't win it likely defaults or force a restructure and that hurts the US as well.
Only I don't see that he was, not when push comes to shove. Because if nothing else he had no control over the CP
I have, as I said my take was he was pointing out lost opportunities due to systemic failures.
Plus you've ignored the points about Germany
I dont actually think it is that far removed form popular history (even if he going into an area where popular history tends not to). Honestly I think the inconsistency is not between popular history and Zelikow, but Zelikow and the conclusion you've drawn
But let's not worry about that (it's a matter of our individual subjective interpretation anyway).
But what I am worried about is:
1) how do you get the German high command to the table in a serious manner
2). how are you going to offer a long term solution to the underlying political issue that doesn't just have the whole thing go again. Because as great as peace is it doesn't necessarily answer the questions that caused the war.
3). if the US is constricting Entente finances in order to force them to the table, that risks emboldening teh CP to continue as the Entente will be less able to continue themselves.
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cardcarrier
Banned
There are the near insolvable issues, of the war mongers in the General Staff who had very unrealistic ideas about the future status of Belgium
As I mentioned above population exchange in Alsace, maybe; but giving up the actual territory would be a bitter pill to put onto the German populace. As much as it make make sense to permanently smooth their relations with France; and give them a vastly more defensible border, the German tax payer had been heavily subsidizing Alsace the previous 40 years; I would not want to be a member of the Reichstag from any part of the country that had to vote on the acceptance of a treaty that would include that in early 1917
As I mentioned above population exchange in Alsace, maybe; but giving up the actual territory would be a bitter pill to put onto the German populace. As much as it make make sense to permanently smooth their relations with France; and give them a vastly more defensible border, the German tax payer had been heavily subsidizing Alsace the previous 40 years; I would not want to be a member of the Reichstag from any part of the country that had to vote on the acceptance of a treaty that would include that in early 1917