Road Less Traveled: WW1 negotiated peace in 1916/17

[DominusNovus]

Just wrapping up an interesting book by Philip Zelikow on how close WW1 came to ending in a negotiated peace of the sort that usually marked European wars in the 1916 and the very beginning of 1917, brokered by the US. Through a series of miscommunications, some likely accidental and some almost certainly deliberate among many of the parties involved, the chance slipped away before the military leadership in Germany was able to push for a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, thus basically killing the chance for a negotiated peace. However, until that point, the US under Wilson was haphazardly committed to brokering a peace convention.

Zelikow presents Wilson as somewhat amateurish in his efforts, his agent House as almost bipolar in his obfuscations, Lansing as a complete rogue, and Llyod George as practically tyrannical in his efforts to sabotage the peace efforts (I'm being more charitable in Zelikow's descriptions of the players involved than Zelikow's book is of them). However, the US had a strong card in that it could basically force the Entente to the peace table, and the desires of the Germans that the Americans were aware of were actually quite limited.

So, lets assume that, despite all the personal obstacles to peace, the effort manages to achieve a negotiated peace, with an armistice in late 1916 (though one in early 1916 is not out of the question, either). The borders in Europe are adjusted slightly, but no major changes, except a possible independent Poland. Some colonies change hands, but every single state can tell its own populace that they achieved their war aims. And, of course, 2 more years of bloodshed are avoided. The Russian, German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires all stagger out of the war in various degrees of intact-ness.

What happens next?

 

[TimTurner]

I feel that the nature of the relationship between Russia and France will be very crucial here.

 

[DominusNovus]

I feel that the nature of the relationship between Russia and France will be very crucial here.

Care to elaborate?

 

[TimTurner]

Care to elaborate?

How Germany aligns itself diplomatically has a big impact on how France does, and vice versa.

 

[DominusNovus]

How Germany aligns itself diplomatically has a big impact on how France does, and vice versa.

That is not much of an elaboration.

For clarification: Wilson and the US in general had the ability to starve the entire Entente war effort at a moment’s notice, and the Brits were very aware of this. Given that the UK entered to protect Belgium, that the Germany offer to open a conference included evacuating Belgium, that the US could force the UK to agree to a conference, and that the French couldn’t continue on w/o the UK (nor could Russia continue on w/o France), the road to a peace conference (likely at the Hague) was pretty wide open.

It just kept narrowly being missed, over and over, throughout 1916/17. Even after the Germans announced they’d resume USW, if the US had not expelled Bernstorff, there was still a chance for a conference.

 

[Johnrankins]

You aren't going to get an independent Poland if there is a peace treaty in 1916, it is part of the Russian, Austrian and German Empires. They aren't going to give that territory very easily. You are stepping on the toes of three great powers and the war is still too much "up in the air" for them to give up much. Some borders might be adjusted , some money change hands but I doubt you would see major boundary changes that the reestablishment of Poland would require.

 

[Mikey]

Just wrapping up an interesting book by Philip Zelikow on how close WW1 came to ending in a negotiated peace of the sort that usually marked European wars in the 1916 and the very beginning of 1917, brokered by the US. Through a series of miscommunications, some likely accidental and some almost certainly deliberate among many of the parties involved, the chance slipped away before the military leadership in Germany was able to push for a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, thus basically killing the chance for a negotiated peace. However, until that point, the US under Wilson was haphazardly committed to brokering a peace convention.

Zelikow presents Wilson as somewhat amateurish in his efforts, his agent House as almost bipolar in his obfuscations, Lansing as a complete rogue, and Llyod George as practically tyrannical in his efforts to sabotage the peace efforts (I'm being more charitable in Zelikow's descriptions of the players involved than Zelikow's book is of them). However, the US had a strong card in that it could basically force the Entente to the peace table, and the desires of the Germans that the Americans were aware of were actually quite limited.

So, lets assume that, despite all the personal obstacles to peace, the effort manages to achieve a negotiated peace, with an armistice in late 1916 (though one in early 1916 is not out of the question, either). The borders in Europe are adjusted slightly, but no major changes, except a possible independent Poland. Some colonies change hands, but every single state can tell its own populace that they achieved their war aims. And, of course, 2 more years of bloodshed are avoided. The Russian, German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires all stagger out of the war in various degrees of intact-ness.

What happens next?

I was pretty impressed with the case Zelikow made, honestly.

I think the big outcomes here are going to be that the war is bloody enough to deliver the message of "we must avoid this at all costs" without the parallel of "we must get revenge for what happened," and within that, the possibility of a functional League of Nations is pretty good.

The various powers' positions within the league are more complicated. Clearly, Britain, France, and Germany are the big guns here, with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey as a kind of second tier (that they may or may not acquiesce to).

Russia is in the top weight class, but may not quite have the dexterity to fully throw its weight around in the various conferences, especially since it may be the power most aimed at expansion within Europe.

The United States will have solidified its position as a global power broker, having advanced what it started in 1905. At the same time, it's going to try to carefully maintain its neutrality, since that position both let America stay out of the heavy fighting, and have the credibility to negotiate a peace conference.

I don't know that any of the Great Powers would come out of that conference in imminent danger of collapse, although their domestic problems will resume before long.

 

[TimTurner]

That is not much of an elaboration.

For clarification: Wilson and the US in general had the ability to starve the entire Entente war effort at a moment’s notice, and the Brits were very aware of this. Given that the UK entered to protect Belgium, that the Germany offer to open a conference included evacuating Belgium, that the US could force the UK to agree to a conference, and that the French couldn’t continue on w/o the UK (nor could Russia continue on w/o France), the road to a peace conference (likely at the Hague) was pretty wide open.

It just kept narrowly being missed, over and over, throughout 1916/17. Even after the Germans announced they’d resume USW, if the US had not expelled Bernstorff, there was still a chance for a conference.

I'm talking post-war.

 

[DominusNovus]

You aren't going to get an independent Poland if there is a peace treaty in 1916, it is part of the Russian, Austrian and German Empires. They aren't going to give that territory very easily. You are stepping on the toes of three great powers and the war is still too much "up in the air" for them to give up much. Some borders might be adjusted , some money change hands but I doubt you would see major boundary changes that the reestablishment of Poland would require.

Well, Germany had already established a Polish state, so that would probably be the starting point. A possible independent Poland seemed to be a point of agreement among many of the belligerants not named Russia.

I would expect that the CP might agree to giving up some slivers of territory to the new Poland as a way for the Russians to save face. Perhaps even allowing a Russian noble to be the new king of Poland?

I was pretty impressed with the case Zelikow made, honestly.

I think the big outcomes here are going to be that the war is bloody enough to deliver the message of "we must avoid this at all costs" without the parallel of "we must get revenge for what happened," and within that, the possibility of a functional League of Nations is pretty good.

The various powers' positions within the league are more complicated. Clearly, Britain, France, and Germany are the big guns here, with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey as a kind of second tier (that they may or may not acquiesce to).

Russia is in the top weight class, but may not quite have the dexterity to fully throw its weight around in the various conferences, especially since it may be the power most aimed at expansion within Europe.

The United States will have solidified its position as a global power broker, having advanced what it started in 1905. At the same time, it's going to try to carefully maintain its neutrality, since that position both let America stay out of the heavy fighting, and have the credibility to negotiate a peace conference.

I don't know that any of the Great Powers would come out of that conference in imminent danger of collapse, although their domestic problems will resume before long.

Agreed. I think Russia would be beset by enough internal instability that they’d be playing catch-up. Especially considering how close they were to their revolution if the war went on.

I could see all sorts of colonial swapping in any direction happening, as compensation for any border adjustments in Europe.

 

[DominusNovus]

So a few things to consider, if we just set a Jan 1, 1917 armistice date (just to make the math easier - maybe they'd do 11/11/16):
- If we assume that about half the wartime deaths occurred in the last 2 years of the war (does anyone have a source on the deaths by year?), then we have just saved 7 to 10 million lives, just directly from the end of the war.
- If we assume the Spanish Flu doesn't start, then we've saved 17-100 million lives.
- If we assume no Russian Revolution/Civil War, then we've saved about 10 million lives right there, plus all the deaths from forced collectivization. Plus, the economic destruction of Russia.

So, our range of lives saved is 34 -120 million people (that huge range is just due to how widely different Spanish flu estimates range). Thats pretty dramatic, right there. Next, whatever the map of Europe is, there's likely a much more stable political situation after the war, with the old regimes still mostly in power, but chastised by the horror of the war. Something in between the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations is quite likely, with formal structures for conflict resolution in place. I'm not overly confident it would prevent war in the long run, but I would be very shocked if Europe plunged back into war as early as 1939. I'd say the 50s, at the earliest. If some sort of proto-European Union, even if it is just a free(er) trade zone, can be established, all the better.

Austria-Hungary and Russia would almost certainly have to reform their empires in some fashion - Russia being the more needful of the two. I think an army full of veterans bitter with how the war was conducted, but still loyal to the idea of Russia as an Empire would likely be a good power base for some reformers. The institution of the Czar is not going to come out of this unscathed, and maybe Nicholas has to be ousted and replaced with someone more amenable, but whatever happens, it is likely to be far less terrible than the Revolution. Russia should rebound, assuming reasonable reforms, within a decade, and start doing gangbusters.

The colonial situation is likely to endure for much longer. The respective colonial empires will not be bloodied by two back to back wars to the death. Maybe the US uses its influence to steer the European powers toward gradual decolonization over the course of decades.

Economically, the US and Europe are likely to be more on a peer level in the first half of the 20th century, especially if no WW2 to artifically deflate European economic potential. The US will still likely also continue to grow more rapidly of the two regions. No idea what the next major economic crisis will look like, but it can't really be much worse than the historical Great Depression. I could see the Democrats doing better in the 1918 and1920 elections due to Wilson's coup of a peace conference, but they'd still likely be out of power by 1924.

 

[Old1812]

The inevitable question on my mind is whether after the enormous bloodshed of 1916 anyone would be willing to accept "peace without victory."

I think an even better German performance at Jutland, where the High Seas Fleet mauls Beatty could help here, if it dampens the drive for USW in the navy.

It would also be interesting to see how a shorter war will affect the presidential race in 1920.

 

[Catspoke]

Dividing up Belgian Congo seems easy. Portuguese Angola seems likely too. Big countries gain some at the expense of the little. The Germans get some gains. Britain could get some German Naval restrictions possibly. Maybe Bulgaria gets southern Dobruja from Romania.

Lots of bills to be paid, everybody but Britain would be reducing naval expenditures. I honestly don't see anyone itching for a round 2 right away, too many dead.

The populations of these countries will be mad, lots of dead for little gain. I actually think Germany with their seven years war mythology can explain it away, i.e. they fought off the encirclement, backed up their flagging confederates like Austria who was wronged and got a peace. The army will still have a high place in German society.

 

[NoMommsen]

Just wrapping up an interesting book by Philip Zelikow on how close WW1 came to ending in a negotiated peace of the sort...

May I ask for the title ?

 

[Disraeli's Ghost]

Just wrapping up an interesting book by Philip Zelikow on how close WW1 came to ending in a negotiated peace of the sort that usually marked European wars in the 1916 and the very beginning of 1917, brokered by the US.

I haven't yet read Zelikow's book so I speak partly out of ignorance about it, but I thought the main problem with a negotiated peace was that Germany, already looking towards the next war, refused to evacuate Belgium in any negotiation (for example in the 1916 peace talks they offered)?

If a negotiated peace does happen as you say, I see it as being something equivalent to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, where nobody got what they wanted and everybody's bitter about it (indeed the parallels between France and Germany both having to give up Belgium are clear). Most of the commanders (and many of the soldiers) felt like they were still going to win in 1917, and so post-war probably sees a strong resentment towards the ruling elites in each nation for not letting them 'finish the job' so to speak.

Whether another war breaks out is a different matter. Austria-Hungary will have Karl on the throne by 1917 and as long as he maintains some independence of action, I can't see him joining another one of Germany's wars of expansion particularly quickly. Russia wont start one and will need many years to recover its strength anyway. France is probably the most interesting variable, as its bled immensely to gain absolutely nothing, so it perhaps turns either very insular and defeatist or aggressively revanchist.

 

[Snowstalker]

Independent Poland out of Russian Congress Poland, Germany loses most of its colonies except possibly Kamerun/Tanganyika, Serbia becomes an AH vassal with Bulgaria annexing northern Macedonia. Ottomans might have to let go of Hejaz and accept British influence over Mesopotamia, but keep Syria.

 

[TheSwedishHistorian]

Russia was in a pretty bad spot at that time, but they would be spared a lot if this happened. Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic nations would likely stay Russian as they are to key and important to Russia for grain, defense, and naval ports, with many Russians in them.

Poland might get independence. Finland might get independence as well but I think it is more likely that they either gets their autonomy guaranteed (Nicholas II pushed for complete russification and the end of Finnish autonomy in 1914, but this was halted by the beginning of the First World War.) Or has no change in status.

I would expect France, the UK, the US, and Germany to benefit/maintain status quo, while the ottoman empire and Russia to be partially screwed over, but largely fine. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire might make it this timeline.

 

[MattII]

What about Alsace-Lorraine? What price will Germany ask for its return? Would it be a price France would be willing to pay?

 

[SIngemeister]

- If we assume no Russian Revolution/Civil War, then we've saved about 10 million lives right there, plus all the deaths from forced collectivization. Plus, the economic destruction of Russia.

That feels like a big assumption. Wasn’t that particular rock already rolling downhill pretty fast at that point? I’m not sure this pretty inconclusive end of the war will make the already very disgruntled Russian army any happier - if anything, they might feel rather betrayed, or like they just fought and bled and died in their tens of thousands for no reason, whilst the Tsar, his German(!) wife, the aristocracy, and still-alive Rasputin did nothing but make things worse. Food’s still growing scarce, inflation’s still rising, strikes are still ongoing, and Russia isn’t likely to get a good enough peace deal to solve these problems; and socialist thought is still heavily embedded in the army itself.

Lenin, Trotsky, et al are still around, and I think this bunch will be more than happy to take advantage of any situation that arises.

Of course, any Revolution/Civil War will have the Whites in a stronger position, with funding from the rest of the major powers of the world.

 

[matzeskatze]

What about Alsace-Lorraine? What price will Germany ask for its return? Would it be a price France would be willing to pay?

Personaly I do not think that Elsaß Lothringen is on the table. Because Germany is still standing in France and it is part of the creation of the Empire. As such a loss of this could be seen as an admission of loss worse then the worth of the purely physical area.

 

[TheSwedishHistorian]

Something needs to give in Russia.

Like Singemeister said ending the war is not the only thing that started the revolution. Starvation, famines, lack of political rights etc, in a deeply conservative leadership opposed to change. That very same Tsar had rolled back Finnish autonomy and enforced Russification, opposed change, and only left at gunpoint more or less.

A war that ends so inconclusively and even midly poorly for russia if they lose Poland, can easily be seen by the populace as another foolish and pointless endeavor fought for by the Russian leadership.