Spain Joins the Axis: Where do D-Day and Dragoon Happen?

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Was Denmark under a fascist dictatorship with clear inclinations towards the axis?...

Salazar wasn't Fascist. Corporatist? Yes. Conservative? Yes. Nationalistic and Authoritarian tendencies? Of course. He wasn't Fascist though. He despised the Nazis for their anti Christian rhetoric and Neo Pagan attitudes and even took issue with certain parts of Mussolini's Italy.

Portugal wasn't Pro Axis either. It was Pro Portugal. It traded with both sides and took issues with the actions of both sides, especially Axis Japanese occupation of Timor.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

That 12 US divisions across the Atlantic is only achieved in Aug 1943.

I think the reason why Aber is completely correct deserves consideration.

After the 1942 landings in France were cancelled, U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN George C Marshall sent two divisions, the 40th and 43rd U.S. Infantry Divisions to the Southwest Pacific, and ordered the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division broken up to form the 9th U.S. Armored Division. After the Casablanca Conference delayed the assault until 1944, Marshall released the 1st U.S. Cavalry and 6th, 7th, 31st, 33rd and 38th U.S. Infantry Divisions to the Pacific. Thus, four of 15 precious pre-Pearl Harbor Regular Army divisions were among nine total U.S. Army divisions lost to employment at all in the European Theater, although six of them underwent specialized training for combat in Europe during 1942. Moreover, to avoid overburdening transatlantic maritime supply lines, Marshall kept all combat-ready divisions in the United States except the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne and the 36th and 45th U.S. Infantry Divisions until actually required in Great Britain for Operation Overlord.

Ina ddition, the British Army was stronger in 1942. A dozen divisions, including the 1, 8, 9, 10, 42 (East Lancashire) Armoured, and 38 (Welsh), 44 (Home Counties), 45 (Wessex), 47 (2 London), 48 (South Midland), 59 (Staffordshire) and 61 (South Midland) Divisions were combat ready in 1942, but broken up or gutted to provide replacements for combat losses in Italy (1943-4), India (1943) or early on after the Normandy landings (mid-1944). Additionally, a plan to form 2 Guards Armoured Division from 6 Guards Armoured and 24 Guards Brigades was abandoned in late 1942 because the prospect for its employment in France was not pressing.

So as many as 21 additional Allied combat divisions could be available if the Iberian Peninsula were an active combat theater in 1942. The training level, quality of equipment, tactical doctrine, leadership, etc. of the American troops may be less, but the lessons learned are on a much broader scale.

As for US Corps HQ, two were used in Operation Torch - II Corps under MG Lloyd Fredenhall in Algeria and MG George Patton's I Armored Corps under the designation Western Task Force in Morocco. In addition, V Corps under MG William Key arrived in Great Britain in January 1942. Active in the United States in January 1942 were I, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII and IX US Corps.

All of this is modified, or dependent on when Spain joins the Axis, and when and whether Portugal does as well.

 

[Aber]

The manpower of German Divisions in France and Low Countries... is sub 15 real divisions and they have limited mobility. The armor, even including divisions which historically went to Italy is generously 2 divisions not committed to Kursk; most of which is inferior in every way to Sherman tanks

Kasserine was in February 1943.

I do not share your confidence in the superiority of US units in 1943, or that the Germans would only be able to mount a limited approach. Driving the Allies into the sea gains the Germans a year in the West, while they could trade space for time in the East.

If Spain is in the war the first US land commitment is still going to be Morocco; then establish air superiority over the Strait of Gibraltar and occupy the Balearics. This creates massive threats around the Western Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Barcelona, Sardinia, Sicily and the costs of Algeria and Tunisia. the next step will depend on the Axis response.

 

[Garrison]

Going back to the OP's original question, D-Day and Dragoon happen where they did OTL and probably when they did. German forces in Spain just means an even longer Westwall and a body of German troops cut off and isolated. Torch landings to take the North African coast leave Spain wide open to air attacks. Also there's the question of what happens to Vichy France if Germany is staging troops through there to attack Spain? That's its neutral status gone and a lot of French people only supported Vichy because it got them out of the war.

 

[cardcarrier]

Kasserine was in February 1943.

I do not share your confidence in the superiority of US units in 1943, or that the Germans would only be able to mount a limited approach. Driving the Allies into the sea gains the Germans a year in the West, while they could trade space for time in the East.

If Spain is in the war the first US land commitment is still going to be Morocco; then establish air superiority over the Strait of Gibraltar and occupy the Balearics. This creates massive threats around the Western Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Barcelona, Sardinia, Sicily and the costs of Algeria and Tunisia. the next step will depend on the Axis response.

The Germans in 1943 don't have the assets in the west to drive the allies into the sea. Marshaling a panzer corps (which they don't have there) means running the gauntlet of short ranged allied light bombers and fighter aircraft; and sustained heavy naval bombardment, which is why their counter attacks in Sicily and Salerno never went anywhere and wouldn't in France either. They are only driving 10+ allied divisions into the sea if they pull out major forces from Russia, which they can't do in the summer of 1943

 

[Aber]

The Germans in 1943 don't have the assets in the west to drive the allies into the sea.

An Allied landing in France in 1943 means no invasion of Sicily (unless there have serious changes to US dispositions), and all German OTL forces in Italy can be redirected to France. German air forces are likely to be relatively stronger with less time for attrition in the Mediterranean and over Germany. A serious threat of invasion in France also means the Germans may think again about Kursk.

An invasion of France in 1943 is possible but requires a much bigger US focus on Europe than OTL.

 

[Garrison]

The Germans in 1943 don't have the assets in the west to drive the allies into the sea. Marshaling a panzer corps (which they don't have there) means running the gauntlet of short ranged allied light bombers and fighter aircraft; and sustained heavy naval bombardment, which is why their counter attacks in Sicily and Salerno never went anywhere and wouldn't in France either. They are only driving 10+ allied divisions into the sea if they pull out major forces from Russia, which they can't do in the summer of 1943

In 1943 the Luftwaffe is far stronger than 1944 and not pinned down defending the Reich. The means to mount a beach landing were inadequate for a landing in 1943, maybe it could have worked but Eisenhower and co. had a duty to their countries and the hundreds of thousands of troops they were going to have to commit to prepare a landing that stood a higher chance than maybe. This is an ongoing issue with proposing 'daring' plans with 20-20 hindsight, the Generals at the time couldn't simply decide to roll the dice because the troops were real and the consequences of failure were real.

 

[cardcarrier]

In 1943 the Luftwaffe is far stronger than 1944 and not pinned down defending the Reich. The means to mount a beach landing were inadequate for a landing in 1943, maybe it could have worked but Eisenhower and co. had a duty to their countries and the hundreds of thousands of troops they were going to have to commit to prepare a landing that stood a higher chance than maybe. This is an ongoing issue with proposing 'daring' plans with 20-20 hindsight, the Generals at the time couldn't simply decide to roll the dice because the troops were real and the consequences of failure were real.

The luftwaffe is not strong in the west in 1943... D-day 43 is not the luftwaffe engaging the clumsy allied fighter sweeps over France, and the unescorted bombers over germany

The luftwaffe could choose which of those raids they wanted to fight and concentrate against them to some degree, and ignore others; and for the raids on Germany proper they had their series of coast watchers, radars, and... unfortunate Bomber command radio practices which caused raids to get leaked. They also had the advantage of their pilots being able to bail out over friendly controlled territory to be recycled, wheras allied airmen where often becoming POWs

France with 20 allied divisions on it has a target the luftwaffe cannot abandon, the German army; and allied bombers would be able to be escorted by short ranged but otherwise good quality allied fighters. The coast watching and radar system are compromised and the Uboat bases, even if the ports hold out for some time lose their LOC back to Germany

Rommel's fortification work and beach defenses didn't even begin until November 1943. The ports where occupied and some where fortified, but the roads and beaches between them where joined by little more than patrols and some MG posts. Heinz Guderian and Albert Speer's reorganization efforts had only just started to generate more equipment by the Summer of 43, along with the call ups of the last exempt groups from the infantry. In the wake of the debacles at Stalingrad, and Tunisgrad the German army was not what it was in 1941 or 42. Army Group Center couldnt maintain an offensive for 5 days at Kursk.

German forces used to combat operation Huskey in raw manpower represented a reinforced division, who even against Green American troops couldn't do much to push them back without triggering battleship and aircraft attacks. Their holding as long as they did was the same sort of effect as the entire Italian campaign, lots of rivers lines mountains and hills and that allied infantry would have to keep digging them out of.

Between Rommels arrival in France, and DDay the German garrison army's armored strength ballooned as did their flak and fortifications. They would have had much less to resist with in mid 43

 

[Garrison]

The luftwaffe is not strong in the west in 1943... D-day 43 is not the luftwaffe engaging the clumsy allied fighter sweeps over France, and the unescorted bombers over germany

The luftwaffe could choose which of those raids they wanted to fight and concentrate against them to some degree, and ignore others; and for the raids on Germany proper they had their series of coast watchers, radars, and... unfortunate Bomber command radio practices which caused raids to get leaked. They also had the advantage of their pilots being able to bail out over friendly controlled territory to be recycled, wheras allied airmen where often becoming POWs

France with 20 allied divisions on it has a target the luftwaffe cannot abandon, the German army; and allied bombers would be able to be escorted by short ranged but otherwise good quality allied fighters. The coast watching and radar system are compromised and the Uboat bases, even if the ports hold out for some time lose their LOC back to Germany

Rommel's fortification work and beach defenses didn't even begin until November 1943. The ports where occupied and some where fortified, but the roads and beaches between them where joined by little more than patrols and some MG posts. Heinz Guderian and Albert Speer's reorganization efforts had only just started to generate more equipment by the Summer of 43, along with the call ups of the last exempt groups from the infantry. In the wake of the debacles at Stalingrad, and Tunisgrad the German army was not what it was in 1941 or 42. Army Group Center couldnt maintain an offensive for 5 days at Kursk.

German forces used to combat operation Huskey in raw manpower represented a reinforced division, who even against Green American troops couldn't do much to push them back without triggering battleship and aircraft attacks. Their holding as long as they did was the same sort of effect as the entire Italian campaign, lots of rivers lines mountains and hills and that allied infantry would have to keep digging them out of.

Between Rommels arrival in France, and DDay the German garrison army's armored strength ballooned as did their flak and fortifications. They would have had much less to resist with in mid 43

And again the professionals working with the information to hand disagreed with such a plan. Unlike Rommel they understood the requirements of logistics and the need to strike with overwhelming force. There's also the issue that amphibious landing techniques were still very much a work in progress in 1943, the refinements developed as a result of experience in the med, and the earlier Dieppe debacle, took time to put into place. In 1943 you are not going to have Mulberry available to help move supplies for example.

 

[Aber]

Rommel's fortification work and beach defenses didn't even begin until November 1943. The ports where occupied and some where fortified, but the roads and beaches between them where joined by little more than patrols and some MG posts.

And?

The major issue for the Allied planners was port capacity to support your 20 divisions - the problem was defined as the number of divisions required to capture a port is less than the number that can be supported by that port when opened.

Exact OTL German land and air dispositions in 1943 are not that relevant as they can redeploy on interior lines. In particular (unless there has been major changes in US plans) all German units in Italy in 1943 OTL would be available for France.

 

[Garrison]

And?

The major issue for the Allied planners was port capacity to support your 20 divisions - the problem was defined as the number of divisions required to capture a port is less than the number that can be supported by that port when opened.

Exact OTL German land and air dispositions in 1943 are not that relevant as they can redeploy on interior lines. In particular (unless there has been major changes in US plans) all German units in Italy in 1943 OTL would be available for France.

This was one of the major lessons of Dieppe, trying to take a port intact on D-Day would be almost impossible, so the allies turned their attention to a beach landing and creating the means to mount such a landing, while using their intelligence assets to persuade the Germans to scatter their defensive firepower from Norway to France. The astonishing Nazi investment in fortifying places like Norway and the Channel Islands made a significant dent in their available resources, and meant German defences in France were far thinner than they might have been.

 

[cardcarrier]

And again the professionals working with the information to hand disagreed with such a plan. Unlike Rommel they understood the requirements of logistics and the need to strike with overwhelming force. There's also the issue that amphibious landing techniques were still very much a work in progress in 1943, the refinements developed as a result of experience in the med, and the earlier Dieppe debacle, took time to put into place. In 1943 you are not going to have Mulberry available to help move supplies for example.

the professionals on Eisenhower's quartermaster staff where conservative, most logistics people are for good reason. The allied army outperformed all their time tables by half a year anyway, they had to improvise and make it work; Eisenhower rewarded them with the finest hotels in Paris for their offices to keep them motivated

the mulberries whilst nice where damaged by storms not too long after the invasion, and ultimately many supplies where just landed on the beach; and the ports where all bombed and sabotaged anyway, with most not being operational at full capacity until a couple years after the war

 

[cardcarrier]

And?

The major issue for the Allied planners was port capacity to support your 20 divisions - the problem was defined as the number of divisions required to capture a port is less than the number that can be supported by that port when opened.

Exact OTL German land and air dispositions in 1943 are not that relevant as they can redeploy on interior lines. In particular (unless there has been major changes in US plans) all German units in Italy in 1943 OTL would be available for France.

Its not 20 divisions on dday, its 6 divisions in the first week. Mark Clark's army didn't capture Salerno at the outset of Avalanche and even when they did it had been bombed and sabotaged and was under artillery fire

Yes there would be hardships, probably considerable ones. The US 7th army endured them in Sicily and Salerno, but it's a lot better to fight the German army when it's paper thin vs after 8 months of Rommel, Speer and Guderian's reorganizing efforts

This was one of the major lessons of Dieppe, trying to take a port intact on D-Day would be almost impossible, so the allies turned their attention to a beach landing and creating the means to mount such a landing, while using their intelligence assets to persuade the Germans to scatter their defensive firepower from Norway to France. The astonishing Nazi investment in fortifying places like Norway and the Channel Islands made a significant dent in their available resources, and meant German defences in France were far thinner than they might have been.

The road network in France radiates out from Paris, there are very limited lateral lines of communication along the coast

The dispersion was Rommel's idea; he felt the armor needed to be dispersed to the likely landing sites for immediate counter attack and that if the allies where not defeated back into the sea in 72 hours that all was lost. Gerd Von Rundstead, Leo Geyr Von Schweppenberg and Heinz Guderian whom had never endured operating on the over powering allied air umbrella, all favored concentrating the panzer corps north of Paris, identifying the main landing and counter attacking in force... given the experiences of Panzer Lehr, and the 2nd, 9th and 10th SS formations in their marches north to fight the Normandy landings; Rommel was correct and any counter attack was going to be broken up and disorganized by air power and if the conditions of 43 let them get into such a range, by the might of the allied fleet's battle ships and cruisers

 

[Garrison]

the professionals on Eisenhower's quartermaster staff where conservative, most logistics people are for good reason. The allied army outperformed all their time tables by half a year anyway, they had to improvise and make it work; Eisenhower rewarded them with the finest hotels in Paris for their offices to keep them motivated

the mulberries whilst nice where damaged by storms not too long after the invasion, and ultimately many supplies where just landed on the beach; and the ports where all bombed and sabotaged anyway, with most not being operational at full capacity until a couple years after the war

Okay, reading this seeing nothing that would make a landing in 1943 either likely or plausible.

Its not 20 divisions on dday, its 6 divisions in the first week. Mark Clark's army didn't capture Salerno at the outset of Avalanche and even when they did it had been bombed and sabotaged and was under artillery fire

It's 20 divisions that have to be supplied for operations in Normandy and are you suggesting Salerno strengthens the case for a landing in 1943?

Yes there would be hardships, probably considerable ones. The US 7th army endured them in Sicily and Salerno, but it's a lot better to fight the German army when it's paper thin vs after 8 months of Rommel, Speer and Guderian's reorganizing efforts

And why did Salerno suffer so badly? Lack of surprise, lack of air supremacy. And in addition to Rommel you are now seriously invoking Speer??? Speer's major talent was propaganda, both during the war to help keep the Nazi war machine going and afterwards to save himself from the noose.

The road network in France radiates out from Paris, there are very limited lateral lines of communication along the coast

This doesn't appear to be a response to anything in my post.

The dispersion was Rommel's idea; he felt the armor needed to be dispersed to the likely landing sites for immediate counter attack and that if the allies where not defeated back into the sea in 72 hours that all was lost. Gerd Von Rundstead, Leo Geyr Von Schweppenberg and Heinz Guderian whom had never endured operating on the over powering allied air umbrella, all favored concentrating the panzer corps north of Paris, identifying the main landing and counter attacking in force... given the experiences of Panzer Lehr, and the 2nd, 9th and 10th SS formations in their marches north to fight the Normandy landings; Rommel was correct and any counter attack was going to be broken up and disorganized by air power and if the conditions of 43 let them get into such a range, by the might of the allied fleet's battle ships and cruisers

No the dispersion was the result of the Allies convincing the Germans that the attack would be in the Pas De Calais and Rommel's performance was less than stellar during this time frame, removing himself to Paris for his wife's birthday the day before the landings. The fundamental truth is that it in 1944 that the German defences are paper thin, scattered along the coast of Europe with huge amounts of men and materiel sitting far from the battle front never to see combat until the war was over. The Allies had overwhelming force in 1944 that weighed the odds heavily in their favour. An attack in 1943 that turned into a Salerno would a catastrophe.

 

[Aber]

and the ports where all bombed and sabotaged anyway, with most not being operational at full capacity until a couple years after the war

No; IIRC many were operating above peacetime capacity within a couple of months.

The allied army outperformed all their time tables by half a year anyway, they had to improvise and make it work;

They managed the pursuit until mid September; after that US logistics could not meet the needs of the armies for artillery support. I feel that this map is the logistics guys trolling Bradley

 

[marathag]

Germany literally doesn't have the assets to drive the allies into the sea in mid 43. Pen them in temporarily and give them some losses yes but any real drive on them is going to be met with the might of the allied air force and navy and flatten them like they did in Sicily and Salareno except on 4x the scale

A foothold in Brittany or the Coast still allows Fighters and Medium Bombers to be based there, that will eat up the Luftwaffe faster than OTL

 

[cardcarrier]

No; IIRC many were operating above peacetime capacity within a couple of months.

They managed the pursuit until mid September; after that US logistics could not meet the needs of the armies for artillery support. I feel that this map is the logistics guys trolling Bradley

View attachment 660781

as best I recall experienced German infantry formations including paratroopers shut themselves in a good number of the ports and had to be dug out via heavy duty bombardment and infantry siege by 3-4 of Patton's divisions; I haven't heard of them being anything other than a slog and mostly a rubble heap when captured.

They where certainly having Axis POWs clean them up for a while after the war was over,

@Garrison The tactics the allies used at Salerno, including with holding the naval bombardment (even though Allied pilots had located most the 16th panzer divisions encampments, and could have directed the navy to crush them), still didn't get them defeated or driven into the sea, and that was landing into the teeth of the only full strength German division in the entire theater in the least imaginative way possible

I would imagine and hope that something like D-Day 43 is given to a more capable commander than General Clark

 

[Aber]

as best I recall experienced German infantry formations including paratroopers shut themselves in a good number of the ports and had to be dug out via heavy duty bombardment and infantry siege by 3-4 of Patton's divisions; I haven't heard of them being anything other than a slog and mostly a rubble heap when captured.

They where certainly having Axis POWs clean them up for a while after the war was over,

That was Brest

Cherbourg was captured at the end of June, was usable in July, and was averaging over 8500 tons/day in August. Other Normandy and Brittany ports were in use in August and Dieppe from early September.

 

[cardcarrier]

That was Brest

Cherbourg was captured at the end of June, was usable in July, and was averaging over 8500 tons/day in August. Other Normandy and Brittany ports were in use in August and Dieppe from early September.

la rochelle and lorient and other ports had to have sieges laid to them. brest wasn't able to be used the rest of the war... Cherbourg represented less than 1/4 of allied supply demands, and that wasn't available till d+60. Most was landed over the beach. Eisenhower's people could rage about ports but they wherent digging the paratroopers and panzershreks out of them, and the allied troops won the campaign ahead of schedule without the ports anyway

 

[Aber]

. Cherbourg represented less than 1/4 of allied supply demands, and that wasn't available till d+60. Most was landed over the beach. people could rage about ports but they wherent digging the paratroopers and panzershreks out of them, and the allied troops won the campaign ahead of schedule without the ports anyway

Actual US tonnages

The British used Dieppe, Calais, Boulogne, Ostend and Antwerp as well.