Riain

Banned
On the battery? Where do you think NSG is going to "get" the battery?

So you're talking about a component rather than the whole boat?

The current Australian procurement contract philosophy is to 'solutionise' as little as possible, the contractor will know what's what and what will produce the best product. Now whether that's the best way to go about things is up for debate, but if the Government demands the supplier use a particular battery that they are unfamiliar with or whatever that's as likely to produce bad results as good.
 
Why French promises may be difficult to keep.

McPherson

Banned
So you're talking about a component rather than the whole boat?

The current Australian procurement contract philosophy is to 'solutionise' as little as possible, the contractor will know what's what and what will produce the best product. Now whether that's the best way to go about things is up for debate, but if the Government demands the supplier use a particular battery that they are unfamiliar with or whatever that's as likely to produce bad results as good.
I mean system. The battery does no good for the USN if it cannot put thrust through the screw.

The heart of the Barracuda is the electromotive plant components and the ability to maneuver at speed for several hours on the stored battery capacity. And by speed I mean competitive to a high energy output noisy and HOT AIP heat engine boat which is at least 5 m/s underwater, and much faster than creep speed but very silently. American nuke boats have tertiary battery and motive capacity that is assumed to be not much better than the SARGO II battery and electric motors of almost 70 years ago. AFAICT this actually changed about the time the Virginias began construction. The French do not yet have that tech. They have to either research or obtain it. I know of two western sources; Japan definitely and possibly the United States who have that electro-motive system. I suspect the Chinese have it as well in the enemy camp because they STOLE it.

Much as I think the French may have to if they want it within two years.
 
Last edited:
Indonesians lose a submarine. Lessons learned?

McPherson

Banned
On a related note.


One should pay attention to hull stress over time. Upthread, it was pointed out that the JMSDF replaces submarines every 13 years. Part of that replacement cycle is to prevent block obsolescence, but part of the policy is is lessons learned that parts wear out and hull stress reduces safe operating depth possible over time as the Indonesians may have discovered for themselves the hard way. The sub lost was 44 years old. That is twice the age I would think is safe for a German built boat. May those 53 brave souls rest in peace.

As for claims that the Republic of Korea shipyard refit may have contributed to the loss, that is hogwash. I find it significant that the wreckage appears in 3 pieces, bow, midsection and stern. Also pieces of torpedo tube, prayer rugs and a periscope grease bottle were recovered. This debris does not provide enough evidence to ascertain cause of loss. It just suggests that unusual debris floated and ascended from the three wrecked sections of the submarine. One will have to await the board of inquiry to see the findings for cause of loss.
 
Last edited:
Blast from the past.

McPherson

Banned

That was 2012. How much of it is true now, is very open to debate. Now the presentation does not factor in the size of infrastructure difference of the USN and RAN, nor does it mark the sheer back or tail behind the shaft forces.

@Sam R. has a joke about "dependence", but there is the option of "leasing" which runs into the iron wall of security concerns for both nations.
 

Riain

Banned

That was 2012. How much of it is true now, is very open to debate. Now the presentation does not factor in the size of infrastructure difference of the USN and RAN, nor does it mark the sheer back or tail behind the shaft forces.

@Sam R. has a joke about "dependence", but there is the option of "leasing" which runs into the iron wall of security concerns for both nations.

Leasing is a can of worms. Australia leased 24 F4E 1970-73 but we crashed one cat 5 and there was no mechanism to pay for it because there was no congressional appropriation for the deal. In the end we wrote it off against a RAAF P3B that burnt out in 1968 prior to delivery while still in US custody.

Allow me to assure you leasing combat stuff from foreign governments is off the table, although it is possible to lease civilian stuff for military duties.
 
Why nations do not like to lease gear.

McPherson

Banned
Allow me to assure you leasing combat stuff from foreign governments is off the table, although it is possible to lease civilian stuff for military duties.
One of these days, I might discuss why French WWII naval developments that interested USN endusers postwar were boloed because the "leasing and licensing" problems ran into French business practices and American politics (Goat Island again.).

Yes, it has to do with torpedoes. The Americans stuck with NAVOL with disastrous results.
 
Last edited:

Riain

Banned
Apparently we are looking at the German type 214 uboat as an interim capability pending the late delivery of the Attack class. Given they will likely arrive at least 5 years too late a handful of U214s alongside upgraded Collins class by 2025 would be better than what we're looking at now.
 

Riain

Banned
If we can get them into service early enough they'd be an asset, I'm thinking 2 or 3 by 2025. Given the first Attacks won't be ready until 2030+ and the last by 2040-2050 we'd get a full life of type out of them. I'd want the non-magnetic hull though.
 
Plan Basker, Plan Chuckles and Plan Dog

McPherson

Banned
Last edited:
>we’ve done this before
Massively fucked up procurement? What were we renting while the F-111s were in development hell?
 

Riain

Banned
>we’ve done this before
Massively fucked up procurement? What were we renting while the F-111s were in development hell?

F4Es.

Luckily we crashed one because the USN burnt-out one of our P3Bs prior to delivery but they had no money to pay us for it. We wrote off the F4 against the P3.
 
I do remember some time last year, reading that a former Australian Minister of Defence, prior to leaving the portfolio, asked for an investigation to take place. That was for the leasing of a Virginia class submarine. I can't remember the reason why it was being sought (possibly due to Collins class problems?) however, on returning to the portfolio some time later, he discovered no investigation had taken place by the Defence Department! Yes, there would have been big costs in certifying a nuclear-trained engineering team and building a supporting infrastructure in Australia. However, the operating cost of a single Virginia class submarine for a year (at the time of some rough calculations put together) was $50m versus $100m.

And, on the matter of the Super Hornet being a stop gap replacement for the F-111 aircraft, there was no need to retire the latter prematurely. Sufficient spares were available to keep them operational for some time. Fatigue of the airframe was not as critical as made out by contractors who had their own vested interests at heart. And there were additional F-111G aircraft that could have been fitted out as either replacement aircraft, or as an additional squadron if required. Sure, a huge cost to bring them up to a serviceable state would be needed, but then again, is there any aircraft around now with a similar range and terrain following radar, let alone the capacity for a large weapons fitout? On top of that, the purchasing and spares cost of the Super Hornet versus making the stored F-111Gs available should have been considered. I am led to believe that the RAAF were very peeved when, down the track, a thorough process was gone through concerning the decisions made at the time.
 
I do remember some time last year, reading that a former Australian Minister of Defence, prior to leaving the portfolio, asked for an investigation to take place. That was for the leasing of a Virginia class submarine. I can't remember the reason why it was being sought (possibly due to Collins class problems?) however, on returning to the portfolio some time later, he discovered no investigation had taken place by the Defence Department! Yes, there would have been big costs in certifying a nuclear-trained engineering team and building a supporting infrastructure in Australia. However, the operating cost of a single Virginia class submarine for a year (at the time of some rough calculations put together) was $50m versus $100m.

The costs of building a complete nuclear infrastructure would easily top a billion Australian dollars and would ten or more years to complete. You would need to train sufficient nuclear physicists, nuclear engineers and technicians to build and run it and all would be neophytes in doing so. Training the engineers and technicians in particular would be difficult. The USN has extremely tight schedules on it's training facilities. Then there would be physical infrastructure which is basically nonexistent. You would need to build refiniing and enrichment plants, reactor refueling and construction facilities, as well as a high level waste disposal dump - witness the current imbroglio over a dump for low-level medial waste! Finally, you need to train the ship builders to maintain the boats as well as build them. All very, very, expensive.

And, on the matter of the Super Hornet being a stop gap replacement for the F-111 aircraft, there was no need to retire the latter prematurely. Sufficient spares were available to keep them operational for some time. Fatigue of the airframe was not as critical as made out by contractors who had their own vested interests at heart. And there were additional F-111G aircraft that could have been fitted out as either replacement aircraft, or as an additional squadron if required. Sure, a huge cost to bring them up to a serviceable state would be needed, but then again, is there any aircraft around now with a similar range and terrain following radar, let alone the capacity for a large weapons fitout? On top of that, the purchasing and spares cost of the Super Hornet versus making the stored F-111Gs available should have been considered. I am led to believe that the RAAF were very peeved when, down the track, a thorough process was gone through concerning the decisions made at the time.
Ah, a follower of Carlo Kopp? Unfortunately that is a horse that has run it's course. There is no way to resurrect the F-111, it is long gone and buried (literally!). The F-111Gs were intended to be part-time replacements for the F-111Cs when the F-111Cs needed a rest during their maintenance programme. They were stored in a "ready to use" form, that just needed minimum maintenance to make them availble to the squadrons flying them. They too are long gone. The RAAF were glad to see them go. They cost a fortune because of seal/de-seal compensation cases they faced.
 
If we can get them into service early enough they'd be an asset, I'm thinking 2 or 3 by 2025. Given the first Attacks won't be ready until 2030+ and the last by 2040-2050 we'd get a full life of type out of them. I'd want the non-magnetic hull though.

Two or three by 2025? You know we’re in 2021 right? That’s just fantasy thinking.

In truth, the look at the German boat is about either or both of keeping abreast of options (official story) or trying to put the French on notice (unofficial, naturally, but very believable).
 

Riain

Banned
Two or three by 2025? You know we’re in 2021 right? That’s just fantasy thinking.

In truth, the look at the German boat is about either or both of keeping abreast of options (official story) or trying to put the French on notice (unofficial, naturally, but very believable).

The Germans could put a boat in the water within 3.5 years of an order, and likely put 3 in the water within 5 years of an order. Super Hornet reached IOC within 4 years of the order, C17 and M1 did similar and the M777 howitzer was way better than that. If this is a directed purchase then it is physically possible.

However you're right, its about leverage.
 
Top