In 1941, the Russians launch a full-scale invasion of Germany just before they could kickstart Barbarossa. How far can the Soviets reach before if they're ever stopped?
Maybe if Hitler sends the Panzers after the Persian Gulf oilfields via Turkey, Syria and Persia (Hitler lulled into a false belief that Stalin is a trustworthy ally)the Soviets do "Operation Nevsky" but in 1941 the Red Army is unfit for offensive operations. If Stalin waits until 1942 or 1943 then it might be a different story.....So, an army that's not ready for war charges into three million men on the border...
That's not going to end well for the Soviets.
This also assumes the Germans somehow do not see the preparations that would be necessary to launch offensives towards Europe.
They get smashed. Perhaps even worse than OTL.In 1941, the Russians launch a full-scale invasion of Germany just before they could kickstart Barbarossa. How far can the Soviets reach before if they're ever stopped?
Maybe if Hitler sends the Panzers after the Persian Gulf oilfields via Turkey, Syria and Persia (Hitler lulled into a false belief that Stalin is a trustworthy ally)the Soviets do "Operation Nevsky" but in 1941 the Red Army is unfit for offensive operations. If Stalin waits until 1942 or 1943 then it might be a different story.....
As I have understood it, Stalin was on the one hand fully aware that the red Army was unprepared, but on the other hand fully invested in attack as the best defence. So if Stalin expect a German attack (many PODS possible), then a soviet first strike might be possible.
I dont think you can use the rejection of a pre-emptive strike in OTL as an argument. Stalin clearly didn’t believe the Germans would attack. Counterattack would be necessary if the Germans attacked first. Whether he would prefer pre-emptive or counterattack if given the choice is unknown.I disagree, while Stalin talked about the offensive repeatedly as the ultimate goal of any campaign his focus in the leadup to 1941 was on fixed fortifications and groups of covering forces to protect mobilization to support a counteroffensive. For example, Stalin's handwritten corrections to/comments on Timoshenko's December 1940 report on the Western campaign of 1940 repeatedly stressed that the Maginot Line wasn't penetrated, only outflanked, and that fortifications at emphatically not been rendered obsolete. Stalin repeatedly emphasized the importance of fortifications in this report and the key role they would play in shielding Soviet forces for a counteroffensive. In February 1941 the Soviet fortification budget was doubled to 1.2 billion rubles for the actual emplacements and fieldwork, not counting artillery and munitions! MGs and artillery pieces were stripped from rear units and reserve stocks in June 1941 to bring fortifications up to strength.
For covering troops, it should be kept in mind that Stalin believed that, as in WW1, mobilization and deployment for war would occur after a formal declaration. Therefore, at the start of the war, corps and other units would need to be deployed forward to protect the mobilization of the main body of the army. While this forward deployment was intended to be aggressive and carry the war onto foreign territory if possible to disrupt the enemy's mobilization, it was reactive rather than preemptive in nature. Stalin did receive proposals for a preemptive attack based on intelligence of Germany's mobilization and rejected them IOTL. Given how aware Stalin was of the poor state of the Red Army's mobilization, countenancing an "off the cuff" attack similar to Finland in 1939 wasn't on the cards.
Not on the air.Spoiler attack that does nothing but make it easier for the Germans.
Stalin clearly didn’t believe the Germans would attack....in June 1941.I dont think you can use the rejection of a pre-emptive strike in OTL as an argument. Stalin clearly didn’t believe the Germans would attack. Counterattack would be necessary if the Germans attacked first. Whether he would prefer pre-emptive or counterattack if given the choice is unknown.
That is understood, and thats what I meant. My point stands that the rejection of attack in OTL summer of 1941 doesnt mean the Soviets wouldnt attack if they were certain the Germans would.Stalin clearly didn’t believe the Germans would attack....in June 1941.
That's the point Julian was trying to make. Not that he (Stalin) didn't believe they would attack at all.
I dont think you can use the rejection of a pre-emptive strike in OTL as an argument. Stalin clearly didn’t believe the Germans would attack. Counterattack would be necessary if the Germans attacked first. Whether he would prefer pre-emptive or counterattack if given the choice is unknown.