East first! Europe after a German / CP victory in 1916

It is perhaps not impossible, but would it be worth of risking losing a major part of the HSF, and other units and forces besides, to take Finland?

I see a German landing in Finland mainly as part of an offensive to St. Petersburg. So that St. Petersburg can be approached from the south and the north at the same time. But maybe this is unnecessary?
 

marathag

Banned
Question - why would the Germans in the West not push farther into France? If two offensives failed so grandly I would think the Germans would attempt to exploit that and head for the Meuse. Also, without the British manpower, what stops the Germans for a run much deeper?
Not enough Troops, with most of the Heer busy in the East
 
Question - why would the Germans in the West not push farther into France? If two offensives failed so grandly I would think the Germans would attempt to exploit that and head for the Meuse. Also, without the British manpower, what stops the Germans for a run much deeper?

As already mentioned by others, there are a number of reasons for this:
  1. The French have a fortress belt running parallel to the Franco-German border. Attacking these fortresses will be too costly, as the Battle of Verdun (OTL) shows.
  2. Many more soldiers are needed for an offensive than for a defense. These troops are not available because they are deployed against Russia.
  3. There is no need to invade France. When Russia gives up the war, France has no choice but to give up the war as well. The French will realize that it is impossible to win on their own.

One of my earlier maps shows the Western Front. Perhaps this provides clarification.

WesternFront.png
 
In terms of a military alliance, then who joins this depends on who is threaten by whom. A popular trope in a CP-victory is for a fascist/communist France or elsewhere, but this shouldn't really be the case here. In peace, the militarists are disgraced and the peace has been "won" in the sense that France was not severely punished (as OTL Germany in 1919). All this should strenghen the doves of French politics.
I quite agree about French Communists. I remain convinced that people just assume the French Socialists were far more powerful in politics than they were because they like the name 'French Commune'. I'm dubious about it strengthening the doves though, France has shown itself to be a very sore loser since the Franco-Prussian war and a second humiliation to the Germans (and on French soil again, no less!) will have a not insignificant portion of the population in a frothing rage. Oh sure, they'll get over it, but probably not for another decade and I worry about French reactionaries gaining ground in Paris.
- No US involvement means a richer and more inward looking USA.
This one I have my doubts about, mostly because of the shorter war and how British banks were still collecting French loans. The great shift of capital across the Atlantic to New York has been severely curtailed in this timeline, so I wouldn't say America would be richer or more inward looking, since they haven't gained or lost anything in the war (although I'm sure France has taken out loans from New York banks as well as from London). America can remain happy as 'the great neutral' without having had to invest anything and without having lost anything either.

It just dawned on me that the war in the Pacific will have gone entirely differently TTL, with the German East Asia Squadron conducting merchant raiding against French Indochina and Polynesia since neither Britain, Australia, and perhaps most significantly, Japan, aren't in the war at all.
I suspect the colours on the map won't change much after the war, although maybe a few islands in French Polynesia would be part of the settlement to the Germans for use as coaling stations.
@Helmuth48 I don't suppose you have a map of the post-war situation in Africa handy?
 
I quite agree about French Communists. I remain convinced that people just assume the French Socialists were far more powerful in politics than they were because they like the name 'French Commune'. I'm dubious about it strengthening the doves though, France has shown itself to be a very sore loser since the Franco-Prussian war and a second humiliation to the Germans (and on French soil again, no less!) will have a not insignificant portion of the population in a frothing rage. Oh sure, they'll get over it, but probably not for another decade and I worry about French reactionaries gaining ground in Paris.

This one I have my doubts about, mostly because of the shorter war and how British banks were still collecting French loans. The great shift of capital across the Atlantic to New York has been severely curtailed in this timeline, so I wouldn't say America would be richer or more inward looking, since they haven't gained or lost anything in the war (although I'm sure France has taken out loans from New York banks as well as from London). America can remain happy as 'the great neutral' without having had to invest anything and without having lost anything either.

It just dawned on me that the war in the Pacific will have gone entirely differently TTL, with the German East Asia Squadron conducting merchant raiding against French Indochina and Polynesia since neither Britain, Australia, and perhaps most significantly, Japan, aren't in the war at all.
I suspect the colours on the map won't change much after the war, although maybe a few islands in French Polynesia would be part of the settlement to the Germans for use as coaling stations.
@Helmuth48 I don't suppose you have a map of the post-war situation in Africa handy?

No, I did not make a map of Africa. In this TL I do not foresee anything exciting there. Except that Gabon and French Congo go to Germany, in exchange France gets Togoland.
 
This one I have my doubts about, mostly because of the shorter war and how British banks were still collecting French loans. The great shift of capital across the Atlantic to New York has been severely curtailed in this timeline, so I wouldn't say America would be richer or more inward looking, since they haven't gained or lost anything in the war (although I'm sure France has taken out loans from New York banks as well as from London). America can remain happy as 'the great neutral' without having had to invest anything and without having lost anything either.
Was it unclear than I meant that ATL-USA woudl be richer and more inward looking than OTL-USA, i.e. it is a relative comparison? Obviously, yes as a non-aligned country, the USA seems to itself to be the same, however, from our perspective then they are going down a different path.

Why a neutral USA would be more inward looking should be obvious, i.e. with no war they remain "the great neutral", where foreign countries and their trouble is seen mostly as a matter of securing trade.

In terms of why a non-aligned USA will be richer than in OTL, then please consider the following:
- no ww1 dead and wounded - adds 300.000 more healthy young men in their prime to the economy.
- no ww1 mobilisation - 4 million young men can do productive stuff for 2-3 years instead of killing Germans.
- no ww1 expenditure - OTL the USA used some 33 billion dollars on ww1 (in 1916 total tax income for the US state was 0.7 billion, so the war necessitated massive tax increases, which significantly damaged growth).
 
For a German landing on the southern coast, you will need to take into account the Russian fleet, coastal artillery, and different minefields the Russians would have laid on the Gulf of Finland and the Archipelago Sea, along with the Russian Army units on the mainland. A landing in southern Finland will be a major operation that can get quite costly to the Germans before they manage a good foothold on the Finnish mainland. IOTL, the German landings in southern Finland were so easy in 1918 because the Russian military had disintegrated and left, and the Finnish Reds were totally unable to protect the coastal areas against a professional military. The Germans practically moved into a military vacuum. In 1916, with the Russian military still functional and operational, the landings would be significantly more difficult.

The coastal fortifications tended to be antiquated, but the minefields are definitely a major, major concern, no doubt about it. I suspect you are right that any German operation in Finland would happen as in OTL -- in the final weeks of the war, after they've done mine clearing, the Russians have withdrawn much of their army, and the Finnish nationalists have begun a rising.
 
And Germans did see, how bad were the losses against well prepaered defenders - in this case French losses against German defenders - there are more reasons for Germany for not to attack and not conquer than to attack and conquer.

I expect that in the final phase, there might be limited local German offensives, perhaps as a way to put pressure on France to make peace. Somewhat skeptical the Germans would do anything more ambitious.
 
The coastal fortifications tended to be antiquated, but the minefields are definitely a major, major concern, no doubt about it. I suspect you are right that any German operation in Finland would happen as in OTL -- in the final weeks of the war, after they've done mine clearing, the Russians have withdrawn much of their army, and the Finnish nationalists have begun a rising.

About the bolded: since 1913 there was a major Russian effort to build fortified coastal artillery positions and emplace heavy and super heavy guns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. By 1916 it had created some results, as well, even if the system was still not entirely completed. So there would also be a decent number of modern or at least semi-modern coastal guns (with calibres up to 12 inches and ranges up to 35 km) on the Finnish coast covering those Russian minefields and the approaches towards Helsinki and Tallinn, the main Russian naval bases in the central Gulf of Finland.

This rough map shows the coastal batteries and their approximate ranges in 1917:

rannikkokartta5.gif
 
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About the bolded: since 1913 there was a major Russian effort to build fortified coastal artillery positions and emplace heavy and super heavy guns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. By 1916 it had created some results, as well, even if the system was still not entirely completed. So there would also be a decent number of modern or at least semi-modern coastal guns (with calibres up to 12 inches and ranges up to 35 km) on the Finnish coast covering those Russian minefields and the approaches towards Helsinki and Tallinn, the main Russian naval bases in the central Gulf of Finland.

This rough map shows the coastal batteries and their approximate ranges in 1917:

View attachment 637130

Hmmmm... fair enough. It becomes easier to see why the Germans did not try a landing any farther east than Hanko, even before considering the minefields.
 

kham_coc

Banned
As already mentioned by others, there are a number of reasons for this:
  1. The French have a fortress belt running parallel to the Franco-German border. Attacking these fortresses will be too costly, as the Battle of Verdun (OTL) shows.
  2. Many more soldiers are needed for an offensive than for a defense. These troops are not available because they are deployed against Russia.
  3. There is no need to invade France. When Russia gives up the war, France has no choice but to give up the war as well. The French will realize that it is impossible to win on their own.

Presumably, it's also related to the terms of British non-intervention, that is, no conquest of metropolitan France (Cutting Russia down a size is fine, but if Germany can break France, the balance is all gone, thus the UK will want France to remain a great power) - Thus any substantial invasions would be pointless anyway.
 
About the bolded: since 1913 there was a major Russian effort to build fortified coastal artillery positions and emplace heavy and super heavy guns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. By 1916 it had created some results, as well, even if the system was still not entirely completed. So there would also be a decent number of modern or at least semi-modern coastal guns (with calibres up to 12 inches and ranges up to 35 km) on the Finnish coast covering those Russian minefields and the approaches towards Helsinki and Tallinn, the main Russian naval bases in the central Gulf of Finland.

This rough map shows the coastal batteries and their approximate ranges in 1917:

View attachment 637130

okay, you convinced me with that map. A landing in southern Finland may not be such a good plan after all. Is there still a way to sail around Aland and land in Vaasa? Or is it better for the Germans to concentrate solely on an attack from the south towards St. Petersburg?
 
About the bolded: since 1913 there was a major Russian effort to build fortified coastal artillery positions and emplace heavy and super heavy guns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. By 1916 it had created some results, as well, even if the system was still not entirely completed. So there would also be a decent number of modern or at least semi-modern coastal guns (with calibres up to 12 inches and ranges up to 35 km) on the Finnish coast covering those Russian minefields and the approaches towards Helsinki and Tallinn, the main Russian naval bases in the central Gulf of Finland.

This rough map shows the coastal batteries and their approximate ranges in 1917:

View attachment 637130

I still read a little further. OTL landings on Ösel and Dagö were successful, despite artillery and minefields present. See Operation Albion (The German wiki is more comprehensive). To what extent would this operation be comparable to an ATL landing at Hanko?
 
Well...

For one thing, more of the German army is in the East in this timeline...

For another, the French only have about 190 miles of front to defend, instead of the 400+ of our timeline. And a lot of that front has extensive pre-war fortifications (cf. especially the Verdun-Toul zone).

Possible solutions for breakthrough (expect high casualties w/ either):

a) Head northwest for Colmar just south of the Meurthe and take both unfortified sides of that river. Then focus on the Moselle River between Toul and Epinal. If the waters are low, there are places that can be crossed.

b) Head northwest from Metz towards the area between Sedan and Verdun. The Meuse will be trickier to cross but French planners appear to assume it can't be and there are few fortifications behind either waterway.

Ultimately, if the French have just lost two offensives, they likely stay behind their fortifications for a while and the space in front is vulnerable. Even just taking everything in front of the line above puts large chunks of Meurth-et-Moselle and Vosges in German hands, which is better than just sitting at the border.
 
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I still read a little further. OTL landings on Ösel and Dagö were successful, despite artillery and minefields present. See Operation Albion (The German wiki is more comprehensive). To what extent would this operation be comparable to an ATL landing at Hanko?

Timing is important here. Operation Albion was realized in October 1917, after the February Revolution and just before the October Revolution. By this point, the revolutionary turmoil in Russia had caused the military's readiness and ability to fight to collapse. This process was most early and complete in the Russian Navy, and in the units that were in close contact with revolutionary sailors - like the coastal artillery. The naval defence's battle value took a dive already in the spring of 1917, with the events of the February Revolution, which included revolutionary soldiers taking over their units and ships to form their own soviets to run them, and going about and killing their officers even in broad daylight. In Helsinki alone, revolutionaries in the navy and other units killed from 50 to 100 officers in the spring of 1917, including several generals and admirals. You can imagine what a process like this, the total breakdown of discipline, officer authority, and the chain of command, did to different units and in general to the Russian naval defence's ability to fight.

If you posit a German invasion of Finland before/in late 1916 instead of late 1917 when Operation Albion took place, you will have to take into account that the Russian naval defence is still operational, its units are more or less cohesive and at least nominally ready for battle, a state of affairs that did not exist after the February Revolution. It will therefore be more difficult and costly than the OTL Albion, which was conducted against a paralyzed enemy whose soldiers had committed extensive self-sabotage against their own forces.

Referring to the map I posted above, if the Germans want to do an invasion of Hanko and the Finnish southern coast in 1916, they should arguably do an Operation Albion, that is take the Estonian islands before it, first. That way the invasion fleet entering the Finnish coastal area would not be under artillery fire from the south as well as from the north. Taking the Ålands would have to happen first, too.
 
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OTL, the European Union (or rather the common market which came before it) was a deliberate attempt at creating a supranational collaboration in order to prevent further devastating wars. Why would a victorious Germany high on nationalism seek an supranational collaboration?

Sure, we might get things like a common currency or a high court for trade matters, but anything beyond that seems dubious.

Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Belgium would be unlikely to benefit from being part of a German led common market, as this would threaten their exports to UK, US and rest of world.
The thing about Mitteleuropa is that it was not some kind of proto EU. No it was basicly a collection of German puppetstates and Mitteleuropa was the way to control them. Obviously countries who would have a choice to stay out of it (like all neutral countries), would remain outside of it. Also after a pretty harsh war, I doubt Germany would start another one just to add some countries to Mitteleuropa.
 
If you posit a German invasion of Finland before/in late 1916 instead of late 1917 when Operation Albion took place, you will have to take into account that the Russian naval defence is still operational, its units are more or less cohesive and at least nominally ready for battle, a state of affairs that did not exist after the February Revolution. It will therefore be more difficult and costly than the OTL Albion, which was conducted against a paralyzed enemy whose soldiers had committed extensive self-sabotage against their own forces.

Excellent point.
 
The thing about Mitteleuropa is that it was not some kind of proto EU. No it was basicly a collection of German puppetstates and Mitteleuropa was the way to control them. Obviously countries who would have a choice to stay out of it (like all neutral countries), would remain outside of it. Also after a pretty harsh war, I doubt Germany would start another one just to add some countries to Mitteleuropa.
Very well said - this was exactly the point I was making.

You would have to have either a huge external threat or a very big carrot (like Northern Schleswig for Denmark) in order to get a neutral to join.

In some ways, perhaps the development of the British or French colonial empire would be a better model for Mitteleuropa (as Bismarck supposedly quipped: "my map of Africa lies in Europe").
 
Timing is important here. Operation Albion was realized in October 1917, after the February Revolution and just before the October Revolution. By this point, the revolutionary turmoil in Russia had caused the military's readiness and ability to fight to collapse. This process was most early and complete in the Russian Navy, and in the units that were in close contact with revolutionary sailors - like the coastal artillery. The naval defence's battle value took a dive already in the spring of 1917, with the events of the February Revolution, which included revolutionary soldiers taking over their units and ships to form their own soviets to run them, and going about and killing their officers even in broad daylight. In Helsinki alone, revolutionaries in the navy and other units killed from 50 to 100 officers in the spring of 1917, including several generals and admirals. You can imagine what a process like this, the total breakdown of discipline, officer authority, and the chain of command, did to different units and in general to the Russian naval defence's ability to fight.

If you posit a German invasion of Finland before/in late 1916 instead of late 1917 when Operation Albion took place, you will have to take into account that the Russian naval defence is still operational, its units are more or less cohesive and at least nominally ready for battle, a state of affairs that did not exist after the February Revolution. It will therefore be more difficult and costly than the OTL Albion, which was conducted against a paralyzed enemy whose soldiers had committed extensive self-sabotage against their own forces.

Referring to the map I posted above, if the Germans want to do an invasion of Hanko and the Finnish southern coast in 1916, they should arguably do an Operation Albion, that is take the Estonian islands before it, first. That way the invasion fleet entering the Finnish coastal area would not be under artillery fire from the south as well as from the north. Taking the Ålands would have to happen first, too.

Thank you for your explanation! This gives a better picture of the situation. Taking the Estonian and Aland islands first fits within this TL, but it may not be the best route to St. Petersburg.

I wonder what Finland's status will be in a peace deal with Russia if Finland is not invaded.
 
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