Was Britain Right to Enter WWI?

[Erzherzog_Karl]

I am not shifting goalposts. Perhaps could you point me out why France and Russia were sending peace offers to Germany asking for neutral mediation even after mobilization if mobilization meant war?

Tibi088 has done that repeatingly, while it was partly only by insinuation, he still mentioned the obvious use of such notions in delaying the German mobilization plans. Throwing a wedge into it. Ensuring their plan may hit off before the Germans would be ready to respond accordingly. It was common knowledge in that day and age that any delay in mobilization can seriously infringe on the military abilities of the armies called forth. The best example is the Austrian mobilization, which was changed midway and got completely bungled thanks to it. These mobilization plans hinged on being meticulously planned and carried out. They were not made to be adapted or changed midway. Same arguments the Russian High Command brought forth to Nicolas to get him to change his mind to a full mobilization.

Also, I would put the whole claim from your side aside. Germany did accept offers from the British side, but they were not given in good faith. One of these offers was that Germany and France withdraw from their borders. And then there would be no DoW from either side. This was accepted by Wilhelm himself and communicated to the British. But such an offer was then immediately withdrawn, said that such an offer was actually never given. Overall, France, Russia and the British acted in bad faith with such offers. Clark shows this nicely in his book Sleepwalkers. How for example the French politicians played this whole game for propaganda reasons and not out of some hope for peace. They did it in a proficient manner, but to equal such a deliberate realpolitik move with one done with genuine intentions is just plain wrong. It was as genuine as the German offer for the US to mediate in 1917.

In another example, at first the ultimatum from the Austrian side was lauded even by British observers and politicians. Then the tone changed and Grey declared it as the most horrendous example of an ultimatum ever given. I mean the heir to the throne was murdered by a member of an organization that was led by a high ranking member of the Serbian Government and the ultimatum was accepted in every point except to allow the participation of Austrian police. This whole process proves such words to be utterly wrong. Depending on which historian you follow the Serbians formulated their response deliberately in a manner to seem conciliatory or actually rejected it outright. Personally, I lean to the later interpretation. Austria had more than reasonable cause to disbelieve any information given by Serbian sources, because they were the assumed instigator of the assassination. This obviously made the point about their participation in the investigation one of the main and most important points.
So, another case of one side playing out the motions to seem good to the public but actually giving the other side the figurative middle finger.


Lastly to the point of the thread, it was a mistake in my opinion for Britain to get involved. They lost far more than they could possibly win. Personally, I find the notion that Germany had some kind of strategic master plan for economic dominance or other such notions to be utterly ridiculous. These thoughts are mostly extrapolated from singular statements from one personage. Germany did not even have a coherent "Weltmachtpolitik" but somehow has such an economic master plan hidden away...just no. The German diplomacy and economic politics was simply not on the level to plan such a thing or pull it off. To proclaim something else is making pet projects into bigger things than they actually were.
Germany wanted to have the biggest fleet. How did that turn out again? Did they even go all in on that? Or did they have to fight for every penny spend on it?

 

[InMediasRes]

Is what the heads of the military agree on necessarily what the government decides to do?

When your militaries negotiate the single most important convention for your nations security and during the negotiations agree that mobilization means war, and when the governments then ratify that military convention, then yes I would think so.

 

[Tibi088]

Wrong question. Why was it necessary for Germany to mobilise - because their entire war plan relied on mobilising faster than the other parties.

To blame others for doing something which only leads to war because of the operational plans that you have drawn up is dishonest. Mobilising is not an act of war as has been pointed out. Or would you grant Germany the right to determine what goes on within another countries borders in peacetime (which to be fair is exactly what Austria requested of Serbia).

If you take he trouble to read back a few post, @InMediasRes pointed out that the chief of both the french and russian general staff stated it is - and it surely was for the germans.

Mobilizing much faster than Russia was one of the biggest adventages of a heavily outnumbered Germany - expecting them to completly give it up because France and Russia - though decided to go to war - does not send DoW's before they are ready with their mobilization which completly negates one of Germanies biggest adventages without firing a shot is ridicolous - and would be supremely idiotic and irresponsible for any german military planner to adopt.

 

[TDM]

Just 'modern' Europe, after Napoleon dis his thing across Europe, Egypt and Russia

Not even then?

 

[Derek Pullem]

Lastly to the point of the thread, it was a mistake in my opinion for Britain to get involved. They lost far more than they could possibly win. Personally, I find the notion that Germany had some kind of strategic master plan for economic dominance or other such notions to be utterly ridiculous. These thoughts are mostly extrapolated from singular statements from one personage. Germany did not even have a coherent "Weltmachtpolitik" but somehow has such an economic master plan hidden away...just no. The German diplomacy and economic politics was simply not on the level to plan such a thing or pull it off. To proclaim something else is making pet projects into bigger things than they actually were.
Germany wanted to have the biggest fleet. How did that turn out again? Did they even go all in on that? Or did they have to fight for every penny spend on it?

Whilst with hindsight Britain lost more from entering WW1 than they could possibly have imagined, this applies to every other combatant (even the USA although it's impact on their economy was marginal).

Napoleon had no master plan for European hegemony, it just evolved on the back of his military success. Realpolitik is such that nations who end up in dominant positions of power will usually exploit it until other nations are able to compete / resist. Germany would have established a European hegemony after a crushing defeat of the Entente, just as the Entente tried to crush Germany at Versailles. The argument on the German side would be that Bismarck let the French off too lightly in 1871 and look where it led us to.

I agree Germany had no idea of how this would work or what the consequences in Russia and France would be. If Germany's rapid victory resulted in the Bolshevik takeover and Communism would future alt-historians be questioning Germany's responsibilities for the "Cold War" (or even "Great Eastern War") against USSR later. Instead of in OTL where the Russian revolution is mostly regarded as an inevitable outcome of the Russian decision to go to war on top of a dysfunctional society.

 

[Belisarius II]

If you're talking about the Napkinprogramm er I mean Septemberprogramm, umm, yeah right
Germany would've found attempting to be the economic hegemon of Europe like herding cats... It didn't work for Nap, it wouldn't have worked for Willy either.
A victorious German Empire may have found hegemony over Europe more costly than defeat turned out to be in the long run...
If the UK had "sat this one out", her three biggest geopolitical rivals would've bashed each other over their heads until they were senseless... IMO being the last man standing is usually a good thing...

I have to disagree with you on this one. The economies of Europe in 1914 were very different then those of the Napoleonic Wars. The ability of a modern State to regulate trade policy, and currency flows was far greater, then 100 years before. The scale of smuggling that destroyed the CS would be impossible in the 20th Century. By 1913 Germany was already the dominate trading partner for most of continental Europe, and had the highest level of reciprocal investment. Control of the Continent, would enable the Germans to create a tight trade block that could close out the UK from European Markets. Germany would have access to food, and strategic metals, and a Berlin to Baghdad RR would secure oil supplies.

The British industrial economy, and financial system was far more advanced then those of Napoleonic France, that was not the case with Imperial Germany. In1913 Germany had a larger population, GDP, and steel production, had the worlds leading chemical industry, and produced half of the worlds electrical equipment. The decline of Britain's global economic dominance was why Britain had to abandon "Splendid Isolation" in 1902, for a Japanese alliance to protect it's Asia, Pacific interests. Only in coalition with France, Russia, and Italy could Britain hope to contend with Germany, and her allies. Waiting for France, and Russia to be defeated, and crippled would leave Britain alone, with just Japan as an effective global ally. The only long term hope would be trying to convince the United States to take a more active part in global affairs, and that would be a heavy lift. The USA's position was complicated, to say the least.

 

[Post]

When your militaries negotiate the single most important convention for your nations security and during the negotiations agree that mobilization means war, and when the governments then ratify that military convention, then yes I would think so.

OK. But if the mediation that was suggested by France and Russia goes anywhere, I doubt that the government attacks regardless.

 

[InMediasRes]

OK. But if the mediation that was suggested by France and Russia goes anywhere, I doubt that the government attacks regardless.

That is of course assuming that the attempts at mediation at that stage were still in good faith. And as pointed out by others, there are indications and incentives that they weren't.

 

[Derek Pullem]

If you take he trouble to read back a few post, @InMediasRes pointed out that the chief of both the french and russian general staff stated it is - and it surely was for the germans.

Mobilizing much faster than Russia was one of the biggest adventages of a heavily outnumbered Germany - expecting them to completly give it up because France and Russia - though decided to go to war - does not send DoW's before they are ready with their mobilization which completly negates one of Germanies biggest adventages without firing a shot is ridicolous - and would be supremely idiotic and irresponsible for any german military planner to adopt.

Actually the quote that InMediaRes used was referring to a statement made in 1892 by General Boisdeferre to Tzar Alexander, Boisdeffre was assistant Chief of Staff at the time. I'd be more comfortable with a slightly more contemporary quote to illustrate the attitudes of the French and Russian governments

Mobilisation is a hostile action and will lead to war unless it is halted. It has been halted before and thank god we don't have the German attitude to military preparedness now or we'd all be in radioactive ruins after a Defcon III alert. There is a political choice to end the war before it starts during mobilisation. Germany's decision was to start the war before the other guy could finish mobilising - a nuclear first strike policy if you like.

 

[TDM]

I would modify that only the german mobilization ment an immediate move to war - against Luxembourg. And shortly afte against belgium and the others yes.
Russian and french mobilization ment a war 15 days later - which again is marginally better as it theoretically leaves a 15 day time to save peace. OTOH in 1914 Russia was resolved to war on the 1st of August - by refusing the german ultimatum to stop a mobilization that was leading to war.

Hang on in the first sentence you say only German Mobilisation means an immediate move to war (because you recognise that German mobilisation and invasion are functionally the same thing here), but then in the second sentence you claim Russian refusal to stop mobilising was also?

Also , Germany is not the sole arbiter of who does what and the German ultimatum does not carry ultimate authority especially because of Germanies actions

Fact of the matter was that Russia was mobilizing which ment they have decided that there will be a war. The sincerity of any offer is more than doubtfull at that point.

See above you already agree Russian mobilisation doesn't automatically lead to war

Only the offer wasn't just Russia but also France ( Britain too and IIRC the US was making similar offers). So unless you have proof that everyone was using it as a smoke screen then the responsibility for the negotiation not taking place stays with those who refused the offer to negotiate. Even more so refusing the offer also fits in with the established pattern of choices made by AH and Germany. They had after all worked hard to get this war going they're not going fall at the last hurdle because someone was offering a reasonable alternative to war.

Because that could delay german mobilization and would lead to Conrad the idiot adopt the Serbian only mobilization plan? They could have lost nothing by adapting this tactics and ended up winning big time.

True but that's limitation brought about by Germanies and AH's war plans which is their problem not anyone else's

 

[Sarthak]

Did I not just do that? It helps to shore up domestic support if you can claim the war is entirely defensive.

Certainly true i admit. The color books from all sides are reason enough for this.

And worst case, you can delay your enemy's plans which would have worked totally in France's and Russia's favor.

When the heads of both militaries explicitly agree that mobilization means war, I'm not sure what other proof I can offer you. Russia refused to halt mobilization on Germany's insistence, knowing full well that they had agreed with the French that mobilization means war. Not sure some attempts at mediation afterwards can be given much credence after that, and instead look very much like bad-faith negotiations to gain advantages.

Regardless the quote you gave was that of 1892, which did not highlight the situation of 1914 at all and by that point the French general staff had changed, and so had the government. This is the same france which had hostile relations to Germany in the 1870s, good relation with the Germans in the 1880s and 90s and bad relations in the 1900s. A quote from ~25 years prior is not an argument at all.

 

[Sarthak]

Tibi088 has done that repeatingly, while it was partly only by insinuation, he still mentioned the obvious use of such notions in delaying the German mobilization plans. Throwing a wedge into it. Ensuring their plan may hit off before the Germans would be ready to respond accordingly. It was common knowledge in that day and age that any delay in mobilization can seriously infringe on the military abilities of the armies called forth. The best example is the Austrian mobilization, which was changed midway and got completely bungled thanks to it. These mobilization plans hinged on being meticulously planned and carried out. They were not made to be adapted or changed midway. Same arguments the Russian High Command brought forth to Nicolas to get him to change his mind to a full mobilization.

Also, I would put the whole claim from your side aside. Germany did accept offers from the British side, but they were not given in good faith. One of these offers was that Germany and France withdraw from their borders. And then there would be no DoW from either side. This was accepted by Wilhelm himself and communicated to the British. But such an offer was then immediately withdrawn, said that such an offer was actually never given. Overall, France, Russia and the British acted in bad faith with such offers. Clark shows this nicely in his book Sleepwalkers. How for example the French politicians played this whole game for propaganda reasons and not out of some hope for peace. They did it in a proficient manner, but to equal such a deliberate realpolitik move with one done with genuine intentions is just plain wrong. It was as genuine as the German offer for the US to mediate in 1917.

In another example, at first the ultimatum from the Austrian side was lauded even by British observers and politicians. Then the tone changed and Grey declared it as the most horrendous example of an ultimatum ever given. I mean the heir to the throne was murdered by a member of an organization that was led by a high ranking member of the Serbian Government and the ultimatum was accepted in every point except to allow the participation of Austrian police. This whole process proves such words to be utterly wrong. Depending on which historian you follow the Serbians formulated their response deliberately in a manner to seem conciliatory or actually rejected it outright. Personally, I lean to the later interpretation. Austria had more than reasonable cause to disbelieve any information given by Serbian sources, because they were the assumed instigator of the assassination. This obviously made the point about their participation in the investigation one of the main and most important points.
So, another case of one side playing out the motions to seem good to the public but actually giving the other side the figurative middle finger.


Lastly to the point of the thread, it was a mistake in my opinion for Britain to get involved. They lost far more than they could possibly win. Personally, I find the notion that Germany had some kind of strategic master plan for economic dominance or other such notions to be utterly ridiculous. These thoughts are mostly extrapolated from singular statements from one personage. Germany did not even have a coherent "Weltmachtpolitik" but somehow has such an economic master plan hidden away...just no. The German diplomacy and economic politics was simply not on the level to plan such a thing or pull it off. To proclaim something else is making pet projects into bigger things than they actually were.
Germany wanted to have the biggest fleet. How did that turn out again? Did they even go all in on that? Or did they have to fight for every penny spend on it?

Britain's offers, one of it anyway, was indeed made in bad faith.
However the other offers included Dutch mediation, or mediation from the Hague Court, which was categorically told no by Germany.

Tibi088 has done that repeatingly, while it was partly only by insinuation, he still mentioned the obvious use of such notions in delaying the German mobilization plans. Throwing a wedge into it. Ensuring their plan may hit off before the Germans would be ready to respond accordingly. It was common knowledge in that day and age that any delay in mobilization can seriously infringe on the military abilities of the armies called forth. The best example is the Austrian mobilization, which was changed midway and got completely bungled thanks to it. These mobilization plans hinged on being meticulously planned and carried out. They were not made to be adapted or changed midway. Same arguments the Russian High Command brought forth to Nicolas to get him to change his mind to a full mobilization.

Viviani's offer on the 31st specifically allowed mobilization on all sides as a result of rising tensions. His offer only forbid offensive actions on all sides. Such an offer being accepted would have allowed germany to take war preparations yet negotiate. Germany did not take the offer at all.

In another example, at first the ultimatum from the Austrian side was lauded even by British observers and politicians. Then the tone changed and Grey declared it as the most horrendous example of an ultimatum ever given. I mean the heir to the throne was murdered by a member of an organization that was led by a high ranking member of the Serbian Government and the ultimatum was accepted in every point except to allow the participation of Austrian police. This whole process proves such words to be utterly wrong. Depending on which historian you follow the Serbians formulated their response deliberately in a manner to seem conciliatory or actually rejected it outright. Personally, I lean to the later interpretation. Austria had more than reasonable cause to disbelieve any information given by Serbian sources, because they were the assumed instigator of the assassination. This obviously made the point about their participation in the investigation one of the main and most important points.
So, another case of one side playing out the motions to seem good to the public but actually giving the other side the figurative middle finger.

The answer to the ultimatum which i posted upthread allows neutral supervisors to the investigation, meaning independent powers like the Swiss, Dutch, Swedes, and Spaniards, to which even the Kaiser agreed to. Serbia's answer to the ultimatum was hailed throughout europe as acceptable and a great diplomatic move that removed all clauses for war. The Austrian ambassador on the other hand been told to return to Vienna whether or not Serbia accepted the ultimatum. That speaks volumes itself.

 

[InMediasRes]

Actually the quote that InMediaRes used was referring to a statement made in 1892 by General Boisdeferre to Tzar Alexander, Boisdeffre was assistant Chief of Staff at the time. I'd be more comfortable with a slightly more contemporary quote to illustrate the attitudes of the French and Russian governments

A quote from ~25 years prior is not an argument at all.

In that case, maybe you should provide a quote to the opposite? The agreement on that principle, not only based on a single quote by Boisdeferre but on general agreement among the general staffs, was foundational to the military convention. If you assert that this fundamental attitude changed afterwards, is there anything to back that up? Because as far as I can tell, the only development in the following years was a concretization and speeding up of a coordinated attack plan following mobilization.

 

[Erzherzog_Karl]

Whilst with hindsight Britain lost more from entering WW1 than they could possibly have imagined, this applies to every other combatant (even the USA although it's impact on their economy was marginal).

Napoleon had no master plan for European hegemony, it just evolved on the back of his military success. Realpolitik is such that nations who end up in dominant positions of power will usually exploit it until other nations are able to compete / resist. Germany would have established a European hegemony after a crushing defeat of the Entente, just as the Entente tried to crush Germany at Versailles. The argument on the German side would be that Bismarck let the French off too lightly in 1871 and look where it led us to.

I agree Germany had no idea of how this would work or what the consequences in Russia and France would be. If Germany's rapid victory resulted in the Bolshevik takeover and Communism would future alt-historians be questioning Germany's responsibilities for the "Cold War" (or even "Great Eastern War") against USSR later. Instead of in OTL where the Russian revolution is mostly regarded as an inevitable outcome of the Russian decision to go to war on top of a dysfunctional society.

If you are the strongest, biggest Empire in the World, you have the most to lose. I think the balancing sheet in Britain was extremely screwed for them to consider it a good idea. Like other countries they did not consider the cost. How bad they did some things initially gives credit to this notion in my mind. Best example their navies idiotic patrol in bad formation at the beginning of the war. Britain had their own problems and if they had genuinely negotiated for their interests Germany would have likely acquiesced to their demands for neutrality. Regarding the US, I would strongly disagree. WWI was a blessing for the US as a whole.

The comparison with Napoleon is horrible and fails. First, Napoleon's rise to power was actually seen as positive in Britain, because they thought him a moderate influence on France. Then they also made peace with him. The problem was Napoleon's unrelenting hunger for conquest, which cannot be compared to the actions of Imperial Germany. They were not known for starting one war after another in the last decade or would actually proclaim plan in that direction.

Germany would not be alone and would have to accommodate two other great powers in A-H and Italy just on the continent. The Triple Alliance was in no way ever exploitative towards the other parties. Considering how the Italians screwed the other two over, it was more directed against Germany and A-H than otherwise. How this would then change towards Germany dictates it all, remains nebulous to me. It is not like France was highly competitive against the German economy before WWI, taking them out would hardly bring forward such a massive change. A-H had a higher growth rate than Germany and was getting their hit-off, Italy without losses and debts could easily come out ahead of it. I honestly have troubles seeing Germany being able to massively exploit a victory on the scale claimed.
The biggest part would likely be the gains in Eastern Europe, which would near totally enter the German sphere of influence but for Middle Europe, I don't see it. Belgium was not intended for annexation, Netherlands was neutral, the same for Denmark and Switzerland. Luxembourg maybe? Or some further part from France, but both could hardly enable Germany to force A-H and Italy to follow their lead however they decide. If Germany would somehow end up being the last remaining Great Power standing, I could see it, but with a Central Power victory through British inaction...I don't think it is possible for Germany to become such a dominant force.

Depending on how Russia turned out, I agree Germany would likely have a strong current of historians blaming a big part of Soviet Russia becoming a thing on Germany. Similarly to Versailles Peace being blamed partly for the Fall of the Weimarer Republic.

 

[Belisarius II]

Which is true, as far as treaties. If Serbian Independence was so important to the Tsar, should have signed a treaty stating such in guarantee of Independence, plus military support, in a secret or not so secret provision.

Otherwise, Russia had just as much right to invade Germany from their crossing the Luxembourg border, for non-treaty support

It's not as if the whole world didn't know Serbia was a Russian Client State. The United States has no formal alliance with Israel, but watch what happens if a major power attacks them. Russia didn't invade Germany in 1914. Russia ordered a partial mobilization, Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, and France, and invading Luxemburg, and Belgium. The Germans didn't even consult their Austrian Allies, they just declared war, and crossed international borders. It's hard to try to make out Russia as the aggressor in 1914. Yes the Serbs needed to be punished for the killing of the Archduke, and his wife, but starting a war to wipe it off the map was grossly irresponsible.

 

[Derek Pullem]

In that case, maybe you should provide a quote to the opposite? The agreement on that principle, not only based on a single quote by Boisdeferre but on general agreement among the general staffs, was foundational to the military convention. If you assert that this fundamental attitude changed afterwards, is there anything to back that up? Because as far as I can tell, the only development in the following years was a concretization and speeding up of a coordinated attack plan following mobilization.

You are using that quote to support the assertion that the French government knew when they started mobilising (or when Russia started mobilising) that war was inevitable.

I would respectfully suggest the burden of proof lies with you.

 

[Sarthak]

Anyways regarding German 'innocence' regarding mobilization.....

Pg 75 of Catastrophe: Europe at war

from pg 76

Germany deciding to mobilize on the 29th, one day before the Russians very surprising indeed!

pg 81-82

 

[Tibi088]

Hang on in the first sentence you say only German Mobilisation means an immediate move to war (because you recognise that German mobilisation and invasion are functionally the same thing here), but then in the second sentence you claim Russian refusal to stop mobilising was also?

Also , Germany is not the sole arbiter of who does what and the German ultimatum does not carry ultimate authority specially because of Germanies actions



See above you already agree Russian mobilisation doesn't automatically lead to war

Only the offer wasn't just Russia but also France ( Britain too and IIRC the US was making similar offers). So unless you have proof that everyone was using it as smoke screen then the responsibility for the negotiation not taking place stays with those who refused the offer to negotiate. Even more so refusing the offer also fits in with the established pattern of choices made by AH and Germany. They had after worked hard to get this war going theiy're not going fall at the last hurdle because someone was offering a reasonable alternative to war.


True but that's limitation brought about by Germanies and AH's war plans which is their problem not anyone else's

No I never agreed that Russian mobilization was not automatically leading to war. I admitted that it would have led automatically to war only if the germans were idiotic enough to wait for them to make the first move.

Russia ordered mobilization first - and refused to stop it when it became a clear cut case that it means war. This is proof that they were determined to go to war and any negotiation offer was on their part dishonest. Also while germany was not mobilizing during this talk and offers Russia was. And as long as Russia is going along with its mobilization plan - which has them attacking Germany 15 days later, when France starts mobilization, Germany has to react. Even if neutral countries make sincere offers to meditate - as long as the mobilizations proceed the war is inevitable - and russia absolutely refused to stop mobilization.

 

[TDM]

I have based my claim on Zuber - given the chapter he analyzes the french and russian mobilization plans and concludes that from mobilization order they had a timetable to war. Further Russia has commited to attack Germany before he completed his mobilization as well - so Russia too was committed to attack and mobilize simultaenously from the 15th day of mobilization.

You cited a text that proves that Germany has such a timetable - you have successfully proven which I never disputed, good for you. But that says nothing of France and Russia, only you assure us that they were different. Maybe you could base that claim on something else than your assertions - like I did with the opposite?


And do you know what ultimatums are good for? They are a clear cut action, a last attampt to save peace. Why is it that Russia never issued an ultimatum to Austria? Or any statement that an austrian attack on Serbia means war? Or setting boundaries that Austria can not cross on the even of victory? A refusal of the german ultimatum makes it evident that they were not going to stand by as Austria fights Serbia. So why not make a clear cut case. Why did France not present an ultimatum to Germany, or even declared war on Germany as it was required by its alliance with Russia after Germany declared war on Russia? Would anyone here seriously argue that France would have let Russia fight Germany and Austria alone? I dont have the answer - my guess is that France has correctly guessed that the germans are attacking first - and thus would be forced to declare war on them facing the diplomatic onus of having done so. Also ambiguity - not giving an opponent a clear answer about the possibility of hostilities favours the side that mobilizes slower (Russia). OTL Russia has won 2 days and some thanks to their preparation to war measures and being first to mobilize - again we are speaking of very tight and short timetables - 2 days are a lot.

By doing that it was clear cut?

Hell Germany certainly thought so since they declared war on Russia the next day on the 1st Aug!


And frankly the rest is basically either:

1). 'why didn't the entente powers act as precipitously as Germany and AH', well because they weren't so hell bent on a war as the CP and were a trying to avoid it (with no help from the CP) and were working out if the CP was actually going to cross their individual Rubicon's, e.g. Luxembourg or Belgium!

or

2). 'why didn't France make it easy for Germany to work out which plan to go with when it starts invading everyone'. Only it's not France job to make Germanies' life easy when ordering it's mobilisations. France didn't force Germany to declare war on them, Germany is it's own grown up country and is in control of who it declares war on!

The last is key because your argument here is basically "Why didn't everyone let Germany/AH do what they wanted to do", followed by "Germany/AH was forced to act when everyone didn't". Ignoring the key point that the rest of the world doesn't owe Germany/AH anything and Germany/AH are not children and are responsible for their own choices and actions.

Edit: and dont forget the greatest effect of Russian ambiguity: The complete bothcing of the Austrian mobilization plans. Dont get me wrong, Conrad was an idiot to go with a Serbia only mobilization plan before making sure of Russian intentions. But even he would not have ignored it if Russia stated on say they 25th of July - the day the serbians answered the ultimatum - that they will fight if austria declares war.

Conrad being an idiot is AH's / Germanies' problem not the Entente's. Hell if AH had been faster in July as Germany urged them to be and when sympathy was still more solidly on their side they might have been able to do this without the escalation and by 'asking forgiveness rather then permission'. But instead you have a plan that won't now work because the context it is in has changed, being stuck to because of political investment and the assumption that "oh well we'll just beat everyone as per our plans" can't fail.

 

[Derek Pullem]

If you are the strongest, biggest Empire in the World, you have the most to lose. I think the balancing sheet in Britain was extremely screwed for them to consider it a good idea. Like other countries they did not consider the cost. How bad they did some things initially gives credit to this notion in my mind. Best example their navies idiotic patrol in bad formation at the beginning of the war. Britain had their own problems and if they had genuinely negotiated for their interests Germany would have likely acquiesced to their demands for neutrality. Regarding the US, I would strongly disagree. WWI was a blessing for the US as a whole.

The comparison with Napoleon is horrible and fails. First, Napoleon's rise to power was actually seen as positive in Britain, because they thought him a moderate influence on France. Then they also made peace with him. The problem was Napoleon's unrelenting hunger for conquest, which cannot be compared to the actions of Imperial Germany. They were not known for starting one war after another in the last decade or would actually proclaim plan in that direction.

Germany would not be alone and would have to accommodate two other great powers in A-H and Italy just on the continent. The Triple Alliance was in no way ever exploitative towards the other parties. Considering how the Italians screwed the other two over, it was more directed against Germany and A-H than otherwise. How this would then change towards Germany dictates it all, remains nebulous to me. It is not like France was highly competitive against the German economy before WWI, taking them out would hardly bring forward such a massive change. A-H had a higher growth rate than Germany and was getting their hit-off, Italy without losses and debts could easily come out ahead of it. I honestly have troubles seeing Germany being able to massively exploit a victory on the scale claimed.
The biggest part would likely be the gains in Eastern Europe, which would near totally enter the German sphere of influence but for Middle Europe, I don't see it. Belgium was not intended for annexation, Netherlands was neutral, the same for Denmark and Switzerland. Luxembourg maybe? Or some further part from France, but both could hardly enable Germany to force A-H and Italy to follow their lead however they decide. If Germany would somehow end up being the last remaining Great Power standing, I could see it, but with a Central Power victory through British inaction...I don't think it is possible for Germany to become such a dominant force.

Depending on how Russia turned out, I agree Germany would likely have a strong current of historians blaming a big part of Soviet Russia becoming a thing on Germany. Similarly to Versailles Peace being blamed partly for the Fall of the Weimarer Republic.

Britain could have sat the war out - I agree. In the short term it would have been to their benefit.

Napoleon was only seen as the lesser of two evils and then only by the more "liberal" elements of British society. As far as the government was concerned he was an example of the military junta France had fallen to and bear in mind that in 1802 France had yet to really fulfill the role of hegemon. That didn't happen until 1806-07 by which time relations with Britain were utterly broken

As for description of the relationships within Triple Alliance I don't recognise this at all. The outcome of a successful war would place Germany in the prime position in Europe and end up with Austria facing even greater nationalities issues and Italy would be complaining about how they had been left out of the spoils. A-H was never going to overtake Germany as the economic powerhouse no matter how fast their growth rate was for a few short years. Germany would have a dominant influence in Belgium and Holland (finlandisation if you will), significant reparations from France (and Russia if it survives), actual gains in the Baltics and Poland and economic dominance over the remaining states of Eastern Europe. Not far short of what they gained from the early years of WW2 but with no military conflict to impact its development. To be honest there would be no need for the Triple Alliance post the war - German foreign policy could well become antagonistic towards A-H to the point of actively encouraging Hungarian separatism in the Ausgleich.