Operation Compass Part 2.
12-14 December 1940. Sidi Barrani, Egypt.
With time running out before two of the 4th Indian Division’s Brigades were to be withdrawn, O’Connor had to decide on priorities. A certain amount of time was wasted on trying to sort resupply and the mess of vast quantities of Italian Prisoners. For the latter, O’Connor gave the job to the Selby Force to march the miles of prisoners back towards Marsa Matruh, under the watchful pompom guns of the A11 Matildas.
O’Connor knew it was important that the 7th Armoured Division, with its Support Group, would continue to press the retreating enemy. The armoured cars of the 11th Hussars reconnaissance patrols reported that were in contact with the Italians on a line from Halfaya Pass to Sidi Omar, where an enemy rear-guard was resisting strongly.
The 16th Infantry Brigade, having taken the most casualties the previous day, along with 48th Bn RTR were given a day to rest and re-organise. The 16th Brigade would be staying as part of Western Desert Force when the two Indian Infantry Brigades were withdrawn. O’Connor wanted them as rested as possible until the 6th Australian Division were present and up to speed. It also meant that the dwindling supplies could be distributed between just to the two Indian Brigades, while 16th Brigade would have first choice of the Italian pickings, something much appreciated by them.
In the morning of 12 December, the headquarters of 7th Armoured Division was eight miles east of Sofafi, its 4th Brigade in the Buq Buq area, the Support Group in the Sofafi area, and the 7th Brigade, pursuing the enemy north-west, had reached Bir el Khireigat. O’Connor knew that 4th Armoured Brigade would need support, so he attached it to Major-General Beresford-Peirse's 4th Indian Division for the moment. After discussions with Horace Birks, its Commanding Officer, Beresford-Peirse ordered 11th Indian Infantry Brigade to support the tanks.
In return for receiving 4th Armoured Brigade, Beresford-Peirse detached 5th Indian Brigade to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division’s Support Group. With much stronger infantry forces, 7th Armoured Brigade began their attempt to cut the road from Bardia to Tobruk and thus isolate the garrison there. While the rest of the Armoured Brigade waited for the Indian Brigade to join them, an advance-guard, consisting of part of the ubiquitous 11th Hussars; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, two batteries of the 4th Royal Horse Artillery from the Support Group; and 3rd Sharpshooters in their Valiant Mark I*, set off to do so.
By the time the rest of the force had coalesced, 7th Armoured Brigade, the Support Group and 5th Indian Brigade, advanced in the evening to where Italian rear-guard remained in strength at Sidi Omar and, having surrounded it, waited until dawn to begin to break it down. After an intense bombardment by the RHA batteries, 1st Bn RTR closed to machine gun range of the Italian position, their A10s poured fire on any attempt to resist, the Close Support tanks with HE shells for their 3.7-inch tank mortars were particularly unpopular with the Italian defenders. The tanks then moved forward to point blank range before white flags began to appear. Sorting out the prisoners and resupplying held the British up most of the morning on 13 December, and then, when they were finally able to move forward again, the reinforced Italian artillery at Fort Capuzzo brought them under sustained and accurate fire.
By 11:00hrs 12 December, strong detachments of the 4th Armoured Brigade, had patrolled the main coast road finding numbers of Italian troops in Fort Capuzzo, Sollum, Sidi Suleiman, and Halfaya. O’Connor knew that Sollum would be needed to be one of the places where some of the shipping that had extra supplies could be unload. So, he ordered that this should be attacked as a matter of priority. The 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, equipped with Valiant Mark I* were given the task, supported by 11th Indian Brigade, backed up by the artillery of 4th Indian Division.
A frontal attack was always going to be difficult, and without being able to get through the Halfaya pass, there was no way round the flanks. The Royal Navy had pounded Sollum during the previous night, so that when the Valiant tanks approached at 15:00hrs, after a barrage from the 4th Indian Division’s artillery, the Italian force began to melt away back towards Bardia. A minefield slowed the progress of the tanks, but with the support of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles they managed to put the Italians on the run. Here the speed of the Valiant I* came into its own, with the Cameron Highlanders in lorries accompanying them, they chased the retreating Italians along the road towards Fort Capuzzo. However, the light was fading and the weather continued to be appalling.
The inclination of the armoured regiment was to go into laager at night, but if they did so, the Italians would reach safety and have to be dealt with later. So, they kept going, machine gunning and firing their main guns at the Italian trucks whenever they could. Very quickly they came within range of the Italian artillery at Fort Capuzzo, which meant they stopped to regroup, resupply and hold the road. To go up against the Italian forces at Fort Capuzzo, they would need the artillery to catch up with them. Because of a communication breakdown, this took much longer to achieve than they’d hoped. Most of 13 December was wasted while 4th Armoured Brigade, 11th Indian Brigade and 4th Division troops sorted themselves out. They had been caught out by the speed of the Italian retreat, and were struggling to get their own re-supply forward, especially ammunition for the artillery.
6th Bn RTR in their A10s, with 4/7th Rajput Regiment made an attempt at the same time on 12 December as the attack on Sollum to dig out the Italian forces in Halfaya Pass, but it wasn’t until the Italians realised that they were on their own and in danger of being surrounded that they withdrew under the cover of night. The British tank regiment in this case did go into leaguer and so the Italians were able to join with the force at Fort Capuzzo along with those from Sidi Suleiman who also realised they were isolated.
When it became clear on the morning of 13 December that the British were approaching both from the direction of Sollum and Sidi Omar, the Italians at Fort Capuzzo decided that their position was untenable. They fell back to Bardia during the day, hotly pursued by the two pincers of the 7th Armoured Division. Fortunately for the Italians, they soon came under the protection of the artillery in Bardia, so the CO of 7th Armoured Division halted his forces. General Wavell confirmed with General O’Connor that the two Indian Brigades were to make their way back to the railhead at Marsa Matruh to begin the journey to Sudan as soon as possible. When O’Connor spoke to General Beresford-Peirse, the two men decided that this was an opportune moment. With the main body of Italians now in Bardia, O’Connor would need the fresh legs of the Australians to take them on. Urging Beresford-Peirse not to empty out any supply dumps on his way back to Marsa Matruh, they shook hands over what had been a very good piece of work.
The plan to cut the road from Bardia to Tobruk and thus isolate the garrison there continued. The force allotted advanced through Qaret Abu Faris, Gabr Lachem, Umm Maalif, crossed the Trigh Capuzzo (the track parallel to the main road and about fifteen miles south of it) at Point 211 and by 10:00hrs on the 14 December its patrols were overlooking the Bardia-Tobruk road from Bir el Baheira, and cut telephone wires along it. The 11th Hussars detachment however were badly hit by an Italian air attack, and once the road was secure returned towards the main British force to recuperate, while the 3rd Sharpshooters made the road impassable for Italian reinforcements to Bardia from the west, or to make withdrawal from Bardia very costly.
On 14 December the rest of 7th Armoured Division stood down to do whatever maintenance it could while waiting for the 6th Australian Division to move up, along with 16th Brigade, and the newly created 7th Army Tank Brigade, 40th, 44th and 48th Bn RTR in their Valiant Mark I (Infantry Tank Mark IIIs).
NB Text in italic differs from OTL. As with the previous update, I've taken the historical events as recounted in official histories and tried to imagine what differences have happened. One of the main ones, which happened in the previous part was that OTL 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades are swapped around, here they aren't so, while they did roughly OTL it was a different unit here. All in all I've basically cut three days off the OTL battle. Cutting the road between Bardia and Tobruk is the same, 10:00hrs 14 December. But the capture of Sollum and Halfaya pass, with subsequent withdrawal of the Italian forces into Bardia is ahead of schedule. As is the arrival of the Australians and obviously the non-existent 7th Army Tank Brigade. Sidi Omar didn't fall until 16 December, the attack on Sollum and Halfaya Pass didn't happen OTL, not sure why, it is 25 miles from Buq Buq to Sollum, too busy collecting prisoners? O'Connor was reported at being furious that Italians escaped during the night because the British tankies stopped at night. OTL the Italians pull back into Bardia on 16 December, here on 13 December. It made sense in my head when I was writing it.