The Forge of Weyland

Perhaps inspired by recent armoured points of departure from history sonofpegasus has posted an update about defending Malta that raises some interesting ideas about field adaptations. Link to post

I wonder if a spade/shovel attached to the front of universal carriers or APCs might prove useful?
Not as useful as putting them on the rear. That would allow them to mount a bigger gun...
 
14-15 May Holland/Ardennes
13th - 14th May - Holland

While the majority of the airborne troops had been in a hopeless position since the failure to reinforce them, they were elite troops who kept on fighting until overwhelmed or running out of ammunition. Without the ability to send fast-moving and armoured forces to relieve them, their struggle was brave but ultimately futile. The fact that they were mainly in isolated small units around bridges helped the light division's troops to deal with them - although resupply had been attempted by the Luftwaffe, dropping the needed supplies onto a small area (indeed, actually locating an area still under the airborne troops control) was hard, and so they were unable to continue fighting for long. There were areas of greater concentration, mainly where reinforcements had been made by Ju52's, but the losses among the transport aircraft, and the obvious lack of time to recover the situation, had led to a cessation of these runs even where there was sufficient space.

By the 14th, General Student had decided to formally surrender to spare his men, and a ceasfire and then surrender was arranged that night. Earlier in the evening troops had been told that they could if they wished attempt an escape, but the Light Division were expecting this, and though another 500 or so men joined the previous escapees the rest of the air-landing force was taken as POW's

At the demolished bridges, German engineers were working frantically to make repairs, but the Dutch demolitions had been efficient. It was possible to get men across, and by the 14th vehicles, but it wasn't until the next day the first tanks would be able to get across the rebuilt structures. By now the Dutch had mainly completed their planned retirement, and the artillery fire hindering the engineers work had died down in some areas.


13th - 14th May - Ardennes Area

A fast advance to the Meuse river had always been anticipated, and while the slipping of small detachments over the river on the 13th had been unwelcome, it was not yet considered serious. The French expected the German advance to pause here for 3-4 days while the artillery caught up and got ready to soften up the defences for a river crossing. This expectation has led to a lack of urgency, and as the roads were congested with refugees, the planned reinforcements were coming in by train. This was made slower by fear of air attack from the Luftwaffe - the troop trains would only run at night.

The German plan was to allow each of the three armies of Army Group A to cross over three bridgeheads. One was to be established, at Sedan in the south, one at Monthermen to the north-west and finally at Dinant further north.

On 13 May, Panzergruppe Kleist forced three crossings near to Sedan, executed by the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions. These groups were reinforced by the elite Grossdeutchland infantry regiment. Instead of slowly massing artillery as the French had expected, the Germans concentrated most of their air power on creating a hole in a narrow sector of the French lines. Guderian had been promised extraordinarily heavy air support during a continual eight-hour air attack that lasted from 8am until late afternoon.

Despite this, some of the forward pillboxes were undamaged and their garrisons repulsed the crossing attempts of the 2nd Pz Div. and 10th Pz Div. However the morale of the troops of the 55th Infantry Division(a grade B reserve division) further back from the river had been broken by the air attacks and the French gunners fled. The German infantry, at a cost of a few hundred casualties, had penetrated up to 8 km into the French defensive zone by midnight. Even by then, most of the infantry had still not crossed. Much of this success was due to the actions of just six French platoons, mainly assault engineers

The collapse that had begun at Sedan spread further. At 1900 on 13 May, troops of the 295th Regiment of the 55th Infantry Division were holding the last prepared defensive line at the Bulson ridge 10 km behind the river. They were panicked by alarmist rumours that German tanks were already behind them and fled, creating a gap in the French defences before any tanks had actually crossed the river. This "Panic of Bulson" also involved the divisional artillery. The Germans had not attacked their position and would not do so until 12 hours later, at 0720 on 14th May.

Recognising the gravity of the defeat at Sedan, General Billotte, commander of the 1st Army Group, whose right flank pivoted on Sedan, urged that the bridges across the Meuse be destroyed by air attack. He was convinced that "over them will pass either victory or defeat!". That day, every available Allied light bomber was employed in an attempt to destroy the three bridges but lost nearly 40 % of the available Allied bomber strength for small results. The level bombing had caused little or minor damage, easily fixed or ignored. The dive bombing attacks of the Battle light bombers had been more effective, and they managed to seriously damage one of the bridges, rendering it unusable for a time, although with heavy losses, mainly due to the heavy fighter cover over the bridges and the surrounding area.

While he had hoped that the bombers would destroy the bridges and allow the French defence time to recover, Billotte realised that this might fail. Accordingly on the 13th he authorised General Giraud to move 7th Army southwards to the area around Couvin. The roads were still congested and with the need to keep the elements of the Army together, it took until the morning of the 15th for them to reach the designated area. So far, although worried, Billotte still expected 7th Army to restore the situation - this was the role the planners had in mind, to restore a broken front. To the south of the breakthrough, he ordered General Huntzinger to attack in the area south of the Stonne plateau with 3s DCR, in order to pinch out the breakthrough from the south.

( this is broadly similar to OTL in the Ardennes - ironically the French reserve in the north was originally tasked with the job 7th Army is moving to do, then Gamelin's insistence on the Breda variant took away the forces required.)
 
The things you find out when you write these things...!
The French actually had a pre-war plan for a force (possibly 7th Army, but in any case a substantial force) to be behind the front to act as a reserve and be available to pinch out any breakthroughs (such as at Sedan)
Then Gamelin came up with his daft Breda plan, and this sucked in the force, which wasnt replaced.
I have to wonder (a) How crazy Gamelin was, and (b) what sort of incriminating photos he had to keep people following his ideas?
 
Checks map for Couvin. Yep, good place to be. Will be interesting to see where they move from there.
A lot will depend on exactly where the Germans are by the time they are all there.
The road transport is difficult, but as they arent too worried yet about the German speed of advance, they are keeping the force together rather than rushing bits on ahead. This is both a good and a bad thing.
 
I have to wonder (a) How crazy Gamelin was, and (b) what sort of incriminating photos he had to keep people following his ideas?
For (a) Gamelin had neurosyphilis, symptoms of which include confusion, inability to concentrate, delusions, failures of memory and dementia. Whether his paranoia came from the brain damage or was always there is an open question. In any event he was exactly that crazy.

For (b) he had no need of photos to keep the job, he had a decent enough reputation from WW1 and he played the game of inter-war French politics very well. He avoided any overt political statements and limited himself to supporting Republicanism and not criticising politicians for their many failures on re-armament or policy. Given that few/none of his contemporaries could manage that he was the obvious choice and probably would have done well during the war had it not been for all the brain damage.

In any event, what could be more French than being defeated due to an ill-advised moment of passion? What is war compared to the demands of the heart (or certain body part located below the navel anyway)
 
Much of this success was due to the actions of just six French platoons, mainly assault engineers
A small typo here, "german" instead of "french".

Will the 1st DCR be committed on its own or along the 7th Army?
 
For (a) Gamelin had neurosyphilis, symptoms of which include confusion, inability to concentrate, delusions, failures of memory and dementia. Whether his paranoia came from the brain damage or was always there is an open question. In any event he was exactly that crazy.

For (b) he had no need of photos to keep the job, he had a decent enough reputation from WW1 and he played the game of inter-war French politics very well. He avoided any overt political statements and limited himself to supporting Republicanism and not criticising politicians for their many failures on re-armament or policy. Given that few/none of his contemporaries could manage that he was the obvious choice and probably would have done well during the war had it not been for all the brain damage.

In any event, what could be more French than being defeated due to an ill-advised moment of passion? What is war compared to the demands of the heart (or certain body part located below the navel anyway)
Wow, that's really well researched. Was there really no one in position to at least threaten Gamelin's position, or even point out erratic behaviour? No senior aides or friends/family to second guess him?
 
A small typo here, "german" instead of "french".

Will the 1st DCR be committed on its own or along the 7th Army?
Well, ideally together.
Given that they are well separate and parts of different Armies, and we are talking French coordination here... probably not :p
 
Wow, that's really well researched. Was there really no one in position to at least threaten Gamelin's position, or even point out erratic behaviour? No senior aides or friends/family to second guess him?

The problem is he was not erratic. He is wholly conventional, with the exception of the Breda Variant and even that is in line with French thinking going back decades. Most of the evidence is post mortem ( or post 1940 anyway).

I mean having syphilis never stopped AP Hill from being aggressive as hell, then sleepy.
 
Wow, that's really well researched. Was there really no one in position to at least threaten Gamelin's position, or even point out erratic behaviour? No senior aides or friends/family to second guess him?
Gamelin's deputy was Georges and that was a poisonous relationship. Gamelin hated him and the feeling was mutual, so a lot of things that should have been serious military debate turned into personal grudge matches. Gamelin promoted staff who would be loyal to him not Georges, would reject ideas if he thought Georges supported them, that sort of thing. Given Gamelin was mostly fairly sensible in the early/mid-30s a lot of criticism of him got seen as personal infighting and most of his aides had been picked for loyalty not competence (and of course not being a threat, his paranoia was awful).

Georges also advocated for militarily sensible but politically toxic policies, like extending the Maginot to cover more of the Belgian border and raising more armoured divisions which would have to be manned by professional soldiers not conscripts. If he had kept his mouth shut about those he probably would have got the job as chief of the army, but he didn't and so the better politically connected Gamelin got the job. Daladier in particular preferred the 'reliable and republican' Gamelin over the 'right wing revolutionary' Georges, and as Daladier was Minister of War and Prime Minster at the key moments that was decisive.

Because Georges did have some support (or more accurate Daladier had enemies) he ended up deputy army chief and commander of the North East front once war broke out. But Gamelin kept control of the overall plan and imposed it on Georges, who hated it for all the obvious reasons, not least the complete lack of reserves. But again this ended up a political fight dominated by personalities not a serious military discussion.

Just because France was cursed at this point I should mention some people have argued Georges had severe PTSD after barely surviving the assassination of King Alexander I in 1934. Certainly he was "overcome" by the stress of the OTL campaign and a few witness report seeing him in tears and unable to react when the bad news started rolling in. So even if he had got the job there's no guarantee things would go well on the command side.
 
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