EELV didn't get a good kickoff until a Titan exploded as well which essentially put an end to the Air Force's insistence that Titan IV could 'carry the load' as a backup for the Shuttle. As it was OTL's Challenger accident was the driver to get Air Force funding towards developing and fielding the Titan IV LV as they had been forced to phase out the Titan III and Titan SLV due to the move of all payloads to the Shuttle. Refer to my above post as what essentially happened was the Air Force had to pay MM a hefty sum to pull the Titan production equipment out of storage, (rumors had it more than some had to be rebuilt) and re-start making Titan LV cores which was NOT cheap.
Despite the cost the Air Force pitched it as the Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle, (as in a "complementary" system to back up the Shuttle) but it was clear that Titan was no longer, (if it every actually had been given that there were significant differences between the Titan missile and the later Titan LV's) a economic launch choice and the loss of one of the fist flights pretty much sealed the deal on needing a new ELV.
They didn't think there would only be four Orbiters, they were supposed to be authorized six (6) "initially" with the parts of what became Endeavour OTL initially supposed to be Orbiter 05 and a refitted Enterprise being 06 but the funding wasn't there. When Challenger happened they pretty much asked Congress to authorize a new-build Orbiter in the hopes of squeezing at least two hulls out of the program but Congress denied it and they had to 'make-do' while they tried to finagle a "new" Shuttle program (Shuttle-II) out of the deal. No such luck since NASA also kept insisting that the STS had plenty of work and utility, (can't admit it's not working after all) and as noted they managed OTL to dodge a lot of the critical review findings and slide around the recommendations without admitting there was actually problems.
OTL they were also fighting some pretty quite but rather intense internal battles with factions that wanted to fundamentally change the STS, (Shuttle-II and alternate Launch Vehicle groups) along with people that wanted to enhance the use of the STS, (such as Shuttle C) along with groups that wanted more commercialized access if not actual NASA purchased commercial launch services. And OTL Congress was clearly not going to give them the money to do much of any of it and certainly not enough to do all of them. Still...
OTL we ended up limping along till the mid-90s when it became clear that the STS wasn't going to live up to the promise, we weren't going to get more Orbiters and there was little interest inside or outside of NASA in trying to significantly improve the STS so in rapid order we got the National Launch System program, the EELV program and finally branching out into "alternative" launch vehicles and/or access planning with some actual support. Unfortunately it also too till about then AND the loss of another Shuttle to finally break NASA from believing it had a duty/obligation to be the US space access "gatekeeper" and allow that other options MIGHT be possible and even desirable.
TTL NASA seems to have learned some of that lesson early and more importantly they seem to have accepted and internalized some of the right lessons and recommendations which is a very good start on actually making changes in a timely manner. Part of what made the "Shuttle" OTL so frustrating was it really WAS all about putting astronauts into space on every flight instead of even considering that the "Space Transportation System" was actually, (while flawed on many levels) actually a SYSTEM rather than a collection of parts that get an Orbiter into space.
NASA TTL is 'stuck' with Space Station Enterprise and that's actually not a bad thing because the thing that the Shuttle program lacked for the majority of its days was an actual 'mission'.
It was purposed initially as a 'secondary' aspect of a large Space Station program, (and we won't get into the rest of the IPP but suffice it to say even THAT was a very "small" part of the overall "PLAN" at that point
) to launch the components and then support that station. There was not going to be enough funding to build that giant space station so the "shuttle" became the "Shuttle" and ended up having to do a lot of jobs the space station was supposed to do. NASA compromised as little as possible in building and designing the Shuttle, and by that I mean they compromised the design to high-heaven to ensure they got the requirements they really wanted at the expense of 'requirements' (and some would argue practicality) they didn't see as a priority. Manned operations every flight? Check. Large cargo bay for large Space Station modules? Check. There are dozens of others at varying levels of 'requirement' but frankly those were the two biggies and since they couldn't get a fully reusable, two-stage, manned flyback system then TAOS (if I haven't noted it that stands for Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle) was likely the best option.
In theory it is a "system" of parts that support the Orbiter and help it get to orbit. (Note the capital letter there which tells you which part is the important bit
) The Shuttle was essentially a 1.5 Stage-To-Orbit vehicle with the SRBs providing enough thrust to get the whole assembly off the pad even if the main engines didn't fire. (Which is why the main engines light BEFORE the SRBs, because you can't shut them off ) The External Tank made the Orbiter smaller, (hence cheaper though there's arguments why 'bigger' would have actually been better ) by moving the propellant outside it into a disposable tank. The Orbiter meanwhile held all the "important" bits, crew, large cargo, oh and those expensive engines, and brought them all back home in the end. Now as a system it should be possible to change some aspects by clever design and construction. (Rockets are NOT Legos, but they still hurt when you step on them so there's some similarities ... Oh and you can 'swap' parts, it's just not easy)Want to recover the engines? You can build a ballistic or lifting 'pod' to put them in and a 'strong-back' to carry the loading. Then replace the rest of the Orbiter with a huge cargo pod or even a lighter more economic Orbiter element. Switch out the SRB's for LRBs or even a single liquid, (don't panic but a single monolithic solid was considered
) booster stage. (Bit more on that in the next post) Still want to fly a crew AND cargo? Put a smaller, lighter, more economical 'glider' on top of the afore mentioned Cargo Pod. See? A system.The "Problem"? Who's going to pay for and more specifically who's going to use it? When you mandate that all US launch traffic will use the STS but at the same time refuse to authorize enough Orbiters, (let alone pads, infrastructure and systems parts) to support that mandate? Congress wasn't going to support expanding the STS nor did NASA really want the to. They WANTED the "next Apollo" and kept pushing for that to be the Space Station, ("stepping stone to Mars" don't you know) and beyond but Congress wasn't biting. TTL there's a foot in the door but NASA isn't really seeing it until right this moment
Randy
