All right. I've finally read all the updates, though not all of the commentary...
First off: Well done to
@Geon for a higly readable and researched timeline. Crisp formatting and very readable prose. I'm very much subscribed. Also, bonus points for picking up on a rarely considered point of departure for the Great War: Belgian acceptance of the German ultimatum. It is specially interesting to think about because, deep down, it was an outcome that Wilhelm and certain of his ministers, conditioned by the bad character of King Leopold, were banking on.
I do have some nits to pick, though most are admittdly in the realm of analysis rather than errors of fact.
1.
It is not a slam dunk, but I think the heavy odds (I would say, at least 4 to 1, if I had to quantify it) are against Asquith declaring war at this juncture, and this is my greatest reservation. I think a lot of examination of not just Asquith's characer, but that of his cabinet - and even that of the Tory leadership - is necessary. As is just exactly what
was decided in cabinet, and
when. Too often, we operate in broad strokes when discussing the British decision-making, when it took a very particular set of developments - I would say, machinations - to get a Liberal-governed Britain to a declaration of war. There was nothing
inevitable about it.
a) Asquith's cabinet was a pacifist-dominated Liberal cabinet in 1914. And when I say "pacifist," I do not mean it in a George Lansbury sense. It might be better to say "non-interventionist" for our purposes. It was probably in the neighborhood of about 15 to 5 - with the five interventionists/hawks being Grey, Churchill (at the hard end), Haldane, Asquith, and - marginally - Lloyd George. At the other end, the most opposed to war could be identified in the four Liberal ministers who resigned over the decision for war (Beauchamp, Morley, Burns, and Simon - Asquith did of course later manage to persuade Beauchamp and Simon to rescind their resignations). So it is quite remarkable that Edward Grey was able to maneuver a mostly non-interventionist Cabinet to agree to a decision that would take Britain into war, even with his unusually close relationship with Asquith to lean on.
b) The key decisions were taken on Sunday, August 2, the date of the German ultimatum to Brussels. There were two Cabinet meetings that day: 1) one from 11:00am-2:00pm, and a second from 6:30-8:00pm. In the first, the Cabinet voted that a stance that a German naval bombardment of French Channel ports would be a trigger for war. In the second, it was also decided that a violation of Belgian neutrality would be a trigger, too. These were the conditions that the majority decided would be necessary for thm to support war, not a declaration of war itself - but even so, they provided the necessary tripwires when the time came for Kaiser Willie to trip them. Note that the prospect of the HSF cruising the Channel blowing up stuff was the first and easiest "get" for the Cabinet - not Belgian neutrality.
c) Something else noteworthy happened on Sunday, August 2, that mattered a great deal. Bonar Law and Lansdowne delivered a letter to Asquith promising "unhesitating" support for the government in any measures it sought to employ in support of the Dual Alliance. This promise was bolstered by Churchill's reading, before the Cabinet, of a letter from prominent Tory F. E. Smith saying that a canvas of his colleagues permitted him to say that "the government can rely upon the support of the Unionist party, in whatever manner that support can be most effectively given." The italics are mine. It became apparent that the prospect now loomed of a national government, one which could well be mostly Tory: a prospect that chilled Asquith, and most ministers present. This had the effect of nudging wavering ministers into the agreement to a "Belgian" formula in the evening. It acted, it seems, as a kind of unspoken threat by Asquith. This wasn't just for crass self-intrested reasons (though these can't be ruled out), but also because Asquith and his ministers mostly thought the Tories were irresponsible madmen who could not be trusted with running a war.
d) Even so, it took the news of Belgium's refusal of the ultimatum, and German bellicosity, on the following two days to shore up the waverers - to give not just them, but the public, the cover they felt they needed to go to war for what really were other reasons - unwillingness to allow the German fleet in the Channel, and fear of Liberal government being replaced by a de facto Tory dominated government. And since the German fleet did *not* make that appearance, it really did come down to a need for Germany to violate Belgian neutrality to close the deal.
But what happens in a scenario where it is the Belgians themselves who violate Belgian neutrality? This would have wrongfooted not only the non-interventionist Cabinet majority, but even the Tories. Much as Bonar Law's caucus might crave a showdown with Germany, Albert's decision to give way would deny them their obvious
casus belli. Given correspondence we have access to now, it seems far more likely that both Grey's faction and the Tories would have to reconfigure their stances. "Saving Belgium" was not going to win any votes any longer, especially with the Huns conducting what amounted to a friendly
koffeeklatch in Belgium, rather than, you know, shooting and shelling their way in. So that leaves the first formula decided on August 2: the High Seas Fleet entering the Channel. But Grey realized full well that Wilhelm was unlikely to provide him with
that.
It is hard to see how a "wait and see" middle path doesn't win the day for Asquith. It would, to be sure, cost him Edward Grey, a great blow, but a blow less painful than losing most of his Cabinet to a mostly Tory National Government Cabinet. The middle path would be a declaration to France and Germany that warships of belligerent nations would be forbidden entry into the English Channel, and for that matter, an exclusion zone in the northern North Sea - all to be enforced by a mobilized Royal Navy. This would clearly favor France, which could readily use territorial waters for its own warships in the Channel, and obstruct Germany, whose navy would be effectively bound to the Baltic and Heligoland Bight - even if it allowed its maritime trade to continue. (The French would still be outraged, and the Germans unhappy, but neither would be in a position to do much of anything about it.) Asquith would be left to hope that the Germans would supply some further provocation (most likely, a breakdown in amicable German transits of Belgium) to supply him with the needed
casus belli to get a united Liberal Cabinet into war.
It is quite possible, even probable, that the Cabinet could, within days, be further persuaded by the hawks to deliver a follow-up note to Germany that any deployment of KM naval units to any Belgian ports, or French Pas de Calais ports, would also be cause for war. This would likely embrace also any Belgian or French warships, even coastal patrol boats, which the Germans might "acquire" as their units moved through.
2.
I think @marathag has a valid point about Joffre's addiction to the offensive. In OTL, it took a hell of a lot to move him off it. That would be true here, too. And what it took was the realization on 21-24 August that the armies opposing his key offensive armies (3rd and 4th) were a lot bigger than he had thought, thanks to his dogmatic belief that the Germans would not include reservists in their frontline formations in war. Belgium surrendering would be a strategic plot twist, no question, one he would have to react to
somehow; but he had been assuming that the German violation of Belgium would be more modest anyway, and he did not think they would have the troop density to sustain a massive right envelopment regardless of whether the Belgians were throwing flowers at marching Boches or grenades. "So much the better for us!"
So I think what he does is goes ahead with Plan XVII preparations, with some adjustments of 5t, 6th, and 9th armies on his left to meet the faster moving German right flank. The attack on Colmar goes ahead on August 7. The tricky part is what happens on August 14, when the main offensive into Lorraine kicks off. By this point, as Geon has it, the Germans are pouring into Artois, Picardy and Champagne, and it's becoming apparent
now - not a week from now - just how numerous these army formations are. In this case, I think that Joffre calls off the Lorraine offensive at the last second, or that he stubbornly keeps at it for a day or two, until the full disaster looming forces him to reverse course. Either way, his position is going to be even worse than Geon has it here, because he has lost valuable time for shifting his front.
3)
My reading of Poincare, based on his public language in these weeks, is that he will insist on fighting for Paris, not abandoning it. In terms of both public morale and his political survival, he simply cannot afford the loss of Paris. The memory of 1870 still looms painfully. "Paris held out for 6 months in 1870, and you are giving it up in less than three weeks? Mon Dieu!"
I think Gallieni is going to get his chance to shine - or die.
. . .
I think my other concerns (like the number of u-boats in the Channel) have already been addressed.
. . .
I think the two latter points do not require a major rewrite of the timeline, and bear some reflection. The first one is a different story, so I'd understand if that is a bridge too far. And I do concede that I cannot be 100% sure that Grey couldn't find an alternate way to get Asquith into the war - I just think it is very unlikely. But in truth, it may not matter much for the main clash, because either way, the BEF is not going to be a factor.