Stonewall Jackson's Way: An Alternate Confederacy Timeline

What Timeline Should I Do Next?

  • Abandon the Alamo!

    Votes: 44 43.1%
  • We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists

    Votes: 48 47.1%
  • Old Cump and Pap

    Votes: 10 9.8%

  • Total voters
    102
  • Poll closed .
Status
Not open for further replies.
@TheRockofChickamauga , seeing as you like American Civil War related history/American History, you might be interested in Hard Graft: A President Infinity Election Game.
I'll have to look into this game. Hopefully it will go better than the last game I joined.

(EDIT: After having looked into it, while it does seem interesting, it also seems like something that would be hard to get into considering how much has already happened and how much there is to go over to really understand it well. Nevertheless, thank you for bringing this to my attention. I'll have to be on the look out for something similar to this.)
 
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Chapter Sixty-Seven: The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt Part Two
Chapter Sixty-Seven: The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt Part Two
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President Theodore Roosevelt
Following his the decisive victory of Roosevelt and the United States in the Mexican Revolution, both Roosevelt and his party, the Republicans, were on the ascendant. Not only was this aided by Roosevelt extreme popularity and successful policy achievements at home, but both of the opposition parties were weak. The Reform Party was all but dead, with it disbanding as an organization in 1906, and the Democrats had been continually hammered in both Gubernatorial and Congressional elections, as the memories of Custer's Revolt and his disastrous presidency were still fresh in the minds of many Americans. To Roosevelt, it seemed that the biggest threat to his presidency was not coming from an opposition party, but from within his own. He was well aware of the quite serious discussions that had been held within the Conservative faction of his party of breaking off and running their own candidate, which many believed had only not occurred due to their presumed presidential nominee, Ohio Senator Mark Hanna, dying followed by the deaths of two more of candidates that were prominent in the minds of many: Senators Orville H. Platt and Matthew S. Quay. With the Republican opposition so clearly shattered, the talks began again of forming a Conservative Republican Party. Although this would never come into existence as an actual party, it remained a powerful faction throughout Roosevelt's administration. Generally it consisted of former War Republicans, although this was far from a rule, as Roosevelt himself had been a War Republican. Leading this would be President Pro Tempore William P. Frye, Senators Nelson W. Aldrich and Thomas Platt, and House Speaker Joseph G. Cannon.
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William Frye, Nelson Aldrich, Thomas Platt, and Joseph Cannon
Perhaps in no instance could this divide in the Republican Party be seen more closely during the Roosevelt Administration than in Roosevelt's Cabinet. When Lyman Gage resigned from Roosevelt's cabinet in late 1904, it quickly developed into a political hailstorm to find his replacement. Originally, Roosevelt hoped to place progressive Albert B. Cummins into the now vacant position. The conservative Republicans, however, were unwilling to support this. Instead, under the advice of Platt, they supported his fellow New York Senator Hamilton Fish II or close protege and New York Governor Elihu Root. With both sides unwilling to compromise, the seat remained empty and slowly but surely the stocks began to go down and the beginnings of a financial panic seemed to appear. Acting quickly to avoid this, Secretary of State Henry C. Lodge, who was a conservative but still held the ear of Roosevelt, began to act as an intermediary between the two sides. His proposed compromise was to move Attorney General Philander C. Knox to the Treasury Department, and allow Roosevelt to appoint a new progressive attorney general, such as William R. Day. Roosevelt considered it, but the conservatives all refused to budge on the issue. Eventually, Roosevelt agreed to appoint Root his Treasury Secretary, but only if he could replace Henry C. Payne as postmaster general with progressive James R. Garfield. With both sides tired from the fight and the economy in peril, the compromise was agreed to. Roosevelt would have to undergo this fight twice more in his presidency, first after Root resigned in 1906 following Platt's retirement from the Senate to seek his seat, with Roosevelt replacing him with Leslie M. Shaw, and again in 1907 when Shaw resigned to accept a lucrative bank position, which resulted in his replacement by Hamilton Fish II. Despite normally being an energetic and active president, Roosevelt would admit after his presidency that when it came to his Cabinet, it was the one thing was not willing to fight the conservatives too hard over.
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Roosevelt's Troublesome Treasury Secretaries: Elihu Root, Leslie Shaw, and Hamilton Fish II
Despite eventually backing down against the conservatives in the issues of his cabinet, one issue where Roosevelt would not quit was trust-busting and labor regulation. During his time in office, Roosevelt would have three main targets: Andrew Carnegie's railroad conglomerate, Henry Flagler's Standard Oil, and J.P. Morgan's vast financial empire and assets. Roosevelt would personally meet with Andrew Carnegie to discuss the issues he had with his railroads. Carnegie, who had already somewhat sympathetic to the cause Roosevelt espoused, agreed to improve worker conditions, slightly increase pay, and to ensure that the conglomerate was dissolved following his death in return for Roosevelt not bringing charges against him for unreasonable monopolistic practices against him. To further stay on Roosevelt's good side, Carnegie would vastly increase and expand his philanthropic spending, and thus he and his railroads were safe until his death in 1919. Morgan and Flagler would prove to be tougher nuts to crack. Morgan had frequently used his wide ranging holdings and property to prevent panics, such as the recent one that had nearly broken out, and even helped bail out President George Custer from his own ineptitude when the U.S. Treasury nearly ran out of gold during his presidency. With this under his belt, he threatened to all but ruin Roosevelt and his presidency if he did not leave him alone. Hardly cowed but also fearing the fall out, Roosevelt would only target Morgan's railroad interests, which in Morgan's eyes was a declining industry. Finally came Flagler, America's richest man and president of the domineering Standard Oil Company. Realizing that not only did Flagler have the ability to tank the U.S. economy, but also the crush the blossoming automobile industry, Roosevelt acted with subtly while facing this most dangerous of foes, and it wouldn't be until his successor took office that Flagler was finally brought before the Supreme Court and Standard Oil was dissembled, but without both Flagler and his vice-president John Archbold going out kicking and screaming.
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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan, and Henry Flagler
While dealing with the titans of industry, Roosevelt was also dealing with the laborers and the unions. For this, he would meet with the president of the American Federation of Workers (AFW) Samuel Gompers, as well as his associate Peter J. McGuire. Contrary to what Roosevelt had expected, neither man came in demanding extreme concessions or for him to overhaul the American labor system. Instead, they believed that gaining rights for the American worker would unfortunately have to be a slow, arduous process by necessity, pointing out the fate of Eugene Debs and his fellow strikers in the Pullman Strike. Impressed with the men, Roosevelt would see to reform, and even create a new cabinet department, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to oversee their implementation. He also would arrange for Gompers and McGuire to be present at the same dinner Roosevelt was hosting with Carnegie, Morgan, and Flagler in attendance, which caused the major public stir Roosevelt had intended. Roosevelt would also speak with John B. Washington on the conditions of African-American workers in the United States, the first president to do this. This action would simultaneously cause much adoration and scorn for Roosevelt throughout America, varying from person to person.
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Samuel Gompers, Peter McGuire, and John Washington
While Roosevelt cared for America's human resources, he also would care for her natural resources as well. To do this, Roosevelt supported the creation of new and more expansive national parks and nature preserves. This would prove to be a harder task than Roosevelt expected. He had been expecting opposition from Western senators, such Henry M. Teller and Francis E. Warren. What he had not been expecting was opposition from environmentalists, such as John Muir. His opposition, although not as fervent and strong as that of those who wanted to exploit the land, stemmed from his belief that the land should be saved for their beauty, rather than Roosevelt's belief that they should be conserved for their resources. Eventually, the two men would meet, and go on a brief expedition to discuss the issue and settle their differences. What exactly occurred on their journey is not fully known, as aside from a cameraman who accompanied them on the first two days to take photos for the press, they were on their own. By the end, however, the two men had settled their differences and Muir had come to support Roosevelt. With this, Roosevelt would create more of these set aside lands than almost all his predecessors combined.
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Henry Teller, Roosevelt and Muir on the first day of their expedition, and Francis Warren
Despite all the controversies and the occasional blunder during his two terms in office, Roosevelt would exit the presidency the most popular president America had had in decades, perhaps even a century. With Roosevelt declining to serve a third term, a major gap was left in the already fiercely divided Republican Party. Everyone expected the upcoming 1908 Republican National Convention to be the fiercest one since 1884, where the party had split in two, which was the fear that many in the party held. As a result of this, everyone held their breath for the 1908 election, and the Democrats hoped it would finally be their time to seize back the Executive office.
 
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Electoral Maps 2
U.S. Presidential Election of 1900
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U.S. Presidential Election of 1904
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U.S. Presidential Election of 1908
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U.S. Presidential Election of 1912
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U.S. Presidential Election of 1916
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U.S. Presidential Election of 1920
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Chapter Sixty-Eight: The 1908 U.S. Presidential Election
Chapter Sixty-Eight: The 1908 U.S. Presidential Election
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A photograph of a meeting between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, in which they discussed how the former would help the latter in the upcoming 1908 Republican National Convention
With Roosevelt's refusal to run for a third term after his two terms in office, a major power vacuum was left within the Republican National Convention. In the eyes of many, they viewed the results of that convention as to be much more suspenseful than the election itself. The Reform Party was dead and gone, and the Democrats desperately fumbled about for an identity, as it seemed that the Republicans dominated both the conservative and progressive ends of the political spectrum. For many, the expected result of this was a collapse into two rival parties by a Republican Party beset by factionalism and rivalries, with one representing the conservative wing of the party, and the other the progressive. For now, however, the Republicans preserved. Coming into the convention, there were many prominent names in contention, such as Vice-President Charles W. Fairbanks, Secretary of State Henry C. Lodge, Attorney General Philander C. Knox, New York Governor Charles E. Hughes, and Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, but two main names dominated in the minds of many Republicans. First was Ohio Governor William H. Taft, the man who had received Roosevelt's endorsement and was generally considered to be the favorite of the progressive wing of the party. The other main man in consideration was House Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, whose ultimate goal in life ever since he was a newly elected congressman was to become the president of the United States. Roscoe Conkling, who viewed Cannon as a favorite and played a major role in his advancement to becoming a major player in the Republican Party, had even predicted and hoped that the then young congressman who eventually follow him as head of state in the years to come. Neither of these two candidates had the necessary amount of backers, however, to ensure nomination by the Republican National Convention, thus making them turn to the other, more minor candidates in hopes of receiving their support.
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Minor Candidates turned kingmakers: Fairbanks, Lodge, Knox, Hughes, and La Follette
Thus the two major campaigns began their efforts to secure the backings of the now powerful men. Fairbanks, Knox, Hughes, and La Follette each controlled the delegations from their home states, or Indiana, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin, while Lodge controlled all of the New England delegation sans Connecticut's. Fairbanks was expected to back Cannon due to their similar conservative views, and that their home states were neighbors. Meanwhile, La Follette and Lodge were planned to back Taft, La Follette out of his support for progressivism, and Lodge out of his personal loyalty to Roosevelt. This left behind Knox and Hughes, both moderate men who also happened to control the two largest delegations to the national convention. Hoping to secure the nomination, Cannon would confer with close ally former New York Senator Thomas C. Platt, who promised him his aid in getting him the nomination, by assembling his supporters to help bring Pennsylvania and especially New York to Cannon's side. To do this, Platt would send New York Senator Elihu Root and Treasury Secretary Hamilton Fish II to help drum up support for Cannon among the New York delegations, as both men were powerful within New York politics. Cannon would also send former Vice-President James S. Sherman, who had returned to living in New York and remained influential in the state, as well as being a close ally to Cannon in his early congressional days, to help ensure that Hughes would eventually side with him, as well as Indiana representative James Eli Watson, another close ally of Cannon, at the advice of Fairbanks. Rumors began flying about that Cannon planned to bring Hughes to his side by offering him the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court when the elderly John M. Harlan finally passed, as well as offering Knox the vice-presidency. There was one flaw in this plan, however. Root, who had struck of a friendship with Roosevelt in the past, felt obligated to inform his old friend of their efforts, although he doubted that it would change the chances of Cannon's nomination, which he viewed to be as inevitable. In this, he would prove to be horribly wrong.
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Cannon's men on the ground: Root, Fish, Sherman, and Watson
Alerted to the danger now posed to the progressive wing of the Republican Party, Roosevelt called an emergency meeting with Taft and Lodge. Realizing the urgent need to bring Hughes and Knox to their side before Cannon did, lest he take the nomination and almost certainly the presidency, Roosevelt, Taft, and Lodge planned to do the previously unthinkable. Taft would drop out and throw his support behind Lodge, who being a moderate would be a much more stomachable candidate to Knox and Hughes supporters. In return, a progressive had to be nominated for the vice-presidential nomination. Lodge agreed to this, and the race was on. The convention was stunned by Taft's last minute drop out, with perhaps the most surprised being La Follette, who claimed he was unwilling to support Lodge, and would again being seeking the nomination. Thanks to Roosevelt's own efforts and floormen, both Hughes and Knox would drop out and throw their support to Lodge, which combined with Lodge's original delegates and those gained by Taft, gave him the nomination in one of the largest upsets in the history American national nominating conventions. As promised, Lodge would see to that progressive Iowa Senator Albert B. Cummins received the vice-presidential nomination. Thus ended one of the most dramatic national conventions in not only the history of the Republican Party, but of the nation.
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Henry Lodge and Albert Cummins
Some Republicans took Lodge's nomination with more grace than others. Cannon would, eventually and begrudgingly, give his support for Lodge's candidacy, as well as most of his supporters. The one man who refused to accept the result was La Follette. In passionate and thought provoking speeches, La Follette would rail against how he viewed that the Republicans had abandoned the progressive cause by nominating Lodge, and he felt it was his civic duty to run to keep the torch of progressivism burning throughout the nation. In an extreme controversial move, La Follette would also hint in his speeches that his administration would finally bring the nation back together as one, through force if necessary. Although this was an effectively campaigning strategy in the 1880s, many Americans had come to accept CSA's independence by now, and view it as part of their life. This, combined with the fact that U.S.-CSA were beginning to warm, all went to go against La Follette's rhetoric, and led to many viewing as an outdated radical without a proper understanding of the modern political situation. It was in spite of this that La Follette would go forward with his presidential ambitions, convincing Indiana Governor Frank Hanly to run with him after failing to persuade fellow progressive senator Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa to run with him. Hoping to cater to the defunct Reform Party, he would refer to himself and his supporters as the Reform Party, leading to much confusion in the modern day.
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Robert La Follette and Frank Hanly
With the Republicans managing to hold together, for the most part, the best hope the Democrats had for winning the presidency was lost. Nevertheless, they preserved with running a candidate, refusing to let their 80 year old party, by far the oldest in the nation, die. Although no candidate drew much enthusiasm from the party, the leading one proved to be Missouri Senator Champ Clark, a senator of three years so far, and before that a representative. In this, he defeated self-made millionaire and newspaperman turned U.S. representative, William Randolph Hearst, who was known for his forceful personality and desire to see himself as the face of the Democratic Party, which he believed he could guide back to greatness by appealing to progressives. Without much chance of winning, the Democrats decided to appeal to as many fronts as possible in this election, especially populists. This can be seen in their nomination of Representative John W. Kern of Indiana, a man who had been elected to seat based on support from Democrats and supporters of populism. Thus, the Democrats presented their ticket, and Champ Clark began his career of running for president.
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Champ Clark and John Kern
Dissatisfied with being denied the Democratic nomination, Hearst would in turn start his own party, which he called the Progressive Party. For his running-mate, Hearst would turn to another businessman with an interest into entering politics, oilman Thomas L. Hisgen. Together, they would run as the Progressive Party ticket. Although Hearst would take his campaign very seriously, not many others would, and many viewed as a move by Hearst to stroke his pride and ambition, as well as to deprive the Democrats of the desperately needed populist vote, which is where Hearst was campaigning to the hardest. Despite, Hearst's newspaper conglomeration made both him and his campaign a force to be reckoned with, even if no one was expecting him to have a slight chance at winning the presidency, at least for now.
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William Hearst and Thomas Hisgen
With the dominance the Republican Party held over politics for the moment, it seemed likely to many that they would win the election. La Follette would heavily campaign on being the true progressive in this election, but his message was somewhat undermined by Hearst's candidacy, who used his vast newspaper empire to attempt to destroy La Follette's campaign to further progress his own. Others claimed that La Follette wasn't really running to improve the country, but because he was angry with Roosevelt and Lodge for leaving him out of the dealings that led to the latter's nomination. He also took flak for some of the radical positions he took, like restarting hostility to the CSA, supporting prohibition, and even calling for an end to segregation on one occasion, although a very negative public reaction ensured that it was never mentioned again. Clark and his campaign, meanwhile, would have to go about trying to make sure that the populists did not defect to Hearst, as well as appeal to any interest groups who had not already defected to the Republican Party, although their efforts on both of those fronts seemed mostly in vain. Watching his opponents tear the opposition to his candidacy to pieces, Lodge would be content to run a very positive, if not very active, campaign, contrasting heavily with those of his opponents, who all ran very active campaigns with a generally negative tone. Come election day, many people were speculating which states would ultimately vote against Lodge, as the divide among his opposition made anyone gaining a majority in state especially difficult.
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La Follette campaigning in Wisconsin, which polls indicated to be his strongest state, Hearst and Hisgen at a campaign rally
Come election day, it was a landslide for Lodge. He would the election win with 286 electoral votes, as opposed to Clark's 31, La Follette's 13, and Hearst's 11. Lodge would win California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Clark would win Missouri and Kentucky, while La Follette secured Wisconsin, and Hearst Delaware, Colorado, and Nevada. Much to the embarrassment of Clark and the Democratic Party, they would place fourth in several notable states, including New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and California, as well as third in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Overall, split opposition ensured Lodge a decisive victory, and continuance of Republican rule.
 
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I hope the readers of this TL had a good time with the latest chapter, as I had more fun writing it than I can remember for a long time! With these two chapters completed, expect me to return my attention to my two main TLs, and don't expect more updates for this one in the near future, although I'm certain there will be more eventually.
 
For some reason, I just saw this timeline for the first time. Crazy, even allowing for the fact that I don't peek into the pre-1900 forum that much...

There are a lot of things I like about it. But on my read so far, a few concerns:

1. First, I do think it is entirely plausible for an ANV with Jackson in place to knock Meade's forces off the Fishhook position on Day 1. It's also plausible that Stanton and Halleck would panic in response.

2. People here have commented on the casualties. While I do agree that the initial estimate for Lee was simply too low, I don't think the ones for the Army of the Potomac are off base. Destroying a modern, competently officered Western army in detail in the field (and not a siege) to this extent was certainly difficult in the 1860's, but it was not impossible.

3. I do have serious doubts that news of the defeat could reach Vicksburg, or more to the point, Pemberton's men, in time to stop the surrender. For that matter, it is doubtful to me that the news would even reach Lincoln or the War Dept in coherent form by July 3, which is what you'd need as just the first step here. The nearest telegraph station was back in Westminster, and in the confusion of the retreat and the unclear command, it is hard to think anyone in authority could get a dispatch with even a semi-coherent account before the morning of July 3. So then Lincoln somehow has to and then to get the message, decide to cut the ground from under Grant (which I tend to doubt - if Grant is on the verge of getting a surrender, Lincoln will want every scrap of offsetting good news he can get) , and then react so quickly as to get a telegram off to Grant at the time of the negotiations, which started late that morning and concluded by evening. But how does word get to the defenders? Grant would be keen to keep the news sub rosa. Eventually news *could* get through the lines, as it invariably did, but it's hard to see how it could do so within a week's time...and by that point, the men are all paroled and gone and Grant is in Vicksburg. It's just hard to see a victory at Gettysburg on July 2 having any possible chance of stopping the surrender at Vicksburg. Communications are simply too slow.

4. I have more limited reservations about the prospects of Lee successfully storm the defenses of Washington - I think Gingrich and Forstchen's scenario in Grant Comes East is closer to the probabilities here, even with Heintzleman being an ass. The Union heavy artillry troops were green, but the fortifications were insanely formidable. But maybe I can think longer about this, to let the timeline take me along.

Does anyone have a full Union order of units and strength for the Washington fortifications in July 1863? I had thought the troop total was more like 25-30,000, but I don't have anything handy which clarifies.

5. I just can't imagine Lincoln abandoning Washington.

But you know, even if Grant still takes Vicksburg, there's still some room to explore how a CSA victory at Gettysburg could shift the course of the war in a dangerous direction for the Union.

(I do not expect any rewrite at this late date. Just offering up my initial reaction, for a timeline that is good enough to merit a critique, which this one is.)
 
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For some reason, I just saw this timeline for the first time. Crazy, even allowing for the fact that I don't peek into the pre-1900 forum that much...

There are a lot of things I like about it. But on my read so far, a few concerns:

1. First, I do think it is entirely plausible for an ANV with Jackson in place to knock Meade's forces off the Fishhook position on Day 1. It's also plausible that Stanton and Halleck would panic in response.

2. People here have commented on the casualties. While I do agree that the initial estimate for Lee was simply too low, I don't think the ones for the Army of the Potomac are off base. Destroying a modern, competently officered Western army in detail in the field (and not a siege) to this extent was certainly difficult in the 1860's, but it was not impossible.

3. I do have serious doubts that news of the defeat could reach Vicksburg, or more to the point, Pemberton's men, in time to stop the surrender. For that matter, it is doubtful to me that the news would even reach Lincoln or the War Dept in coherent form by July 3, which is what you'd need as just the first step here. The nearest telegraph station was back in Westminster, and in the confusion of the retreat and the unclear command, it is hard to think anyone in authority could get a dispatch with even a semi-coherent account before the morning of July 3. So then Lincoln somehow has to and then to get the message, decide to cut the ground from under Grant (which I tend to doubt - if Grant is on the verge of getting a surrender, Lincoln will want every scrap of offsetting good news he can get) , and then react so quickly as to get a telegram off to Grant at the time of the negotiations, which started late that morning and concluded by evening. But how does word get to the defenders? Grant would be keen to keep the news sub rosa. Eventually news *could* get through the lines, as it invariably did, but it's hard to see how it could do so within a week's time...and by that point, the men are all paroled and gone and Grant is in Vicksburg. It's just hard to see a victory at Gettysburg on July 2 having any possible chance of stopping the surrender at Vicksburg. Communications are simply too slow.

4. I have more limited reservations about the prospects of Lee successfully storm the defenses of Washington - I think Gingrich and Forstchen's scenario in Grant Comes East is closer to the probabilities here, even with Heintzleman being an ass. The Union heavy artillry troops were green, but the fortifications were insanely formidable. But maybe I can think longer about this, to let the timeline take me along.

Does anyone have a full Union order of units and strength for the Washington fortifications in July 1863? I had thought the troop total was more like 25-30,000, but I don't have anything handy which clarifies.

5. I just can't imagine Lincoln abandoning Washington.

But you know, even if Grant still takes Vicksburg, there's still some room to explore how a CSA victory at Gettysburg could shift the course of the war in a dangerous direction for the Union.

(I do not expect any rewrite at this late date. Just offering up my initial reaction, for a timeline that is good enough to merit a critique, which this one is.)
Thank you for this kind and generous reply. I’ll admit, the Vicksburg thing was more of a case were the author allows certain things to occur for the sake of the plot. If Vicksburg had fallen and the Confederacy was divided, I believe there still would be a chance that the Union could hold out. If this still leaves some a bit perturbed, then I’ll just fall back on the easy excuse of the fact that the original POD for this TL is in the 1850s, and as a result small changes occur in the Vicksburg Camapign to let them hold out slightly longer. Thank you for your comment, though, it really made my day to hear people are still enjoying this TL nearly a year after it first started.
Out of curiosity, how did you figure out the choices about who to run for president in your Confederate presidential elections?
For the answer to this, I used mostly a mixture of prominent military figures from the CSA Army, as well as leading political figures in the South during the Civil War and afterwards. If you want some helping crafting the presidents for your CSA TL rewrite, feel free to send me a PM, and I’ll help as much as I can, although I’ve been busier lately.
 
Thank you for this kind and generous reply. I’ll admit, the Vicksburg thing was more of a case were the author allows certain things to occur for the sake of the plot. If Vicksburg had fallen and the Confederacy was divided, I believe there still would be a chance that the Union could hold out. If this still leaves some a bit perturbed, then I’ll just fall back on the easy excuse of the fact that the original POD for this TL is in the 1850s, and as a result small changes occur in the Vicksburg Camapign to let them hold out slightly longer. Thank you for your comment, though, it really made my day to hear people are still enjoying this TL nearly a year after it first started.

I think you CAN get around this to get your result.

The problem to resolve is that the Gettysburg and Vicksburg Campaigns both culminate basically simultaneously. But what if you could change that? What if you could make Gettysburg, in some form, happen sooner, or push back Vicksburg somewhat later? And by move, I mean, "move by more than just a few days."

I think getting Lee to Gettysburg any sooner is a hard ask, given how fast he reorganized and moved in OTL after Chancellorsville, and the need to get all of Longstreet's troops in hand. There is little slack in the timeline to move it up by more than a few days, I think, and that is not enough. The advantage of looking into this option is that it is easier to get a direct butterfly from Jackson surviving Chancellorsville, since he is, you know, right on the scene. Still, not easy. Maybe I should think about this some more.

But I *could* see Grant getting delayed in kicking off the Grand Gulf/Bruinsburg landings by 2-3 (maybe even 4) weeks, for a number of plausible reasons that could be reasonable butterflies of a resasonable POD; or in the alternate, if it must come after May 4, Grant gets delayed on the way up to Champion Hill. Which, if the rest of the campaign plays out as in OTL, would mean Grant would be far enough away from obtaining a surrender that an order from Lincoln to withdraw becomes plausible; and even that, somehow, news seeps through the lines to Pemberton and his men, which eventually would be inevitable. I could see Lincoln wiring Grant, on July 5-6, querying: "Is it likely you can secure Pemberton's surrender in the next fortnight?" Grant could respond that it is not impossible, but far from certain. At that point, Lincoln might reluctantly order Grant to lift the siege.

Here is one other difficulty, and it is one Grant would point out: Without control of Vicksburg, a withdrawal of Grant's army to make parts of it available to go east is going to be difficult. He could march up to Corinth, but that would take...weeks. To load onto transports out of gun range of Pemberton means probably dragging troops up to Snyder's Bluff or down to Grand Gulf. Either way, it is hard to see Grant being able to get any divisions to Pennsylvania before September.

But as I say, I think even without Vicksburg sticking, you can find a way to a plausible Southern victory. Not easy, but not impossible.

Anyway, I am enjoying the timeline anyway. The Vicksburg thing really is the one thing that's scratchy to me, and even that could be fixed, as I said. Otherwise, a lot of plausible things to chew over here.
 
3. I do have serious doubts that news of the defeat could reach Vicksburg, or more to the point, Pemberton's men, in time to stop the surrender. For that matter, it is doubtful to me that the news would even reach Lincoln or the War Dept in coherent form by July 3, which is what you'd need as just the first step here. The nearest telegraph station was back in Westminster, and in the confusion of the retreat and the unclear command, it is hard to think anyone in authority could get a dispatch with even a semi-coherent account before the morning of July 3. So then Lincoln somehow has to and then to get the message, decide to cut the ground from under Grant (which I tend to doubt - if Grant is on the verge of getting a surrender, Lincoln will want every scrap of offsetting good news he can get) , and then react so quickly as to get a telegram off to Grant at the time of the negotiations, which started late that morning and concluded by evening. But how does word get to the defenders? Grant would be keen to keep the news sub rosa. Eventually news *could* get through the lines, as it invariably did, but it's hard to see how it could do so within a week's time...and by that point, the men are all paroled and gone and Grant is in Vicksburg. It's just hard to see a victory at Gettysburg on July 2 having any possible chance of stopping the surrender at Vicksburg. Communications are simply too slow.

4. I have more limited reservations about the prospects of Lee successfully storm the defenses of Washington - I think Gingrich and Forstchen's scenario in Grant Comes East is closer to the probabilities here, even with Heintzleman being an ass. The Union heavy artillry troops were green, but the fortifications were insanely formidable. But maybe I can think longer about this, to let the timeline take me along.

Does anyone have a full Union order of units and strength for the Washington fortifications in July 1863? I had thought the troop total was more like 25-30,000, but I don't have anything handy which clarifies.

5. I just can't imagine Lincoln abandoning Washington.
I agree with many of these points, particularly those about assaulting and laying siege to fortified positions. The preparations required are fairly steep for both, and once underway, it is generally a terrible idea to stop unless necessary, excluding instances where new information reveals the attempt to be pointless or pyrrhic.

As for finding troop counts within garrisons that didn't actually see combat... it's tough. There are generally very few resources, something which has been a massive pain for me while writing my own civil war timeline. The problem is especially pronounced on the western front, where men were constantly shuffled around and much shoddier records were taken in those instances. The only effective method I've found is reviewing the last campaign to go over an area and looking over troop count fluctuations. For instance, if a Union army goes through part of Tennessee and seizes a town, and they lost 2,000 men in the battle, but at the start of their next battle, their count is shown to be 4,000 less men than what it had been, and there aren't any records of serious reinforcements arriving, I would assume that the garrison of the town they had taken is somewhere around 1,500, and that the other 500 men un-accounted for were stragglers or left dead/incapacitated due to disease at some point in between the two battles. For Confederates... it's even rougher, as they kept considerably worse records of troop counts, especially outside of battles. There's always an element of guesswork.

I would put TheRockofChickamauga's estimate of 20,000 as the number of men within Washington's defenses as fairly accurate prior to a loss at Gettysburg, but I personally would place the number at around 25,000. After such a defeat, I would probably put the number higher due to desperate reinforcement from nearby garrisons and desperate impressment of random militias and city-folk into the ranks, though such a force would be fairly ineffective.

And as for the idea of a post-Vicksburg victory for the Confederates, I agree. It would be immensely difficult, especially when also considering the effects of the concurrent Tullahoma campaign on the Western Theatre. I cover in my Chickamauga campaign a timeline in which the Confederates have quite possibly one of the best realistic outcomes for the battle, along with a number of other major victories, and even then, they're still in a very grim position by the time the winter of 1863 rolls around, with a chance of victory that is... not great.
 
I agree with many of these points, particularly those about assaulting and laying siege to fortified positions. The preparations required are fairly steep for both, and once underway, it is generally a terrible idea to stop unless necessary, excluding instances where new information reveals the attempt to be pointless or pyrrhic.

Also, Lincoln, as a man of the West, was passionately attached to the idea of getting control of the Mississippi. I think getting him to abandon the project is difficult, with two final holdouts (Vicksburg and Port Hudson) closer to the end of their sieges than their beginning. Especially once Grant points out how long it will take to get troops back east without control of Vicksburg anyway.

I would put TheRockofChickamauga's estimate of 20,000 as the number of men within Washington's defenses as fairly accurate prior to a loss at Gettysburg, but I personally would place the number at around 25,000. After such a defeat, I would probably put the number higher due to desperate reinforcement from nearby garrisons and desperate impressment of random militias and city-folk into the ranks, though such a force would be fairly ineffective.

All good points.

And given them, I think Gingrich/Forstchen paint the much likelier result: Lee gives it a shot, and gets repulsed bloodily. Then most likely goes to take Baltimore instead. After that, it's harder to say, lots of possibilities. Mind you, even this is a gruesome turn of events for Lincoln. He would fight on, but Northern morale would take a kicking.

And as for the idea of a post-Vicksburg victory for the Confederates, I agree. It would be immensely difficult, especially when also considering the effects of the concurrent Tullahoma campaign on the Western Theatre. I cover in my Chickamauga campaign a timeline in which the Confederates have quite possibly one of the best realistic outcomes for the battle, along with a number of other major victories, and even then, they're still in a very grim position by the time the winter of 1863 rolls around, with a chance of victory that is... not great.

This is also a good point. Braxton Bragg is just the gift that keeps giving.

Now, one possibility is that with Grant tied down wrapping up Vicksburg, maybe Lincoln decides to yank a corps from Rosecrans to bring east, and orders him to fall back on Nashville. I'm not sure this would happen, but I imagine it would cross Lincoln's mind.
 
This is also a good point. Braxton Bragg is just the gift that keeps giving.

Now, one possibility is that with Grant tied down wrapping up Vicksburg, maybe Lincoln decides to yank a corps from Rosecrans to bring east, and orders him to fall back on Nashville. I'm not sure this would happen, but I imagine it would cross Lincoln's mind.
It's funny, in my timeline Bragg and Rosecrans are both out of the picture pretty quick, for totally different reasons. Rosecrans was going to be replaced by Thomas, but he died (R.I.P.), and so Granger took his place. Meanwhile, there was a struggle among Confederate command that eventually left Longstreet of all people in command of the Army of Tennessee... yeah, I know.
 
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I think you CAN get around this to get your result.

The problem to resolve is that the Gettysburg and Vicksburg Campaigns both culminate basically simultaneously. But what if you could change that? What if you could make Gettysburg, in some form, happen sooner, or push back Vicksburg somewhat later? And by move, I mean, "move by more than just a few days."

I think getting Lee to Gettysburg any sooner is a hard ask, given how fast he reorganized and moved in OTL after Chancellorsville, and the need to get all of Longstreet's troops in hand. There is little slack in the timeline to move it up by more than a few days, I think, and that is not enough. The advantage of looking into this option is that it is easier to get a direct butterfly from Jackson surviving Chancellorsville, since he is, you know, right on the scene. Still, not easy. Maybe I should think about this some more.

But I *could* see Grant getting delayed in kicking off the Grand Gulf/Bruinsburg landings by 2-3 (maybe even 4) weeks, for a number of plausible reasons that could be reasonable butterflies of a resasonable POD; or in the alternate, if it must come after May 4, Grant gets delayed on the way up to Champion Hill. Which, if the rest of the campaign plays out as in OTL, would mean Grant would be far enough away from obtaining a surrender that an order from Lincoln to withdraw becomes plausible; and even that, somehow, news seeps through the lines to Pemberton and his men, which eventually would be inevitable. I could see Lincoln wiring Grant, on July 5-6, querying: "Is it likely you can secure Pemberton's surrender in the next fortnight?" Grant could respond that it is not impossible, but far from certain. At that point, Lincoln might reluctantly order Grant to lift the siege.

Here is one other difficulty, and it is one Grant would point out: Without control of Vicksburg, a withdrawal of Grant's army to make parts of it available to go east is going to be difficult. He could march up to Corinth, but that would take...weeks. To load onto transports out of gun range of Pemberton means probably dragging troops up to Snyder's Bluff or down to Grand Gulf. Either way, it is hard to see Grant being able to get any divisions to Pennsylvania before September.

But as I say, I think even without Vicksburg sticking, you can find a way to a plausible Southern victory. Not easy, but not impossible.

Anyway, I am enjoying the timeline anyway. The Vicksburg thing really is the one thing that's scratchy to me, and even that could be fixed, as I said. Otherwise, a lot of plausible things to chew over here.

I agree Vicksburg is a major complication. It makes Zero Sense to have Grant raise the siege. Withdrawing would actually put his army in jeopardy, for no possible gain. As you say he couldn't ship a Corps to Pennsylvania for about 2 months, so it make no strategic sense. Other Union Corps were available in the East to fill the gap. To retreat from Vicksburg would be giving back the gains of the last 2 years of hard fighting. The Union only had to hold their positions and the Mississippi Valley would fall into their hands.

By this point in the war the Union was occupying most of Tennessee, most of the populated areas of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. They also held all of Maryland, West Virginia, much of Northern, and tidal Virginia, and strategic parts of South Carolina, and Florida. The also hold all of what would become the States of New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Yet in the end the Union grants the 11 States of Dixie, in there entirety, their independence, plus Oklahoma, the Southern parts of New Mexico, and Arizona Territories, and I forget just how but West Virginia was thrown into the pot as well.

I've always thought Gettysburg is far to late for a plausible POD for a Confederate Victory. It just seems it has to be an earlier POD. I give the Rock a lot of credit for the care he put into the alternate politics of North, and South. It's hard to say how public opinion would react to Union defeat, and Confederate Victory, and how the party systems would adapt. The fallout from any war is usually complex, the ACW would be much messier then most.
 
I agree Vicksburg is a major complication. It makes Zero Sense to have Grant raise the siege. Withdrawing would actually put his army in jeopardy, for no possible gain. As you say he couldn't ship a Corps to Pennsylvania for about 2 months, so it make no strategic sense. Other Union Corps were available in the East to fill the gap. To retreat from Vicksburg would be giving back the gains of the last 2 years of hard fighting. The Union only had to hold their positions and the Mississippi Valley would fall into their hands.

Indeed, and it is not only that makes little objective strategic sense to give up on Vicksburg and Port Hudson, but that it's just something Lincoln would be very, very unlikely to do, thanks in part to his zeal for opening up the Mississippi.

And like I said, he will also be in desperate need of some offsetting good news for outraged Northern publics...

Which is why I tend to doubt that my scheme of delaying Grant a few weeks would make a difference. It would just bring it into the outer margins of plausibility.

I agree that it starts to get very, very hard to get a Confederate victory after summer 1862 - not that there was ever a really good chance of it, of course.
 
Chapter Sixty-Nine: The Presidency of Henry C. Lodge, Part One
Chapter Sixty-Nine: The Presidency of Henry C. Lodge, Part One
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President Henry C. Lodge
With Lodge's entering into office, many outsider observers of the United States were truly beginning to suspect America was becoming a one party system, not due to the machinations of an ambitious leader or an erosion of American democracy, but because of utter Republican domination of both Houses of congress. Of the 64 Senate seats, only 7 were not held by members of the Republican Party, of them only six were Democrats, consisting of Nevada's Francis G. Newlands, Colorado's Charles J. Hughes, Kentucky's Thomas H. Paynter and James B. McCreary, and Missouri's William J. Stone and Champ Clark. The sole remaining man who was opposed to the Republicans in Senate while also not being a Democrat was Wisconsin's Robert LaFollette, who claimed affliction with the Reform Party he had ran with the 1908 election, although he would frequently vote with the Republicans on many issues. As had become evident in previous years, however, the Republicans were far from a united party, and it wasn't surprising when some conservative Republicans would cross the aisle and vote with the six Democrats. This would lead Newlands to state, "The only hope for the continuance of the Democratic Party as a major political force is for a mass defection of the conservative wing of the Republican Party to our side. Should this fail, I see little hope for the future of my party."
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Nevada Senator Francis Newlands, leader of the six Democrats in the Senate
Shortly into his presidency, Lodge would be confronted with his first major issue as president, which happened to deal with the presidency of another nation, Mexico. In the wake of the 1909 Mexican Presidential Election and the subsequent Zapatista rebellion, Lodge was confronted with what to do. Should he lead the United States in remaining neutral, or back the government under Orozco that his predecessor had helped form and install? Ultimately, Lodge what stick to his principles of avoiding United States involvement abroad and following a policy of isolationism unless the Mexican government would directly request assistance, which it did not. This decision, however, would be much scorned by some of the more progressive elements of the Republican Party, including Roosevelt himself, who openly claimed that had the rebellion broken out under his administration, he would have sent troops to quell it. This move by Lodge coincided with his efforts to begin removing U.S. troops from the region, and beginning to advocate for Mexico to become more self-reliant, although he was still in favor of a friendly foreign policy, as well as remaining a firm defender of the informal alliance that existed between the United States, the Confederacy, and Mexico, which he had played a major role in crafting while acting as Secretary of State under Roosevelt.
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A photograph depicting U.S. and Mexican soldiers partaking in joint U.S.-CSA-Mexican military exercises as part of their policy of mutual friendship
Lodge's term would also be marked by his increased push for civil rights, being their most fervent advocate since Garfield. For example, he would again break with Roosevelt, and formally offered to the three discharged companies of the 27th U.S. Infantry the opportunity for reentry into the army, as well as full presidential pardons and honorable discharges for those who wished to remain out of the service. He would also meet with several leaders within the African-American community, asking to hear their grievances, as well as their ideas for improvements. Among those who he would speak to were John B. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, Kelly Miller, William M. Trotter, Arturo A. Schomburg, and Paul L. Dunbar. This, however, was not completely well-received by the general populace, and the Democrats were able to exploit the issue of racism for slight congressional gains in the 1910 congressional midterms, although the Republicans still dominated both houses of Congress. The most notable of these gains would be the election of William R. Hearst over incumbent Republican Chauncey M. Depew for his U.S. Senate seat of New York. Hearst's victory was attributed both to his massive media empire, as well as the effective work of his campaign manager John Alden Dix in uniting many of the disparate factions in New York who opposed Republicans but lacked unity. Despite this, Lodge remained true to his convictions, and continued his meetings with the African-Americans, which has received much praise in the modern day.
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W.E.B. Du Bois, Kelly Miller, William Trotter, Arturo Schomburg, and Paul Dunbar, all among the African-American leaders whom Lodge invited to the White House
Another major conflict would rise within the Lodge adminstration in 1911. On October 14, 1911, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John M. Harlan was pass away, thus ending his 28 years of service on the bench that had begun with his appointment by President Garfield. The battle on who would replace him would help highlight once more the divides within the Republican Party. Lodge considered two major candidates. First was his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, while the other was Ohio Governor William H. Taft. Remembering how his dropping out at the 1908 Republican National Convention had led to Lodge's nomination, Taft was confident he would receive the appointment, and he received the endorsements of Theodore Roosevelt and Vice-President Albert Cummins, as well as several other prominent progressive Republicans. Once again defying his old leader, Lodge would instead nominate Knox, who shared closer views to him. This would enrage Taft, who tried to mobilize enough senators to block Knox's approval, and rejected out of hand Lodge's offer to appoint him as Knox's successor in the State Department. Ultimately, however, Taft's movement failed to gain much traction, and Knox's nomination was easily approved by the Senate. Thus, Knox became the 10th Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and with Taft's refusal to accept the post, Lodge would appoint James E. Watson, recently elected senator from Indiana and a close ally of House Speaker Joseph G. Cannon from his time in the House of Representatives, to the now vacated position of Secretary of State as an attempted olive branch to the conservative wing of his party.
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Chief Justice Philander Knox
It was under the newly inaugurated Knox's court that a long awaited and prepared for legal battle began. In the case Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the long-awaited showdown between the most powerful monopoly of them all, Henry M. Flagler's Standard Oil, and a United States federal government intent on busting trusts finally occurred. Hundreds of people would appear as witnesses to offer their testimony, even including Chairman Henry Flagler, Vice-President John D. Archbold, as well as senior company executives including Henry H. Rogers, Oliver H. Payne, and William A. Rockefeller. As arguments from both sides were heard, the courtroom remained tense as the future of American industry was decided, with the silence only broken the droning of the lawyers and their witnesses, the occasional rapping of the gavel, and the frantic scribing of notes by newspaper reporters eagerly hanging on every word. Eventually, the Supreme Court would return with their verdict. In it, it ordered Standard Oil to dissolve into over two dozen smaller, more local companies within six months of the court's ruling. While some eagerly claimed this as a victory, other progressives, led by Senator Robert LaFollette, saw it as a defeat in disguise, as with the ruling came the government establishing what it would consider monopolistic practices, which they feared would lead to the monopolies merely finding loopholes to continue with their ways. For the moment, however, the power of America's largest and most domineering monopoly was shattered.
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Leaders of the Dissolved Standard Oil: Henry Flagler, John Archbold, Henry Rogers, Oliver Payne, and William Rockefeller
Besides Knox, Lodge had the opportunity to appoint two justices to the Supreme Court. The first chance arose almost shortly into his term, and was caused by the passing of Associate Justice Rufus W. Peckham. In perhaps a controversial move, Lodge would nominate Charles E. Hughes to fill the vacancy. Immediately cries rang out within conservative Republican circles that Lodge had bought the nomination by promising Hughes a the next seat open on the court. Luckily for Lodge, however, House Speaker Cannon decided not to pursue or promote the rumors, and instead asked his followers to align themselves similarly. Thus, what could have became a major executive crisis was averted. Lodge's next nomination would prove to be less eventful, with him selecting Julian W. Mack, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and noted for his progressive racial views, to be nominated and ultimately approved by the Senate.
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Associate Justices Charles E. Hughes and Julian Mack
As Lodge's term began coming to a close in 1912, he and his supporters who forced to look to the future. Despite Lodge being a much more moderate president than Roosevelt had been, the divides within the Republican Party had only grown. Even though Lodge had listened to them much more than Roosevelt ever did, the arch-conservatives within the party were growing more and more dissatisfied by the day. Without the threat of a major opposition party holding them together, many of these conservatives were seriously beginning to toy with the idea of an independent run, which had been present in their minds since 1904. All of these factors would burst forth in clear light in the 1912 election.

Lodge and his cabinet:
President: Henry C. Lodge
Vice-President: Albert B. Cummins
Secretary of State: Philander C. Knox
Secretary of the Treasury: Hamilton Fish II
Secretary of War: Leonard Wood
Attorney General: Jonathan P. Dolliver
Postmaster General: James R. Garfield
Secretary of the Navy: Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of the Interior: Porter J. McCumber
Secretary of Agriculture: James Wilson
Secretary of Labor and Commerce: Charles Nagel
 
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