Trent Affair Goes Hot

[marathag]

. And that's despite the Armstrong gun being a far more sophisticated design which requires different metal coils to be shrunk onto a core AND being rifled,

If such a minor problem, as you say, why were the 110 pounders withdrawn from Naval Service, and 7" Rifled Muzzle Loaders brought in to replace them after 1866, even though far less sophisticated?
You can read the after action reports from the Japanese actions just as well as I can.
Had the 110pdr gone to war as the main Naval piece against the USA, the RN would have been very disappointed in them.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

If such a minor problem, as you say,

I don't believe I did say it was a minor problem. You claimed that the phenomenon of Dahlgren guns bursting was a minor problem, and I demonstrated that it was more frequent than Armstrong guns being damaged (not bursting).

why were the 110 pounders withdrawn from Naval Service, and 7" Rifled Muzzle Loaders brought in to replace them after 1866, even though far less sophisticated?

Because the 7in RML was cheaper, did everything the Armstrong gun did and had better performance against armour. The real question is why the US navy kept the Dahlgren gun in service despite it being more likely to burst than the Armstrong gun, particularly as 'racking' with heavy shot at low velocity is a completely ineffective method of disabling well-made armour, and the logical answer is not in favour of the Union.

You can read the after action reports from the Japanese actions just as well as I can.

I can indeed. I can also read the reports of the Union attack on Fort Fisher, in which smaller (6.4in, 100pdr) Parrott guns, banded in a more simplistic fashion than the Armstrong gun, burst repeatedly. Indeed, they killed more sailors in a single accident than the Armstrong guns did in their entire career. However, I'm not sure how reading these after-action reports is meant to disprove @von Adler's assertion that "The US did not have the industrial know-how in 1861 to cast steel or iron without hidden imperfections... and still had problems with bursting guns at times".

Had the 110pdr gone to war as the main Naval piece against the USA, the RN would have been very disappointed in them.

A good job it wasn't the main naval piece intended for rapid broadside fire, then, which (as I noted above) was the well-proven 32pdr. Indeed, it wasn't even the main armour-piercing gun, which was the highly reliable and extremely potent 68pdr. It might well, however, have fulfilled an effective niche role as a slow-firing but long-range and accurate pivot gun, which is fortunately pretty much exactly the role the Royal Navy had selected it for.

 

[von Adler]

To be fair, the standard broadside gun of the British navy in 1861 would definitely be the 32pdr: the 110pdr Armstrong and the 68pdr smoothbore tend to be the standard pivot gun, or the broadside gun for ironclads. To be scrupulously fair, the standard gun of the Union navy in 1861 would also be the 32pdr, and the standard pivot gun was definitely not the 15in Rodman/Dahlgren.

Fair enough - what I meant was that any ship going up against US coastal fortification is bound to be an ironclad, and those were armed with 68pdr:s. The 32pdr:s will be mounted on the many, many wooden screw corvettes and frigates that maintain the blockade. In essence, any fighting against the US will be done with 110pdr Armstrongs and 68pdr smoothbores while the 32pdr:s will be used to fire warning shots across the bow of merchant vessels trying to run the blockade.

 

[marathag]

It takes time constructing them and loading them, then it takes roughly 2 years before the urine and other ammonia-rich materials have been turned enough

Joseph Leconte, 1823-1901. Instructions for the Manufacture of Saltpetre

Page 7
Thus it is hoped that the preparation of saltpetre may be set on foot at once in three different stages of advance, viz.: by the collection of already nitrified earth; by the making of nitre-beds from already formed black earth; and by the preparation of black earth. By leaching, the first would yield immediate results, the second in six or eight months, and the last in about eighteen months or two years.
...
Prussian Method:This method yields results in about a year-- probably in our climate in eight months.
...
Swedish method: two years, perhaps less in the South

This is backyard engineering.
Note that Napoleonic France was also cut off from Nitre imports, and revolutionary France was producing much sooner than two years.

But this is the 1860s.
Industrial chemistry is at work. Calcium Hydroxide, Potassium Chloride and Acid treatment and washing, you can get the nitrates you want from Urea without all the months long wait for Mother Nature to do here worth the old fashioned way.

The South didn't have much of a chemical industry.
That was a Northern thing.

 

[marathag]

The real question is why the US navy kept the Dahlgren gun in service despite it being more likely to burst than the Armstrong gun, particularly as 'racking' with heavy shot at low velocity is a completely ineffective method of disabling well-made armour, and the logical answer is not in favour of the Union.

Racking was a problem for RN Armor until the hollow stringer mounting was done, in the mid 1860s onward. What good is armor that doesn't stay attached to the backing?

That's why you need to look closer at the postwar 1868 Shoeburyness tests of the 15" Rodman. Targets were built with the then current method, using the hollow stringers, not the 1859-1865 way, so the 1868 'Warrior' Target, wasn't the same as what was afloat during the Civil War

That's what the large bore smoothbores were good at, plus, as naval guns, roundball skips across the water, unlike conicals that richochet in random directions after first graze on water
1400fps from a Dahlgren isn't that low of a Black Powder Velocity, especially for a 440 pound ball

again, if the 110s were fine in your opinion with so few problems from your view(ignoring the Japanese actions), why were they condemned from service?
It was brought up that the lighter pieces didn't have problems, that's why I posted the scans, showing, yes, there was a problem.

How many 15" burst in service, again?
The 9" and 11" didn't.

Why did the 15" stay in service so long? It worked well enough, and then by 1865, the US stopped most military development
Perfect enemy of the good enough, and all that.

 

[marathag]

Moreover, when you compare like with like, you tend to find that US guns are heavier than their British guns, and/or use a smaller charge. For instance:

Some of Dahlgrens testing in the 1850s, not going for heavier powder charges for maximum velocity, but slightly lighter charges gave better accuracy

 

[marathag]

smaller (6.4in, 100pdr) Parrott guns, banded in a more simplistic fashion than the Armstrong gun, burst repeatedly.

I was speaking of Dahlgrens, not the Parrotts that blew muzzles off repeatedly. They weren't using Rodmans technique to relieve stresses in a cooling barrel, or Dahlgren, who just cast a solid cylinder and then had a lot of time on the lathe for inside and outside contours.

Cheaper and faster manufacture on Parrotts had their downside.
To blow up a 9" Dahlgren, they tried 22 firings with the shell set to zero delay, so would explode inside the barrel. Didn't hurt the gun.
What finally did that gun in, was twenty pounds of powder, with multiple shells loaded into the barrel, just shy of the muzzle: filled with shells, the whole length.

15" were not as strong

 

[The Professor]

Some of Dahlgrens testing in the 1850s, not going for heavier powder charges for maximum velocity, but slightly lighter charges gave better accuracy

And less effective.
I've lost what point you're trying to make disputing the minutiae of all these posts unless it's that the British had the better gear and manufacturing which I'm pretty sure is what your opponents are arguing.
If your cases is argument ad exhaustio then well done for persistence but it's not exactly a good faith argument for this discussion.

 

[Bullmoose713]

The United States wasn't fighting in Mexico.

But it's always been assumed that if the British went to war the French would follow?

 

[Sarthak]

But it's always been assumed that if the British went to war the French would follow?

Kinda. Napoleon III was basically holding back because he wanted Britain to intervene alongside him as well. It's not guaranteed, but 8/10 yeah Napoleon III would follow.

 

[von Adler]

Joseph Leconte, 1823-1901. Instructions for the Manufacture of Saltpetre

Page 7
Thus it is hoped that the preparation of saltpetre may be set on foot at once in three different stages of advance, viz.: by the collection of already nitrified earth; by the making of nitre-beds from already formed black earth; and by the preparation of black earth. By leaching, the first would yield immediate results, the second in six or eight months, and the last in about eighteen months or two years.
...
Prussian Method:This method yields results in about a year-- probably in our climate in eight months.
...
Swedish method: two years, perhaps less in the South

This is backyard engineering.
Note that Napoleonic France was also cut off from Nitre imports, and revolutionary France was producing much sooner than two years.

But this is the 1860s.
Industrial chemistry is at work. Calcium Hydroxide, Potassium Chloride and Acid treatment and washing, you can get the nitrates you want from Urea without all the months long wait for Mother Nature to do here worth the old fashioned way.

The South didn't have much of a chemical industry.
That was a Northern thing.

Collection of already nitrified earth was certainly possible, but cumbersome and required quite the logistic apparatus. This meant digging out the land under old barns and dry toilets/outhouses and leeching and boiling the nitrates out of it at the site, and then transporting the nitrates. Already nitrified earth is a rare and non-renewable source of nitrates - in Sweden, the nitrate cookers had to be repeatedly told not to dig at older cemetaries. You will get some gunpowder this way, but it will be expensive and inefficient, which is why it was not tried neither by the south nor the north during the civil war.

Nitre-beds were the way to go, as you could produce large amounts of nitrified earth all in one place, increasing production efficiency by a lot. However, using already formed black earth runs into the same problems as collecting already nitrified earth - you need to collect and transport it from a very wide area. Finally you have nitre beds from scratch, which takes a year or two to yield tangible results. Even if the US can get results quicker, those yields will be very small for a high cost and will not be enough to supply a 400 000 man army with gunpowder.

Napoleonic France had an already existing gunpowder industry using niter beds with sweage from the cities and was producing roughly 1 000 tons of salpetre per year before the revolution. In fact, most European countries had built up a domestic gunpowder industry during the 17th and 18th centuries using niter beds in various forms to supply its military. The US was one of the few countries that did not have a niter bed industry, as cave or guano niter from South America was far cheaper than the rather cumbersome process of making nitrates yourself.

Again the lack of a military-industrial complex will bite the US in the arse in this era if they end up under blockade. It will take TIME to build up this kind of industry, and with niter even more so as the niter beds need time.

 

[Belisarius II]

It been fascinating to read so many jingoistic posts, about 19th Century British Exceptionalism. England will always muddle through, while keeping a stiff upper lip, quite. This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England. The only country that can make rifles that don't burst, naval rifles that don't blowup, has chemists, metallurgists, strategists, international lawyers, has soldiers who can shoot straight, or has logistics, (because the Americans have no logistics).

So 130 gun ships of the line can't just sail into New York Harbor, and burn the city down? No they can't. One of the great lessons of the Crimean War was shell guns can burn wooden ships. A lot of the waters off the U.S. East Coast are shallow, the weather is often rough, all the major ports have narrow channels, that were guarded by forts, and none of them are deep. The officers who would've been ordered to carry out a blockade thought it would be a tough job, because they didn't have enough of the right kinds of ships, but what did they know? They actually thought the Americans were ahead in some critical technological areas, but what did they know?

By 1862 the standard gun on USN Frigates, and Sloops were 8" or 9" Smooth Bore shell guns, that could also fire solid shot. The 9" Dahlgren compared very favorable with the British 64 lb. gun, and far more reliable then the 110 lb. guns, that had to be taken out of service. The 32 lb. gun was still the most common weapon on RN Ships of Line. Taking their capital units out of the mix leaves near parity in naval strength in American Home waters, making it hard to maintain a blockade on a long coastline. In the event of war the Union planned to build a class of 17kt raiders, to prey on British Merchant ships. If the RN couldn't stop American Privateers form going to sea in the ARW, or War of 1812 with a blockade, how can the stop them in 1862 without one? Or certainly not a close one.

Now about the Americans have no logistics, (Is that good English?) It's strange to even have to mention this but there were railroad lines running up to the Canadian Border. The Americans had railroad heads within 45 miles of Montreal, they ran to Buffalo NY on the Niagara River, and to Detroit Mi. Do supply lines count as logistics? The Union Army was very good at using railroads, and even building them, when needed. More logistics?

http://gorhistory.com/Hist%20111%20Images/RR1860.jpg

By the 1850s, fears of an American invasion had begun to diminish, and the British felt able to start reducing the size of their garrison. The Reciprocity Treaty, negotiated between Canada and the United States in 1854, further helped to alleviate concerns.[138] However, tensions picked up again during the American Civil War (1861–65), reaching a peak with the Trent Affair of late 1861 and early 1862,[139] touched off when the captain of a US gunboat stopped the RMS Trent and removed two Confederate officials who were bound for Britain. The British government was outraged and, with war appearing imminent, took steps to reinforce its North American garrison, increasing it from a strength of 4,000 to 18,000.[139] However, war was averted and the sense of crisis subsided.

Add 40,000 troops shipped that Spring, and maybe 30,000 Canadians, and you have up to 90,000 men to defend upper, and lower Canada. Their 1863 assessment stated that only Quebec City was well defended, so nothing could be effectively defended west of Montreal. I think that Vancouver, and the rest of British Columbia are west of Montreal? A pincer movement by 40,000 men base out of Buffalo, and Detroit could secure the Canadian territory between them, before linking up, and marching on Toronto. 75,000 men could march on Montreal, from the Plattsburg area. Another 40,000 men based in Northern New England could march on Quebec City, to screen the movement on Montreal. IMHO this strategy would give the Americans an excellent chance of securing a good part of the populated areas of Canada, by the Fall of 1862.

Now I'm sure some will say the Americans will run out of gunpowder, their rifles will burst, their cannon will explode, and each British Soldier will simply have to shoot twice, and the whole operation will end in a humiliating defeat, but I don't think so. Others will say the Confederates will overwhelm the 200,000 Union Troops holding the Border States, and easily capture Washington, but I don't think so. The Union Army had over 500,000 men present that Spring, and under this kind of desperate situation during the course of the Winter, and Spring, another 100,000 men could be raised, formed into regiments, and armed with older weapons from State Arsenals. Not suffering the embarrassing Eastern defeats of 1862 the Union hasn't lost as many weapons.

Partly addressing the shortage of Union Rifles, of course not all of the men listed as present, in the Union, Confederate, or even the British Army are frontline riflemen. No every British Soldier isn't a sharp shooter, or grenadier guardsmen, so they don't all even need rifles. I wonder can the Americans make revolvers without British Steel? Probably not. But despite British Exceptionalism, and the invincibility of the RN the British Government might find in the Spring of 1863 that paying the costs of a war with the Union hurts more then the sting to their pride in the Trent Affair.

Lord Palmerston will make an eloquent speech in the House proclaiming victory over the Americans. He'll state, "The affront to international law, and British honor have been avenged, and American arrogance chastised. But we are a Christian People, who love peace, so now we offer peace. If the Americans apologize, and give us back Canada all will be forgiven, and peace restored." What do you think would be the American terms? "A phased withdrew, from Canada, and a British arms embargo of the South." The British counter with an ok, but here's an itemized bill for the cost of the war. The Americans say drop dead. The British say ok, no reparation's, land for peace. The Americans say ok. Gee the war was really worth it, wasn't it?

 

[Belisarius II]

Kinda. Napoleon III was basically holding back because he wanted Britain to intervene alongside him as well. It's not guaranteed, but 8/10 yeah Napoleon III would follow.

And how big an army was he going to send to invade the United States? Chances are he'd end up leaving the British in the lurch. He had too many irons in too many fires. 40,000 men in Mexico, 20,000 in Italy, 80,000 in Algeria, and was conducting military campaigns in Senegal, and Indochina. Maybe 20,000 men might sail to the Confederacy, or Quebec? How many troops would be left in France for a European contingency? Just the depot troops? He could send a fleet, Gloire, and a few steam frigates?

The French army, on the normal war footing of 1868, could thus place in the field 285,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 984 guns; having in the second line, as depot troops, 91,000 men, infantry and cavalry. On a peace footing, the army could muster about two-thirds of these numbers; and as the calling in of the reserves was, in spite of the amendments introduced in 1868, not to be easily accomplished, the fact had to be accepted that, in case of the sudden breaking out of the war, only about 200,000 men, infantry and cavalry, would be disposable for active service.

At the time of the war of 1870 the Mexican expedition had returned to France, and the army was in the middle of a large expansion, in anticipation of a war with Prussia.

 

[Belisarius II]

when Philip wrote thus to the Spartans: If once I enter into your territories, I will destroy ye all, never to rise again; they answered him with the single word, If.


The only work that's ever assumed that the Union back down over the Trent and the British just go ahead and declare war anyway is Conroy's 1862. I'd be surprised if anybody other than you is working on any other basis than the British deliver the ultimatum, the Union refuse for whatever reason, and the British declare war as a result.


Perhaps the opinion of foreign powers will help to clarify both that the Trent is a big deal, and why it's a big deal.

'The arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell... has produced in France, if not the same emotion as in England, at least a profound astonishment and sensation. Public opinion was immediately occupied with the legality and the consequences of such an act... The act seemed to the public so entirely at variance with the ordinary rules of international law, that it has determined to throw the responsibility exclusively on the Commander of the "San Jacinto"... The desire to aid in preventing a conflict... and the desire to maintain, with a view to placing the rights of their own flag beyond the danger of any attack, certain principles essential to the security of neutrals, have convinced themselves, after mature reflection, that they [the French government] could not remain perfectly silent on the matter...

'The United States have admitted, with us, in the Treaties concluded between the two countries, that the freedom of the flag extends to persons found on board, even were they enemies of one of the two parties... Messrs. Mason and Slidell were, therefore, by virtue of this principle, the insertion of which in our Treaties of Amity and Commerce has never encountered any difficulty, perfectly free under the neutral flag of England... this is the place to recall a circumstance which should govern this entire affair, and which renders unjustifiable the conduct of the American cruiser. The "Trent" was not bound to a point belonging to either of the belligerents. She was carrying her cargo and passengers to a neutral country, and it was, moreover, in a neutral port where she had embarked them. If it was admissible that, under such circumstances, the neutral flag did not completely cover the persons and good on board, its immunity would be an empty word. At any moment the commerce and navigation of third Powers would be liable to suffer in their innocent or even indirect relations with one or other of the belligerents. These latter would not only have a right to require from the neutral a complete impartiality - to prohibit him from all participation in acts of hostility; they would impose upon his liberty of commerce and navigation restrictions of which modern international law has refused to admit the legality...

'If the Cabinet of Washington could only regard the two arrested persons as rebels, whom they have always a right to seize... there would be a non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a ship to be a portion of the territory of the country whose flag she bears, and there would be a violation of the immunity which forbids a foreign Sovereign to exercise there his jurisdiction. It is not necessary, doubtless, to recall the energy with which on every occasion the Government of the United States have defended this immunity, and the right of asylum which is a consequence of it...

'The Federal Government would be inspired by a just and elevated sentiment in yielding to these demands. One would vainly search for what object or in what interest they would risk to provoke, by a different attitude, a rupture with Britain... I invite you, sir, to take the first opportunity of speaking frankly to Mr. Seward, and if he should ask it, to leave with him a copy of this despatch.'
(M. Thouvenel, French foreign minister, to M. Mercier, French ambassador to the United States, Paris, 3 December 1861)

'according to the notions of international law adopted by all the Powers, and which the American Government itself has often taken as the rule of its conduct, England could not by any means refrain in the present case from making a representation against the attack on its flag, and from demanding a just reparation for it.' (Count Rechberg, Austrian foreign minister, to M. de Hulsemann, Austrian ambassador to the United States, Vienna, 18 December 1861)

'The maritime operations undertaken by President Lincoln against the Southern Seceding States could not, from their very commencement, but fill the King's Government with apprehensions lest they should result in possible prejudice to the legitimate interests of neutral Powers. These apprehensions have unfortunately proved fully justified by the forcible seizure on board the neutral mail-packet the "Trent"... This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced in England and throughout Europe the most profound sensation, and thrown not Cabinets only, but also public opinion, into a state of the most excited expectation. For, although at present it is England only which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand, it is one of the most important and universally recognized rights of the neutral flag which has been called into question.

'I need not here enter into a discussion of the legal side of the question. Public opinion in Europe has, with singular unanimity, pronounced in the most positive manner for the injured party. As far as we are concerned, we have hitherto abstained from expressing ourselves to you upon the subject, because in the absence of any reliable
information we were in doubt as to whether the Captain of the San Jacinto, in the course taken by him, had been acting under orders from his Government or not. Even now we prefer to assume that the latter was the case. Should the former supposition, however, turn out to be the correct one, we should consider ourselves under the necessity of attributing greater importance to the occurrence, and to our great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in it not an isolated fact but a public menace offered to the existing rights of all neutrals... You will read this despatch without delay to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, should he desire it, you will give him a copy of it'
(Count Bernstorff, Prussian foreign minister, to Baron Geralt, Prussian ambassador to the United States, Berlin, 25 December 1861)

If this doesn't work, ponder the case of John Anderson. Anderson was a slave who escaped to Canada, killing a man on his way. In 1860, the US government applied to have him extradited to Missouri, where he would have been burned alive if found guilty. Before the Canadian courts could throw out the case, the British government issued a writ of habeas corpus as a means of having him brought to London beyond the reach of the US government, despite the risk of provoking a constitutional crisis with Canada and a war with the United States. Moral of the story: in the 1860s, the British take their ability to protect people under their flag seriously.


Then you factor in what might happen to morale if those new poor-quality rifle barrels start exploding in the hands of the troops. Probably a good job the Union won't have too many cartridges to fire through them.


To be fair, the standard broadside gun of the British navy in 1861 would definitely be the 32pdr: the 110pdr Armstrong and the 68pdr smoothbore tend to be the standard pivot gun, or the broadside gun for ironclads. To be scrupulously fair, the standard gun of the Union navy in 1861 would also be the 32pdr, and the standard pivot gun was definitely not the 15in Rodman/Dahlgren.

Moreover, when you compare like with like, you tend to find that US guns are heavier than their British guns, and/or use a smaller charge. For instance:

Royal Navy 32pdr 32cwt: 5lbs full
US Navy 32pdr 33cwt: 4.5lbs full

Royal Navy 32pdr 50cwt: 8lbs full
US Navy 32pdr 51cwt: 7lbs full

Royal Navy 32pdr 56cwt: 10lbs distant
US Navy 32pdr 57cwt: 9lbs distant
US Navy 32pdr 61cwt: 10lbs distant.

Royal Navy 8in 52cwt: 8lbs full
US Navy 8in 55cwt: 7lbs full

Might be due to better metallurgy or a more carefree attitude - either way, the small difference gives the Royal Navy more range and better penetrating power even before you start throwing training and the Moorsom broadside directors into the bargain.

It's not the Middle Ages, wars are massively expensive in lives, and money. Britain is a mercantilist power, with global commitments, and assets to protect. The Government answers to the tax paying, monied classes, who don't like trade disrupted, or their taxes raised. One would hope their capable of rational calculation. Gain, and lose was their primary motivation in the Mid Victorian Era, not national duels of honor. Everyone already knew Britain was powerful, they had nothing to prove.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

It been fascinating to read so many jingoistic posts, about 19th Century British Exceptionalism. England will always muddle through, while keeping a stiff upper lip, quite. This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England. The only country that can make rifles that don't burst, naval rifles that don't blowup, has chemists, metallurgists, strategists, international lawyers, has soldiers who can shoot straight, or has logistics, (because the Americans have no logistics).

Most of the points being made here are, quite literally, to dispel this idea that the United States of 1861 is the United States of 1940. It's just the case that, yes, the United States in 1861 was industrially, and in many ways technically, behind British industry and manufacturing. Britain produced more steel, iron, and coal than the United States in this period (and would continue to do so for the next two decades) and her navy was bigger, her army bigger and more professional, and an economy three times the size.

I'm pretty sure no one has said in this thread that the British will walk over the Americans, but there's a lot of salient points to be made that in terms of economics, the Union has way more problems than most of the pro-American posters are willing to admit, and this would be a problem in any hypothetical Trent war in 1862.

Now about the Americans have no logistics, (Is that good English?) It's strange to even have to mention this but there were railroad lines running up to the Canadian Border. The Americans had railroad heads within 45 miles of Montreal, they ran to Buffalo NY on the Niagara River, and to Detroit Mi. Do supply lines count as logistics? The Union Army was very good at using railroads, and even building them, when needed. More logistics?

http://gorhistory.com/Hist%20111%20Images/RR1860.jpg

You may want to inspect that map more closely before trumpeting American logistics. How many run into Canada? How many run to the frontier with Maine? I can answer the Canada one, three, and the Maine one, zero. That also ignores the Americans to have a chance at winning, can't just use the railroads, but also need to control Lakes Ontario, Champlain, and the Richelieu and St. Lawrence rivers. That's not an easy feet, and would take way longer than this rough "spring 1863" bit you seem to be optimistically insisting on.

Add 40,000 troops shipped that Spring, and maybe 30,000 Canadians, and you have up to 90,000 men to defend upper, and lower Canada. Their 1863 assessment stated that only Quebec City was well defended, so nothing could be effectively defended west of Montreal. I think that Vancouver, and the rest of British Columbia are west of Montreal? A pincer movement by 40,000 men base out of Buffalo, and Detroit could secure the Canadian territory between them, before linking up, and marching on Toronto. 75,000 men could march on Montreal, from the Plattsburg area. Another 40,000 men based in Northern New England could march on Quebec City, to screen the movement on Montreal. IMHO this strategy would give the Americans an excellent chance of securing a good part of the populated areas of Canada, by the Fall of 1862.

To pick this apart again, for starters they could send more than 40k men to North America, and there would be more than 30k Canadians showing up. That's not up for debate.

I am confused by the continuous reference to an '1863 assessment' when Jervois only delivered his assessment in 1864, and then revised it again the same year. There was already an existing plan and assessment submitted in 1862, and the prevailing wisdom that Canada west of Kingston not Montreal, could not be defended. Even in Jervois pessimistic assessment of early 1864 when he said that, he revised it, again, to the assessment that Canada west of Kingston was unlikely to be held. The British view remained remarkably consistent and again did depend on having a flotilla on the lakes. Which it is very unlikely they would not have.

Vancouver and British Columbia are West of Montreal, roughly 4,500km west to be exact. I'm not quite sure what point you're trying to raise here. I already pointed out that an invasion of either is pretty much impossible given the resources available to the Union in the West, the superiority of the British squadron on the Pacific, and the pessimism expressed by the American commander that he could even defend his base of operations against a British attack.

Your assessment of men marching from Detroit and Buffalo, then linking up to march on Toronto is not unrealistic. Getting them to march along the shores of Lake Ontario to points east however, without controlling the Lake itself, is the rub for any invasion.

75,000 men from Plattsburgh, eh probably more like 60. But again, that would be the crux of American strategy and the one they would pin their hopes on to win the war. That force though, would be marching into the teeth of British prepared positions, naval power, and the bulk of the forces defending Canada. That's going to bleed them very badly.

40,000 from northern New England marching on Quebec... nope. That one is a plain no. The only American general (Halleck) who wrote about it pretty blunty wrote that off. Other than trying to exclusively rely on the Grand Trunk Railroad to take Richmond (Canada East) in an overland march to try and work behind the Canadians, they don't have a well maintained road or river network to use so that's a write off. The other route by marching from the headwaters of the Kennebec River overland to Quebec City? A single road through largely uninhabited wilderness? Suicide, and also a write off. Those 40,000 have a far better chance not dying and being actually useful garrisoning New England from any British invasion, which the British did plan.

There's pretty much no realistic plan for the Americans to do anything but march on Toronto and, barring naval supremacy on Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain, stall on the shores of the St. Lawrence for want of naval superiority and British defences by the fall of 1862. The campaign would open again in the spring, both sides having built more and reinforced to the best of their abilities, and they'd be fighting it out again.

Now I'm sure some will say the Americans will run out of gunpowder, their rifles will burst, their cannon will explode, and each British Soldier will simply have to shoot twice, and the whole operation will end in a humiliating defeat, but I don't think so. Others will say the Confederates will overwhelm the 200,000 Union Troops holding the Border States, and easily capture Washington, but I don't think so. The Union Army had over 500,000 men present that Spring, and under this kind of desperate situation during the course of the Winter, and Spring, another 100,000 men could be raised, formed into regiments, and armed with older weapons from State Arsenals. Not suffering the embarrassing Eastern defeats of 1862 the Union hasn't lost as many weapons.

Others have already addressed rifles and powder far better than me so I'll just direct you back to their posts.

Sure the Union will probably get the 600,000 men under arms in 1862 they got up to historically, but with probably close to 300,000 of them tied down in invading Canada, protecting the coasts, and in the Washington/Baltimore defences or facing off against a terrifyingly larger Army of Northern Virginia, holding the border states and invading the Western Confederate states becomes a more dicey proposition.

To fight Britain the Union has to weaken itself elsewhere, which is a net advantage to the Confederates.

Lord Palmerston will make an eloquent speech in the House proclaiming victory over the Americans. He'll state, "The affront to international law, and British honor have been avenged, and American arrogance chastised. But we are a Christian People, who love peace, so now we offer peace. If the Americans apologize, and give us back Canada all will be forgiven, and peace restored." What do you think would be the American terms? "A phased withdrew, from Canada, and a British arms embargo of the South." The British counter with an ok, but here's an itemized bill for the cost of the war. The Americans say drop dead. The British say ok, no reparation's, land for peace. The Americans say ok. Gee the war was really worth it, wasn't it?

The British plan was to grind the Americans down via blockade. They could occupy all of Canada (save the Maritimes, because that's pretty close to ASB levels of unlikely) and the British would keep the blockade on until they agreed to give Canada back. That's a sentiment pretty clear in their correspondence and the scholarly sources that they were damned unlikely to let it go.

 

[Belisarius II]

I don't believe I did say it was a minor problem. You claimed that the phenomenon of Dahlgren guns bursting was a minor problem, and I demonstrated that it was more frequent than Armstrong guns being damaged (not bursting).


Because the 7in RML was cheaper, did everything the Armstrong gun did and had better performance against armour. The real question is why the US navy kept the Dahlgren gun in service despite it being more likely to burst than the Armstrong gun, particularly as 'racking' with heavy shot at low velocity is a completely ineffective method of disabling well-made armour, and the logical answer is not in favour of the Union.


I can indeed. I can also read the reports of the Union attack on Fort Fisher, in which smaller (6.4in, 100pdr) Parrott guns, banded in a more simplistic fashion than the Armstrong gun, burst repeatedly. Indeed, they killed more sailors in a single accident than the Armstrong guns did in their entire career. However, I'm not sure how reading these after-action reports is meant to disprove @von Adler's assertion that "The US did not have the industrial know-how in 1861 to cast steel or iron without hidden imperfections... and still had problems with bursting guns at times".


A good job it wasn't the main naval piece intended for rapid broadside fire, then, which (as I noted above) was the well-proven 32pdr. Indeed, it wasn't even the main armour-piercing gun, which was the highly reliable and extremely potent 68pdr. It might well, however, have fulfilled an effective niche role as a slow-firing but long-range and accurate pivot gun, which is fortunately pretty much exactly the role the Royal Navy had selected it for.

No Dahlgren ever burst in battle, Armstrong's did. Yes Parrott's did burst, which is why they kept the very safe, and reliable Dahlgren. Almost all guns of the period suffered failures. Breech Loading Krupp guns in the 1870 war had a very bad safety record, and had to be replaced after the war, but they were good enough to defeat the French in a short war. The Armstrong's didn't get the chance to kill many British Tars because it wasn't used in many battles. Parrott's were fired thousands of times in action. Ordnance Rifles had a very safe record. Rodman's were used mostly in forts, so had few chances to engage the enemy. The 9" Dahlgren fired a 90 lb. shot, with a range 3,450 yards, at 15 degree elevation. The Dahlgren 50 lb. Rifle was very successful. We all know about the 11", and the 15" was devastating.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

It been fascinating to read so many jingoistic posts, about 19th Century British Exceptionalism. England will always muddle through, while keeping a stiff upper lip, quite. This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England. The only country that can make rifles that don't burst, naval rifles that don't blowup, has chemists, metallurgists, strategists, international lawyers, has soldiers who can shoot straight, or has logistics, (because the Americans have no logistics).

The level of projection in this paragraph is really quite remarkable.

 

[marktaha]

And no one is denying that. The Rape of Indian Women by the British regiments were extremely deplorable indeed.
However deflecting the main point of his remark is again, deflection. The Battles of Oudh, Battles of the Carnatic, Siege of Delhi, and Invasion of the Gangetic Plains were real battles, not skirmishes. Don't deflect his remark. No one denied the atrocities that happened, however the main point was that he rebuked you when you said that the Sepoy Mutiny was not an actual serious shooting war.

Nations can't afford to hold eternal grudges, and WW1 is fifty years away (Germany hasn't even unified yet). The US annexed Texas and California from Mexico, yet that didn't cause Mexico to seek eternal vengeance. Neither did Columbia after the US helped Panama secede. Austria lost a war to Prussia, yet that didn't stop them from allying during WW1. The UK and France were on the same side in WW1 despite being enemies for most of their history.

Read Hrry Turtledove's "How Few Remain" and the rest of the Southern victory series.

 

[Belisarius II]

Most of the points being made here are, quite literally, to dispel this idea that the United States of 1861 is the United States of 1940. It's just the case that, yes, the United States in 1861 was industrially, and in many ways technically, behind British industry and manufacturing. Britain produced more steel, iron, and coal than the United States in this period (and would continue to do so for the next two decades) and her navy was bigger, her army bigger and more professional, and an economy three times the size.

I'm pretty sure no one has said in this thread that the British will walk over the Americans, but there's a lot of salient points to be made that in terms of economics, the Union has way more problems than most of the pro-American posters are willing to admit, and this would be a problem in any hypothetical Trent war in 1862.



You may want to inspect that map more closely before trumpeting American logistics. How many run into Canada? How many run to the frontier with Maine? I can answer the Canada one, three, and the Maine one, zero. That also ignores the Americans to have a chance at winning, can't just use the railroads, but also need to control Lakes Ontario, Champlain, and the Richelieu and St. Lawrence rivers. That's not an easy feet, and would take way longer than this rough "spring 1863" bit you seem to be optimistically insisting on.



To pick this apart again, for starters they could send more than 40k men to North America, and there would be more than 30k Canadians showing up. That's not up for debate.

I am confused by the continuous reference to an '1863 assessment' when Jervois only delivered his assessment in 1864, and then revised it again the same year. There was already an existing plan and assessment submitted in 1862, and the prevailing wisdom that Canada west of Kingston not Montreal, could not be defended. Even in Jervois pessimistic assessment of early 1864 when he said that, he revised it, again, to the assessment that Canada west of Kingston was unlikely to be held. The British view remained remarkably consistent and again did depend on having a flotilla on the lakes. Which it is very unlikely they would not have.

Vancouver and British Columbia are West of Montreal, roughly 4,500km west to be exact. I'm not quite sure what point you're trying to raise here. I already pointed out that an invasion of either is pretty much impossible given the resources available to the Union in the West, the superiority of the British squadron on the Pacific, and the pessimism expressed by the American commander that he could even defend his base of operations against a British attack.

Your assessment of men marching from Detroit and Buffalo, then linking up to march on Toronto is not unrealistic. Getting them to march along the shores of Lake Ontario to points east however, without controlling the Lake itself, is the rub for any invasion.

75,000 men from Plattsburgh, eh probably more like 60. But again, that would be the crux of American strategy and the one they would pin their hopes on to win the war. That force though, would be marching into the teeth of British prepared positions, naval power, and the bulk of the forces defending Canada. That's going to bleed them very badly.

40,000 from northern New England marching on Quebec... nope. That one is a plain no. The only American general (Halleck) who wrote about it pretty blunty wrote that off. Other than trying to exclusively rely on the Grand Trunk Railroad to take Richmond (Canada East) in an overland march to try and work behind the Canadians, they don't have a well maintained road or river network to use so that's a write off. The other route by marching from the headwaters of the Kennebec River overland to Quebec City? A single road through largely uninhabited wilderness? Suicide, and also a write off. Those 40,000 have a far better chance not dying and being actually useful garrisoning New England from any British invasion, which the British did plan.

There's pretty much no realistic plan for the Americans to do anything but march on Toronto and, barring naval supremacy on Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain, stall on the shores of the St. Lawrence for want of naval superiority and British defences by the fall of 1862. The campaign would open again in the spring, both sides having built more and reinforced to the best of their abilities, and they'd be fighting it out again.



Others have already addressed rifles and powder far better than me so I'll just direct you back to their posts.

Sure the Union will probably get the 600,000 men under arms in 1862 they got up to historically, but with probably close to 300,000 of them tied down in invading Canada, protecting the coasts, and in the Washington/Baltimore defences or facing off against a terrifyingly larger Army of Northern Virginia, holding the border states and invading the Western Confederate states becomes a more dicey proposition.

To fight Britain the Union has to weaken itself elsewhere, which is a net advantage to the Confederates.



The British plan was to grind the Americans down via blockade. They could occupy all of Canada (save the Maritimes, because that's pretty close to ASB levels of unlikely) and the British would keep the blockade on until they agreed to give Canada back. That's a sentiment pretty clear in their correspondence and the scholarly sources that they were damned unlikely to let it go.

No most of the people posting on this aren't trying to dispel the image of 1940, their presenting an idea of 1812. I've been saying this war is a desperate struggle for the Union. Your assessment is that the British army in Canada will easily out maneuver, and out fight twice their number of American troops, on a broad front. I said the attack on Quebec was to screen the move on Montreal. If they concentrate on the defense of Montreal how many troops could they have to defend Toronto? A fleet with no army can't defend it. It's also unlikely that by the time the campaigning season starts the Union wouldn't have warships on Lake Ontario, some of them armored. They can't defend everywhere. As I said all the American have to do is occupy half of the populated parts of Canada.

In his assessment of the war at sea, Admiral Milne didn't seem very confident he could blockade the American Coast, so it's not 1812. They can't just take all the time in the world blockading the Union. Union raiders would be causing serious shipping loses on the British Merchant Marine, the British Army is bleeding, and losing land in Canada. Just what are the British suffering all this pain for? What terms do they want to impose on the Union? If it's to allow the Confederacy to succeed, it's going to be a very long war. They ended both the ARW, and the War of 1812 to cut their losses, what are they getting out of this war?

 

[Belisarius II]

The level of projection in this paragraph is really quite remarkable.

Excuse me? The mockery of falling back on American Exceptionalism.