I was having a brain fart at the time I wrote that, because I was reading that as akin to "This is after Taranto, after all...", instead of, as intended, "This will be more so after Taranto, so...".
I realised my brain was misfiring, and misunderstanding what, in retrospect was clear enough that it really shouldn't have been misunderstood, yet my addled brain managed to do so anyway. So my apologies, and I hope I didn't offend, and I'll scuttle back to lurker mode in a moment, lol.
As for this whole concept, I like the back and forth's that are taking place. With access to historical wartime records that we in the present have been enjoying for decades, the proverbial **SeaLion** is revealed as something not even the Nazi's were dumb enough to actually try and go through with, yet at the time, fear in the UK populace was allowed over this very subject. We know that the Germans could 100% have landed "German boots on ground" in the fall of 1940, but unknown to the general population of the UK, these boots would 99% of the time be worn by some tattered, scattered, tiny disjointed groups with no hope of fighting their way off the coast, and would even have been incapable of being evacuated when it became clear even to Hitler what an unadulterated mess the whole 'invasion' had turned out to be, what with thousands of German troops lost due to drowning, while the more fortunate others being forced to jump 'ship' and swim back to shore when their craft swamped right as they set off. Those poor folks that actually made it to British shores are much more likely to be 'survivors' than effective combatants, and mostly not landed anywhere near where they were supposed to be. So not only no reinforcements/resupply, what with the majority of their barges scattered and lost in the initial, first wave, but no evacuation either! My point here is that, it matters not what the invader
thinks they can do, but what the defender is afraid the invader can do. If anyone disagrees or doubts this, look no further than the historical attacks upon both the French and Italian fleets in 1940. Both were based upon fears, in this case of the UK government, that these fleets,
used competently, may have posed a dire threat to British power/interests. The British government was not incorrect in their fears, and took appropriate steps to ensure that this would not come to pass.
Now back to Malta.
For us to get an attempted invasion of Malta, what would have to have taken place before hand? For my thoughts on the matter, should Italy have taken into account the potential need to take Malta right at the outset of their entry into WWII? You know, like when the defenses would likely have been undermanned and weak, and the potential for launching a surprise attack is at it's most likely/possible? Did Italy make any such preparations, or did they just jump in with both feet and overlook Malta entirely?
Basically, what I would ask, is when should the Italians have recognised Malta as a potential thorn in their sides, and begin planning to remove said thorn, before or after their entry into WWII?