WI: Rommel was right about Malta

I am not a whiz at geography, but I think it's a pretty long row from the Isle of Wight to Malta so I would opt to start at Gozo instead but maybe I am missing something. Maybe hit the Isle of Wight as a diversion? I don't think so but I am open minded.
I think that the Vatican does have a copy of the Necronomicon.
A pre-requisite for any operation on the Isle of Wight.
 
I don't disagree in principle, but getting LW involvement is the big problem, isn't it - for 1940 anyway. It's Mare Nostrum.

By 1941 the LW is there and there's a far better opportunity. Have to time it such that the British can't fly in from Cyrenaica, or that the LW isn't redeployed to distractions such as Barbarossa. Try the summer?

Then Jan-April 1942 seems th be the other window. By May, the Axis has lost air superiority and can't regain it, and the opporuntiy is gone. Only starvation remains. Yet that should have succeeded too - Pedestal was defeatable. But too late - Torch is still coming.
Hard to find the right window. Summer of 1940 may be too early because Mussolini may not be willing to let the Germans get involved Maybe early 41 - around the time Mussolini was really having problems in North Africa but before Barbarossa. In my view, the earlier the better both because it would save more Axis merchant shipping, free up the air units earlier and probably be easier.
 
I am not a whiz at geography, but I think it's a pretty long row from the Isle of Wight to Malta so I would opt to start at Gozo instead but maybe I am missing something. Maybe hit the Isle of Wight as a diversion? I don't think so but I am open minded.
Someone suggested that the best way for the Allies to invade continental Europe was to invade the Frisian Islands first, and use them as a build-up area.
And someone suggested the best way for the germans to invade the UK was to invade the Isle of wight and use that as a build up area. Both were agreed to be really bad ideas by the majority of the forum, because your build up area is in artillery range of the enemy.

Gozo is that too from Malta. Only difference is that Malta is not the home country of the enemy, and the logistics for the enemy will be worse than if it is in their home country. But still it's not a good idea to start your invasion from a spot where you have to ship everything to by sea, while the enemy can see pretty much every move you make, and can bombard you at will.
 
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Hard to find the right window. Summer of 1940 may be too early because Mussolini may not be willing to let the Germans get involved Maybe early 41 - around the time Mussolini was really having problems in North Africa but before Barbarossa. In my view, the earlier the better both because it would save more Axis merchant shipping, free up the air units earlier and probably be easier.

Indeed. May 1941 sounds nice - just after Rommel has retaken Cyrenaica, before Barbarossa - but there's something going on in Crete which gets in the way! There was really good reason for bouncing Britain out of Crete - but would you choose an attack on Malta instead?

Autumn is also an option, but again it's hard to argue the value of an attack on Malta when forces could be used to try to push the Soviets over the brink. We often discuss the awful choices and ruthless prioritisation that the British had to make in 1940-42, but here's a interestingly similar case for Germany.
 
Someone suggested that the best way for the Allies to invade continental Europe was to invade the Frisian Islands first, and use them as a build-up area.
And someone suggested the best way for the germans to invade the UK was to invade the Isle of wight and use that as a build up area. Both were agreed to be really bad ideas by the majority of the forum, because your build up area is in artillery range of the enemy.

Gozo is that too from Malta. Only difference is that Malta is not the home country of the enemy, and the logistics for the enemy will be worse than if it is in their home country. But still it's not a good idea to start your invasion from a spot where you have to ship everything to by sea, while the enemy can see pretty much every move you make, and can bombard you at will.
Virtually every landing anywhere - whether on an offshore island or on the mainland - will be within the artillery range of your enemy - the troops who landed at Anzio, Normandy and Iwo Jima did not land on an off shore island but still got pounded by artillery. The advantage of an offshore island is that you are not as likely to be forced back into the sea by an assault of infantry and armor. Air supremacy is key. In the early stages you use your air force as field artillery to suppress the other side's artillery. One advantage is that the British are unlikely to have distant forward observers for very long. Also in the Malta campaign - every round of artillery they fire is going to have to be replaced by one brought in by sea in the face of mines, the Italian navy, submarines, , and air power.
 
Indeed. May 1941 sounds nice - just after Rommel has retaken Cyrenaica, before Barbarossa - but there's something going on in Crete which gets in the way! There was really good reason for bouncing Britain out of Crete - but would you choose an attack on Malta instead?

Autumn is also an option, but again it's hard to argue the value of an attack on Malta when forces could be used to try to push the Soviets over the brink. We often discuss the awful choices and ruthless prioritisation that the British had to make in 1940-42, but here's a interestingly similar case for Germany.
May 1941 is getting too close to Barbarossa. So I lean toward January/February 1941 - again, earlier is better.
 
Ah yes, just a few months after Taranto. Yeah, like the Italian Navy is really looking for a confrontation right now, aren't they?
Even after Taranto Italy had 3 BBs. By March 10, 1941, they had 4 (the Littorio had been repaired) and by May 16, 5. So start bombing away in late February, deploy the navy in early March after achieving total air control and land in late March targeting a wrap up by mid April (in time to get the planes ready for Barbarossa).
 
Even after Taranto Italy had 3 BBs. By March 10, 1941, they had 4 (the Littorio had been repaired) and by May 16, 5. So start bombing away in late February, deploy the navy in early March after achieving total air control and land in late March targeting a wrap up by mid April (in time to get the planes ready for Barbarossa).
You're forgetting the psychological issues of going up against a force capable of sinking half the battle-fleet in one night.
 
You're forgetting the psychological issues of going up against a force capable of sinking half the battle-fleet in one night.
The Italians deployed their battleships before and after this. With total air control, no ships in Valletta and close to home waters, and a submarine screen, I think that they are up to it.
 
The Italians deployed their battleships before and after this. With total air control, no ships in Valletta and close to home waters, and a submarine screen, I think that they are up to it.
HMS Illustrious is still in theatre, so their air control won't be total. Also, blockading Malta will bring the RN out in force, which the Italians were always edgy about.
 
Virtually every landing anywhere - whether on an offshore island or on the mainland - will be within the artillery range of your enemy - the troops who landed at Anzio, Normandy and Iwo Jima did not land on an off shore island but still got pounded by artillery. The advantage of an offshore island is that you are not as likely to be forced back into the sea by an assault of infantry and armor. Air supremacy is key. In the early stages you use your air force as field artillery to suppress the other side's artillery. One advantage is that the British are unlikely to have distant forward observers for very long. Also in the Malta campaign - every round of artillery they fire is going to have to be replaced by one brought in by sea in the face of mines, the Italian navy, submarines, , and air power.
The near crippling downside is that you cannot push your enemy back either. So you have undertaken the logistically intensive operation of an amphibious landing, only to (optimistically) engage in a gunnery duel with an enemy that is closer to his own ammo dumps than you are to yours. While possibly having to continuously risk your ships moving within the danger zone to supply your mostly useless force. Amphibious operations are assaults. By putting a body of water between your landed troops and their objectives you basically eliminate their effectiveness. If you have the airpower to completely suppress Malta and make the RN run for cover (which is much harder than I think you give allowance for) your target should be Malta. Not Gozo. Gozo gains you very little save to draw more attention to Malta and possibly inspire reinforcement.
 
Virtually every landing anywhere - whether on an offshore island or on the mainland - will be within the artillery range of your enemy -
The landing yeah, but you're suggesting to use Gozo as a build up area. Usually the build up area is not withing artillery range of your enemy. If you're going to invade Malta, there is little to no benefit to invade Gozo first. Because it makes it clear your next move is going to be invading Malta, and the british can see what you're doing. So there goes your element of surprise.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Virtually every landing anywhere - whether on an offshore island or on the mainland - will be within the artillery range of your enemy - the troops who landed at Anzio, Normandy and Iwo Jima did not land on an off shore island but still got pounded by artillery. The advantage of an offshore island is that you are not as likely to be forced back into the sea by an assault of infantry and armor. Air supremacy is key. In the early stages you use your air force as field artillery to suppress the other side's artillery. One advantage is that the British are unlikely to have distant forward observers for very long. Also in the Malta campaign - every round of artillery they fire is going to have to be replaced by one brought in by sea in the face of mines, the Italian navy, submarines, , and air power.

At Anzio, Normandy & Iwo Jima the amphibious forces had plenty of 15-inch & 16-inch naval guns to support them, let alone cruisers with 6- & 8-inch guns. In May/June 1940 the RM is outgunned by the RN, as they also are after Taranto.

Could you please explain why the British would not have distant forward observers for very long? They have boots on the ground.

Would also point out that any very round of artillery fired from Gozo is going to have to be replaced by one brought in by sea in the face of mines, theRoyal Navy, submarines, and British air power.
 
At Anzio, Normandy & Iwo Jima the amphibious forces had plenty of 15-inch & 16-inch naval guns to support them, let alone cruisers with 6- & 8-inch guns. In May/June 1940 the RM is outgunned by the RN, as they also are after Taranto.

Could you please explain why the British would not have distant forward observers for very long? They have boots on the ground.

Would also point out that any very round of artillery fired from Gozo is going to have to be replaced by one brought in by sea in the face of mines, theRoyal Navy, submarines, and British air power.
1. The RN stayed away from Malta whenever the Axis was able to develop air supremacy. They would escort convoys to a certain distance from Malta and then leave them to head back to base. They would not approach Malta in the face of Axis air supremacy. The RM would be able to pound away.
2. In fairly short order Gozo would be cleared of British infantry so no forward observers.
3. The British would have no air or naval power in the area other than subs.
 
Italy isn't going to risk a brazen confrontation with the RN just months after the RN sunk half their battle line.

And the RN absolutely will get involved, the same as they did at Crete. "Three years to build a ship, three hundred to build a tradition" and all that.
 
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Italy isn't going to risk a brazen confrontation with the RN just months after the RN sunk half their battle line.

And the RN absolutely will get involved, the same as they did at Crete. "Three years to build a ship, three hundred to build a tradition" and all that.
Crete was the costliest naval engagement for the RN in the entire war. They lost 4 cruisers and 6 destroyers and had one AC, 2 BBs, and 4 cruisers put out of action for a long time, Maybe the time to hit Malta was right after Crete. The relative strength of the RM v. the RN was at its highest.
Also Crete was much closer to British bases and further from Axis airfields and ports. The garrison on Crete was about twice the size of the garrison on Malta. There was some British air power on Crete at the beginning of the battle and more could be brought in with direct flights rather than having to use ACs. The Italian navy was not really present for the Crete operation. All of these things make Crete a much, much more attractive venue for the RN in comparison with Malta.
 
1. The RN stayed away from Malta whenever the Axis was able to develop air supremacy. They would escort convoys to a certain distance from Malta and then leave them to head back to base. They would not approach Malta in the face of Axis air supremacy. The RM would be able to pound away
This same logic sometimes comes up in Sea Lion threads. That the RN would not be an issue as they had already withdrawn far from the channel. Here, as there, the answer is that they are of course not going to hang around getting bombed when there is no reason for them to be there. An invasion is definitely the time for them to be there
 
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