WI: Rommel was right about Malta

I am not sure why it is nonsense, it takes time to train paratroops to throw themselves out of a perfectly good aircraft AND to do all the combat stuff on the ground, Malta was not a friendly place for gliders either as lots of small fields and rocks everywhere. As for there being no Divisional drops post WW2, there were no real opportunities. The terrain in Korea excluding the coastal plains were not really conducive to large scale para drops and only the US could have done this and subsequent wars didn't really offer opportunities or a need for divisional para insertion, to my mind the only proposed operation would have SOUTHCOM divisional paratroops inserting into the Gulf to defend against a Soviet attack post Afghanistan or whatever the Russians cooked up for WW3.
If its nonsense, then it's because the Italians had a capable air droppable division ready to go, and that assessing the amphibious capacities of the Axis at the time provides a grim picture for Malta. At the least, an early, say 1941, assault on the island is a probably axis victory.

The Germans could have probably mustered a solid brigade+ for air drops, meaning that they were significantly reduced from their Crete drops. However, viewing the Axis capacity holistically must include the Italians too.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Actually, 173rd Airborne Brigade dropped almost 1,000 men onto an airfield in Iraq in March, 2003 to serve as blocking force to stop retreating Iraqi divisions. And the 75th Ranger Regiment has also made a few drops with one in Afghanistan numbering 200 men.
Well, 1,000 men is a battalion, so smaller than a regiment (although in some cases, often naming tradition based, the terms describe the same number of personnel).

How much of that is down to helicopter-borne troops being able to do most of what paras can do, but with fewer variables and greater flexibility?
Most of it. There is also the factor that once the Air Cav was introduced there simply hasn't been the need to deploy more than a battalion outside of helo radius.

Simply has never been a reason to do it.
 
If its nonsense, then it's because the Italians had a capable air droppable division ready to go, and that assessing the amphibious capacities of the Axis at the time provides a grim picture for Malta. At the least, an early, say 1941, assault on the island is a probably axis victory.

The Germans could have probably mustered a solid brigade+ for air drops, meaning that they were significantly reduced from their Crete drops. However, viewing the Axis capacity holistically must include the Italians too.

Define capable air droppable division?

The only fighting unit I can find in 1941 is the 1st paratrooper Division - which was formed in April 1941 with a single Regiment of 3 Battalions with a second regiment forming later in the year (Sept).

This gets a trickle of additional divisional assets into 1942 before being used to form the 185th Paratroopers Division Folgore in July 1942 which of course was ultimately sent to North Africa as a Infantry Division where it fought in both El Alemain battles being effectively destroyed in the 2nd despite a very good performance 'fighting to the last round'.

Had they been dropped in 1941 onto Malta even with a 3rd FJ Brigade supporting them - they are at the end of the day very light infantry with little or no heavy weapons or supporting echelons.

And an unsupported Paratrooper unit is too light to fight and too heavy to move

While I am sure that they would have put up a very spirited fight - they are at the end of the day unsupported light infantry and for the Italian unit - they have only made 1 'combat drop' onto the Greek Island of Cephallenia - with no actual fighting taking place.

Given the trials and tribulations that early WW2 Parachute operations 'enjoyed' and even late war ones often turning into an utter shambles - and given the relatively untried nature of the 1st Paratrooper 'division' I have to conclude that against the reinforced regular army British Infantry Division that Garrisoned the Island which would enjoy a massive firepower, mobility and Logistical advantage against any parachute landing, I cannot see any airborne landing being anything other than an unmitigated disaster for the Axis forces.

As for an amphibious landing the Italians had certainly managed landings against the Greeks but these were almost certainly all 'administrative' in nature and where either walk down a gang plank onto the dock or whaler and barge affairs onto an undefended beach.

And cross beach logistics was something that happened to someone else.

They had no legacy of conducting opposed landings.

Certainly nothing like the Allies were conducting from late 42 onward's and would be more akin to a reverse Dunkirk type operation with side order of Dieppe without the specialised equipment.

Again a disaster writ large waiting to happen.
 
I would also add that Crete is effectively '3 islands' connected by very poor transport network of roads and the north to south roads pretty much do not exist - so any defending force has to split itself between those 3 areas and given the lack of Motor transport (as most had been abandoned in Greece) those units could not easily come to each others aid.

Malta is a single Island* with a far more comprehensive road network and is of course as you say much smaller and as far as I am aware the garrison had sufficient MT.

Therefore the Garrison forces could have concentrated far faster and more effectively against a parachute landing or landings and would have known the ground very well

Also the Garrison would have enjoyed a complete ToOE unlike many of the units on Crete which had suffered losses in both manpower and equipment in Greece (particularly in heavier equipment such as an almost total lack of artillery, Motor Transport and field kitchens etc ) or ad hoc units thrown together or the Greek forces who had 50 LMGs between them and if lucky 30 rounds per man.

Had there been an RA Field Regiment with 24 x 25 pounder guns shelling Maleme then it would have been game over for the FJs

(12th Field Regiment RA was part of the Malta Garrison with 24 x 25 pounder guns)

As it was the Crete forces had an ad hoc battery of Italian guns - some without sights IIRC

FJs landing on Malta would have have suffered such losses as to have made the Cerberus disaster look good

*Obviously there is Gozo but capturing Gozo achieves nothing.
Capturing Gozo in 1940 would be relatively easy - the Italian had basic landing craft as early as 1938. It could be used as a staging base and artillery base and then a short hop to the northern end of the main island would set the stage for an nasty grinding push south. Artillery from Gozo as well as bombing and naval bombardment would minimize resistance to land units landing in the north part of the island. If air supremacy was maintained and the Italian navy maintained at least a loose blockade, the combination of the battle and the supply cut off would probably lead to victory. The whole deal would take two months and tie up a good chunk of the Italian navy and several hundred aircraft.
But air supremacy is essential and it would not be quick. And a quick parachute offensive is not practical.
 

nbcman

Donor
Capturing Gozo in 1940 would be relatively easy - the Italian had basic landing craft as early as 1938. It could be used as a staging base and artillery base and then a short hop to the northern end of the main island would set the stage for an nasty grinding push south. Artillery from Gozo as well as bombing and naval bombardment would minimize resistance to land units landing in the north part of the island. If air supremacy was maintained and the Italian navy maintained at least a loose blockade, the combination of the battle and the supply cut off would probably lead to victory. The whole deal would take two months and tie up a good chunk of the Italian navy and several hundred aircraft.
But air supremacy is essential and it would not be quick. And a quick parachute offensive is not practical.
Now for a reality check about having Italy do an invasion in and around Malta, let us see what the RM's amphibious abilities were in June 1940 per Wiki:

On 21 June, the units advancing through the Val Roia successfully occupied Fontan. The Cosseria Division, coming down the coast towards Nice, were supposed to be met by some Alpini coming down the valley of the Vésubie and by the San Marco Regiment making an amphibious landing behind the French Ouvrage Cap Martin. The amphibious assault had to be called off for logistical reasons—engine failures, overloaded boats, rough seas. Lacking sufficient landing craft, the Regia Marina had commandeered fishing boats and pleasure boats. The Italian navy attempted some landings, but after several craft grounded the whole operation was called off. The Cosseria Division was met by a barrage of shellfire from Cap Martin and the Ouvrage Mont Agel, which destroyed an armoured train.[42][155] Nonetheless, assisted by thunderstorms and fog, they occupied the Les Granges-Saint-Paul on 22 June. Mussolini then gave the order that the Cosseria were to advance at all costs.[42]

On the night of 22/23 June, still under the cover of fog, the Cosseria Division bypassed Cap Martin and then entered the Garavan quarter of Menton. The bypassed French troops continued to fight, firing the fort's armament at Italian coastal shipping, until the armistice.[161] The fighting in the streets of Menton was fierce. The Italians pushed through the Baousset quarter and took the hilltop Capuchin monastery of Notre-Dame de l'Annonciade on 23 June. A planned naval landing at Garavan by the Blackshirts (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale, MVSN) on 24 June had to be called off because of high waves and a full moon.[42] The French—except for the garrison of the advanced fort of Pont Saint-Louis[t]—gradually withdrew from Menton

So Italy didn't have enough amphibious lift to get a single regiment moved against the French in June. How are they going to do better against Malta or Gozo?
 
Now for a reality check about having Italy do an invasion in and around Malta, let us see what the RM's amphibious abilities were in June 1940 per Wiki:



So Italy didn't have enough amphibious lift to get a single regiment moved against the French in June. How are they going to do better against Malta or Gozo?
There would be little defense left on Gozo after days of unopposed bombing and naval bombardment so that the landing would not be heavily opposed. You might even be able to head into the small harbor covered by naval fire and tie up. Maybe use some German paratroopers and wait for calm waters. Once on Gozo, You build up, continue to soften up the main island with bombing and naval bombardment and then hop over there - the trip to the main island is a short one more similar to a river crossing.
 
There would be little defense left on Gozo after days of unopposed bombing and naval bombardment so that the landing would not be heavily opposed
Except every amphibious operation in WWII proves you wrong. Normandy and the Pacific Island hopping campaign expended literal mountains of bombs and shells in pre-landing air strikes and bombardments. The Germans and Japanese still fought tenaciously for every inch of ground. Why would the Axis suddenly get vastly superior results with fewer assets than the Allies?
 

TDM

Kicked
Capturing Gozo in 1940 would be relatively easy - the Italian had basic landing craft as early as 1938. It could be used as a staging base and artillery base and then a short hop to the northern end of the main island would set the stage for an nasty grinding push south. Artillery from Gozo as well as bombing and naval bombardment would minimize resistance to land units landing in the north part of the island. If air supremacy was maintained and the Italian navy maintained at least a loose blockade, the combination of the battle and the supply cut off would probably lead to victory. The whole deal would take two months and tie up a good chunk of the Italian navy and several hundred aircraft.
But air supremacy is essential and it would not be quick. And a quick parachute offensive is not practical.

There would be little defense left on Gozo after days of unopposed bombing and naval bombardment so that the landing would not be heavily opposed. You might even be able to head into the small harbor covered by naval fire and tie up. Maybe use some German paratroopers and wait for calm waters. Once on Gozo, You build up, continue to soften up the main island with bombing and naval bombardment and then hop over there - the trip to the main island is a short one more similar to a river crossing.



The problem is even if the Italians land on Gozo, they're on Gozo not Malta. They're going to get hit by artillery from Malta plus the RN Mediterranean fleet is literally at Malta and going to chase the RM off and then cut the Italians on Gozo off. .

I don't know why you think any Italian bombing and naval bombardment would be un opposed? do you imagine the British are just going to let the Italian take and hold and reinforce Gozo?


Also it's not like there was no action at Malta 1940 onwards anyway?

Also more similar to a river crossing? Gozo to Malta is about 5km in a straight line, it's 2km Gozo to Comimo and then another 2km Comino to Malta if you hop.

Plus the north west point of Malta is a really shit place to try and invade Malta from since there is very noticeable pinch point at Gjadita you going to have to get past, and all your target destinations are further back


map_of_malta.jpg
 
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Except every amphibious operation in WWII proves you wrong. Normandy and the Pacific Island hopping campaign expended literal mountains of bombs and shells in pre-landing air strikes and bombardments. The Germans and Japanese still fought tenaciously for every inch of ground. Why would the Axis suddenly get vastly superior results with fewer assets than the Allies?
Ubermensch versus foppish, decadent English?
 
Once on Gozo, You build up, continue to soften up the main island with bombing and naval bombardment and then hop over there - the trip to the main island is a short one more similar to a river crossing.
Sounds about as sensible as the Frisian Isles or the Island of Wight.
 
Sounds about as sensible as the Frisian Isles or the Island of Wight.
I am not a whiz at geography, but I think it's a pretty long row from the Isle of Wight to Malta so I would opt to start at Gozo instead but maybe I am missing something. Maybe hit the Isle of Wight as a diversion? I don't think so but I am open minded.
 
If you land in Gozo in summer 1940 you've got, what, 48 hours before the RN turns up, sinks the Italian heavy cruisers and any invasion shipping hanging around.
 
If you land in Gozo in summer 1940 you've got, what, 48 hours before the RN turns up, sinks the Italian heavy cruisers and any invasion shipping hanging around.
Not if you have total command of the air. The RN will stay away just as they got out of Norway and tried to avoid the English channel when possible. By the summer of 40 it had become clear that ships are vulnerable to bombing. If what you say is true, the RN could have sailed into Tripoli at any time and shot things up ending the whole North Africa campaign in an afternoon.
 
Not if you have total command of the air. The RN will stay away just as they got out of Norway and tried to avoid the English channel when possible. By the summer of 40 it had become clear that ships are vulnerable to bombing. If what you say is true, the RN could have sailed into Tripoli at any time and shot things up ending the whole North Africa campaign in an afternoon.

The RN did stay off Crete in 1941 despite heavy losses from bombers. The RN had been trying to force a fleet engagment with the Italians, instead of Cape Matapan it will be Malta.
 
Not if you have total command of the air. The RN will stay away just as they got out of Norway and tried to avoid the English channel when possible. By the summer of 40 it had become clear that ships are vulnerable to bombing. If what you say is true, the RN could have sailed into Tripoli at any time and shot things up ending the whole North Africa campaign in an afternoon.

Wrong analogy. Tripoli is an established port with abundant facilities and repair capacity. It can only be suppressed temporarily. Gozo is a large rock close to a hostile base. A landing there can be ruined in minutes.

And Italy did not have total command of the air in 1940. At Calabria the British fleet came within, what thirty miles of the mainland. Over 100 aircraft sorties achieved nothing. They couldn't even accurately bomb their own fleet.
 

nbcman

Donor
Wrong analogy. Tripoli is an established port with abundant facilities and repair capacity. It can only be suppressed temporarily. Gozo is a large rock close to a hostile base. A landing there can be ruined in minutes.

And Italy did not have total command of the air in 1940. At Calabria the British fleet came within, what thirty miles of the mainland. Over 100 aircraft sorties achieved nothing. They couldn't even accurately bomb their own fleet.
That's generally correct about the RA's ability for anti-shipping bombing at Calabria but they did manage to hit HMS Gloucester with one bomb.
 
Wrong analogy. Tripoli is an established port with abundant facilities and repair capacity. It can only be suppressed temporarily. Gozo is a large rock close to a hostile base. A landing there can be ruined in minutes.

And Italy did not have total command of the air in 1940. At Calabria the British fleet came within, what thirty miles of the mainland. Over 100 aircraft sorties achieved nothing. They couldn't even accurately bomb their own fleet.
You would have to assume substantial involvement of the Luftwaffe in order to make this work. With that assumption, I still think it works but it is not easy and it gets tougher and tougher every month that you put it off.
 
You would have to assume substantial involvement of the Luftwaffe in order to make this work. With that assumption, I still think it works but it is not easy and it gets tougher and tougher every month that you put it off.

I don't disagree in principle, but getting LW involvement is the big problem, isn't it - for 1940 anyway. It's Mare Nostrum.

By 1941 the LW is there and there's a far better opportunity. Have to time it such that the British can't fly in from Cyrenaica, or that the LW isn't redeployed to distractions such as Barbarossa. Try the summer?

Then Jan-April 1942 seems th be the other window. By May, the Axis has lost air superiority and can't regain it, and the opporuntiy is gone. Only starvation remains. Yet that should have succeeded too - Pedestal was defeatable. But too late - Torch is still coming.
 
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