Pretty much all but the 5th Army HQ
The 82nd Airborne, 2 Armd , and all the infantry divisions wear their own badge.
Other units and Corps HQ theirs
Rearm the British Infantry for WWII
- Thread starter Peg Leg Pom
- Start date
The 82nd Airborne, 2 Armd , and all the infantry divisions wear their own badge.
Other units and Corps HQ theirs
Some food for thought,
U.S. Army Rifle Company Organization (1942-1943)
An in-depth overview of the U.S. Army Rifle Company.
www.battleorder.org
Additionally, there was a lapse where the capacity for simultaneous squad-level fire and maneuver was not a thing for the Army after the M1 Garand entered service in the late 1930s. Between 1938 and 1942 there were no BARs in the Rifle Squads at all (subject to whether units had M1 Garands which can't be taken for granted), with all of the Platoon's BARs being contained with an Automatic Rifle Squad. This was similar to Marine practice until 1943 which they copied from the Army, but the exact opposite of the Marines' interwar testing where they found it preferable to have 2 BARs per squad instead. Getting rid of the Automatic Rifle Squad simplified things for the Platoon Commander by bringing the elements from 3 maneuver and 1 fire down down to 3 maneuver elements with their own squad automatic weapons. However, the Army wouldn't go a step further and authorize more than 1 BAR per squad throughout the war. Rather following June 1944, they would have 6 spare BARs in the Company HQ that could reinforce 6 of 9 Rifle Squads to 2 BARs until the mid-1950s when squads finally got the 2 BARs the soldiers had desperately wanted. This was most likely because the Army valued maneuver and fire equally and had a fetish for their semi-automatic rifles. Brass did not want to sacrifice the mobility of all-rifle squads (something they had had officially from the adoption of the M1 Garand to this TO&E) to add more BARs which pre-war Army viewed as mostly emergency firepower. It was thought that the M1 Garand could make up for an inferior automatic fire capability, a meme which was permeated to today. This is reflected in the fact that the Americans generally treated the BAR as a specialist weapon, with few men in the squad actually receiving formal training on it. Contrast this with the British and Germans who both trained every squad member on the use of the Bren and MG-42 respectively. But then again the British and German sections/squads essentially existed to feed and protect their squad automatic weapons, while the US Army squads much more valued their riflemen. Further contrast this with the Marines who could be argued valued squad automatic fire more than the Army due to the nature of contested amphibious landings and the environment of the Pacific. The Marines ultimately increased the BARs per squad from 1 to 2 in 1943 and to 3 in 1944.
McPherson
Banned
Some food for thought,
U.S. Army Rifle Company Organization (1942-1943)
An in-depth overview of the U.S. Army Rifle Company.
Additionally, there was a lapse where the capacity for simultaneous squad-level fire and maneuver was not a thing for the Army after the M1 Garand entered service in the late 1930s. Between 1938 and 1942 there were no BARs in the Rifle Squads at all (subject to whether units had M1 Garands which can't be taken for granted), with all of the Platoon's BARs being contained with an Automatic Rifle Squad. This was similar to Marine practice until 1943 which they copied from the Army, but the exact opposite of the Marines' interwar testing where they found it preferable to have 2 BARs per squad instead. Getting rid of the Automatic Rifle Squad simplified things for the Platoon Commander by bringing the elements from 3 maneuver and 1 fire down down to 3 maneuver elements with their own squad automatic weapons. However, the Army wouldn't go a step further and authorize more than 1 BAR per squad throughout the war. Rather following June 1944, they would have 6 spare BARs in the Company HQ that could reinforce 6 of 9 Rifle Squads to 2 BARs until the mid-1950s when squads finally got the 2 BARs the soldiers had desperately wanted. This was most likely because the Army valued maneuver and fire equally and had a fetish for their semi-automatic rifles. Brass did not want to sacrifice the mobility of all-rifle squads (something they had had officially from the adoption of the M1 Garand to this TO&E) to add more BARs which pre-war Army viewed as mostly emergency firepower. It was thought that the M1 Garand could make up for an inferior automatic fire capability, a meme which was permeated to today. This is reflected in the fact that the Americans generally treated the BAR as a specialist weapon, with few men in the squad actually receiving formal training on it. Contrast this with the British and Germans who both trained every squad member on the use of the Bren and MG-42 respectively. But then again the British and German sections/squads essentially existed to feed and protect their squad automatic weapons, while the US Army squads much more valued their riflemen. Further contrast this with the Marines who could be argued valued squad automatic fire more than the Army due to the nature of contested amphibious landings and the environment of the Pacific. The Marines ultimately increased the BARs per squad from 1 to 2 in 1943 and to 3 in 1944.
All of which makes THIS, more infuriating to me. The BREN is so much a squad flexible asset...
A question about the T10/T23E1 light machine gun?
Anyway, perhaps a portable rocket launcher akin to a British version of an RPG might be a better investment than the PIAT?
Deleted member 1487
Why not just adopt the Bren? The T-23E1 was heavier and no better, plus still in testing as of 1943. More than 26.65 pounds empty, while the Bren was about 19.15 empty.All of which makes THIS, more infuriating to me. The BREN is so much a squad flexible asset...
A question about the T10/T23E1 light machine gun?
Anyway, perhaps a portable rocket launcher akin to a British version of an RPG might be a better investment than the PIAT?
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This is basically the gun (the FN MAG) that replaced the Bren in British service.
Deleted member 1487
Huh? The T-23 was never adopted. The FN MAG was a different design, though mechanically similar. It was also lighter and simpler, plus more reliable. And the FN MAG was only adopted because the army wanted to use the same MG for tanks and infantry in the 1980s, so the infantry had to drop the M60 since it didn't work as well in tanks as the MAG.
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The T23 and MAG are both upside-down BARs and they both weigh a little over 26 lbs.
The L7 was the direct replacement for the Bren and Vickers after the 1957 trials. The British Army never used the M60 as a GPMG.
Deleted member 1487
The T23 is heavier and had a rate reducer without (AFAIK) the MG42 trigger and feed systems that help make the FN MAG so reliable.
I'm aware the Brits never did I was talking about the US. The Brits didn't have any other option at the time because the M60 was not made available to them and their belt fed conversion of the Bren was a mess. Too bad and somewhat bizarre given that the Bren's direct ancestor originally was designed as a belt fed weapon and modified later to lower the weight and reduce cost and complexity, but was apparently fine as a belt fed weapon.
The FN MAG is a pretty recent adoption by the US and the M60 was superior in the infantry role, plus 2kg lighter. The most recent version is arguably even better than the MG3, at least the Danes thought so and adopted it and dumped the MG3.
Danish Army Adopts M60E6 7.62 GPMG -
The Danish weapons blog Krigeren (translation: “Warrior) reports that the Danish military has chosen the M60E6 as its next GPMG. The M60 beat out its arch-rival, the HK121.. The new GPMG weights almost 3 KG less than earlier models of the M60 On a personal note, I would have loved to have had...
www.thefirearmblog.com
The Danish Military Has a New Retro-Futuristic Machine Gun
Afghan war lessons lead Denmark to buy M60s
medium.com
Inferior to the Bren.
Would be cool if someone made a modernized belt fed version of the Bren in 6.5 Creedmoor.
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McPherson
Banned
REPLY TO ASSORTED.
,
The thing eventually worked. It actually worked. 27 pounds is not too heavy for an LMG, especially one that will turn directly into the FN-MAG.
,
The thing eventually worked. It actually worked. 27 pounds is not too heavy for an LMG, especially one that will turn directly into the FN-MAG.
This site is a good one for the Organisation of WW2 Infantry Battalions.
(Unfortunately no Russian units and you have to spend forever tallying up the small arms totals.)
However there is a convenient Battalion summary of manpower, vehicles and crew served weapons.
(Something notable from which is that the units considered the most effective in the US Army in NW Europe, the Parachute Battalions, were the ones with the most machine guns.)
It did not work as well, at all. The FN-MAG58 was basically unstoppable in the mid-1980s tests that the US Army undertook. The only way they could induce a stoppage was to pour sand into the mechanism and even then it still worked for nearly another 100 rounds. The FN-MAG58 was a superb weapon, so much so, the US Army abandoned basically the M60 as its standard squad automatic weapon and adopted the FN-MAG58.
The M60 was never a SAW in USA or USMC.
It is GPMG, used by weapons squads in USArmy and weapons Plt in USMC.
Its restarted at http://bayonetstrength.uk/index.htm
Well Para BNs are elite anyway but yes its 18 smg and 0 BAR with 44 .30 cal LMG or 18 SMG 27 BAR and 35 . 30 cal. basically 3s the MG firepower of a US rifle BN.
On the other comments.
The US kinda goes down a rabbit hole interwar. I blame Pershing. who really does not absorb whats going on in WW1. Alone of the WW1 CinC he has assaulted dug in regulars with Mausers and machine guns, barbed wire and Krupp artillery and taken the position - Kettle Hill - with riflemen only. The US never really has enough WW1 experience to contradict this ( and Pershings attitude is common to all WW1 Generals at the start of the war except maybe the Russians, slightly less likely the Brits).
The US basically copies over the French 1917 manuals and the platoon organization is more or less French ( or British) 1916/17. They miss out on the 1917/18 changes. Basically the Brits and French learn that the Automatic Squad can't move under fire so the rifle squads, and for all the armies the rifle squad is at least as much about grenades and bullets, need to have their own Automatic rifle which generates the firepower to allow the grenadiers to move. The US does actually know this but the US army ( USMC less) is dragged back by Pershing post war to the Rifleman. This is actually fine given the fighting the US is doing. And post WW2 the solution is the M14 which is every man a machine gunner. They really are obsessed with the individual rifleman not the rifle Squad or higher formations.
In 1942/3 when the Brits get to see the US - In training - in North Africa you get a series of Oh My God comments from Senior British Officers about the US infantry. Remember those those senior officers in 43 were company - Bn commanders in 1916 -18 and had personally tried to use the same organization and had seen it fail.
The British and German ( I would put the French in with the brits for these purposes) have different experience and priorities from WW1. The Brits emphasize the offensive power the germans the defensive for the infantry formations. The British Squad is definitely not there to feed the MG - it can dump mags for the Bren or 2'' or carry more grenades but the squad is clearly 2 elements. A gun group and the rifle group ( also called even in manuals the assault group or bomber group) with multiple LMG suppressing the objective while the assault group gets close enough to lob ( or fire) a grenade at the position. The German does the same but emphasis is on the defensive capabilities of the gun and certainly late war there are instances of the MG being inoperable and the squad bugging out or surrendering. For example the Bren is famously accurate which means the gunner has to move it to get a decent beaten zone to suppress the enemy. The MG34/42 fires so fast it cannot be accurate on auto fire which gives a biggish beaten zone.
Both armies are happy with the outcome. The Brits because the accurate bren can keep suppressing until the assault unit is in grenade range ( well drop grenade through window) the Germans because they can easily suppress a large area with a short burst, downside is when the assaulters get close they run the risk of getting hit by their own MG. Operationally the offensive punch will come from the Panzer formations anyway.
When looking at the British intentions for WW2 remember that those go out of the window in 40 when France collapses and Britain has to extemporize and accelerate mobilization by about a year deal with U boat bases on the French Atlantic coast and Norway, plan for an invasion and then gets a North African front and Japan and supporting Russia in 41 early 42. The first two requiring intercontinental reinforcement.
The second thing is the Experimental Mechanized Force lessons. There are two, one is the power of a mechanised force against a non mechanized force without AT weapons. The other is the Power of a Mechanized force against a non mechanized force Without AT Weapons.
The German solution is to produce a powerful Mechanised element of a larger army, The British is mechanise the whole ( but smaller) Army. The big differences are that the Germans start the process two years earlier and have a strategy of continental war. The British start later and do not commit to a continental war until 38.
So the Germans have 36 - 40 to gear up and then a year ( 40-41) of limited operations to learn lessons and reequip accordingly. The Brits start in 38 on the army and the plan is for a force of 32 motorised divisions each with an integral tank Bn by 41/2. And then have the issue of shipping it around Africa and/or assault landings and long logistic lines. By mid 42 thats just about in place and from then on continual advance to the Baltic.
If the Brits had started mobilising in 36 well its not 11 divisions ( with one arriving in May 40 and another three as construction troops without artillery At or AA elements) but 30 mech infantry with a tank Bn plus 2 armoured and a much bigger RAF which on a 1:1 replacement frees up 20 French French division ( including the whole of their Armoured force) and any breakthrough at Sedan gets a flank attack by at least twice its strength of equally mobile troops and we get to laugh at the puny german 20mm vs monster 2lb on the A10s and the unstoppable Valentines.
Considering the US (both Army and Marines) see the M249 at 16.5lb empty too heavy for a SAW and the M240 at 27lb for a MMG,
you may want to reconsider 27 is “not to heavy”
Deleted member 1487
Not per US testing. The M60 was found to be superior for the infantry, the tank version of the MAG being superior to the M60 version. For some reason the use in vehicles was prioritized, so the infantry M60s faded away.
Not sure this is accurate.
The US used the Chauchat and developed both the Thompson and BAR for use in 1918-19, but the war ended before they could use them. They certainly did not miss out on the French 1917-18 changes, since the US fought alongside the French in the Meuse-Argonne offensive (my Great Granddad was one of the soldiers there), and were continually in touch with the French for some time. Post-war he only became CoS of the Army in 1921 and retired in 1924, so I doubt his influence on the military after that had any significant influence. Douglas MacArthur was vastly more important to organization and equipment development in the interwar period.
The biggest issue was the lack of money for the Army after WW1 since conscription ended, the military disbanded, they were left with the leftovers from WW1, and rearmament only really started in the late 1930s. The Depression wiped out funding from 1930 on until rearmament, so that was probably the biggest issue.
Still they made sure there were BARs present in every squad by WW2, though experience would show they needed 2-3.
The post-WW2 situation is somewhat different and again afflicted by post-war budget problems. The M14 was an institutional problem and was meant to combined every infantry small arm into one unit and since several people's careers depended on it being adopted and a success they were willing to overlook the obvious about it. It had less to do with the individual rifleman at that point and more to do with overpromising and underdelivering on a weapon system.
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The M60 just wasnt reliable enough
From wiki
In January 1994, the U.S. Army began the Medium Machine Gun Upgrade Kit program. The only two competitors were M60 and M240 versions. Saco offered an "enhanced" M60E3 with improved parts, and FN offered the M240 variant of its MAG; both weapons were upgrade kits of weapons already in service. Eighteen guns of each were tested until December 1995. There were two main performance areas: mean rounds between stoppages (MRBS-jams) and mean rounds between failures (MRBF-parts breaking). 50,000 rounds were fired through both guns. The M240 had 2,962 MRBS and 6,442 MRBF, compared to the M60's 846 MRBS and 1,669 MRBF. As a result, the M240 was declared the winner and accepted into infantry service.
| Type | Rounds fired | MRBS | MRBF |
|---|---|---|---|
| FN MAG 58 | 50,000 | 2,962 | 6,442 |
| M60E2 | 50,000 | 846 | 1,669 |
| M219 | 19,000 | 215 | 1,090 |
| Minimum specified | 850 | 2,675 | |
| Minimum desired | 1,750 | 5,500 |
Doesnt matter how good the gun is if it doesnt work often enough.
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McPherson
Banned
Modern desires is not in the context of the WWII emergency they faced. They were willing to go for broke on the T23 if it met the 26 pounds goal. *(See citations above for the program goals.)
If it is a choice between a M1919 on a tripod at 25 kg at platoon or a M23 at 12 kg with the squad organic, I have no problem with 12 kg at all if it 3xs the firepower in the attack. Neither would they had been if they had any brains at all.
Marines were lugging these on Iwo Jima in a test case.
What are some of the most effective yet improvised weapon ...
Damned things weighed over 14 kgs with the box.
Hence a GPMG at the squad is not heartburn for me in the context that heavy to lug as a unitary is better than... nothing at all.
@Gannt the chartist. My grandfather's father left behind letters in which he referred to Pershing by assorted quite colorful obscenities, but in which he also suggested that the man was the stupidest ___ ___ed fool among the Allied army commanders at the time for rejecting French and British advice.
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It is not just the heart burn of the Gun, it’s the spare barrel and enough link to do the job.Modern desires is not in the context of the WWII emergency they faced. They were willing to go for broke on the T23 if it met the 26 pounds goal. *(See citations above for the program goals.)
If it is a choice between a M1919 on a tripod at 25 kg at platoon or a M23 at 12 kg with the squad organic, I have no problem with 12 kg at all if it 3xs the firepower in the attack. Neither would they had been if they had any brains at all.
Marines were lugging these on Iwo Jima in a test case.
What are some of the most effective yet improvised weapon ...
Damned things weighed over 14 kgs with the box.
Hence a GPMG at the squad is not heartburn for me in the context that heavy to lug as a unitary is better than... nothing at all.
@Gannt the chartist. My grandfather's father left behind letters in which he referred to Pershing by assorted quite colorful obscenities, but in which he also suggested that the man was the stupidest ___ ___ed fool among the Allied army commanders at the time for rejecting French and British advice.
I can you, nobody in my unit put their hand up to carry the gun, or be No2, whether on a cold day, and never on a nice toasty 40c /104F day.
Deleted member 1487
I don't know why you put the M60E2 in your chart, the E3 was the model tested, which was a lightened version for the infantry who had to carry the heavy bastard around. That comes at a cost of reliability though:
M60 machine gun - Wikipedia
The E3 variant was lightened to make it more mobile for the infantry to lug around per the requests of the infantry, but that comes at a cost. The MAG didn't do that and was unsurprisingly more reliable as a result.
That says nothing about the inherent design, it says everything about the fundamental point of lightening components for mobility means reduced reliability in sustained firing.