World of the Continued United Front
* Second Sino-Japanese War
* Chinese Leaders, 20s and 30s
*
Map: Asia after the Second Sino-Japanese War, around 1940
* Sino-Soviet Relations, 1930s to 1950s
* United States Politics, to 1960
* Indochina and the Second Indochina War
* Indonesia, 1965 to 1989
* Russia, 1990s and 2000s
Indonesia, 1965 to 1989
By the 1960s, Indonesia had won independence from the Netherlands, and been established as a Republic. During the 1950s, Indonesia had a period of liberal democracy, but in the late 50s, the country transitioned to a system of "guided democracy" in an attempt to bring political stability in response to rebellion and division in the country. During that period, the country's leader, Sukarno, sought a foreign policy of anti-imperialism, leaning towards the Soviets and Chinese in order to attain developmental aid, but also pursuing a policy of non-alignment, playing a role in the Bandung Conference (which his country hosted) and the formation of the 'Non-Aligned Movement'. Domestically, Sukarno pursued a left-leaning policy, with the concept of 'Nas-A-Kom', a compound of the words for nationalism, religion, and communism, to try to balance the competing interests of the communists, islamists, and army. He was not a communist himself, but adhered to the ideology of "Marhaenism", a socialistic ideology seen by some as an offshoot of Marxism, and aligned himself and his government with the Communist Party of Indonesia, one of the largest communist parties outside of the Soviet and Chinese spheres. This did not endear him to certain sections of the military
In the mid 60s, a group of rightist generals and officers, led by General Suharto, plotted to change the political situation in Indonesia. On early 1 October 1965, a group of soldiers and officers calling themselves the '30 September Movement' mobilized and attempted to launch a coup, claiming they were intending to prevent a coup by another faction of generals supported by the CIA. But in the military, a handful of communist-sympathizing officers managed to catch wind of the broader scheme, and were able to provide proof that the so-called 30 September Movement was actually itself more or less a false flag operation, with rightist military elements organizing a coup attempt to kill generals who could have stood in the way of Suharto's seizure of power, and then claim that the Communist Party had organized the coup attempt, allowing a purge of Communists by the military once the rightists had seized power. Indeed, the 30 September Movement, and the rightist generals who organized them, were the ones who actually had ties to the CIA, the evidence showed
For a few hours, Jakarta was in chaos, and the situation was unclear. As the day progressed, the government forces had managed to take control, with the leaked information by communist sympathizers in the military playing a key role in allowing the government to disarm the coup. The coupists were able to kill Suprapto, Second Deputy General of the military, but failed in their attempts to kidnap or kill other generals. By the end of the day, Jakarta was back under government control, and by 6 October, all coupist forces had been captured or killed
The failed coup had major repercussions in Indonesian politics. Had the coup succeeded, the rightists may have succeeded in taking control, ousting Sukarno, and purging the communists. Or alternatively, a partially successful coup could have resulted in something like the 1936 Spanish Coup that failed to seize total control of the country but gave the coupists control of significant parts of the country and signaled the start of a years-long civil war. But the Indonesian coup was a failure, and indeed backfired, with the Communist Party growing in influence and being seen as a force victimized by a foreign-backed plot, and with Sukarno managing to gain a stronger control over the military. The coup attempt was a major factor in shifting the political winds in Indonesia, which would transition from 'Republic' to 'People's Republic' by the end of the decade, with the rise of the Communist Party and other leftist forces
__________________________________________________
Even after the establishment of the People's Republic of Indonesia, the Communists in the country found themselves in a somewhat precarious position. By the 70s, the Communist Party of the USSR had an iron grip on power, and in the Socialist Republic of China the Communist Party governed with a much lighter touch but had nonetheless completely removed any real opposition to its rule as well. But the Indonesian Communists didn't face such a luxury, governing a smaller and poorer country, with less entrenched power, more geographic fragmentation due to the country's archipelagic nature, and facing sizable opposition from the Islamist sectors of the population, with such opposition often facing covert US and other Western support and funding
One way the Communist Party of Indonesia attempted to appease Islamists and reduce opposition from that direction was by attempting to meld socialism and religion. While the Soviet and Chinese spheres generally endorsed state atheism to some extent or another, the Indonesian government merely endorsed a broad idea of secularism and religious freedom, and at various times mildly endorsed Islam. The state also at times gave some support specifically to Islamic socialist and other Islamic progressive movements
By far the most influential of these Islamic movements is that of 'Reform Shafi'i'. This Islamic movement was never explicitly socialist at its core (though it has generally been favorable to socialist ideals), but stands for a broadly progressive social teaching. When it was founded, in the early 70s not long after the foundation of the People's Republic, it had generally embraced ideas like women's rights and equality, state secularism, religious tolerance and intercommunal relations, and while it has not necessarily been on the absolute cutting edge of social reform, it has pretty consistently evolved with the times, embracing various other progressive causes as the decades have passed. This, along with its friendly relations with leftist political movements, and its more generally very liberal and unorthodox theological interpretations, has done plenty to draw the ire of conservative Muslims and Islamic groups. Even though 'Reform Shafi'i' presents itself as simply a particular interpretation of Shafi'i Sunni Islam, Reform Shafi'i is often considered its own particular sect of Islam akin to Shia, Sunni, and Ibadi Islam, and recent polling suggests that a sizable minority of the global Muslim population views Reform Shafi'i as heretical as having outright ceased to be Islamic at all. That said, the movement has managed to gain support of a significant minority of the population of Indonesia, having been controversial among some of the most conservative Indonesian Muslims, but being popular enough among the general public, and arguably serving of a bridge of sorts between the Communist Party and some of the more religious sections of the Indonesian population
Reform Shafi'i has also been the only major Islamic movement to gain any substantial amount of support outside the People's Republic of Indonesia. While some of the explicitly Islamic socialist movements arguably had some influence on latter developments in countries like Iran, they didn't actually gain more than a handful of actual adherents, while Reform Shafi'i today has around 12 million adherents in the Middle East and South Asia, in addition to its 80 million adherents in Indonesia itself. Furthermore, Reform Shafi'i has had some splits and offshoots itself, though these have never managed to achieve even a fraction of the support and adherents that the original movement has, with the largest, an attempt to create a progressive reform theology that also unifies Sunni, Shia, and Ibadi Islam, only having a little over 150,000 adherents around the world today
__________________________________________________
The Revolutions of 1989 were largely centered on the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and other countries within the Soviet sphere, with the largest changes, indeed quite earth-shattering changes geopolitically, occurring within those regions. But the protests and uprisings were not limited to the Soviet sphere. Indonesia, facing cuts in economic aid from the Chinese as well as a total end of aid and support from the Soviets, found itself facing economic issues, as well as political opposition, initially due to the economic crisis and expanding to include various movements calling for various different sorts of reforms, including increasing liberal democratic socialism and expanding civil liberties within the socialist model, transitioning to a liberal democratic capitalist system and abandoning socialism altogether, and eschewing the former two options and instead establishing an Islamic State to enforce orthodox conservative Islam
In the end, despite facing significant opposition, the Communist Party of Indonesia was able to fare far better than the Communist Party of the USSR, enacting some political reforms and minor economic reforms but ultimately retaining its grip on power
The most significant area where the Communist Party conceded power was in the region of Irian Jaya/Western Papua, now the Papuan Autonomous People's Republic. When Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands, the Dutch retained control of Western New Guinea/Papua for years after the rest of the Dutch East Indies gained independence. The Dutch eventually withdrew, and West Papua came under the administration of Indonesia. But the Indonesian attempts to integrate West Papua were deeply unpopular among the Papuans, and while the Communists were able to cement control over the rest of Indonesia, the party faced rather more opposition in Papua. In 1989, the protests in Papua were far more intense than in the rest of the country, and unlike in other areas, the anti-government movement saw significant defection from local law enforcement and security forces. The government in Jakarta eventually decided to just cut its losses. In the rest of the country, concessions granted to protesters were generally minor, but in Papua, the government granted major concessions, establishing the Papuan Autonomous People's Republic and granting the new government pretty much complete control over its internal affairs, largely reducing Jakartan influence in Papua to just diplomatic and military affairs as well as certain economic matters relating to foreign trade and economic relations between the Autonomous Republic and Indonesia-proper