I disagree with the notion that it wouldn't do much. Sure Japan would still lose World War II, but it could change the post-war peace. If the (largely but not entirely American) western allied advance in the Pacific is delayed, then we could see the Soviets play a larger role towards the end. For example all of Korea could fall under the Kim regime.
Could Japan have won at Midway? And if so, what would change?
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BlackDragon98
Banned
The USN sub fleet will continue to decimate IJN ships and the Japanese merchant marine.
Experiences in Midway will show the inadequacy of the F4F and the Hellcat and Corsair's development will be sped up, along with the development of the Helldiver and Avenger.
IJN and IJA aircraft will start falling out of the sky like flies pretty soon.
The US will start churning out escort carriers as a stopgap until they have enough fleet carriers.
And come 1945, the US will not hesitate to light Japan up with nukes like the 4th of July.
BlackDragon98
Banned
Problem here lies with the captain, not the subs themselves.
the passive sub skippers get replaced with more aggressive skippers like the skipper of USS Growler.
the US will now have greater incentive to fix their torpedo problem.
If the war lasts a little longer, then the Mk 16 torpedo might actually see some service.
History Learner
Banned
I don't really see any reason how the U.S. would speed up development of its aircraft or CVEs, but beyond that, I'm not seeing much here to counter what I said. Case in point, as long as Australia is isolated, no suppression bombing of Japanese oil fields in the NEI is possible nor is relying on submarines a panacea:
A few hours after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved a message authorizing Pacific commanders to “Execute Unrestricted Air and Submarine Warfare Against Japan.” On the first day of the war, American submarines based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the Philippines took the war to Japan, beginning an anti-shipping campaign. In 1942, submarines inflicted 72 percent of Japan’s shipping losses, but initially the campaign was unfocused, and aimed to maximize tonnage sunk regardless of ship type. This led submarines to sink only 9,000 tons of tankers (1.3 percent of total sinkings) with only slightly better anti-tanker activity through most of 1943. As a result, the Japanese began increasing both their tanker tonnage afloat and their imports of Dutch East Indies oil.
The campaign against Japan’s oil supply was aided by loss of the 14,503 ton Army transport TAIYO MARU (ex-German liner CAP FINISTERRE) to an American submarine. At 1200, 7 May 1942, TAIYO MARU departed Mutsure, Japan for Singapore carrying a large number of oil field technicians to revive the refining facilities at Miri and Balikpapan and other technicians bound for Palembang, Sumatra. She also carried 34 soldiers and 1,010 civilians including military governors, doctors, staff, educators and technicians needed to administer conquered Southeast Asian regions, but at 1945, 8 May, LtCdr William A. Lent’s (USNA ‘25) USS GRENDADIER (SS-210) torpedoed TAIYO MARU 80 nms from Me-Shima Lighthouse. At 2040, TAIYO MARU sank. 656 of 1,044 passengers, four of 53 armed guards/gunners and 156 crew were KIA (total 817). The loss of the oil technichians undoubtedly delayed the Japanese in restoring oil production capacity.
Late in 1943, the United States Navy made tankers the top priority target for submarines. Bomber attacks on Dutch East Indies oil refineries also aided the blockade by eliminating Japan’s capability to supply military refueling stations with refined product directly from the East Indies. By forcing the Japanese to ship crude oil from the East Indies to home island refineries first--before it could be delivered to consumers--these attacks increased Japan's tanker requirements, with a resultant rise in sinkings. Yet, despite these successes, USAAF leaders committed less than two percent of their sorties toward maritime missions. LtGen George C. Kenney, CG of the USAAF Far East Air Forces’ (FEAF) chafed to attack the lucrative oil field targets on Borneo, but the distance from his existing South West Pacific Area airfields to targets in Borneo exceeded the range of Kenney’s longest ranged heavy bomber, the Consolidated B-24 “Liberator”.
With no costly Solomons campaign, the Japanese will be able to launch Operation No. 5 against the Chinese in 1942, effecting what Operation Ichi Go achieved in 1944 in terms of setting up a land corridor for oil transport that could not be effected by submarines. Finally, with regards to nuclear weapons:
Having them is one thing, but the ability to get them on target is another matter entirely.
The Japanese might be able to scrape out a naval victory with some better luck or decisions. Successfully invading Midway itself is an absolute non starter. Invading an island defended by more troops then the attackers, with armor support, more heavy weapons, a horrible walk in under fire after the landing on the Atoll outer ring, and a mere ninety minute preemptive bombardment by four heavy cruisers and two destroyers... that sounds like a death sentence to me.
BlackDragon98
Banned
The Japanese win a Pyrrhic battle naval wise but the landing is total disaster and most of the IJA troops and equipment are lost.
IJA blames IJN for not enough naval gunfire support.
IJN blames IJA for landing in the first place.
the Imperial Japanese forces are now in a state of undeclared civil war.
You know I enjoy chatting with you, HL, but . . . I just completely disagree with that assessment, from start to finish.
- The Japanese can secure Guadalcanal in the absence of WATCHTOWER, obviously, though by itself that doesn't give them real capability to interfere with American supply lines to Australia or New Zealand. Bettys can reach that far, but they weren't great anti-shipping weapons, they would only have had a couple dozen thre at most, and they would have been flying into Allied dominatd air space without any fighter escort for much of the flight.
- The Japanese have no appreciable chance to take Port Moresby by August (or later) given the size of the Australian garrison there at that point and the weakness of IJN and IJA logistics. They could have done it in the spring, possibly.
- It will take more than a Midway defeat to make Roosevelt abandon "Germany First," no matter how much grumbling West Coast governors engage in. That's clear from the record. There isn't much of value they can divert from TORCH that would be of value beyond RANGER, and even that can be substituted by the Brits with one of their decks. You'll see a handful more Baltimore-class conversions to Independence-class CVL's, and some additional beefing up of Pacific garrisons, but otherwise, not that massive of a shift.
- If Nagumo's losses of air crew and decks at Midway are negligible, they probably try some variant of Operation FS in August-September. But given the limits of IJN logistics and the strength of air forces in the New Hebrides, it's highly unlikely they can get farther than Efate, and only at heavy risk to their carriers. Taking New Caledonia, Fiji, or Samoa by that point is impossible for the Japanese.
- In this case, it is far more likely Nimitz simply skips the Solomons, beyond perhaps air and submarine attacks on IJN forces there. Strategically, the Solomons don't have any real value. But Micronesia has some.
- Japan is utterly and completely overmatched in warmaking power and natural resources, and it's going to lose the war, completely. Jon Parshall is right: Midway cannot really be decisive in this regard, because Japan had lost the war the moment the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor.
I agree on this point, because on both Hellcat/Corsair development and CVE construction the US were already going flat out by summer 1942. There is not much slack room here.
But the US could convert as many as an additional half dozen Baltimores to Independence CVLs and have them in theater by late 1943, based on what was in the slipways. (I tend to think it would be more like another 3-4.) Not as good as an Essex, but still very valuable. That's upwards of another 250 additional aircraft you can add to your fast carrier task force, which is not far off what Nagumo brought to Midway, FWIW.
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The appendix 6 in Shattered Sword on the possibilities of a landing is pretty compelling on this point. As Calbear says, it would have been a Tarawa in reverse, only with the Japanese not having a fraction of the amphibious capability that Spruance and Turner had. It would have been a slaughter.
I thought what Japanese were willing to accept was essentially a return to the pre-war status quo...
Well, what we know from the intercepts the US was getting via Magic in July and early August was that the Japanese wanted their core - Home Islands + Formosa + and, seemingly, Korea - no occupation, no war crimes trials, retention of the emperor and the regime. Even the War Cabinet by that point realized that status quo ante bellum was not really an option.
But those terms were unacceptable to the Allies, and we know they were, because we have the documentation that they had the intercepts, and what their reaction was: they decided to split some atoms over Hiroshima.
Here is one example, the discussion of an intercept from July 12, in Richard B Frank's Downfall:
Seriousy, getting back to my first post in this thread, and not meant in any way as a criticism of the OP: We have a thread for a "Glossary of Sealion Threads." I think we are reaching a point where maybe one for Midway threads is a good idea. Not because Midway was unwinnable for Japan, but because there have been so, so, so many threads on this subject over the years.
I think it has to be the most popular thread subject that doesn't involve an unmentionable sea mammal.
I think it has to be the most popular thread subject that doesn't involve an unmentionable sea mammal.
I’m thinking a glossary of Midway and Pearl Harbor threads given how much we have to deal with the mythology of the Third Strike/Hawaii Invasion.
Actually - yeah, that's a great point.
And heaven knows, an Oahu Invasion is pretty much in Sealion territory.
Isolate Australia.
Right.
You have noticed its a CONTINENT?
Just how do you intend to achieve isolation around ALL of it???
Right.
You have noticed its a CONTINENT?
Just how do you intend to achieve isolation around ALL of it???
Which means that even a lost battle of Midway can be spun as a partial success, especially of the USN manages to sink one japanese carrier and one of their own escapes.
Yeah, even if the japanese take New Caledonia and New Zealand (which is logistically impossible for them), it's still not isolated.
The US Navy is not abandoning the Atlantic, navally. Wasp aside, the heavy surface units that gave significant Atlantic service don't materially change the situation by being transferred to the Pacific. The rest are primarily ASW combatants that are needed desperately in the Atlantic and much less so in the Pacific.
As for the shipping equation, OTL the US was able to pull off both Watchtower and Torch at largely the same time. Watchtower is obviously not happening now, so now the shipping that went to Watchtower can be earmarked for other tasks, like building up the South Pacific air and ground garrisons to defend against Operation FS. Which would be the only task that would require additional shipping anyway. I don't see this changing the shipping equation, is the point.