I found a date for Poincaré's talk I alluded to with the austrian ambassador: that was the 21st of July.
Yes I saw that and thanks, but it would still be nice to know when the Russian declaration that you referred to was made.
The problem with that assesment is the following: it assumes that the russians were interested to discover the culprits. Im not at all sure about that.
A massive assumption and it also assumes that the Russians would be less interested in finding
some culprits (who were also
not the King or Prime Minister of Serbia) as part of a process to steer Austria away from an attack on Serbia. If the latter holds true then we need to have sources showing without a doubt that Russia was
not trying to deter Austria from attacking Serbia.
1. Im not sure if the russian leadership knew of official ties to Serbia - I think they did not. But there were lower level offcials who were aware of this.
Given that it would be the Russian leadership who would make the call and not the lower level officials, the fact that they were unaware of ties between Black Hand and persons in the Serbian government would tend to suggest that they might be open to an international investigation. Besides, it was the Russian government who advised Serbia to accept as much of the demands as possible even while indicating that Russia would stand behind them. Why would they do that (advise Serbia to accept as many demands as possible) and then tell them to
not accept an international investigation in which Russia would partake (and thus presumably be able to protect Serbia), as would Russia's ally France and with said investigation being led by a neutral nation? Britain's Grey had proposed four-power mediation (Britain, Italy, France and Germany) for Austria and Russia and although the Russian ambassador to London didn't like the idea, Russia's foreign minister Sazanov accepted the idea on July 23. Had Austria attempted to pivot to regain the diplomatic advantage that Serbia had taken by its conciliatory reply (by "graciously" acceding to the possibility of international cooperation on the investigation whilst still reiterating that it reserved the right to punish Serbia militarily if Serbia in turn did not accept international cooperation) then the stage would be set for Grey's four power mediation to lead to something approaching this as the Four Power conference would actually have something to work with (Austrian willingness to accept international cooperation on the issue as a way to avoid war).
There has been I think a military attache in Belgrad who boeasted after the war that he was supporting Apis and the Black hand with Money
I would be cautious about using that as evidence about what would have happened in say an alternate July 25, 1914 onwards if Austria-Hungary's leadership had decided to perhaps delay the idea of war and seize upon Serbia's reply to state that they wanted Serbia to accept an international investigation or risk war.
2. If the russian higher ups even suspect that Sebia might be involved they would find a reason to prevent any investigation. And they can easily get that information.
Again, this pre-supposes that the Russian government would presume that Serbia as a state was guilty and not some non-royal or non-cabinet official who could be characterized as "acting on his own". Russia would actually be far more likely to tack to the idea of rogue agents or independent terrorists one would think.
3. Seeing how deeply rooted in Serbia the Black Hand was do we suppose that any foreign investigators who are forced to at least a big part to rely on local assistance will have a successfull investigation.
This supposes that every Serb who an international police team spoke to would simply clam up or lie and that every
single official and local Serbian police officer was a secret Black Hand agent. I don't buy the idea that every single Serb was guilty by association or actively linked into a secret society. I am sure many, many Serbs agreed with the idea of a Greater Serbia, but that's not the same thing as every Serb investigators could possibly interact with being a member of a criminal terrorist organization that wanted to kill Austrian royals.
Only half a year earlier there was example of an international police force (the Dutch-led international gendarmerie of about 5,000 officers in all of Albania) having a detachment successfully raid Vlore and stop a plot by the Young Turks to install an Ottoman-Albanian military officer as monarch of Albania and thus restore Ottoman suzerainty over Albania. In the process they captured 200 Ottoman soldiers and the Ottoman officer charged with leading the plot. The plot itself was made with and being carried out with the full and active support (not just the awareness) of the Albanian Prime Minister Ismail Qemali. Qemali and his cabinet resigned after the trial of the plotters and Qemali left for Nice, later returning to Albania in mid-1914 to offer his services to (German) Prince of Albania.
4. If the investigation goes along and despite every serbian attempt to mislead the investigators it succeeds and a very big chunk of the serbian officer corps is revealed to be either directly responsible for the action or being members of the organization that is responsible for it, that the assassins were armed from official serbian army depots its hard to see what happens next. Would the conspirators go along with this result without a fight? Would russia accept this? Or come up with a reason why the finding are invalid?
Well most likely as happened with Albania, the direct conspirators end up on trial (a great outcome for Pašić as Dimitrijević and the Black Hand were supposedly dissatisfied with Pašić meaning he gets the removal of a potential threat to his premiership), you probably see some high profile resignations and life goes on and maybe 20 million people don't all die between 1914 and 1918. In Albania the revelation that both the Ottoman and Albanian governments were plotting together to overthrow the German prince as ruler of Albania and bring Albania back into a relationship with the Ottoman Empire didn't result in an Austro-Ottoman War or German-Ottoman War or Franco-Ottoman War or Italo-Ottoman War killing thousands did it? Nor did the assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria in 1898 by an
Italian result in Austria waging war on Italy (despite much popular agitation for reprisals against Italy in Vienna). A fews years later when the Italian King was assassinated by an Italian-
American there wasn't some Italian-American war or Italian sanctions against America.
We also have the examples of Alexandros Schinas (assassin of the King of Greece in 1913) who died from falling out a police station window after interrogation in May 1913 as a possible fate for Apis. Defenestration was very popular at the time.
This was not simply a murder case but a political question and the Russian would be very interested in not allowing the truth to surface or deny it if it surfaced anyway. France was ready to go along with this.
Again that's making some very major assumptions and the simple truth is that almost
everything was a political question during that period anyway. Curiously despite the numerous examples of cases where the Great Powers did
not go to war over pressing political questions between 1890 and 1914 (Fashoda, Morocco I and Morocco II, Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, the Albanian question, the Ottoman-Albania plot) and examples of Great Power cooperation (Boxer Rebellion, international police congress of 1914 which was the predecessor to Interpol, international anti-anarchists conferences, cooperation in Orthodox Greece (where Russia would be expected to not like the idea of the Germans or Austrians being involved), Iran (where Russia wouldn't like the idea of powers besides Great Britain being involved) and Albania (which touched on the interests of most of the powers whether directly or indirectly)) there seems to be this idea even today that the Serbo-Russian baddies would
inevitably conspire to protect Dimitrijević when they found out the truth (rather than try to protect
Pašić and throw Apis under the bus, or more likely out the police station window) and that the Austrians were not totally without justification for wanting to shell an entire city of people because they
felt (without yet having absolute proof in July 1914) that Serbia as a nation was responsible.
As noted above though as happened after the Ottoman-Albania plot, assassination of Empress Elisabeth, assassination of the Greek King, assasination of the Italian King and with the Boxer Rebellion, Greek Debt Management arrangement and international action in Albania and Iran, life would very likely have gone on as it had before (more or less)
Pašić might have been compelled to resign, but:
- new elections had been called for August 1914 anyway by Pašić
- as happened in the immediate aftermath of the 1912 elections when Pašić was actually in Russia at the time, someone else from his party would probably lead the new Serbian government (in 1912 it was Marko Trifković, it would probably be him again in 1914).
Look a bit further afield, the outcome of such a course of action would probably have resulted in a delay of the planned Serbia-Montenegro union (Serbia and Montenegro had been in
talks in early 1914 on forming some kind of union
(involving their militaries, finances, trade, foreign policy and communications) and Austria was opposed to this (yet the Austrian policies towards Montenegro actually strengthened the case and desire for Montenegro to forge closer links with Serbia until Austria realized this and tried (far too late) to change its policies)). Perhaps after a period outside of official governance Pašić returns between 1916-1918, during which time the Serbo-Montenegrin union of their militaries, budgets, customs, foreign policy and communications would already have occurred. Would this be the end of Austro-Serbian tensions? Of course not. But the point of the OP for this thread is that war was not unavoidable specifically in July/August 1914 (it was always highly probable, but not inevitable).