Isn't the Ohranka like a CIA if it didn't work internationally?A latin american country but with snow and Orthodoxy.
Why? What reason would the Russians have to be in a cold war with the United States? This just sounds like you spend too much time in the chat section on this site with its endless obsession with Russia and assume that because Russia is an illiberal democratic dominant party system controlled by the intelligence services right now, then if it has these same characteristics then it must be similarly in a rivalry with the United States. Russia, up until 1917 - and arguably up until 1946/1947 since the US intervention in the Russian Civil War is imo much more credibly assigned to other reasons than just opposition to the Bolsheviks, and there were many elements of cooperation in the Interwar about Japan and economic ties between the USSR and USA, not even mentioning the Grand Alliance during WW2 - never had any significantly rivalry with the United States. If anything Russia could be counted as one of the USA's closer partners in Europe, since Russia and the USA tended to have a commonality of interests when it came to rival nations in between them, particularly England and Japan, and had no real strategic disagreements, with only US outrage over Russia's treatment of its Jewish minority souring the picture. But this never led to any real action in terms of actual US policy towards Russia.It's an illiberal democratic dominant party system controlled by the intelligence services in a rivalry with the United States.
That's quite the range.A latin american country but with snow and Orthodoxy.
Nah they had an unofficial Paris office.Isn't the Ohranka like a CIA if it didn't work internationally?
Thucydides Trap.Why? What reason would the Russians have to be in a cold war with the United States?
I don't see any reason for this theory to apply to the Russian situation, since that seems to be just a new name for the idea of a preventative war by a stronger power against a weaker but quickly rising state, but the idea is patently absurd since Russia are so far apart and have such difficulties actually fighting against each other, and the US is unlikely to be a dominant hegemonic power in the event of a Russian WW1 victory - and nor would the Russians.Thucydides Trap.
You're right about actual war being implausible, but tensions, economic competition, and jockeying for influence between the worlds first and second foremost economies seems inevitable. That said I think it'd resemble 19th century Great Power politics rather than OTL's Cold War (both because the world would remain multi-polar, and because "the looming spectre of not-quite-absolute-but-the-constitution-is-kinda-weak Monarchy" just doesn't have the same ring to it that "the red menace" does)I don't see any reason for this theory to apply to the Russian situation, since that seems to be just a new name for the idea of a preventative war by a stronger power against a weaker but quickly rising state, but the idea is patently absurd since Russia are so far apart and have such difficulties actually fighting against each other, and the US is unlikely to be a dominant hegemonic power in the event of a Russian WW1 victory - and nor would the Russians.
I was thinking one of the less functional ones. Think more central america for level of prosperity/stability, although I could also accept a Russia as developed as say Mexico. That is to say roughly OTL Russia, but with development held back due to over the top protectionism as opposed to shooting itself in the food with bolshevism.That's quite the range.
Eh I think that would depend an awful lot on how Russia wins WWI. There's quite the wide range of possibilities between a better prepared Russia overrunning Silesia in August of 1914 and a somewhat luckier Russia simply not collapsing before Germany runs out of fumes in 1918.If there's anything like the First World War, then the Western European powers are done in the medium to long term.
Russia would have to revert back to the Time of Troubles to have Central American levels of disfunction.I was thinking one of the less functional ones. Think more central america for level of prosperity/stability, although I could also accept a Russia as developed as say Mexico. That is to say roughly OTL Russia, but with development held back due to over the top protectionism as opposed to shooting itself in the food with bolshevism.
Tensions and dislikes yes - but history shows us that the fear of economic overtaking does not necessarily lead to war. The United States didn't fight with Britain. Japan was feared to be on the verge of overtaking the US economically, and yet the US and Japan were allied. So far the US and China haven't engaged in war - and this despite severe strategic disagreements about Taiwan, Korea, and the South China Sea. Russia and the United States are so far apart that i just don't see how significant tensions constituting a real rivalry could develop in the context of the multipolar politics of this alternate world.You're right about actual war being implausible, but tensions, economic competition, and jockeying for influence between the worlds first and second foremost economies seems inevitable. That said I think it'd resemble 19th century Great Power politics rather than OTL's Cold War (both because the world would remain multi-polar, and because "the looming spectre of not-quite-absolute-but-the-constitution-is-kinda-weak Monarchy" just doesn't have the same ring to it that "the red menace" does)
*cough* arguably Austria-Hungary on both counts, but a points decision either way - otherwise, I concurErr no. Russia had the fastest growing economy in the world and was already the fifth largest industrial power on the eve of the great war.
The better scenario is not fighting ww1 at all, or losing rapidly before Nicky can be blamed for the military performance and/or unreasonable war goals imposed. Those scenarios both avoid having to contend with victory disease and keep potentially sympathetic CP monarchies to the west intact.Eh I think that would depend an awful lot on how Russia wins WWI. There's quite the wide range of possibilities between a better prepared Russia overrunning Silesia in August of 1914 and a somewhat luckier Russia simply not collapsing before Germany runs out of fumes in 1918.
Err no. Russia had the fastest growing economy in the world and was already the fifth largest industrial power on the eve of the great war. Between 1888 and 1913, Russia's industrial economy was growing at an average of 6.1%, as fast as during Soviet times
Also, the October Revolution put the country far behind what it could have achieved, and growth did not resume till the late 20's.
In addition, while GNP per capita of the USSR increased, productivity actually decreased. So a lot of the growth that the Soviet Union achieved only compensated for the loss from the civil war and October revolution.
Plus, growth in Tsarist Russia was accelerating. From the end of Serfdom to around the turn of the century, Russian industry was growing at double digit rates. Subsequently, until around 1906, it entered a recession of 4-5% growth. However, after this, even during the first world war (but without the October revolution), Russian industry was growing at double digit rates again, even outpacing the growth during the height of the Soviet industrialization.
Agricultural production would likely have slowed down due to collapse in demand following the great war, but it wouldn't have been completely devastated. Urbanization might actually have been slower without collectivization, but it would have occurred nonetheless.
In truth, by 1913 Russia had universal (male) schooling
This is just wrong. Russia's fertility rates, which were one of the highest in the world, collapsed following the October Revolution and fell deeper as collectivization proceeded. Russia's population in such a world would have been twice or thrice the population of OTL. Remember, even if Stalin did not necessarily accelerate industrialization or economic growth, he did accelerate urbanization, which decreases fertility rates.
This is at least the third time you've reposted this. No problem with that, it's a reasonably good post, but I don't think it quite works in this context.
Ah yes, the bomber gap folks. Well known for never overestimating America's adversaries.
Here's the thing though, no civil war and no loss of territory. So, assuming 1913 values in 1918, resuming 3.3% per year gets you 459,463 million 1990s USD in 1939. Which is higher than the historic values for the USSR.
Now one could argue that this is an optimistic projection which assumes minimal economic loss in WWI, a quick recovery to pre-war growth rates, and no severe effects from the great depression (although on the other hand it also assumes no Roaring 20s for Russia, nor have I accounted for the Tsar's education programs eventually paying dividends). However, in any case, in 1939 Russia is unlikely to be remarkably worse off than the USSR was.
See this is the problem with whole sale reposting things without any edits for the context of the conversation. You'd have a point if the discussion was about a white regime which could be expected to lose at least that much territory as well, but an intact Russian Empire doesn't have this issue.
Which is basically what Imperial Russia's railroad building and military modernization schemes were.
Hitler gets bent over a table by France if he goes east and bent over a table by Russia if he goes west.
Again, this is a fine point for discussing White Russia, it doesn't work for a victorious Russian Empire.
The German right can't claim to have won in the east and been "stabbed in the back" before they could finish off the west if they've lost on both fronts. Militarism and German supremacy would be at least somewhat discredited by a defeat at the hands of "weak and backwards" Russia.
There is no reason a victorious Russian Empire fully integrated with the european and world economies and with a much higher population, due to no civil war and no decrease in birth rates, would somehow lag behind in industrial growth. Even if their push for industrialisation is less, simply because they dont care solely about the cities as the SU did, they would still have vastly bigger markets and material resources to work with. Your claim that Russia needed communism to induatrialise is stupid considering pre war trends. This is not to mention the vast investment that would flood in from the entente powers.This is simply not true. Manabu Suhara's "Russian Industrial Growth: An Estimation of a Production Index, 1860-1913" (the very source you cited) states that Russia's industry had an average annual growth of 6.1% between 1888 and 1913.
On the other hand, according to "Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered: Some Preliminary Conclusions about Economic Development between 1926 and 1941" by
S. G. Wheatcroft, R.W. Davis and J.M. Cooper, the USSR's industrial production in the period 1928–1937 increased 2.5–3.5 times, that is, 10.5–16% per year.
In 1913, Russia had the fifth largest industry in the world. In 1937, after the Second Five-Year Plan, the USSR had the second largest industry in the world, second only to the United States (according to Vitaly Lelchuk's "Industrialisation").
If Stolypin's reforms had continued their effects apace as had been happening pre war, private land ownership would have skyrocketed post war. This and the fact that there would havebeen no famines, as well as the factor of a rapidly increasing population amoung the peasantry, would mean VASTLY greater crop and grain yields. No collectivization would do wonders for Russian agriculture. This is ignoring the tremendous human cost of the slave labour the SU used, which would be non existent in a tsarist RussiaIn 1913, the Russian Empire's grain harvest amounted to 86 million tons (according to "Russian Agricultural Statistics" by Manabu Suhara). According to "low" western estimates, the USSR's grain harvest amounted to 97 million tons in 1937 (Stephen Wheatcroft, "The Economic Transformationof the Soviet Union"). And, again, the Russian empire controlled Poland, Finland, the Baltics, Moldova, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, while the USSR didn't. Taking this, and the fact that the economy all but collapsed during the civil war, into account, the increase in grain production is even more impressive.
The literacy measurements you are citing accept those who can read individual letters one by one as being literate(Richard Pipes). The Libkez program has been hailed as doing wonders, but it was mostly propaganda. Aside from this, why would the imperial russian government have any incentive to keep russians illiterate? This is just nonsense.In 1913 Russia had a literacy rate of 38%, and the number actually decreased during the war (reaching 32% in 1920). However, in 1926, literacy had grown to 55% (thanks to "Libkez", the USSR's anti-illiteracy campaign). So the USSR archieved in just a few years, what the Autocracy failed to do in decades.
Gdp per capita would be HIGHER. Access to markets of europe and world, free trade economy and no collectivization would produce much greater economic growth. Uou do realise the SU economic growth was literally achieved through slave labour. Im sure you would agree that no slave labour would certainly be a positive of Imperial russia.I never said that the GDP of Tsarist Russia could not be higher than that of the USSR, especially if they manage to secure their 1914 borders (plus maybe Galicia, Poznan and Istanbul) assuming they are victorious in WW1). However, GDP per capita and the overall economic growth would definetly be lower.
France would ITTL keep their alliance with Russia. What reason do either party have to ditch it? France had to resort the the pathetic alliance of poland and romania and Yugoslavia IOTL,which was wholly inadequate. ITTL germany would have to start a two front war if it wants to make war again. This is an extremely unrealistically scenario, as no elected government would be crazy enough to basically commit national suicide like that.There'd still be revanchism which a far right movement could capitalise upon. Especially if the peace treaty is particularly harsh.
I disagree, a lot of it only works with the context of the not-Bolsheviks having to deal with the same stuff the Bolsheviks did.I think it fitted even better in this context, since I compared the economic developement of Tsarist Russia to that of the USSR. Orriginally I used the example of Tsarist Russia to compare the estimated economic developement of Russia after a white victory in the civil war to that of the OTL USSR. However, in the context of a surviving Tsarist Russia the comparision is actually more accurate.
Yes, but removing the decade of lost time that the USSR had to contend with evaporates any benefit that faster rate yields. Also, this relies pretty heavily on the assumption that the Russian Empire couldn't exceed 3.3% per year. I don't see any reason why demand for grain would be lower iTTL (in fact, without the civil war and period of economic isolation Russia probably loses less market share to Canada and America).The 6.1% number is supported by Vadim Rogovin's "World Revolution and World War", too. However, according to Vitaly Melyantsev's book "Russia for Three Centuries: Economic Growth in the Global Context" the the USSR's GDP grew by an annual average of 4.6% between 1928 and 1940. According to the same source, Tsarist Russia had an average annual growth of 3.2% between 1900 and 1913.
Either way, the USSR's economy grew faster than that of Tsarist Russia.
Not by all that much.I never said that the GDP of Tsarist Russia could not be higher than that of the USSR, especially if they manage to secure their 1914 borders (plus maybe Galicia, Poznan and Istanbul) assuming they are victorious in WW1). However, GDP per capita and the overall economic growth would definetly be lower.
Impressive yes, but irrelevant in a direct comparison. What is the actual take away from that? "Congratulations on your handicap! Maybe if your race car didn't have square wheels you might have won the race!"How? I compared the economic developement of Tsarist Russia to that of the USSR, and pointed out that many of the most industrialized regions of Tsarist Russia were not part of the USSR (making the USSR's archievements all the more impressive).
Fastest growing economy on the continent, set to over take Imperial Germany (ie with Alsace-Loraine and the whole of Silesia) by the 1930s in industrial output, a large and modern ship building industry (something the USSR took a very long time to regain, and in some specific capacities outright never did), and over 81 thousand km of rail.Yeah, but look at the scale and the results.
Britain and Russia drifting apart is very possible. France and Russia is a bit less so. Germany is going to remain their primary concern and the economic relationship between them is likely to continue, at least until the Russians pay off their debts (which will be a matter of decades).That really depends on how alliances shift in the aftermath of the war. And this TL's Russia would, in pure geopollitical terms, be a lot more frightening for France and Britain (stretching from Valdivostok to Poznan and from Helsinki to Constantinople).
Given Japan's anti-Soviet hysteria, that'd be quite the feat. Additionally, I've heard other opinions about the likelihood of a second Russo-Japanese War.It would be a lot more frightening for Japan aswell.
Revanchism alone does not guarantee a far right takeover, as France and Denmark show. Additionally, domestic developments in the German left may happen differently without the inspiration of the Soviets and the manipulations of Moscow (I'm thinking less organized over all but also less polarized).There'd still be revanchism which a far right movement could capitalise upon. Especially if the peace treaty is particularly harsh.