Post-Summer 1934 French Sanity Options

[HexWargamer]

It's the political situation that needs attention. In the eary 30's the Soviets are stiring it up everywhere in Europe in the belief, evidence the Great Depression, that Capatilism was about to fail. All they needed was one more push and a Communist Revolution was just around the corner. Few countries have worken up to the Stalins plans for them (after all, so far he has 'only' seen off a few million of his own ethnic minorities and who cares what happens to 6 million Ukrainians ?) . The anti-Comiterm movement hasn't taken off yet as Goverments are slow to recognise the threat == even so, many countries are facing a choice between the Facists and Communists. Italy has already gone Facist, Spain is about to fight a civil war, Germany is also about to go Facist. Meanwhile, in Britain the Governent has grounds to fear that socialist France is about to go Communist with a capital 'C' ....

But it's not just military co-operation that suffers. Who's going to license an areo-engine to a company in a country that where it might suddenly be nationalised and you can wave your investment good bye ? .(yes, yes, I know Rolls Royce gave the Neme jet engine to Stalin after the war, but that was after 4 years of 'our glorious brothers in arms' properganda from people who should have known better...)

So yes, Britain is indeed reluctant to help France in almost any way .. to change that, the socilists have to be turfed our and a semi-authoratarian rightist Government be voted in ... Good Luck coming up with a believable rational for that == unless, of course, you can find a way to make a military coup possible ... (socilist Govermnet tries to take over the armed forces by purging the officer class and installing 'commisars' perhaps ?)

 

[Bougnas]

So yes, Britain is indeed reluctant to help France in almost any way .. to change that, the socilists have to be turfed our and a semi-authoratarian rightist Government be voted in ... Good Luck coming up with a believable rational for that == unless, of course, you can find a way to make a military coup possible ... (socilist Govermnet tries to take over the armed forces by purging the officer class and installing 'commisars' perhaps ?)

Which is why this thread is based on the 1934 POD that the constitutional reforms go through to increase executive power, bring more political stability and reduce the influence of political extremes.

 

[Bougnas]

Said cannons could only be fed from a 60 round drum magazine, either way. you're right in that it's technically irrelevant but it's something that annoyed me in ww2 flight games/sims.

on that note: adapt the 13.2mm Hotchkiss for aircraft use, rip and tear.

To be fair the Hotchkiss was a low-ROF HMG (450rpm) and was mag-fed so not exactly a good platform for development of an aircraft MG. Plus the French had quite a few better alternatives:
- FN Browning in 13.2, with 1000rpm and HE ammo. However it was asked for too late to be developped and delivered in time, but the Belgians had started production of the FN Browning early enough that they could have delivered those and a license in about 1938 if asked in 1935.
-Darne MG in 11x78 caliber. Darne MGs had really great potential as cheap, easy to produce modern belt-fed MGs but Darne alone didn't have the means and once integrated into the MAS the state factory wasn't cooperative. Changing that might yield an excellent weapon in time. Great potential in other calibers too, including as LMGs.
- MAC 38 in 11x78. Again, development was too slow so the first protos were delivered in 1939.

11x78 was an interesting caliber as it would have offered intermediate, compact and light aircraft HMGs so could be more easily fitted in engine cowls and in the wings, or the nose of twin-engined fighters. Also useful as an anti-air airfield defense weapon (the Army asked for 9mm originally so they weren't going for powerful weapons anyway).

The problem was that the Air Force felt that the combination of 20mm and 7.5mm weapons was fine enough so they never really prioritized HMGs. That could have changed if they saw the need to have an alternative to the unreliable 20mm and more powerful weapons than the 7.5.

Regarding 20mm, Hispano-Suiza was too obsessed with high power and ROF and would probably have got a more reliable weapon if like the British the French settled for a slightly less powerful cartridge. For 7.5 and 20mm weapons the unreasonnable obsession with magazines reduced reliability, added unaerodynamic bulges in the wings and reduced ammo capacity.
MAC was ordered to develop a belt-fed version of the MAC 34 but didn't start in earnest until 1938 and essentially wasted a year because the factory wanted to make an entirely new MG. Once work really started it was rather quick so pressuring the arsenal to develop the MAC 34 M39 earlier could get us proper belt feeding in 1937 or 1938.
That also helped develop the belt-fed HS 404 so it's really useful.

Another issue with French aircrafts was the very poor pneumatic gun controls which were slow and wasted ammo. Have the French get the technology for the Browning solenoids and you could get excellent electric gun controls.

 

[Bad@logic]

It's the political situation that needs attention. In the eary 30's the Soviets are stiring it up everywhere in Europe in the belief, evidence the Great Depression, that Capatilism was about to fail. All they needed was one more push and a Communist Revolution was just around the corner. Few countries have worken up to the Stalins plans for them (after all, so far he has 'only' seen off a few million of his own ethnic minorities and who cares what happens to 6 million Ukrainians ?) . The anti-Comiterm movement hasn't taken off yet as Goverments are slow to recognise the threat == even so, many countries are facing a choice between the Facists and Communists. Italy has already gone Facist, Spain is about to fight a civil war, Germany is also about to go Facist. Meanwhile, in Britain the Governent has grounds to fear that socialist France is about to go Communist with a capital 'C' ....

But it's not just military co-operation that suffers. Who's going to license an areo-engine to a company in a country that where it might suddenly be nationalised and you can wave your investment good bye ? .(yes, yes, I know Rolls Royce gave the Neme jet engine to Stalin after the war, but that was after 4 years of 'our glorious brothers in arms' properganda from people who should have known better...)

So yes, Britain is indeed reluctant to help France in almost any way .. to change that, the socilists have to be turfed our and a semi-authoratarian rightist Government be voted in ... Good Luck coming up with a believable rational for that == unless, of course, you can find a way to make a military coup possible ... (socilist Govermnet tries to take over the armed forces by purging the officer class and installing 'commisars' perhaps ?)

This is post-event justification which doesn't stand up to a broader look at Franco-British relations during the Interwar. The time when Franco-British relations suffered the greatest cooldown - dropping from the status of a full scale alliance to being uneasy partners at best - was during the immediate post-war era, when the French were led by the Bloc national, a right-wing government. The closest thing to a rapprochement in the 1920s was with the Locarno treaties, with a French left wing government in charge. There probably was some distrust of the French internal political scene, but even a French right wing government wouldn't have received any significant support from the British - until the British realized that the Germans were a much greater threat. Trying to justify poor British diplomacy and their suicidally poor treatment of their only possible European ally based off of its internal politic doesn't hold water when this poor treatment was a consistent Interwar phenomenon and not linked to any singular French government.

In any case the examples you mentioned of technical cooperation weren't important to the French - the French were about technologically equal and they thought that key possible British equipment that we fawn over on this site, such as the Spitfire, were inferior to their own and had no interest in procuring them. What the French cared about was an alliance and military aid, not licensing British aeroplane engines.

In fact the big breakthrough for the French, the British instituting conscription and massively increasing their planned troop commitments in the BEF, came about due to the British perception of weakness on the part of the French, not the strength of a strong government. What the French need to convince the British to wake up is to get the Germans to destroy their diplomatic credibility as possible, and project an image of sufficient weakness that British help becomes a necessity, but not so great that British help is irrelevant.

 

[formion]

Trying to justify poor British diplomacy and their suicidally poor treatment of their only possible European ally based off of its internal politic doesn't hold water when this poor treatment was a consistent Interwar phenomenon and not linked to any singular French government.

Exactly! I m always glad to read posts that describe the big picture. The power output of a Gnome-Rhone engine doesn't matter. What matters is France's strategic position and her alliances first and foremost, then perhaps monetary policy, labor relations, fiscal policy etc. You solve the above or at least some of them and nazism dies in the craddle or during its baby steps.

 

[HexWargamer]

In fact the big breakthrough for the French, the British instituting conscription and massively increasing their planned troop commitments in the BEF, came about due to the British perception of weakness on the part of the French, not the strength of a strong government. What the French need to convince the British to wake up is to get the Germans to destroy their diplomatic credibility as possible, and project an image of sufficient weakness that British help becomes a necessity, but not so great that British help is irrelevant.

OK, I note OP stated post '34 so I guess if we agree no POD post '34 will turn the French military into a force capable of facing the Nazi Blitzkrieg then the reverse = generating a perception of them being militarially weak, might be a good tactic to get the Brits. re-arming earlier. BUT it could equally be argued that Hitler, percieving the French to be weak, might well start in the West before going East .... Of course whilst that might make sense = avoids any possability of 2 front war, gains Germany time and a lot more raw maerials from Nazi Soviet Pact (assuming H plans defeat France 39-40, consolidate 41 / peace with Brits, invade Poland 42, Russia 43) & might even end up with Stalin becoming impatient and invading Poland first, who knows what Hitler might think. If Stalin did invade Poland first, Hitler could then turn round and appeal to the Allies to help him face Soviet aggression (not as if the Allies are aware of the N-S deal over Poand, so Hitler might well be able to suggest Red Army is on it's way to Berlin via Warsaw ... even if/when Stalin pauses at the agreed diving line the assumption will be that it's the poor performance of the Red Army .. or determined resistance of the Poles ... ). If H attacked France instead of Poland in Sept 39, would Stalin still attack Poland/Finland in '39 and discover the dire state of the Red Army in time to do anything about it ? Or would the purges contine and the Commissars take over to such an extent that when Hitler knocks on the door in 42/43 the whole rotten structure really woud collapse ?

 

[jsb]

so I guess if we agree no POD post '34 will turn the French military into a force capable of facing the Nazi Blitzkrieg

I think that's pushing it a lot, any early war ie 34-37 is probably automatically a French win due to German rearmament not having full equipped the army yet to a size to fight France? (and post say 41 without a war Rearmament would catch up as Germany runs out of magic money trees and France has started spending)

 

[Thomas1195]

BUT it could equally be argued that Hitler, percieving the French to be weak, might well start in the West before going East .... Of course whilst that might make sense = avoids any possability of 2 front war, gains Germany time and a lot more raw maerials from Nazi Soviet Pact (assuming H plans defeat France 39-40, consolidate 41 / peace with Brits, invade Poland 42, Russia 43) & might even end up with Stalin becoming impatient and invading Poland first, who knows what Hitler might think.

Or, a France that rearms earlier could have prevented Sudetenland - at the time the Soviet would have intervened (against the Nazis) had Britain, France and Czech fought.

 

[Thomas1195]

Thus, prolonging the effects of the Depression, similar to the New Deal in the USA.

Say anything about the New Deal, but I have read the conservative alternative (posted by David T as far as I remember), it was worse (hint: it was not doing nothing). But well, other than that, let's focus on France.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

No takers for the Marine Nationale? Given how popular naval sanity options are and the fact that France had a quite outdated navy for the most part in the 30s...

but it was really a white elephant. France's real problems lay on the Meuse.

Spending for the Navy needs to be on the frugal side - main enemy is Germany.

Thing is France is not going to need a modern navy as much as Great Britian or United States. Most of their real crucial fighting is going to be Continental Europe

The OP is French Sanity Options - spending millions and millions of Francs on the Marine Nationale when the Germany Heer is getting stronger and stronger is not the sane option. To paraphrase von Moltke, France's future will be decided between the Meuse and the Rhine, not in the Atlantic or the Channel.

 

[Bougnas]

The OP is French Sanity Options - spending millions and millions of Francs on the Marine Nationale when the Germany Heer is getting stronger and stronger is not the sane option. To paraphrase von Moltke, France's future will be decided between the Meuse and the Rhine, not in the Atlantic or the Channel.

Did I say that we should have invested more into the Navy? Higher efficiency with what you can spend is a form of sanity option

 

[Thomas1195]

Did I say that we should have invested more into the Navy? Higher efficiency with what you can spend is a form of sanity option

Anyway, MN is not needed in the battle of France. Any efficiency generated should be allocated away from MN towards the Army and the Air Force. I mean, losing every single naval encounter is nothing-burger if France wins the battle of France.

 

[Incognitia]

Honestly if you can improve the stability of politics, and get a couple of big decisions right (get off the Gold Standard, asap!), starting from 1934, that might be enough without any further changes.

The German invasion of France was a close-run thing. If it had failed, well, see Blunted Sickle elsewhere on this forum.

Sure, there are alternate doctrines you could develop; there are technical matters where you can improve the quality or quantity of kit in soldiers' hands. But how much change do you really need for that sickle to be blunted? And once it has been, Britain and France together can beat Germany, war is over in ~1942.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Did I say that we should have invested more into the Navy? Higher efficiency with what you can spend is a form of sanity option

To improve the MN to the point it could achieve something of note (amphibious operations against the Baltic Coast?) would require millions and millions of Francs

 

[jsb]

Anyway, MN is not needed in the battle of France. Any efficiency generated should be allocated away from MN towards the Army and the Air Force.

To improve the MN to the point it could achieve something of note (amphibious operations against the Baltic Coast?) would require millions and millions of Francs

Just to be funny, what about a super strong MN saving France?

The Government was worried about the army taking over could they be less worried about having separate forces that are less coordinated (and can be designed to hate each other like all good interservice things should...)?

What about giving the MN a strong Troupes de la Marine ground force under Navy command (and the AF Defence troops/Airborne/Paras?) to balance the army as a counter to making it stronger?

This then is hated so sent to hold a none important part of the line and not have to work with the proper French army up north and being made up of well-trained marines holds Sedan?

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Just to be funny, what about a super strong MN saving France?

The Government was worried about the army taking over could they be less worried about having separate forces that are less coordinated (and can be designed to hate each other like all good interservice things should...)?

What about giving the MN a strong Troupes de la Marine ground force under Navy command (and the AF Defence troops/Airborne/Paras?) to balance the army as a counter to making it stronger?

This then is hated so sent to hold a none important part of the line and not have to work with the proper French army up north and being made up of well-trained marines holds Sedan?

I know it's not what you intended, but I would imagine a very-pissed off Dunkerque-class battleship would be awfully handy on the Meuse.

 

[McPherson]

It's the political situation that needs attention. In the eary 30's the Soviets are stiring it up everywhere in Europe in the belief, evidence the Great Depression, that Capatilism was about to fail. All they needed was one more push and a Communist Revolution was just around the corner. Few countries have worken up to the Stalins plans for them (after all, so far he has 'only' seen off a few million of his own ethnic minorities and who cares what happens to 6 million Ukrainians ?) . The anti-Comiterm movement hasn't taken off yet as Goverments are slow to recognise the threat == even so, many countries are facing a choice between the Facists and Communists. Italy has already gone Facist, Spain is about to fight a civil war, Germany is also about to go Facist. Meanwhile, in Britain the Governent has grounds to fear that socialist France is about to go Communist with a capital 'C' ....

But it's not just military co-operation that suffers. Who's going to license an areo-engine to a company in a country that where it might suddenly be nationalised and you can wave your investment good bye ? .(yes, yes, I know Rolls Royce gave the Neme jet engine to Stalin after the war, but that was after 4 years of 'our glorious brothers in arms' properganda from people who should have known better...)

So yes, Britain is indeed reluctant to help France in almost any way .. to change that, the socilists have to be turfed our and a semi-authoratarian rightist Government be voted in ... Good Luck coming up with a believable rational for that == unless, of course, you can find a way to make a military coup possible ... (socilist Govermnet tries to take over the armed forces by purging the officer class and installing 'commisars' perhaps ?)

1. I will let the French political experts sort out the Popular Front and the communists/socialists mechanics in France.
2. I will take the mechanics of industrial policy and make a few suggestions.
a. Instead of concentrating so much key industry north of the Seine and so near the reach of the Germans, how about putting some aircraft factories, arsenals and automobile plants in the Aquitaine? South of the Loire sounds like a good plan in case the Germans try Schlieffen 2.0 or something stupid like Mannstein 1.0.
b. Aircraft manufacturers can be consolidated and nationalized or they can be internationalized. Gnome/Rhone and Pratt Whitney might be a possible merger example. This is forward post nationalist thinking, but you grab your efficiencies wherever it can be grabbed.
c. To be frank, invest the Franc. Say overseas airlines. Compete, subsidize. Develop commercial airlines. Commercial airlines = source of twin engine bombers and pilot-reservists who can fly them.
As an aside...
d. If you have the doctrine of deliberate or more properly "controlled battle" as the basis for the French national army, then open up factories to build lots of road construction equipment, land mines and take a ,look at what can be done to utilize material on hand. For example, the venerable Canon de 75 modèle 1897 that will see its future sticking out of 55,000 Sherman tanks' turrets, sure could use a motor gun carriage parked under it, along with a new modernized family of anti-panzer and German infantry dissuader shells as a civil works program, to go with industrializing France's southwest.
e. Build a civilian radio network and encourage shortwave broadcasting. The radio problem will kind of take care of itself. French industry will be encouraged to supply decent radios and the ham operators will be a ready made cadre of radio-men.
f. I have noticed in my perusal of French problems from 1938 to 1940, that the French were actually doing a better job on the military intelligence front than the British when it came to things German. The PROBLEM, was that nobody in authority in France was listening to either their civil or military or SIGNALS intelligence people. There was a robust signals intelligence effort that had in concert with the Polish signals service broken ENIGMA. Not only that little gem, but the French had recruited a German traitor who for beer money was supplying weekly keys to the Enigma machines at least for the Herr. The British, more or less inherited this foundation after the Fall of France 1940.

Just some opening observations. Navy and air force when I think about it later.

 

[Bad@logic]

a. Instead of concentrating so much key industry north of the Seine and so near the reach of the Germans, how about putting some aircraft factories, arsenals and automobile plants in the Aquitaine? South of the Loire sounds like a good plan in case the Germans try Schlieffen 2.0 or something stupid like Mannstein 1.0.

That was already French policy, which aimed to decentralize the aircraft industry in particular. However, lack of raw materials and dispersal of talent and economies of scale is a negative.

b. Aircraft manufacturers can be consolidated and nationalized or they can be internationalized. Gnome/Rhone and Pratt Whitney might be a possible merger example. This is forward post nationalist thinking, but you grab your efficiencies wherever it can be grabbed.

Given American politics at the time, that is a risky move which endangers French defense.

c. To be frank, invest the Franc. Say overseas airlines. Compete, subsidize. Develop commercial airlines. Commercial airlines = source of twin engine bombers and pilot-reservists who can fly them.

Also French policy, although it could have been done better.

d. If you have the doctrine of deliberate or more properly "controlled battle" as the basis for the French national army, then open up factories to build lots of road construction equipment, land mines and take a ,look at what can be done to utilize material on hand. For example, the venerable Canon de 75 modèle 1897 that will see its future sticking out of 55,000 Sherman tanks' turrets, sure could use a motor gun carriage parked under it, along with a new modernized family of anti-panzer and German infantry dissuader shells as a civil works program, to go with industrializing France's southwest.

Many of the canon de 75s were converted into anti-tank guns, although the French army was unhappy with them as they were heavy, large, and not nearly as stealthy as smaller AT guns.

f. I have noticed in my perusal of French problems from 1938 to 1940, that the French were actually doing a better job on the military intelligence front than the British when it came to things German. The PROBLEM, was that nobody in authority in France was listening to either their civil or military or SIGNALS intelligence people. There was a robust signals intelligence effort that had in concert with the Polish signals service broken ENIGMA. Not only that little gem, but the French had recruited a German traitor who for beer money was supplying weekly keys to the Enigma machines at least for the Herr. The British, more or less inherited this foundation after the Fall of France 1940.

The French might have gotten more sources but their military ingellience on the Germans proved to be catastrophically over-pessimistic in over-estimating German military strength, which led to faulty deployments in 1940 both in the air (with fear of being wiped out by the German air force leading to dispersal) and the ground (with the Breda part of the Dyle plan.)

OK, I note OP stated post '34 so I guess if we agree no POD post '34 will turn the French military into a force capable of facing the Nazi Blitzkrieg then the reverse = generating a perception of them being militarially weak, might be a good tactic to get the Brits. re-arming earlier. BUT it could equally be argued that Hitler, percieving the French to be weak, might well start in the West before going East .... Of course whilst that might make sense = avoids any possability of 2 front war, gains Germany time and a lot more raw maerials from Nazi Soviet Pact (assuming H plans defeat France 39-40, consolidate 41 / peace with Brits, invade Poland 42, Russia 43) & might even end up with Stalin becoming impatient and invading Poland first, who knows what Hitler might think. If Stalin did invade Poland first, Hitler could then turn round and appeal to the Allies to help him face Soviet aggression (not as if the Allies are aware of the N-S deal over Poand, so Hitler might well be able to suggest Red Army is on it's way to Berlin via Warsaw ... even if/when Stalin pauses at the agreed diving line the assumption will be that it's the poor performance of the Red Army .. or determined resistance of the Poles ... ). If H attacked France instead of Poland in Sept 39, would Stalin still attack Poland/Finland in '39 and discover the dire state of the Red Army in time to do anything about it ? Or would the purges contine and the Commissars take over to such an extent that when Hitler knocks on the door in 42/43 the whole rotten structure really woud collapse ?

Sure, I was just arguing about the British and getting them involved. Given that the French assumed that any war with Hitler would require British aid, then under their logic it is the sane solution.

 

[McPherson]

Move industry southwest.

That was already French policy, which aimed to decentralize the aircraft industry in particular. However, lack of raw materials and dispersal of talent and economies of scale is a negative.

Well... I suggest that the British with their shadow factory programs and the Americans with their civil engineering projects of the 1930s, faced the same difficulties. I dare not say the French could not do it, because it seems post 1945 that they did?
International partnership and investment.

Given American politics at the time, that is a risky move which endangers French defense.

Again, I wonder how American politics endangers France, when Pratts roll off Gnome/Rhone assembly lines?
Commercial airlines.

Also French policy, although it could have been done better.

I think the French were handicapped (as were the Americans) by the system of Imperial Preference, which in part formed a lot of the economic problems in recovery in and among global markets. One can understand the reasons, but one must also understand the consequences of such policies. For example; one might understand why such policies of protectionism can lead to mistrust and handicap mutual aid in the midst of a global economic or political crisis. But putting this problem aside, the French government certainly had a chance to invest in western Africa and make that economic market integrative with airline investment for example.

About using what one has...

Many of the canon de 75s were converted into anti-tank guns, although the French army was unhappy with them as they were heavy, large, and not nearly as stealthy as smaller AT guns.

Source: EBAY.

"sure could use a motor gun carriage parked under it"

French military intelligence.

The French might have gotten more sources but their military intelligence on the Germans proved to be catastrophically over-pessimistic in over-estimating German military strength, which led to faulty deployments in 1940 both in the air (with fear of being wiped out by the German air force leading to dispersal) and the ground (with the Breda part of the Dyle plan.)

Gamelin was a fool on so many levels, that it is hard to find anything good to say about the man's military acumen. His staff had some good men, but his chief of intelligence was not one of them. As for the Breda modification of the Plan D? I never understood it. WHY lunge so far north and why place your maneuver reserve so out of position that it could
not cover the hinge of the movement? Did Gamelin learn nothing from Schlieffen 1.0? Apparently not. I think he was Peter Pincipled well above his his WWI divisional command level of competency. The nearest American comparison to him is the criminally incompetent rat bastard; William Westmoreland.

Joseph Vuillemin, on the other hand, was a lessons learned kind of guy who would do the best he could by the AdA in the air. It is unfortunate that he had the hand dealt to him that he had in May 1940. Just to summarize, only 47% of his first line aircraft on paper were in actual fact airworthy on 10 May. The AdA ground establishment spent most of their time during the Battle of France, either servicing the aircraft that could fly without the proper spares or tools to maintain them, the planes that unfit could stiil fight; or uncrating and assembling during combat fresh from the factory planes that often arrived without flight instruments, radios, or even guns or propellers. This explains the absurd 1 sortie per day per plane per pilot record far more than the claimed "inefficiencies of the ground crews". That in turn can be traced to the panicked production foulups of 1939-1940 as the French government tried to expand its aircraft park by 200%. René Bouscat is the man who had to pick up the pieces after the Petain/Laval "regime" tried to gut the French air force with the trumped up excuse that the AdA had "failed" France.

As for the "over-estimation" of the Luftwaffe by the AdA air staff? I don't see it. The realistic 4-1 odds the air staff produced as their dire prediction proved DEADLY precise. The subsequent bug-out for the North Africa settlements and bases, makes perfectly good sense in light of the situation the AdA found itself.

Sure, I was just arguing about the British and getting them involved. Given that the French assumed that any war with Hitler would require British aid, then under their logic it is the sane solution.

The sane solution is not to rely on others for your own needs. In foreign affairs, convergence of interests can be encouraged, but in the end, De Gaulle had the 'right' of it. France has to look out for France.

McP.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

For the MN cease building their ridiculously fast and large DDs and use the saved funds to build a larger number of sensibly sized destroyers and around 4 fast minelayers. Oh and get more large building slips completed ASAP so you can actually build a decent force of modern capital ships. Oh and rearm the existing large destroyers with a gun that has a decent rate of fire and ideally DP capabilities(maybe license the USN's 5"/38). On the cruiser front build the De Grasse class earlier and make Alegire a quartet of sisters. Lastly add more light and medium AA to everything. Ideally use Bofors and Oerlikons for this