BlackDragon98
Banned
Goebbels laughs from his grave in Berlin.
Anyway.
A German "victory" in BoB would be at best a hollow, Pyrrhic one at best.
At worst it would be resulted in the wholesale destruction of most of an German invasion force.
German victory at the Battle of Britain
- Thread starter FernandoPerla
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- battle of britain wwii
Anyway.
A German "victory" in BoB would be at best a hollow, Pyrrhic one at best.
At worst it would be resulted in the wholesale destruction of most of an German invasion force.
And of course once it had been attempted and defeated - the threat of invasion has gone
In mid 1941 there was a large number of British divisions in the UK at least 12 of which were fully equipped and trained
These ITTL could be freed up for service over seas making a serious difference to the ability of the Commonwealth army's redeploy to threats such as Rommel and the Japanese Sabre rattling in the far east at a time where forces were stretched.
Several projects that OTL were delayed due to invasion fears and concerns might be less delayed here.
Spitfire units might see adventure abroad earlier etc etc
This is not what it was. RAF was attriting the Luftwaffe, not the other way around. UK was out-producing Germany in aircraft (fighters, predominantly) and pilots. The 'last 50 Spitfires' was a cool aid fed to the LW pilots by their high command, by September there was no LW pilot believing it.
No pilot was tasked in making 30 sorties a day, ever.
Agreed.
Andrew Neil was in a twitter spat yesterday about Battle of Britain and Sealion. Post 18 raised the Isle of Wight gambit.
Yes, there is a way. It requires a bit of the foresight, long-term- and economy-thinking.
German win in the BoB does not equates to German win in the war. The BoB was a battle - ie. one battle - after which the winter wether starts and shots down most of German war effort against UK.
BoB 2.0 is needed in spring of 1941, that Luftwaffe needs to win, so it can proceed to whack British industry, ports, POL targets and whatnot to the rubble. The BoB 2.0 automatically removes the invasion of Soviet Union in 1941 - a major boon for the Axis cause.
Deleted member 94680
Although a “starter level entry” point for any successful BoB/USM thread for the Nazis, a Halifax government is unlikely for more reasons than Halifax simply not really wanting to be PM.
The May Crisis was drawn out over several days and the eventual key point in Churchill’s victory was the near unanimous support of the Cabinet. Not the War Cabinet, but the “outer” Cabinet comprised of all the other MPs in government. Churchill’s fight on position was inherently popular, Halifax’s (possible) negotiate position was not.
Ironically, it would have taken something along the lines of a successful USM (first stage possibly, probably more) to shake this position. Yet with Churchill secure in power the chances of such an event were that much lower.
The May Crisis was drawn out over several days and the eventual key point in Churchill’s victory was the near unanimous support of the Cabinet. Not the War Cabinet, but the “outer” Cabinet comprised of all the other MPs in government. Churchill’s fight on position was inherently popular, Halifax’s (possible) negotiate position was not.
Ironically, it would have taken something along the lines of a successful USM (first stage possibly, probably more) to shake this position. Yet with Churchill secure in power the chances of such an event were that much lower.
With reinforcements, would it be possible to win the NA campaign, before the Afrika Korps got involved?
McPherson
Banned
Arguably yes clear into early May 1940. Just increased logistics by 15% and another division or 2 from India might have been enough to snuff Italian Libya.
Okay - how might LW win the BoB. Unfortunately, we don't have a date to start changing the LW, so I'd go from 1.1.1939.
No Bf 110 that use DB 601 engines - all DB 601 engines that can be spared go to Bf 109 production. This can yield another 1500-2000 Bf 109s by summer of 1940, ie. about doubling the number.
The 109s get the bomb rack facility, so the drop tank fitment is quick and easy ( drop tank was a known thing in Germany well before ww2, the Hs 123 was using it in 1937).
The Bf 109E-1 gets another pair of LMGs in the wing for 6 total; the E-3 and, later, E-4 get a 90 rd drum for the MG FF(M) cannons. See whether the LMG can fire reliably through the prop shaft, so it is 7 LMGs for the E-1, and 3 LMGs + cannons for the E-3 and E-4.
The surplus of 750-1000 fighters needs an increase of pilots' 'production'. Offer good deal to Spanish, Hungarian, Slovakian pilots, but in either way try and get the German training program up to the speed. A much earlier and German-outfitted (no CR.42, but BF 109, etc) Corpo Aereo Italiano might be a good idea, though it will require Germans and Italians being quick on the ball.
Outfitting the bombers with twinned LMG installations might've helped against 'leakers', but the number and quality of escorts is mandatory tool in keeping the bomber losses at acceptable level. Try to have Ju 88 earlier in the game, with a good part of them trimmed down (low-profile ccokpit, only internal bombs, perhaps clip the wings a bit) so they can be faster than per OTL. Similar with Do 17, but that one will not improve much unless better engines are fitted. What is left of Bf 110s perhaps receive Czech HS 12Y engines, so they should be still making 300+ mph with them - these are to be fighter-bombers for low level attacks. Make sure that Avia factory is running at least 2 shifts, and that all Ju 87s have drop tank facility, not just the 87R.
So these are techy things, with a touch on logistics (pilots). Target allocation - kill RAF by killing the Fighter Command in the air; when they don't wan't to come out and play - kill Radars and FC bases.
No Bf 110 that use DB 601 engines - all DB 601 engines that can be spared go to Bf 109 production. This can yield another 1500-2000 Bf 109s by summer of 1940, ie. about doubling the number.
The 109s get the bomb rack facility, so the drop tank fitment is quick and easy ( drop tank was a known thing in Germany well before ww2, the Hs 123 was using it in 1937).
The Bf 109E-1 gets another pair of LMGs in the wing for 6 total; the E-3 and, later, E-4 get a 90 rd drum for the MG FF(M) cannons. See whether the LMG can fire reliably through the prop shaft, so it is 7 LMGs for the E-1, and 3 LMGs + cannons for the E-3 and E-4.
The surplus of 750-1000 fighters needs an increase of pilots' 'production'. Offer good deal to Spanish, Hungarian, Slovakian pilots, but in either way try and get the German training program up to the speed. A much earlier and German-outfitted (no CR.42, but BF 109, etc) Corpo Aereo Italiano might be a good idea, though it will require Germans and Italians being quick on the ball.
Outfitting the bombers with twinned LMG installations might've helped against 'leakers', but the number and quality of escorts is mandatory tool in keeping the bomber losses at acceptable level. Try to have Ju 88 earlier in the game, with a good part of them trimmed down (low-profile ccokpit, only internal bombs, perhaps clip the wings a bit) so they can be faster than per OTL. Similar with Do 17, but that one will not improve much unless better engines are fitted. What is left of Bf 110s perhaps receive Czech HS 12Y engines, so they should be still making 300+ mph with them - these are to be fighter-bombers for low level attacks. Make sure that Avia factory is running at least 2 shifts, and that all Ju 87s have drop tank facility, not just the 87R.
So these are techy things, with a touch on logistics (pilots). Target allocation - kill RAF by killing the Fighter Command in the air; when they don't wan't to come out and play - kill Radars and FC bases.
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So that's a quick end of the campaign in NA.
Apart from that I think that a failed Sealion (following the won BoB) might also lead to the Germans losing the battle of Krete. I assume they will use paratroopers in Ssealion, and they will all be lost, so those divisions will have to be rebuild. There will also be heavy losses of Ju-52's (and the pilots, so that's a big setback for the Luftwaffe). Krete may be cancelled, of fail (it was fairly close to faiing in OTL). So 1941 will look mightily different, with the UK in a much better position in the mediterranian.
The German economy will be in a much worse shape, due to the lost barges. Which will hamper the buildup for Barbarossa.
I think Hitler will launch Barbarossa anyway, but I assume it will not go as well for them in 1941 as in OTL. I doubt they'd reach the outskirts of Moscow now.
What would the UK do after winning NA and holding on to
So with Germany winning the BoB, we'd see a totally different war, and it will be a lot worse for the Germans.
Oh, and Rommel won't have his NA career, so his careerpath will be completely different too.
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McPherson
Banned
Advantages of seapower. If you are fast enough and ruthless enough.
That implies a failed ITTL Greek campaign. You cannot even mount a Greek campaign if you want to win North Africa. You need the desert army and its veterans to get to Tripoli, which is 2,000 km. very hard going and tough on tanks and trucks even with the Balbo highway, which the Italians have helpfully provided to ease the road march.
The RAF should be mining every river and lake in Germany anyway.
No Greek campaign is a 2 week head start on the Barbarossa timetable. Not significant in the end because Stalin, "the world's greatest military genius", will still make his mistakes and 9 million Russians will immediately die because of him, but it is what it is. The Germans will be at Moscow unless someone shoots Stalin 2 weeks into the campaign before the encirclements really close up.
No Greece.
Nobody can convince me that with Fatso, Greim and the other Luftwaffe LOSERS, such as Milch and Jeschonek, that the Germans could win the BoB even with 3x their RTL strength. Those losers were losers because they were freaking clueless MORONS as to how to fight an air campaign.
That is true, but only if no Greece. Here's why:
There is no way in HELL the UK can hold on in Greece or even Crete. Churchill blew his chance in North Africa when he tried Greece. The Americans, when Churchill tried to prod them into the Balkans in 1943, actually told him WHY he was a damned fool when he tried.
Source: wiki commons for map.
Summary: the British cannot establish air superiority in region at all; because the air bases the axis control; catch them in a fighter cross-fire from Italy, Albania, southern Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The British have to march into central Yugoslavia and mid Bulgaria to establish an AIRPOWER cushion. They do not have the troops, the logistics or the allies in 1941 or in 1943 or 1945. They never will.
It is that simple. The Americans explained the LOGISTICS and AIRPOWER involved to Churchill very pointedly.
After a failed Sealion the situation for the UK is a lot better than OTL, Greece might go as OTL, but NA better, because due to no more threat of invasion they may be able to reinforce both, instead of just Greece. I agree Greece will be lost though. I meant to write "The UK holding on to Krete" where I wrote "Greece".
Have you read "A better show" by Michele? POD is Weber surviving and the LW performing a bit better, so the Germans think they won the BoB and launch Sealion. And then their fun ends.
You got to realise we're talking about what happens after the Germans winning the BoB, and then a failed Sealion, which means big butterflies. Krete was already a close call OTL. The Germans were only just able to hold on to the airfield and reinforce by air. Reinforcements by sea were repelled. With no threat of UK invasion, there can be more airsupport on Krete, of more ground forces (or both). A few squadrons of Spitfires might make a big difference.That is true, but only if no Greece. Here's why:
There is no way in HELL the UK can hold on in Greece or even Crete. Churchill blew his chance in North Africa when he tried Greece. The Americans, when Churchill tried to prod them into the Balkans in 1943, actually told him WHY he was a damned fool when he tried.
Source: wiki commons for map.
Summary: the British cannot establish air superiority in region at all; because the air bases the axis control; catch them in a fighter cross-fire from Italy, Albania, southern Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The British have to march into central Yugoslavia and mid Bulgaria to establish an AIRPOWER cushion. They do not have the troops, the logistics or the allies in 1941 or in 1943 or 1945. They never will.
It is that simple. The Americans explained the LOGISTICS and AIRPOWER involved to Churchill very pointedly.
Apart from that, after a failed Sealion, the German paratroopers need to be rebuild completely (there won't be many left), and there will have been losses of Ju-52s too. So a German invasion on Krete may even be impossible, or undesirable to them. OTL Krete was the pyrric victory for the German paratroopers. This ATL might be the big loss of the paratroopers, with a similar (or worse) effect than OTL Krete.
I have a POD for that
No Greek Adventure - W Force is not sent to Greece - both senior Australian and New Zealand commanders delay the sending of their forces until they have received permission from their respective government (they just accepted Wavell's word OTL - the op was not properly cleared with the NZ and Aus Governments)
By the time permission is given the Germans have started moving into the Balkans and Alexandros Papagos the Greek PM bottles it believing that if British troops arrived in Greece to fight the Italians then this would provide the Germans with a Casus Belli for invading Greece.
Before this decision can be overturned through political action the Germans invade anyway and the Greeks rapidly collapse and while the ships intended to deploy W force are instead used to help evacuate Greek forces from the mainland dropping a large number on Crete where the British seek to rearm them (largely with Captured Italian weapons, guns and AFVs)
This means both quite powerful infantry Divisions and 1st Armoured Brigade are both still in Egypt - an additional couple of British Divisions and a full Armoured Division have also arrived from the UK over the Winter months given the absence of even a remote invasion fear in the UK along with additional aircraft
Maybe not enough in and of itself to snuff Libya but certainly it would be enough to decide East Africa much more quickly than OTL and turn Sonnonblaume into a defeat or a stalemate (which would effectively be the same thing) with a far more powerful 'Battleaxe' falling on the Axis during the summer much further West than OTL
McPherson
Banned
But as you also postulate, one cannot have a Greek campaign. I might even go so far as to suggest that the desert army might have to hang on to captured Italian lorries and artillery to make up shortfall in the drive from Cyrenmaica to Tripoli, especially to get past Sirte.
I might have actually shifted forces out of Sudan to push "Compass" forward harder. After all, if Libya falls, Ethiopia and East Africa is a mop-up operation. THINK LIKE A SEAPOWER. Churchill seems to have had a problem with that concept.
Read only if you want to see how Greece and North Africa lessons learned apply also to the Battle of Britain.
Apologies for getting away from the BoB, but as the North Africa operations; also hinge directly on German incompetence in the air campaign and in mounting operations across enemy contested air space and controlled oceans,[/ISPOILER] I think the two examples in situ can show why just an air farce cannot be the measure of "victory" in any operational context where the enemy has two of the three air-land-sea battle dimensions in which he will be dominant, logistically, geographically, numerically and operationally. The Germans have the LLOCs, numbers, geography, logistics, land power, and air superiority to make Greece impossible for British forces available to commit. By contrast; for a brief period, the British in Egypt have the air and sea superiority and a marginal but significant operational land superiority over the Italians to snuff out Italian Libya if they move fast and without distraction to achieving that obtainable objectives. When the Germans import air power and sneak across an equivalent land power after April -June 1941, it becomes a contested theater in North Africa, essentially parity across land sea and air, especially after Churchill squanders 40-50% of the British land power in Egypt with the Greek adventure and further squanders 20% of the British Med fleet in a failed effort to SLOC support Greece and Crete. Sheer idiocy.
That RN seapower wastage allows Italy to maintain a SLOC into Libya that the RN will NEVER break until Montgomery snuffs the Axis the hard way on land in conjunction with Andersen's own inept efforts into Tunisia. Costly two years for the Allies. That is the price of a Landlubber's War.
You have to really tear your hair out as an American when you see the missed mixed signals. The BoB with a Berlin maniac ordered drown-ex appendix to Fatso's failed air campaign of course might make shuffling the chairs on Compass a bit more interesting, but the point is that in theater resources better used could have made more of Compass without any hedge of the BoB. Just do not do the five stupids.
A. O'Connor has to remember he is a general directing an offesnsive, not a troop leader looking for hard going for his tank company.
B. The RAF has to learn that bombing trucks is more important and useful than bombing tanks and to make sure it is the right trucks being bombed@!
C. Cunningham has to realize that his BBs are floating artillery and have to be risked forward to blast the Italian coast defenses so that Wavell can right hook 10th Army... especially at Sirte.
D. No Greece, DAMNIT!
E. Keep Mediterranean maps (Actually ANY maps.), away from Churchill and get him drunk and keep him drunk, only trucking him out to give one of his famous morale booster speeches as needed. Let Alan Brooke run the military show. That is why HE is there.
That RN seapower wastage allows Italy to maintain a SLOC into Libya that the RN will NEVER break until Montgomery snuffs the Axis the hard way on land in conjunction with Andersen's own inept efforts into Tunisia. Costly two years for the Allies. That is the price of a Landlubber's War.
You have to really tear your hair out as an American when you see the missed mixed signals. The BoB with a Berlin maniac ordered drown-ex appendix to Fatso's failed air campaign of course might make shuffling the chairs on Compass a bit more interesting, but the point is that in theater resources better used could have made more of Compass without any hedge of the BoB. Just do not do the five stupids.
A. O'Connor has to remember he is a general directing an offesnsive, not a troop leader looking for hard going for his tank company.
B. The RAF has to learn that bombing trucks is more important and useful than bombing tanks and to make sure it is the right trucks being bombed@!
C. Cunningham has to realize that his BBs are floating artillery and have to be risked forward to blast the Italian coast defenses so that Wavell can right hook 10th Army... especially at Sirte.
D. No Greece, DAMNIT!
E. Keep Mediterranean maps (Actually ANY maps.), away from Churchill and get him drunk and keep him drunk, only trucking him out to give one of his famous morale booster speeches as needed. Let Alan Brooke run the military show. That is why HE is there.
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That's not actually what happened at all. The German plans took on three phases as follows. First they set out to explore British defences whilst attacking British shipping and make the Straits of Dover too dangerous for the British to operate in. This allowed building up forces and preparations for Eagle Attack to start some time after 1st August. Second phase was Eagle Attack itself planned for 10th August but delayed until 13th August with the aim of knocking out the RAF (please note it wasn't just aimed at knocking out Fighter Command) and it's infrastructure. The general plan was to knock out airfields in a systematic manner starting with those on the south coast and working inwards towards London, in doing so they would weaken Britains fighter defence. This second phase was to last three to four weeks. On 3rd September (three weeks after Eagle Attack Began) the Luftwaffe chiefs met to discuss progress and they (very) incorrectly believed the second phase had been successful. The third phase was given the green light at this meeting, attacks on commercial and transport centres, ie ports, docklands and rail transport hubs. The attacks on London were part of this and Hitler approved the attacks, after previously banning London as a target, only partly as a retaliation for the Berlin bombings. This third phase was always in the original plan and had been allotted ten days for completion. So, on the 7th September, the attacks on London's docklands began, London being the largest port in the UK and the third phase began. It was also hoped that attacks on London would draw out Britains fighter forces for one last battle and the RAFs defeat.
But as you also postulate, one cannot have a Greek campaign. I might even go so far as to suggest that the desert army might have to hang on to captured Italian lorries and artillery to make up shortfall in the drive from Cyrenmaica to Tripoli, especially to get past Sirte.
View attachment 550584
I might have actually shifted forces out of Sudan to push "Compass" forward harder. After all, if Libya falls, Ethiopia and East Africa is a mop-up operation. THINK LIKE A SEAPOWER. Churchill seems to have had a problem with that concept.
Read only if you want to see how Greece and North Africa lessons learned apply also to the Battle of Britain.
Apologies for getting away from the BoB, but as the North Africa operations; also hinge directly on German incompetence in the air campaign and in mounting operations across enemy contested air space and controlled oceans,[/ISPOILER] I think the two examples in situ can show why just an air farce cannot be the measure of "victory" in any operational context where the enemy has two of the three air-land-sea battle dimensions in which he will be dominant, logistically, geographically, numerically and operationally. The Germans have the LLOCs, numbers, geography, logistics, land power, and air superiority to make Greece impossible for British forces available to commit. By contrast; for a brief period, the British in Egypt have the air and sea superiority and a marginal but significant operational land superiority over the Italians to snuff out Italian Libya if they move fast and without distraction to achieving that obtainable objectives. When the Germans import air power and sneak across an equivalent land power after April -June 1941, it becomes a contested theater in North Africa, essentially parity across land sea and air, especially after Churchill squanders 40-50% of the British land power in Egypt with the Greek adventure and further squanders 20% of the British Med fleet in a failed effort to SLOC support Greece and Crete. Sheer idiocy.
That RN seapower wastage allows Italy to maintain a SLOC into Libya that the RN will NEVER break until Montgomery snuffs the Axis the hard way on land in conjunction with Andersen's own inept efforts into Tunisia. Costly two years for the Allies. That is the price of a Landlubber's War.
You have to really tear your hair out as an American when you see the missed mixed signals. The BoB with a Berlin maniac ordered drown-ex appendix to Fatso's failed air campaign of course might make shuffling the chairs on Compass a bit more interesting, but the point is that in theater resources better used could have made more of Compass without any hedge of the BoB. Just do not do the five stupids.
A. O'Connor has to remember he is a general directing an offesnsive, not a troop leader looking for hard going for his tank company.
B. The RAF has to learn that bombing trucks is more important and useful than bombing tanks and to make sure it is the right trucks being bombed@!
C. Cunningham has to realize that his BBs are floating artillery and have to be risked forward to blast the Italian coast defenses so that Wavell can right hook 10th Army... especially at Sirte.
D. No Greece, DAMNIT!
E. Keep Mediterranean maps (Actually ANY maps.), away from Churchill and get him drunk and keep him drunk, only trucking him out to give one of his famous morale booster speeches as needed. Let Alan Brooke run the military show. That is why HE is there.
John Dill was CIGS at this time - Alanbrooke Replaced him in Dec 1941.
Churchill found Dill obstructionist and so 'promoted him' and sent him to the USA where he did a fantastic job as the senior British officer on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Fortunately he couldn't fire Alanbrooke who was probably even more 'Obstructionist'!
Fair enough.
But Geon's comment that the LW were close to winning was grossly incorrect.
It's a weird one that, they were close to breaking the back of Fighter Command who had just 2-3 days worth of reserves left in the first couple of weeks in September but that doesn't equate to a British defeat. It's only the beginning of what might be a rapid collapse or a slow decline but no one could really say which it would be.
McPherson
Banned
Source: Here.
Discussion with data: Here.
Summary: Platforms; there were enough in the RAF. It was the PILOTS, who were the problem. The trained reserves were killed and maimed off dangerously fast around mid-September.
If one side paused to replenish and refresh pilots and train up replacements, then they blinked first. The "difference" was splashed RAF pilots, both wounded and unwounded, who survived bailout, landed on friendly soil and received good care and returned to service. Luftwaffe pilots bailing out over hostile countryside, got farmers with pitchforks or city dwellers with rocks and knives, and if they survived that encounter, wound up behind barbed wire. Plus the usual "follow them down and make sure they don't make it" unofficial stuff that happens during air combat. This is what you earn when you bomb enemy territory and you have no air rescue service.
The Germans did "blink". Their pilot attrition was too high.
(my bold)
Any good source that can back up the bolded claim?
Any good source that can confirm that FC was in either rapid collapse or a slow decline in the 1st couple of weeks in September?