Once again, read my post at
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rael-during-suez-crisis.433483/#post-16277815
As I note there, "...it is important to remember that the British and French were *not* counting on an all-out war with Egypt. Hence their need to pretend that they were merely responding to the dangers posed by the Israeli- Egyptian war to the Canal; hence the wishful thinking that limited seizures of territory along the Canal combined with some bombing could quickly bring down Nasser. This is why I believe the operation would have been a failure even if the US had not opposed it: When you have a goal (overthrow of Nasser) and are not willing or able to go all-out in pursuit of that goal, your enemy senses that fact and takes advantage of it."
BTW, as I also noted in that post, "rolled over' is an oversimplification. Nasser's "people's war" strategy was already starting to slow down the Anglo-Frrech forces before the cease-fire:
***
3) Egypt's military weakness: You make much of this. But it is something of which Nasser himself was aware, and which he had a strategy to overcome (and a strategy, incidentally, that did *not* count on Soviet or American intervention):
"Nasser saw Egyptian civilians as a weapon of last resort. Although he preferred using properly trained and equipped military forces, if circumstances deteriorated he planned to transform non-combatants into combatants. In this scenario, Egypt would wage a 'people's war' against invaders. Troops were to jettison all military trappings--uniforms and the like--except their weapons, and disperse incognito into the population. They would then lead civilians in resisting Anglo-French occupation.
"For Nasser, the advantage of a 'people's war' was the obliteration of lines demarcating military and civilian spheres. With this distinction blurred, British and French soldiers faced dilemmas: who is our enemy, and under what circumstances are we to use deadly force? Nasser understood the delicate political nature of allied operations in Egypt and the intense public scrutiny they entailed; these conditions exacerbated for Britain and France thorny questions regarding proper rules of engagement.
"If British and French troops aggressively countered the popular insurgency, many civilians, even those not involved in the 'people's war,' would die. High civilian casualties would increase pressure in Britain, France, and abroad to cease hostilities and withdraw from Egypt. Moreover, such casualties would persuade more Egyptians to resist occupation, again expanding the conflict in Egypt's favor.
"Alternatively, if Britain and France cautiously countered the 'people's war,' Egyptian partisans could attack with near impunity by hiding among crowds of apparent non-combatants. The resulting British and French casualties might provide the impetus for those countries to abandon Egypt. Essentially Nasser hoped to replicate in microcosm the asymmetric strategy of the Algerian revolution, still in its preliminary phase at the time of the Suez Crisis, but nonetheless showing promise as a way for a militarily inferior state to vanquish its more powerful adversary." Derk Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956*, pp. 87-8
As Varble notes (pp. 88-90), brief as the Suez fighting was, Nasser was already beginning to implement this strategy, and it was already starting to slow down the Allied forces before the cease-fire :
"When British and French warplanes attacked Egypt on 31 October, 1956, Nasser implemented this philosophy. Realizing that an invasion was imminent, he directed all Egyptians, soldiers and civilians, to resist Britain and France. Expecting those nations to attack Port Said, he distributed assault rifles and grenades, instructing recipients to use them to harass occupying forces at every opportunity.
"Most Egyptian civilians were unfamiliar with sophisticated military technology, limiting somewhat their effectiveness as partisans. However, civilians could easily master basic munitions such as grenades. On 5 November several weapons shipments arrived via rail in Port Said; pallets of grenades, Czech assault rifles, and other devices were available on street corners, offered to anyone hoping to resist the imminent invasion.
"Probably just a small percentage of Port Said's civilians participated in hostilities. Nonetheless their 'people's war' had significance. Relentless sniping forced Royal Marines to seek armored protection when moving along city streets, hindering their advance. Armed civilians concealed themselves inside Port Said's buildings; the threat they posed slowed the progress of soldiers engaged in clearing operations. These delays prevented a rapid allied breakout from Port Said. When the 7 November UN ceasefire took effect, British and French troops had not reached al-Qantarah, the next city south of Port Said. After the ceasefire, Egyptian insurgents continued resisting occupation. They sniped and threw grenades at patrolling soldiers, inflicting a few casualties at a time and providing an additional motive for Britain and France to leave Egypt.
"For Nasser, the Egyptian people had an unambiguous role: resist invading forces, delay their advance, and swing world opinion into line behind Egypt. In Anglo-French strategy, by contrast, Egyptian civilians constituted a paradox. In some ways, the allies, especially the British, sought to minimize the suffering of the Egyptian people. Indeed, concern over potential non-combatant casualties forced Eden to abandon Alexandria as a bridgehead for invasion. While planning the Egyptian campaign, Mountbatten and other British leaders fretted that attacking cities would stigmatize them as 'murderers and baby killers' and injure Britain internationally. During Revise Phase I, in which bombers struck airfields, Eden repeatedly modified target lists to avoid hitting civilians, Just before British and French forces stormed Port Said, the cabinet limited bomb and gun size for aerial and naval bombardment despite their knowledge that such restrictions might increase British losses. Although some military commanders disregarded these stipulations, the restrictions illustrate palpable British concern--political, moral, or otherwise--at the highest level for non-combatant safety.
"Yet the very success of Revise rested on terrorizing Egypt's civilian population. Phase II, which Keightly hoped would form the crux of allied military operations by forcing a regime change in Egypt, attempted to coerce Egyptians through a bombing offensive. RAF planners who designed the 'aero-psychological' campaign had full confidence that disrupting daily life would compel Egypt's people to topple Nasser. Airstrikes against communications and transportation networks were to be the mechanism for paralyzing Egyptian society.
"Perhaps recognizing the contradictions in British strategy, and at last understanding the political repercussions of a terror bombing campaign, Eden eliminated many of Phase II's more aggressive tactics. Aircrew resistance and technical challenges undercut other aspects of the aerial offensive. However, many bombs still fell on Egypt, inflicting scores, perhaps hundreds, of civilian casualties in Cairo and adjoining areas. British pilots, operating unfamiliar weapons systems and steeped in an 'area bombing' culture rather than in precision tactics, often placed ordnance on unintended targets, killing or wounding non-combatants. International pressure *and an awareness that Phase II served to rally, not destroy, Egyptian morale* led Keightly to cancel Phase II soon after its awkward inception.." [my emphasis--DT]
Varble concludes (p. 92) that
"Strategic bombing was the least successful of the aerial missions. Revise Phase II and its aero-psychological ambitions proved an abject disappointment...[Eden] failed to grasp how the world might respond to the sight of British planes raining bombs on Cairo. Also, RAF weapons and skills were unsuited to the task at hand--disrupting the Egyptian economy and damaging morale while inflicting minimal civilian casualties. The RAF had no tradition of pinpoint bombing, and in an era before precision- guided munitions high-altitude night attacks against specific targets were quite difficult. Under these conditions, ordnance dispersed, as happened during Revise Phase I Canberra and Valiant raids on Egyptian airfields. In the end, relatively few bombs fell, and those that did mostly missed, leaving the Egyptian air force intact and Egyptian morale strong..."
