If Moscow falls in October as you describe what would plausibly happen in 1942?
Would Stalin make peace?
Would a civil war break out?
How long until the USSR gives up and the Reich accomplishes their goal of controlling everything up to the Urals?
How easy would it be for Germany to capture Moscow in 1941?
- Thread starter jonmb
- Start date
Would Stalin make peace?
Would a civil war break out?
How long until the USSR gives up and the Reich accomplishes their goal of controlling everything up to the Urals?
Deleted member 1487
Hitler wouldn't make peace, so that's that.
Civil War is unlikely to break out, though there might be localized fighting for resources if things get desperate.
I don't think it's an issue of the USSR giving up, but the system breaking down and resistance being localized based on generals still able to command loyalty from troops rather than organized national resistance.
In 1942 I think the Soviet system implodes if Moscow is not taken back and Case Blue happens in which case Stalin loses command of his own forces and organized national resistance falls apart and local warlords seize resources to survive.
Klin is behind the defensive line to get their and avoid the line you have to go north around Kalinin?
You mentioned forces but you've not said how they get to their starting positions 10 day earlier, also the forces you mention seem to be stronger because you have them missing out some steps ting they need to do to get to where you want them?
Again I feel like you're not paying any attention to things we've been arguing about over several pages. The 41st Panzer corps that took and held Kalinin would in the scenario we've been talking about instead head East against Volokolamsk. They would be diverted early on and arrive around the 14th or so there instead of Kalinin.
IOTL they were not part of the Vyazma or Bryansk pocket forces they were an exploitation force that slipped through the gap in Soviet lines created by the pocket battle. Again I already posted a map of their movements during the battles, but will repost it again despite being only a few posts up on this very page:
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My point was you still have to do Vyazma and Bryansk, the Germans have to finish that and regroup before going forward even if they have units not actually fully committed at them. Your doing this classic thing of using hindsight to know exactly what happens and when OTL and creating a fantasy timetable which every new move starting 5 seconds after the last one. Wars aren't like that. In reality these German units will not be operating know exactly when the thing they currently doing will finish and thus be able to pre mobilise to be ready to hit h next hurdle in order to get you you 10 days.
Right so we go back to head north east and then east around the line! This leaves aside the fact that if they don't secure Kalinin they just cut their own supply lines! Also you seem ti think the German army will have perfect foreknowledge about where the mud will be, again as per above just because you posting in 2020 knows where it was less bad, doesn't mean they will. (this is just one example of the perfect foreknowledge you are gifting the Germans with ).
You also seem to be scattering your forces everywhere in order to do everything all at once to buy you this extra time. so you have some forces going around Kalainin some forces screening teh centre from Kalinin, some still dealing with Vyazma and Bryansk some forces busting through the centre all at the same time each group assuming that every other forces will do exactly what it needs to do in exactly the time frame you set them. All in shit conditions, poor supply and degraded capability. You going to at worst disintegrate or at best dissipate your force so that you end up some rolling fight stretching the entire defensive line. This is is what Zhukov will want because while he knows 90k men aren't going to stop you dead, but he only trying to delay you.
If I had to sum it up in one word you seem to think you are immune from Clausewitz's operational "Friction", or perhaps a more precise way to say it is you seem to think those German units you are moving around like re fighting a chess game where you remembered the opponents moves will assume they will be immune from operational friction.
well that and teh perfect foreknowledge thing.
No Vyazma and Bryansk same point as above
In the Moscow Option by by David Downing, where Hitler is incapacitated in time for plans to take Moscow to get the go ahead. Moscow falls, Kiev follows, as does Leningrad. However Stalin and th Russian Government flee to Kuybyshev, in 1942, the Germans head east take Gorki, but then head south for Stalingrad and the oil fields, the Russians heaved a sigh of relief.
Here's a map from the above mentioned "The defense of Moscow 1941 - The northern flank" which shows the position of 41st Mot Corps on Oct 10.
On Oct 11, the 1 Pz Div captured Zubtsov, while the 36th Mot Div captured Pogoreloye Gorodische.
On Oct 14, the Corps had moved north and captured Kalinin.
I think wiking's ATL suggest that the corps advance east through Volokolamsk instead. In that case, the map should answer the question on how they get in position to attack 10 days earlier. They were already there.
When PzGr 3 received orders to advance on Kalinin on Oct 7, the commander of said PzGr objected, but was overruled by the OKH.
So it's not only people in 2020 that believe the corps should attack in another direction.
I would argue that the ATL is actually proposing the exact opposite.
The attack towards Kalinin and further north - in conjunction with AG Norths southward strike, was intended to encircle the bulk of Northwestern Front.
Launching such a separate major effort before the battle of Moscow had been decided, is a good example on scattering your forces by trying to do everything at once.
And that mistake might have had a marked effect on both the battles of Moscow and Leningrad,
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You seem to be a little confused
1. Defensive liens don't have to be circumvented. They can be punched through.
2. No one said anything about going around Kalinin. It is also irrelevant to German logistics.
3. Vyazama and Bryansk are essentially irrelevant as the forces being discussed weren't involved in mopping up the pockets anyway.
4. Germans forces are actually less dispersed in this scenario.
I made you a crude map which I think summarizes Wiking's proposal. 3rd Pz. moves in the direction volokolamsk-klin ->Moscow. 9th Army screens left flank.
Anglocalvinist67
Banned
Invading when originally planned (May) would help a lot.
Also, if Hitler could have convinced the Japanese to attack Siberia, thus tying down the crack troops that Zhukov was able to use to throw the Nazis back in that first winter, would be extremely important.
One caveat I would add, of course, is that capturing Moscow is no guarantee of winning the war. Napoleon managed to do it and look what happened to him. The Russians were bloody-minded enough to practice a total scorched earth policy, leaving little for the Nazis to use.
Also, if Hitler could have convinced the Japanese to attack Siberia, thus tying down the crack troops that Zhukov was able to use to throw the Nazis back in that first winter, would be extremely important.
One caveat I would add, of course, is that capturing Moscow is no guarantee of winning the war. Napoleon managed to do it and look what happened to him. The Russians were bloody-minded enough to practice a total scorched earth policy, leaving little for the Nazis to use.
I never said otherwise but wiking seemed to be suggesting he was going to get to Klin (and it betters roads) without going through the line, which as per you map involves going around it
see above, and if a force circumvents Kalinin and drops down SE to Klin, it risks getting cut off by the forces still in Kalinin, the 9th basically have to not just screen Kalinin from the south, but suppress it. This leaves the Russian forces to the south who will also have to be warded/blocked off from closing onto the rear lines of the 3rd Panzer rushing to Moscow. Basically as i said earlier if that break through force could just go hang about east of the line regrouping while the line get mopped up then cool. But it's not it's about the smack into Moscow as fast as it can and it not even a suitable force to do that.
Yes and no, the problem is wikings suggestion basically involves those forces moving forward before Vyazama and Bryansk are completed (or even near to done). But even if they're not directly involved in mopping Vyazama and Bryansk up this is unrealistic because if they do that they won't know what state their rear is in, which include their support and supply. And in that situation wiking would have them not only engage the defensive line (or try and go around it) and then drive on into Moscow. That is unrealistic especially given the already deteriorating roads and supply situation nt to mention erroded strength of these forces.
Right OK, if you read the earlier posts between Wiking and I you'll realise this is what I thought he was talking about i.e not trying to roll up the defensive line from a flank and then bust through (as per OTL). But instead push through the centre straight away and immediately on into Moscow 70 mile away. However as per those posts there are problems with this. Then wiking started talking about better roads north circumventing the line to Klin etc which is why I was asking what exactly his plan was.
Anglocalvinist67
Banned
Uh, I see some of the points I raised were dealt with pretty thoroughly beforehand.
Apologies for beating a dead horse! That was not my intention!
Apologies for beating a dead horse! That was not my intention!
basically see my answer to Oofo, but just quickly just because the commander of Panzer3 objected doesn't actually make Wiking right
Also as per my earlier post OTL they don't do everything at once they did it one after the other (finish Vyazama and Bryansk secure the flank against Kaliniin while also freezing the defensive line by hitting it's strong points and then push though to Moscow) that's wiking bone of contention doing that in consecutive order took too long, and thus fatally delayed the final drive to Moscow. But wikings plan seem to involve either doing two of these at the same time or just doing one and leaving the rest. Now that would be quicker no doubt about it but see my earlier posts and my post to Oofo regarding the issues with that
Deleted member 1487
The only part of the map I'd contest is 9th army moving on Kalinin. There wasn't really a point to that IOTL so would be avoided here, 9th army would screen the flank of 3rd Panzer Group.
I'll get to your direct reply to me later when I have more time.
Just to clarify this yet again Klin was only mentioned as an option if someone was interested in trying to propose a move around the Mozhiask defense line and what route the 3rd Panzer group ended up taking IOTL in November-December. That is NOT the scenario I'm proposing, just a potential alternative that was mentioned.
Again this needs to be clarified, because you're either not reading or strawmanning my argument.
41st Motorized Corps did not participate in either the Vyazma or Bryansk pockets, they slipped through the gap created by 9th Army and the rest of 3rd Panzer group that was forming and liquidating the pocket and pushed on Kalinin per orders. They were an exploitation force not involved in the pocket battle at all, which should be obvious based on the multiple maps posting their route IOTL.
Here is yet another from Stahel's Operation Typhoon. Note that XXXXI Corps (41st motorized corps) is totally separate from Vyazma, north of it, on October 8th and moves north to Rzhev on the 10th. There are earlier maps in the series I didn't scan that show them not participating in the Vyazma pocket at all. So ITTL as in OTL they are already moving on the path that could take them to Volokolamsk or Kalinin as of October 10th and had no impact on Vyazma. Note too on the 10th they are getting ready to overrun the Soviet 247th RD, which netted them prisoners, equipment, and most important of all a fuel dump that sustained their advance IOTL on Kalinin, but could just as easily do so headed towards Volokolamsk and the Soviet 16th army:
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I agree that that in itself does not make him right.
But what it does show, is that the idea of pushing east instead of north, was something people that were there believed in as well.
And that it isn't an idea limited to people with perfect hindsight.
It should be pointed out that the objective wasn't to secure the flank against Kalinin.
Instead, it was to drive straight through that city in order to link up with AG North that was about to start attacking southwards 400km to the north
The question then becomes if 9th Army is capable of defending most of the northern flank if such an attack is cancelled, and the advance northwards is far more limited.
I don't have the answer to that - but it is an interesting idea.
No. I never said head north and even posted a map to show what I meant.
I said if you're were going to try and avoid the Mozhaisk defense line entirely go after Klin, which was north of Volokolamsk, but southeast of Kalinin:
Volokolamsk was the way to go though thanks to the rail line via Rzhev and road as well as the mud limiting the ability to head north around the defense line.
More like 10 days or so with different, stronger forces. I said repeatedly which forces and where they'd come from.
Again I feel like you're not paying any attention to things we've been arguing about over several pages. The 41st Panzer corps that took and held Kalinin would in the scenario we've been talking about instead head East against Volokolamsk. They would be diverted early on and arrive around the 14th or so there instead of Kalinin.
IOTL they were not part of the Vyazma or Bryansk pocket forces they were an exploitation force that slipped through the gap in Soviet lines created by the pocket battle. Again I already posted a map of their movements during the battles, but will repost it again despite being only a few posts up on this very page:
Mud depended on where and when. The forces that reached Kalinin IOTL and ITTL will head East instead were not hampered enough by it, despite overrunning at least 1 Soviet rifle division in the process of getting to Kalinin in OTL.
In Volokolamsk? The first attack was on the 23rd of October IOTL and the city fell on the 27th or 28th.
Most of these tactical debates are pretty pointless. There based on assumptions that if X did something different then Y would have no effective response, and would be crushed. Sometimes this may be true, but not very often. What your saying is the forces that captured Kalinin instead head straight to Moscow, and if they could capture Kalinin then they could capture Moscow. This makes several assumptions, first that this is obviously a clear choice for the Germans, that they know what's in front of them, and what's behind the Soviet Front in the way of reserves. It also supposes the Red Army can't redeploy reserves to cover this line of attack.
By virtue of holding the central position, the Red Army has interior lines of communication, including the use of functioning rail roads. One thing that immediately comes to mind is that by going straight East for Moscow the left flank of XLI Panzer Corps is exposed to attack from the now unengaged forces around Kalinin. The reason XLI Panzer Corps took Kalinin was to deal with the Soviet Forces on that flank, so they could then attack SE toward Moscow. This isn't a one day battle, the Soviet's have time to react to a changing situation. Your assumption seems to be the Red Army was trying to put out so many fires at this time that one more would have overwhelmed them. I have serious doubts that XLI Panzer Corps can get to Moscow before the rain stops everything.
What you suggested was peace in the West. On what terms would a peace with the West be made?
Invading in May is a bad idea. The Balkans needed to be settled first. In that wet spring the ground was too soft, and the rivers too swollen. The tempo of operations would have been much slower, giving the Red Army a much better chance of keeping pace with the Germans. It was the speed, and surprise of German operations, not their firepower that defeated all the Soviet battle plans. Hitler didn't fully trust the Japanese, or the Italians for that matter. The Japanese were gun shy about a full scale war with the Soviets in 1941. They also understood the Americans would impose a total oil embargo if they attacked the Soviet Union. After joining the Soviet War they wouldn't have the resources, or troops to take the oil fields in SEA.
Glantz reports in INITAL PERIOD OF WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT, pp 120 , that XXXXI & LVI Korps, both marched 675-750 km in the first 24 days of Barbarossa . A direct distance to MOSCOW is maybe 1100km , which is roughly 1.5 times this distance , suggesting Moscow can be reached in 38 days of continuous march from D-day, provided the supplies can keep pace with the demand. Nigel Askey in his BARBAROSSA VOL-II shows that the tonnage of logistics expended in that first couple of weeks was 135,915 tons per day in combat -with total expenditure of 102,486, 936 km/tons supplies.
That’s 135,915 ton per day over 754km…. delivered from June 22 to July 4th or 102,479,910 km/tons. Had the overall forces deployed been half as much – then in theory the distance covered could have been twice as far. To reach MOSCOW would require 1150km based on a force with 2/3 as much troops/units/vehicles etc. Askey volumes show relative power of all these different units involved and one –with enough effort- could construct a force able to fight the distance to MOSCOW. Why go the distance , well , while all roads may lead to MOSCOW , so to do all the railways.
Wehrmacht motorized supply system was able to deliver 3-4 times as much munitions as the RED ARMY did. The only way the RED ARMY was going to survive this war was unfettered access to that railway network , to offset that operational german advantage. It also needs to be remembered that the gap between Wehrmacht and Red ARMY fighting was the most in 1941 and 1942.
That’s 135,915 ton per day over 754km…. delivered from June 22 to July 4th or 102,479,910 km/tons. Had the overall forces deployed been half as much – then in theory the distance covered could have been twice as far. To reach MOSCOW would require 1150km based on a force with 2/3 as much troops/units/vehicles etc. Askey volumes show relative power of all these different units involved and one –with enough effort- could construct a force able to fight the distance to MOSCOW. Why go the distance , well , while all roads may lead to MOSCOW , so to do all the railways.
Wehrmacht motorized supply system was able to deliver 3-4 times as much munitions as the RED ARMY did. The only way the RED ARMY was going to survive this war was unfettered access to that railway network , to offset that operational german advantage. It also needs to be remembered that the gap between Wehrmacht and Red ARMY fighting was the most in 1941 and 1942.
Thing is they do push east as well, they did attack all the strong points on the line
I'm not sure that's right at least not on the scale we're talking, in terms of a couple of weeks in Oct and all the mud AGN is on the moon. The Germans actually kind of did what wiking is talking about (just not as fast), Gudarian ends up at Klin (he actually skirts it leaving it for infantry). It's just they had to deal with Kalinin first not just screen it.
The 9th army isn't free to move until the 24th Oct having finally crushed the Vyazma pocket (Barbarossa to Berlin vol 1 pg153). This is my point you can't go on to do the next thing if you haven't done the last thing, and even units not directly involved in the last thing will still need to coordinate with those units that were and aren't available until then
I have to saying having buts out my copies of Barbarossa to Berlin by Brain Taylor and looks at what happened day by day, the overall issue here is that even though there's a timeline of attacks there is near constant fighting pretty much everywhere all the time. The usual story is German units push forward do well then get counter attacked, repulse the counter attack, push forward again. It's little faster in some areas than others, and Russian resistance is better in some ares than others but that's the general story here. However teh Germans seem to think that every time they'd push forward teh Russians would pull back, only they generally speaking did counter attack and even if the counter attack didn't reclaim teh ground it did delay teh German and cause casualties. Every day they're doing this they're losing fuel and men and machines. Something you get a couple of times is a Panzer division giving up their remaining fuel to a Panzer brigade and waiting for resupply because the division no longer has enough fuel to operate as a division!.
Take the point about 41st PzCorp yes It could east and not north east to Kalinin, but that one Corp isn't going to be the magic thing that makes this work
if you look at 41st during Oct it goes to Beyli, then on to Rzhev then on to Kalinin OTL
so Ok instead it goes east straight for Volokolomamsk / Istra basically it's going to join teh 56th , but I don't thjnk this one Krop is going to make all these differences especially as changes with Germans will mean Russian changes too. especially as per above you also planing of using the 9th army to bloke teh north you have to wait so I'm not sure you gain time here anyway..
So all in all i get the appeal of the idea of basically "stop messing around too much north and south on the approach to Moscow just go east keeping your attack narrow". You save fuel and time. And don't get me wrong punching through won't be the issue IMO. It's what happens next, because by doing that you haven't negated or encircled those Russian formations. They just going to pull back and by doing so they're going to pull back onto your beak through line's of communication/supply
Now even that doesn't matter if you think all you need to is just get tanks to Moscow in what ever shape.
But this leads to teh next issue Wiking seem to think that all the Germans have to do is get element of a panzer division into Moscow streets. But that is not enough, to take a city the size and numbers of Moscow you can't just drive in pop the hatch and say "all this is ours please line up for processing". Even if you not going fora long siege you going to have to encircle teh city and establish a perimeter even if it's just a light one, and also attack into if you not relying on staving them out! To take a city that big you need a lot of infantry but their no good to you still slogging though the muddy approaches to Moscow and those Russians still milling around.
On top of that the Germans dont actually know what's waiting for them in Moscow. We know Is Zhukovs mobilised population and while I think thy're going to out up more of a fight than Wiking does, yeah it's not Guards divisions. But the Germans don't know that. Plus what's the German experience been pretty much from Aug onwards. They've met encircled and defeated more than their own number of soviet soldiers and equipment, but they still keep running into more Russian in front of them. Remember they were told that it was just a matter of meeting the Soviet army in the field beating it and the Russians will collapse (ala France), only they've been meeting and beating the Russian army in large numbers since June and there has been no collapse just more Russians. So I very much doubt the Germans who are that close to Moscow standing in front the Zhukov's 90,000 are thinking whew this time these really are the last Russians in army uniforms we'll see.
so while I get the appeal of the plan, I think it's unrealistic on two big points
1). The faster straight narrow push to Moscow: The Germans are not in fit state to pull it it off, and even if the they punched through the Russians are going have a say in it as well
2). It doesn't help anyway because the German don't actually think to take Moscow all they need to do it pop some Panzer hatches in Moscow and declare victory and this time unlike all the other times the Russians will roll over. Now some in central command might think this, and some on teh front might wish this, but generally speaking I think most the German commanders there not being stupid men are realising the difference between Nazi propaganda and reality after four months of it.
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The 9th aren't going anywhere until the 24th Oct
No it you not reading my posts I know the 41st aren't involved in the pocket, but read what I posted about the issues with making moves in conjunction with other units that are!
To wit if you are going to block the north off with the 9th you can't do that until the 9th is done with the pocket, and without the 9th blocking the north your albeit free to move 41st going east risks getting flanked from the north as it hits the line. Now you can of course ignore the pocket and not crush it freeing up the 9th, but then you are left with a bunch of Russians (who were still fighting pretty tenaciously through most fo Oct) who you are going to have to either leave free or redirect other forces to contain/crush them.
This is one problem with blitzkrieg, yes your forward elements can push past the enemy and in theory be free to do the next thing, but you still have to deal with that enemy, and those forward elements still get constrained even if they not engaged in doing that because they will still need support for what they want to do next!
Your playing this like chess where each moves get made and the pieces get taken instantly, and it's just not like that.
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Doing maths for the entire campaign on the assumption that it's all going to be like the first 24 days is not going to work. Leaving aide all other issues yes I imagine the German logistics chaps did achieve pretty good delivery rates during June/July since at that point their supply lines were at their shortest and the roads they were delivering on wee in good condition
Out of interest what's the cite on the "Wehrmacht motorised supply system was able to deliver 3-4 times as much munitions as the RED ARMY did" claim though?
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