10.52. More Tactical changes from Kieth Park as Goering Blusters.
October 17th.
Day. Fighter-bomber attacks on Kent and London.
Night. Targets in No11 Group Area. Liverpool and Birmingham.
Weather. Bright Intervals. Local showers (1)
Once again today there was poor visibility in the morning however this did little to curtail the Luftwaffe operations that commence early. The coastal towns of Broadstairs and Margate were attacked by a force of around ninety bomb carrying Me 109’s and Me 110’s. Part of this force pressed on inland to drop their bombs on Stanmore in north east London. Whether the Fighter Command HQ at Bentley Priory was their intended target could not at the time be ascertained.
The Afternoon attacks saw the Luftwaffe employing the full gambit of tactical variations with their fighter bombers. Some aircraft came in singularly, others in gaggles while another attack might be by a stream of aircraft on the same route. Some groups would fragment and then re-join, others were feints and turned back early. Some flew low weaving courses, others at mid altitudes, while still more crossed the channel at high altitude. All of these variations were intended to confuse and disrupt the defence as much as possible. In this the Luftwaffe was partially successful with the single most successful attack of the day being om Waterloo station where the automatic signal box was hit and put out of action. Despite these efforts Fighter Command pilots shot down fifteen enemy aircraft for the loss of three aircraft from which one pilot survived.
Night attacks by the main Luftwaffe bomber force were split the cities of Liverpool and Birmingham as well as several airfields in Eleven Group. Once again the night fighter force was engaged on two very different kind of sorties. Those defending the airfields in Eleven Group had very little time to catch up with, identify and then engage the enemy. Whilst those night fighters tracking the enemy formations attacking Liverpool and Birmingham had to be vectored within RDF range of an aircraft within the bomber formation and then close in and engage it without being seen by any of the other bombers. To further complicate this chase the Night fighters in most cases had to be passed from one GCI controller to another as the raid travelled towards it’s target and back.
As pilots and Controllers gained more and more experience this process was getting honed to a fine art. The continued expansion of the RDF network and the night fighter force however meant that not everybody was as yet as skilled as the High Command would wish.
Once again from his Headquarters at Uxbridge Keith Park today issued another detailed set of instructions to all his Controllers and Squadron Commanders in his quest to master the attacks by the Luftwaffe as their tactics evolved and changed.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF HIGH FIGHTER RAIDS
The general plan is to get one or two Spitfire squadrons to engage the enemy fighters from above about mid-Kent, in order to cover other Spitfire, Defiant and Hurricane squadrons whilst climbing to operating hight at back patrol lines east and south east of London.
Preparation
Whenever the cloud conditions are favourable for high raids by fighters the following preparations will be made;
1) Reconnaissance Aircraft: One or two reconnaissance aircraft to be kept on patrol near the Kent coast, height depending on the cloud layers.
2) Readiness Patrol: A patrol by one or two squadrons to be maintained on Maidstone line at 15,000 feet, between 0800 hours and 1800 hours.
3) Stand-by Squadron: One squadron at sector providing patrol at (2) to be standing-by during the peak periods- breakfast, noon and tea-time,
4) London and Debden Squadrons: State of readiness of Hurricane and Defiant Squadrons to be
advanced state whenever cloud conditions are suitable for very high fighters raids.
Attack
Immediately enemy formations are plotted over the French coast or Dover Straits, the following action will be initiated:
1) Reconnaissance Aircraft: Dispatched to the area under GCI control to the area enemy raids are plotted, to locate, shadow and report numbers and type of enemy aircraft and if bombs are being carried.
- Readiness Patrol: Ordered to climb to 3,000 feet on the Maidstone patrol line to cover other squadrons whilst climbing over base patrol lines.
- Stand-by Squadrons: Despatched to operating hights over base and then to join the readiness squadrons at 30,000 feet.
- Readiness Squadrons : Despatched to rendezvous over base at 20,000 to 27,000 feet, and when assembled, detailed to raids.
- Squadrons at Available: Spitfires : to be brought to readiness, and if necessary despatched to assemble in pairs on back patrol lines at 25,000 to 30,000 feet, and the detailed to raids.
- Squadrons of available : Hurricanes: brought to readiness, and if there is a second or third wave, assembled in pairs over back patrol lines so as to protect sector aerodromes and London area whilst climbing.
- Hurricane Squadrons from Tangmere, Debden and Duxford: Despatched in wings or pairs at 20,000 to 27,000 feet according to time and weather conditions, of one of the following purposes:
- To reinforce London sectors if there is a second or third wave of enemy raids:
- To protect sector aerodromes and London area whilst the earlier squadrons are refuelling and rearming.
- Close protection of important bombing objectives: If enemy raids are approaching aircraft factories, London area, sector aerodromes, etc, single Defiant squadrons if not assigned to pairs or wings should be detailed to protective patrols between 15,000 and 18,000 feet depending on clouds.
Where enemy formations consisted of bombers escorted by fighters. The enemy formation is to be engaged in the following manner. The high fighter screen with Spitfire squadrons from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London and the coast, ang so enable Hurricane and Defiant squadrons from North Weald, Kenley, and Northolt. To attack bomber formations plus close escort before they reach the line of fighter aerodromes east and south of London.
The squadrons from Debden, Duxford and Tangmere (if disengaged) to be despatched and employed in wings or pairs so as to form a screen east and south-east of London to intercept third or fourth wave coming inland, also the retreating earlier waves.
Spitfire Squadrons:
Assembled at height in pairs on the back patrol lines, then detailed to engage high fighter screen at 30,000 feet.
Role: To protect pairs or wings of Hurricane and Defiant squadrons whilst climbing up, also while attacking bombers plus escort. If the high fighter screen withdraws to the coast a proportion of the Spitfires may be detailed to attack the escorts to incoming bomb raids.
Hurricane and Defiant Squadrons:
Squadrons at readiness to be dispatched in pairs to back patrol lines covering line od aerodromes. Immediately pairs have reached operating hight, detail to bomb raids or to forward patrol line under Spitfires. Squadrons at available to be brought to readiness and assembled in pairs at operating height on back patrol lines covering sector aerodromes, and detailed to second wave of bomb raids.
Whist gaining height the latter squadrons may have to be detailed to split raids by bombers that attempt to attack vital points on the flank of the mass of bombers plus escort.
Hurricane and Defiant Squadrons from Flank sectors (Debden, Duxford, Tangmere and possibly Northolt):
Dispatch in pairs or wings according to clouds to patrol mid-Kent patrol lines at 20’000 to 25,000 feet to engage:
- Third or fourth wave attacks of bombers plus escort;
- Retreating bomb raids of first or second waves;
- To protect fighter aerodromes whilst the earlier Hurricane, Defiant and Spitfire squadrons are being rearmed and refuelled.
Reinforcements from other Groups:
Immediately the enemy numbers appear to be more than 150, request two to three squadrons to cover the northern approaches to London, or the south-western group of vital points near London, as directed in Controllers’ Instruction No 7, dated August 27th 1940. (2)
Sir Hugh Dowding on receiving a copy of the latest instructions issued by Keith Park from Eleven Group had gone down into the Bentley Priory underground command bunker and from his lofty seat in the gallery perused the large plotting table below. Reading through the instructions he visualised the approaching attacks and the counter moves as laid out in the new instructions. Having already discussed the new instructions with Keith Park the night before this was simply an exercise in ensure that their were no glaring holes in the arrangements that had been missed by them and their staffs. From his desk he than phoned in turn the AOC Ten and Twelve Group to receive their comments as to how they would integrate the requested support into their own operational structure.
Just before leaving the gallery Sir Hugh took a telephone call from Sir Phillip at the AM. Sir Phillip had called to voice his concern at the extraordinarily long hours Sir Hugh was working. For currently Sir Hugh was present in his HQ at all hours as he fought both the day battle and the night assault at the same time. Sir Phillip asked Sir Hugh when he had last spent an entire night at his house down in Stanmore, The reply was not within the last week. Sir Phillip then remind Sir Hugh that it would be a disservice to the nation and the RAF if he worked himself to a state of total collapse. Sir Phillip also stated that he and the Prime Minister were appreciative of the need to contain the night attacks, doing so was not worth the loss of Sir Hugh. Sir Phillip continued by saying that despite the intensity and difficulties of the daylight raids Keith Parks and the other Group Commanders were coping. Therefore if Sir Hugh was going to spend all his nights at his HQ trying to improve the night defence then perhaps he should trust his staff to manage the day to day running of his command and get some rest. That was about as close to an order as a minister could give to a serving officer under the circumstances.
1. Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
2. Adapted from the instructions issued by Keith Park on this day OTL.
October 18th.
Day. Relatively quiet.
Night. Raids on a reduced scale.
Weather. Fog in Straits of Dover and Estuary; also in North Sea. Visibility poor. (1)
Despite the relatively high level of bomber activity overnight the morning proved much queiter. The bulk of the days activity comprised high altitude incursion over East Anglia in mid-afternoon. To counter the thirty five separate raids the RAF Fighter Command mounted forty-five fighter patrols. Throughout the day the total losses to the Luftwaffe totalled nineteen machines for the lost of four British fighters.
It would appear that the Luftwaffe wanted an early night for the last bomber cleared the RDF screen at the very early time of two Am. With only one hundred and sixty bombers recorded as crossing the coast the level of assault was one of the lowest for several weeks. For their efforts tonight in which they lost eight bombers to all causes and their earlier raids, Goering when addressing his forces on this day claimed on their behalf that:
‘In the past few days and nights (Goering said) you have caused the British world enemy disastrous losses by your uninterrupted destructive blows. Your indefatigable, courageous attacks on the heart of the British Empire, the City of London, with its eight and a half million inhabitants, have reduced British plutocracy to fear and terror. The losses which you have inflicted engagements are irreplaceable.’ (2)
Whether the Luftwaffe Fighter pilots and the bomber crews who daily faced combat against the RAF agreed with Goering’s pronouncements were never recorded.
1. Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
2. As OTL, published at the time.
