I am more of a structuralist when viewing the tragedies of the Soviet Union '24-'39, but most of this thread seems to be pushing a steady intentionalist argument: that is that Stalin is the central figure and all of this can be laid directly to him and the Party under him because he was an exceptional dictator and differed from autocrats. It's reminiscent of the Holocaust historiographical debates which posit the (now largely outdated) intentionalist argument that it all derived from a well developed set of steps by Hitler in advance and can be laid to him as an unique historical dictator rather than acknowledging the pressure from below, chaos of the bureaucracy in actual implementation, and the accumulative radicalization of the regime by war (
The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Kershaw). In this case, I think it's useful to look at arguments that place the actions of Stalin and the Bolsheviks within a certain space of context and relate it to the power of the Soviet apparatuses in place during and after the conclusion of the Civil War.
Within modern Soviet studies, it is pretty widely accepted that the Soviet regime was characterized by its lack of control rather than its over control, which is why the notion of totalitarianism as laid out by Arendt has lost much of its force in the field. Information was scarce in a country torn by civil war and chaos - facts about outlying regions of the country could only be drip fed to the Party center through officials sent out and that could take months. Some parts of the country were only contactable one month a year due to harsh weather conditions. Essentially, the Bolshevik hold on power was very tenuous in all of the Russias total. If you wanna hear succinct explanations of modern scholarship on collectivization, I will leave these
here for
y'all, but in this thread there seems to be the idea that Collectivization was a solely top down imposed process handed by Stalin that kept going and wracking up death tolls until they finally broke out of their ideological stupor and realized it was so bad they had to do something. As
@Sam R. points out, the modern scholarship shows that collectivization got as bad as it did is due to of course faulty practices but also lack of communication between much of the countryside and the central, botched delivery of aid leading to congestions and overall slow response times, weather, inexperience with local officials working out in the countryside with the peasantry in dealing with these sorts of issues, etc.
As laid out in works like J Arch Getty's landmark "
The Road to Terror, Stalin and the Self Destruction of the Bolsheviks 1932-1939" (updated revised 2010), the Terror was also unleashed through the same sort of lack of control the Bolshevik state had over its territory and the Party itself. The target of these purges shifted and changed to favor the nomenklatura party élite or the rank and file party members depending on which way the political winds were blowing and overall it is quite more complex than the standard popular culture narratives - Stalin himself often didn't even have control over the direction, form, and shape of the purges particularly in the early stages. To illustrate a bit of the advances in general Soviet field regarding analyzing the Stalinist state, I'll just quote a short paragraph from the introduction:
" It has been nearly fifteen years since I wrote Origins ofthe Great Purges, at a time when no Moscow archives were available and when our field's interpretive horizons were narrower than they are today. Scholars have since produced a large number of exciting and brilliant studies, and what seemed strident revisionism in the early 1980s is now old hat.
No one is surprised anymore to read that the Soviet state was not an efficient, monolithic, omnipotent machine. Nobody bats an eye at discussions of the leadership's poor (or nonexistent) planning or at the unintended consequences of their policies. Chaos and inefficiency in the Stalinist hierarchy are now included in the conventional wisdom. Although there is still disagreement aplenty, no one thinks it irrelevant to write about women, peasants, or local party organizations. Few today are outraged to read about them and other social groups trying to articulate their interests to a state that had to take them into account. Nobody believes any longer that the history of the Stalin period is synonymous with Stalin's personality or purported desires. A recent influential book described Stalinism as a complex, interactive 'civilization' without provoking violent academic attack. Totalitarianism has become more a subject for historiographical and sociological analysis than an obligatory creed or framework for analysis.
The sudden availability of new archival sources has obliged me to rethink a number of the points about the terror that I had suggested before... "
Essentially, my point here is that in regards to your point about Stalin or Hitler being some sort of exceptional brand of dictator outclassing your regular Pinochet, Mobutu, or Tsar Nicholas is sort of an outdated and "Great Man of History" esque view that has, for the most part, been tossed out in favor of looking at the structural and material conditions of the state, the role of the dictator within their own party apparatus, and a shift away from the totalitarian creed that dominated Cold War histories and made clear analyses difficult.
As for how this pertains to a White Russian victory? Essentially, all the problems the early Soviet state faced would be the same problems any White regime wishing to be secure in its power would face. Lack of communication and destroyed infrastructure would breed paranoia and overreactions, political radicalizing and siege mentality would breed distrust, factionalizing and fracturing of the White movement into disparate and competing political ideologies would certainly create violence, all mixed in with leftover practices of the Civil War and implementation of certain Bolshevik policies like grain confiscation that are essentially necessary to keep the cities fed in the aftermath of the Civil War, all result in a White Russian state likely having fairly similar outcomes to that of the Bolsheviks in governing a wartorn and vast country plus an ongoing continuation of violence that would probably take a disgusting human toll.
TLDR: instead of the argument focusing so much on why the Whites couldn't be like Stalin, it would be important to focus on the actual structural issues and roadblocks in governing the White regime would face that the Red regime faced...
I recommend generally to this thread to read some modern works on Soviet history (important to distinguish works made before archives were available and after too) to really get a better grasp on the field - much of the arguments floating around here are either popular history notions or outdated historical ideas that the field has since abandoned and moved on from. If you send me a PM, I can drop a list of books but for now I can't recommend enough of the
SRB podcast for familiarizing yourself.